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This thesis focuses on grassroots practices, meanings and understandings in the context of the Greek
economic crisis and austerity restructurings that were unilaterally imposed by hegemonic institutions and
Greek governments  between 2010 and 2016.  I  employ a  bottom up approach to  identify the  social,
economic,  political  and  cultural  shifts  and  ruptures  that  the  imposition  of  austerity  measures  and
neoliberal  policies  provoked  in  Chalkida,  a  mid-sized  (post)  industrial  city.  I  juxtapose  mainstream
definitions and explanations of crisis with national and place-bound grassroots experiences, practices and
understandings in order to establish an inter-scalar interconnection between global processes and local
agency. 
This  thesis  is  based  on  18  months  of  systematic  fieldwork  that  took place  between April  2015 and
December 2016.  Material  was collected through participant  observation in workplace settings,  public
spaces and households. Additionally, the research was informed by semi-structured personal and group
interviews, as well as many informal conversations in cafes, taverns and open air markets.  Building  on
existing literature on crisis, neoliberalism, scale and power, household transformations, social solidarity
and  informality,  I  assess  the  impact  of  crisis  and  austerity  on  the  socio-economic  relationships  and
established livelihood patterns that were severely challenged by it. 
My research demonstrates that people in a provincial city like Chalkida counterbalanced the austerity
crisis’s effects on formal income resources and the restructuring of the state and its welfare provisioning.
They did so by reinventing traditional structures and practices that had been predominant in the past when
resources had also been scarce. I therefore suggest that crisis was understood as a retrograde movement
that  questioned  linear  processes  and  conceptualizations  of  modernity  and  progress.  Drawing  upon
historical continuities and ruptures at the local, national and international scales, this dissertation offers a
rich ethnographic account of everyday life under the condition of “being in” and “living with” crisis.
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Introduction 
This thesis’ aim is to offer an ethnographic, political and historical account of everyday struggles
and life experiences during the Greek economic crisis in the city of Chalkida. As the capital of an
industrial  region  in  Central  Greece,  Chalkida  has  been  severely  affected  by  the  ongoing
socioeconomic transformations produced by the current crisis. It has been almost a decade since
the outbreak of the sovereign debt crisis which has brought with it harsh austerity measures that
have changed the country’s economic, social and political landscape. Greece today finds itself in
an unprecedented situation due to neoliberal restructuring that has resulted in wage cuts, high
taxation,  reductions  in  social  welfare  spending,  privatization  of  the  public  sector  and  mass
layoffs. These policies have pushed increasing numbers of people into poverty. Most of those
affected by the so-called sovereign debt crisis are those who belong(ed) to the working middle
classes  (Giannitsis  & Zographakis,  2018),  that  is  to  say,  the majority  of  Greek society  who
experienced a radical decline in their standard of living. 
The current economic crisis has on the one hand unveiled the middle classes’ false
consciousness and on the other, revealed the great chasm of inequality and injustice inherent to
the articulation of power under globalized capitalism today.  People who had constructed their
livelihoods  according  to  the  prospect  of  continual  capitalist  progress  and  economic  growth,
which  opened  up  a  world  of  possibilities,  saw their  future  expectations  and  existing  living
arrangements collapse.  As a result,  the crisis  has produced not only economic and structural
shifts  in everyday economic activities and decisions  but has also challenged ideological and
moral values. In this thesis, I follow a bottom up approach in order to critically evaluate the
effects of the reforms that the IMF and the Eurogroup have imposed on the Greek economy, and
more particularly on ordinary people. I do so through an exploration of grassroots anti-crisis
responses that have emerged through people’s day-to-day communication and interactions. My
particular interest is in the ways in which people value and manage their limited resources and
the grassroots networks they mobilize in order to sustain social reproduction practices.  
The recent crisis has broken the livelihood arrangements of the majority of Greeks
and has greatly affected their income resources, shattering the promise of modernity as well as
any possibility of future upward mobility. Therefore, people who built their life projects during
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the past thirty years believing that they belonged to one of the richest and most “developed” parts
of the world (the European Union), experienced an identity shock which altered their relationship
with national and international power structures. The abrupt transformations brought about in the
context  of  the  austerity  crisis  altered  their  moral  and  ideological  values  and  their  attitudes
towards the state, the political system, the EU and the banks. This led them to reconsider and
reflect on their pre-crisis consumption-based lifestyles and to reevaluate their life needs. In order
to locate the process of social transformation in its broader context, it is therefore necessary to
describe ordinary people’s pre and post-crisis practices and expectations as regards happiness,
success and wellbeing. In order to do so, I engage in a detailed exploration of the life and work
histories of local people. Thus, I consider that “crisis” is a concept with varied meanings that
motivate people’s actions in diverse ways, and that these grassroots definitions must therefore be
placed at the center of attention. It is my contention that within the crisis context we can witness
the transformation and reconfiguration of other social spheres in which economic actions are
embedded.  Hence  my  research  questions  and  analysis  are  guided  by  a  combined  political
economy and moral economy framework through which I assess social stratification.
Aligned with the collective objectives of the Grassroots Economics Project (GRECO),
my aims are to assess the impacts of mainstream expert economic models on the unfurling of the
crisis, unpack new social and economic dynamics that emerge in the crisis context and elaborate
on how, in the creative process of getting by, people adapt to crisis. My goal is to provide an
anthropological  perspective  on  socio-economic  life  that  dissects  neoliberal  narratives  on  the
economy, deconstructs the salvational discourses of “austeritarian policies” (Mirowski,  2013)
and popular media representations of crisis. I focus my analysis on the ways in which moral and
cultural values are produced within the context of modern Greek history and the contingencies of
the recent crisis. I establish a multi-scalar interconnection between the global economy and local
agency by highlighting a “global sense of place.” In this way, I make the regulatory frameworks
that stabilize economic behavior available to analysis.
My main objectives are the following: a) to analyze everyday economic practices during
the crisis and their regulatory framework; b) to apprehend grassroots meanings and definitions of
“the economy” and lay understandings of  “economic logic”; c)  to trace the multiple ways in
which the global, national and local are integrated in ordinary people’s practices, feelings and
7
experiences; d) to unravel the inherent inequalities of the capitalist economic system by giving
special  attention  to  the  gendered  and  generational  aspects  of  the  crisis   e)  to  assess  the
neoliberalization of the economy and the financialization of everyday life through a bottom-up
approach and f)  to  unravel the historical  continuities and discontinuities that surfaced in the
context of the recent economic crisis..
Consequently, in the thesis I seek to answer the following questions: 1) what are the
multiple grassroots meanings and definitions of “crisis” and “austerity” and how do they differ
from dominant discourses? 2) how do people reconfigure their identities through the concept of
crisis and the condition of austerity, and what are the implications of this for the social contract?
3) how is social consent reproduced under austerity and generalized crisis? 4) what are  the
ground responses to authoritative models of the crisis? 5) what are the new labor regimes that
have emerged during the crisis? 6) what meanings and moral value frameworks sustain economic
practice? 7) what sorts of livelihood projects are designed by diversely situated people? 8) how
are resources assessed, evaluated, accessed and distributed? 9) how do people manage (or not) to
sustain their livelihoods and socially reproduce under the regime of austerity? 10) how do people
understand change and how do they decide what to keep and what to abandon in the creative
process of moving forward? 
My Field 
Today, the municipality of Chalkida is an urban conglomeration of 100.000 people.  It  is the
capital of the island of Evia and its city-center stretches across both sides of the Euripus Strait.
Two bridges connect Evia with central Greece. Since 1995, when the new bridge was opened, car
access to the city of Chalkida, which is located only 78 kilometers north of Athens (about an
hour’s drive), was made even easier. When driving to Chalkida, the first thing that one notices
are the cement factory’s giant installations at the city’s threshold. Whether you take the new or
the old road to the city, you pass abandoned industrial areas and factories and the closer you get
to the center, the older the abandoned factories. This is how Chalkida’s industrial history unfolds
before the eyes of the visitor. Chalkida is a typical modern Greek city that is a miniature of
Athens (see Burgel, 1975; Leontidou, 2006), indeed the city has frequently been characterized as
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“Athens’ backyard”. Because of its geographic location, it developed as an industrial hub and
satellite production site for the needs of Athens. It also served as a host area for thousands of
displaced immigrants from Asia Minor, who settled there and were exploited as cheap labor force
for the growing industrial  sector  during the early 20th century.  As Greece’s urbanization and
modernization project unfolded, the dynamic opening of factories along the coast of the Evian
Gulf attracted many economic migrants who sought to improve their livelihoods through waged
employment at one of the many factories that had opened. For over a century, industrial income
provided the basis on which the local economy expanded, and commercial markets emerged in
the city. The construction sector thrived and, until 2008, the demand for housing was continually
on the rise as the city’s population grew and their living standards improved. 
 Chalkida  started  to  develop  its  industries  in  the  1880s,  when  small  industrial  units
appeared around the port that processed the areas’ raw materials (olive oil, vines, wood, clay). At
the dawn of the 20th century, the city was connected to Athens by train and its port facilities were
upgraded. Several new factories were constructed along the railway network and by the port.
After the population exchange between Greece and Turkey in 1923, many people from Asia
Minor settled in Chalkida and the areas around it,  and its population grew significantly. The
displaced populations provided low cost labor for the factories (Hirschon, 1979) and Chalkida’s
Cement  Plant,  the  first  heavy  industry  and  landmark  of  the  city’s  industrial  character,  was
founded. After the Second World War, capitalist expansion in Greece advanced at a radical pace
and  from  1951  to  1991,  the  extensive  industrialization  of  the  area  was  followed  by  an
exponential growth of Chalkida’s population, from around 30 to 60 thousand people. Another
surge of relocations to Chalkida occurred after the new bridge was completed in 1995. This made
the city, which lay in the boundary area between three administrative prefectures, Attica, Viotia
and Evia, the center of the largest industrial region in Greece. 
Beyond its industrial character, Chalkida is also the capital of the island of Evia, Greece’s
second  largest  island.  The  city  therefore  serves  as  a  hub  that  concentrates  the  island’s
agricultural, animal and fish production, which is processed and/or consumed in the city. Locals
maintain strong relationships with the countryside and with food production sites and activities.
Together  with  their  formal  employment,  first  and  second,  generation  rural  migrants  usually
maintain a secondary, often informal income from agriculture (Diamianakos, 2002). Critical to
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this  development  has  been  car  ownership  which  has  enabled  people  to  commute  and move
around to attend to their multi-sited activities. As I got used to driving in and around the city, I
started to notice the many trucks that were either going to or returning from the Athenian open-
air markets. Evia is also the fifth biggest olive oil producer in Greece and as Braudel (1972)
noted, olive oil is an essential element of Mediterranean culture and a crucial material in the
social reproduction of the Greek household. It is also a good that many households in Chalkida
have market-free access to through kinship and social networks. 
The economic crisis in Chalkida has been very acute and it pushed numerous factories to
close. Between 2011 and 2013 and nearly 3,100 industrial workers lost their jobs in Chalkida. If
we scale  up the  number  of  unemployed workers  at  the  level  of  the  household,  we need to
multiply that number by four (the aggregate number of household members). In that case, more
than one tenth of the population was directly affected by the closures of the four large factories,
and their social reproduction practices were threatened by unemployment. In and of itself, this
event signals challenges to the social reproduction not only of laid off workers’ households, but
also  to  the  wider  local  economy  and  to  social  life.  The  disappearance  of  industrial  labor,
combined with austerity cuts to pensions and salaries, has induced great shocks in the formal
market where the self-employed operated and managed to earn a living. Narotzky and Goddard
(2016, 2015) combine contemporary ethnographic examples of capitalist crises around the world
with a focus on the connectedness between local livelihood patterns and the global economy.
Restructuring in the industrial sector has the power to make and unmake livelihood projects in
local spaces where heavy industry is present. Through industrial capitalism, local places become
vulnerable to shifts in capital accumulation processes in the era of financial capitalism. Local
economies that depended on heavy industry were among the first to be affected by the global
financial crisis in 2007. In Greece, the economic crisis has accelerated de-industrialization, thus
Chalkida was among the first cities in Greece to experience the effects of the economic crisis. 
Crises in the industrial sector have been common since the 1980s, as a result of the global
restructuring of industrial production and the rescaling of the Greek economy to meet the EEC’s
standards.  Chalkida’s  population  has  faced  many  smaller  scale  crises  in  the  past  that  were
successfully  absorbed  by  other  thriving  economic  sectors  such  as  construction  or  other
commercial activities and self-employment schemes. Chalkidians are therefore accustomed to
crises in the industrial sector and have learned to adapt to them and counterbalance the small
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scale, local crises caused by factory closures. In the recent iteration of the Greek economic crisis,
the process of de-industrialization has become more acute. Widespread economic instability and
austerity taxation have prevented the formulation of alternative self-employment projects which
in the past had provided an alternative to forced unemployment (Parker, 2004). When I entered
the field in April 2015, the city of Chalkida had fallen into socio-cultural and economic decay.
One could see abandoned factories both within and outside of the city, the lack of public funds
and unmaintained and undeveloped public infrastructure, abandoned construction projects and
sense the general state of disorganization, despair, hopelessness and misery that had taken over
public life.   
    Interestingly, Chalkida’s other constitutive aspect, in which it is the capital of an island
rich in natural resources, has not faced crisis. In fact, small scale agricultural and food production
activities that combine formal and informal structures and characteristics have proliferated and
taken  a  central  role  in  the  organization  of  economic  life  during  the  crisis  years.  As  a
consequence,  food  production  was  the  leveling  force  that  counter-acted  the  crisis.  The
population’s food production skills and means provided them with material resources for social
reproduction, and goods and services circulated through social and kinship networks. Amateur
fishing, for instance, provided a steady source of income for those who wanted to sell their catch
in the local market or to the many fish taverns that attracted weekend visitors from Athens.
Chalkida is a well-known destination for sea food lovers and offers a greater variety of locally
produced  sea  food than  I  have  encountered  elsewhere  in  Greece.  Local  taverns  absorb  and
formalize  most  of  the  informal  sea  food  production,  making  amateur  fishing  a  profitable
business.  Furthermore,  there  are  numerous  agricultural  production  sites  around  the  city  of
Chalkida. Food resources are plenty and easily accessible for sustaining the needs of the local
population. I had many encounters with people who were themselves petty food producers and
who stressed the fact that the impact of crisis was not as intense there as in Athens or other large
cities.  Amateur  fishing  and  small-scale  agriculture  dampened  the  effects  of  the  crisis  and
resource scarcity.   Chalkidians possessed the knowledge and means for producing their  own
food, something which is unattainable in large cities where the only option for accessing food at
the local scale is through formal markets.  
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In the neighborhood where I chose to live, I heard people talk about the weather and how
it  affected  agriculture.  For  instance,  in  August,  a  rain  might  be  catastrophic  for  vineyard
cultivation,  but  beneficial  for  the  olive  harvest.  As  Panourgia  (1995)  explains,  the  peasant
populations that migrated to modern urban centers reproduced village life and their rural habitus
in their new urban surroundings (Hondrageu-Sotelo, 2014). 
Research Hypothesis  
 Chalkida’s current population consists of first, second and third generations of internal
economic  migrants  with rural  backgrounds who chose  to  live  in  the  city  and improve their
livelihoods through industrial employment and participation in the growing capitalist markets.
Quite a few neighborhoods were informally built by people of the same kin or from the same
village, through collective self-built housing. With the state’s structures absent, people helped
each other with the construction of their humble homes. Social progress was therefore a matter of
collective  effort  and mutual  support,  a  matter  that  was  negotiated  on  the  social  grounds  of
everyday life rather than through top-down plans executed by the state. Informal houses were
built with the help of kin, neighbors and friends in the same manner as people had harvested their
olive groves and carried out agricultural tasks in their villages. Thus, the village community was
reproduced and recreated at  the neighborhood scale.  With the passage of time, however,  the
characteristics of village communities have faded, especially among the younger generations.
Capitalist progress and consumption-based lives have eroded the foundations of such networks
as  they  ceased  to  be  vital  for  socio-economic  reproduction.  Eroded  but  not  extinct,  these
grassroots structures acquired a customary role in the Greek traditions which elders maintained,
and in times of resource scarcity, old and new village-type communities were reinvented to aid
social reproduction. 
My  research  hypothesis  in  the  thesis  is  that  a  mid-sized  city  such  as  Chalkida  is
representative of  how people who are less  alienated from each other,  from nature  and food
production, people who possess knowledge and skills and have access to informal networks, are
more resilient to crisis and socio-cultural changes and transformations than the populations of
large  urban  centers  where  provisioning  systems  are  embedded  into  capitalist  market
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relationships.  While  most  of  the  social  and  economic  research  of  modern  Greece  has  been
focused on big cities such as Athens and Therssaloniki, or the Greek rural world, there is very
little knowledge about smaller, peripheral cities such as Chalkida, and the experience(s) of crisis.
In order to understand the actual crisis, I believe it is necessary to conduct a bottom up approach
also to such medium size cities  and correlate  it  with the broader  national  and international
transformations and global processes which have shaped the city and its social and economic life
throughout the past two centuries of modern capitalist development, up to the present. 
One of my first informants, was Sotiris, (49), a laid-off factory worker. In order to cope
with unemployment, he developed a small wine producing unit and cultivated vineyards. One
day, while I was conducting participant observation at a local tavern owned by another informant
of mine, I accidentally met Sotiris who invited me to sit at his table. He revealed to me that he
was  not  only  a  customer,  but  also  a  supplier  of  wine.  Then a  chain  of  social  relationships
appeared as I discovered later, that, Angeliki, (42), who worked at the tavern as a cook and was
the former wife of a good friend of the owner, had known Sotiris  and she was the one that
introduced him and arranged to supply wine to the tavern. Angeliki, knew Sotiris because she
used to be employed at  Sotiris’s brother venture who owned a canteen in an industrial zone
nearby. Such unexpected, ethnographic encounters were recurring during my fieldwork and I was
surprised  by  the  social  networks  of  proximity  that  govern  socio-economic  relationships  in
Chalkida.   In  such  a  small  city,  almost  everyone  knows  everyone,  a  fact  which  impacts
significantly  on  a  person’s  social  and  economic  integration.  Very  frequently,  I  met  people
through varied contacts and situations who ended up at the very least being known to each other.
These random encounters are indicative of the extended domestic networks of proximity that
could be maintained and further cultivated in Chalkida’s small society because almost everyone
is, more or less, connected, integrated and interdependent within the city’s social and economic
life.  This also means that  local  economies  have a  solid  foundation that  is  based on durable
interpersonal relationships that last over time. 
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Theoretical Framework
 Neoliberalism, Power & Culture 
Today, the neoliberal form of capitalism, with its understanding of the “Economy” (Comaroff &
Comaroff, 2000), has largely replaced the hegemonic, regulating role of religion, especially in
the old centers of western capitalism. “Crisis” and “Austerity” are concepts which have been
borrowed from the christian religion/culture and ideology and entailed notions of punishment
and judgment, revelation and salvation (Koselleck, 1988) .  Therefore, I suggest that cosmologies
and  philosophical  beliefs  are  now  increasingly  expressed  in  the  economy  and  economic
institutions at the macro level (Peck & Tickell, 2002), and in ordinary economic practices at the
micro level. Following Mirowski’s analysis (2013) about the similarities between neoliberalism
and  religious  dogmas,  one  can  state  that  historically  dominant  doctrines  both  produce  and
reconfigure people’s habitus. Hence, the recent crisis in Greece, did not only affect the economic
arrangements of people, but it has challenged the deep structures of the Greek society and the
established pre-crisis capitalist culture. The invasion of neoliberal mentality under the guise of
crisis  has  clashed  with  traditional  modes  of  capital  accumulation  under  which  people  have
learned to get by and aspire for upward mobility.  The shift from traditional, industrial capitalism
to neoliberal, financialized modes of capital accumulation and free-market ideology has created a
profound rupture in the Greek project of modernity that was entangled with the national project
of  capitalist  development.  Stuart  Hall,  traced  neoliberalism’s  passage  through  liberalism by
stating that “political ideas of ‘liberty’ became harnessed to economic ideas of the free market”
(2011: 71). 
Since  the  beginning of  the  so-called  financial  crisis  in  2008,  mainstream economists,
politicians,  journalists  and  other  “experts”  from  across  Europe  have  employed  organic  and
corporatist images of southern Europe in crisis. Three core ideas shape their discourse. First, the
crisis is a (class-blind) state of disruption that affects the entire social body. Second, national
entities share responsibility for producing the economic meltdown through their collective  bad
southern behavior (the product of corruption, conspicuous consumption and the lack of an ethos
of hard work). Finally, the discourse lauds austerity as the “cure” for crisis that will promote
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regeneration of the social body (Hadjimichalis 2017; Mylonas 2014; Narotzky 2012; Raudon and
Shore 2018). In the current time, global power lies more in the economic dogmas that are created
in capitalism’s metropolises than in  religious dogmas.  It  is  no longer  a  case of missionaries
preaching the bible and trying to convert everyone to Christianity; today it is the neoliberals who
preach for the free-market and try to promote capital  accumulation schemes and free-market
ideology. Neoliberalism in that sense, can be conceptualized as a project of acculturation (Lawn
& Prentice, 2015).   The present thesis focuses on the latter project, its inner mechanics of not
only economic, but cultural and moral transformation, and the unraveling of socially situated
dynamics  that  accommodate,  react  or  resist  to  that  project.  Within  this  frame,  I  resist  the
temptation of understanding Chalkida's social reality as the mere “object” of a top down project
of  financialization  and rent  extraction.  Rather,  I  am convinced  that  I  can  give  voice  to  the
regimes of truth and meaning expressed by my informants at the grassroots level, by shedding
light  onto  their  active  role  as  parts  of  a  complex,  dialectical  relation,  in  which  they  daily
negotiate, mediate, resist to and transform the cultural models that the free-market structures  are
bringing  about  (  Narotzky  and  Smith,  2006;  Narotzky,  2007).  I  suggest  to  theorize
neoliberalization as a cultural hegemonic project which lands in social lifeworlds and imposes
itself by affecting social reproduction and systems of provisioning (Narotzky, 2005).
Austerity  restructurings  have  triggered  social  and  cultural  shifts  in  the  way  people
approach social and economic life. Consequently, investigating the shifts in people’s habits can
be illuminating, given that economic arrangements lead gradually to the formation of habits, and
durable  habits,  in  so  far  as  they  reproduce  structural  differentiation,  constitute  the  habitus
(Bourdieu,  1984).  Habitus  then  provides  the  framework  in  which  people  are  exploited  in  a
particular  way.  For  instance,  global  consumption  trends  such  as  smoking  and  the  tobacco
industry or the recent rise of mobile phone use  and services indicate that production and profits
are maximized by targeting and creating habits which have gendered, cultural and generational
dimensions  (Mintz,  1985;  Sahlins,  1976).   In  this  sense,  the  interaction  of  practices  and
representations at the local level, with the logics and dynamics imposed by globalized economic
models can only be grasped by an effort to combine historically grounded ethnographic data
collection,  with a  multi  scalar  analysis  of  the  relational  processes  that  link global  structural
powers (Wolf, 1989), to institutional fields (transnational and national), to the more localized,
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socially situated  fields and lifeworlds of “normal people”, like the  individuals and families I
spent time with in Chalkida. 
Scale
In order to assess the impact of ongoing austerity restructurings and the neoliberalization of the
Greek economy on the ground, I decided to borrow the concept of scale as it was developed by
critical geographers. There is a comprehensive literature on the fluid concept of scale (Katz,
2001; Marston, 2000; Peck, 2002; Smith, 1984; Swyngedouw, 1997) that concerns itself with the
sense of time and place which Harvey has termed “space-time compression” - an effect of global
relations of production and consumption. Abstract logics of capital accumulation processes at the
larger  scale  are  formed  and  performed  in  particular  local  contexts.  Katz  (2001)  provides  a
detailed topography of globalization in Sudan where, she argues, neoliberal modes of production,
reproduction  and  consumption  are  grounded  in  local  culture.  However,  different  local
expressions of this accumulation process express a similar position in regard to the larger scale
logic, hence her concept of “topography”. Globalization would mean nothing had there not been
local  spaces  to  be  (neo)colonized.  As  Katz  (ibid)  shows,  the  transformations  prompted  by
neoliberal doctrine at first target the market base of the economy (Gudeman, 1990) which in turn
prompts subtle shifts within other spheres of social reproduction and stratification (Doob, 2012;
Gowdy, 2006). Harvey (1990) argues that modernization and restructuring are about speeding up
the pace of economic processes and consequently of social life. However, “the implantation of
new methods of capital accumulation has either to await the “natural” lifetime of a worker or an
industry  to  pass  or  engage in  the  process  of  creative  destruction  which  rests  on  the  forced
devaluation  or  destruction  of  past  assets  in  order  to  make  way  for  the  new.  (ibid:  230)”
Transformation occurs both ways though, since there are many critical in-between factors that
affect  change.  Scalar  relationships  involve  nation-states  which  often  act  as  intermediaries
between the local and the global. Most of the time, states appear to be acting in favor of global
patterns of capital accumulation that become localized thanks to their intervention. 
However, recent approaches to the issue of scale have underscored the fact that it is not
only  capital  that  has  the  capacity  to  jump  scales  and  affect  structures  at  multiple  scales
simultaneously; mobilizations against capital by workers, social movements and so on also have
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this  capacity.   Scale  is  a  very vague and fluid  concept  that  is  able  to  mold  into  any shape
(Brenner, 2001; Marston et al, 2005; Marston, 2000); yet at the same time, both its advantages
and disadvantages lie in this fluidity. Therefore, according to Wolf’s (1999, 1994) approach to
power and knowledge, scale can be employed for understanding how global power is diffused
and channeled through multiple scales.  Neoliberal models aim to exploit and manipulate, not to
destroy  pre-existing  forms  of  organization,  as  long  as  these  do  not  stand  in  the  way  of
accumulation.  Scale  becomes  thus crucial  to  the  understanding  of  the  constructive  and
destructive forces that function together at multi-level interactions, and of how global events
affect local people and vice versa.  Accordingly, my research follows Burawoy’s (2000) global
ethnography scheme, that is, it explores the mutual shaping of local struggles and global forces.It
also takes up Wolf’s emphasis on those practices by people that produce structures, with the
difference that today, the global economy and neoliberalism are very distinct from what they
were  at  the  time  of  his  research.  The  new  technological  innovations  have  produced  new
analytical challenges and possibilities. 
Household & Social Reproduction
In 2008, 320,000 households in Greece had at least one unemployed member while in 2014 the
number of unemployed had increased to over a million (Gianitsis & Zografakis, 2015). This
represents one third of the working population aged 18-65 and at the same time, more than 70
percent of people faced long-term unemployment (Eurostat, 2015). During the crisis, more than
300,000 men lost their jobs while the number of unemployed women increased by 100,000 and
youth unemployment surpassed 60 percent (Giannitsis & Zografakis, 2015).An assumption that
can  be  extracted  from statistics,  is  that  crisis   triggers  new  gendered  and  intergenerational
relationships both within the household and the labor regimes as the established male bread-
winner model (Janssens, 1997) failed, in many cases, to reproduce itself. Those shifts that the
crisis  produced, alter gendered and intergenerational relations (Guerin et  al.,  2014; Narotzky,
1997; Pine, 2002, 2000;  Hondagneu-Sotelo, 1999, 2014) upon which the socio-cultural project
of  Greece  has  been  construed.  I  maintain  therefore  throughout  the  whole  of  my  thesis,  a
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gendered analysis of how crisis affects different generations and assess whether it narrows or
enhances the gender gap in the contemporary Greek society. 
Households  are  privileged spaces  in  which  to  study social  reproduction  practices  and
dynamics. I conceptualize the household as a node that links multiple channels and networks of
social agency, and as a primary field of social reproduction. “The household (or domestic unit)
generally refers to a group of co-resident persons who share most aspects of consumption and
draw upon a common pool of resources for their livelihood” (Kandiyoti, 1999: 4). As Kandiyoti
points  out,  many  household  arrangements  and  forms  are  excluded  from formal  sociological
analysis because of the diversity of their kinship relationships. Similarly, Smith & Wallerstein
(1992) approach the household as a resource pooling structure that is not confined to four walls.
Guided  by  anthropological  approaches  to  the  household  (Narotzky,  1997;  Collins,  1986;
Kandiyoti, 1999; Yanagisako, 2015; Wilk, 1991; Smith & Wallerstein, 1992), I investigate the
rescaling of the household’s role and functions to the reality of crisis and evaluate whether crisis
has extended the limits of the household and facilitated the reemergence of extended family
households.  Narotzky  (ibid)  has  pointed  to  the  problems  of  defining  the  “household,”  its
boundaries and conceptualization as a consumption unit, and suggests that we conceive of the
household  according to  its  functions  rather  than  its  morphological  characteristics.  Following
Narotzky’s critique of the household and the extensive feminist literature on hidden and unpaid
reproductive  labor  (Federici,  2013;;  Narotzky,  1991;  Pine  2002;  Guerin,  2013),  I  evaluate
whether crisis has extended the limits of the household, and look at how households manage to
reproduce themselves and how capitalism in its financialized guise invades the lifeworld of the
households.  In  addition,  I  assess  the  intergenerational  and  gendered  reconfigurations  and
strategies for accessing resources and envisioning the future that the new circumstances bring
about.  Following household members as they support, negotiate and conflict with each other
and  following  their  provisioning  networks  and  practices  can  reveal,  as  Lomnitz  (1988)
suggests,  the  various  logics  that  inform  everyday  economic  practices,  which  cannot  be
explained by mainstream economic laws. Carol Stack (1974) has shown the importance and
complexity of domestic networks that are used to circulate goods and exchange services,
which serve to improve the living arrangements not only of private, isolated households, but
the whole “informal” configuration around them.  
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 According to Narotzky (1997), social reproduction should be studied as a whole, that is, material
relations  should  be  studied  together  with  their  cultural  expressions  and  their  world-wide
connectedness. Social reproduction practices have been severely challenged by the imposition of
austerity. While this is a familiar scenario for the middle and working classes, one can ask, what
happens when social reproduction fails? What do people choose to reproduce and keep, what do
they abandon and what do they change in times of crisis? This is the central question that I
explore  systematically  in  this  thesis,  unraveling  the  new  social  dynamics  that  emerge.
Ethnographic  accounts  that  analyze  systems of  provisioning (Collins,  2012,  2008;  Narotzky,
2005) has guided my ethnographic explorations in the ways people access and manage resources.
I  therefore,  focus  on  the  provisioning  of  care  and  the  circulation  of  resources  both  within
households and across kin households and social and kinship networks (Stack, 1974). Following
Narotzky who acknowledges the significance of a  provisioning approach, I  conduct  a multi-
scalar  analysis  that  unravels  the  complex  path  of  socio-economic  relations  of  production,
distribution  and  appropriation  of  goods  and  services,  their  regulatory  framework,  while
“complex connections and processes of differentiation in provisioning that are simultaneously
material, political and cultural are a product of the intersections of regional and global histories
(Narotzky 2005: 91). 
Consumption
Consumption practices and strategies are another topic which I focus my research on. Sahlins
(1976) and Mintz’s (1985) classic works, about how people’s consumption practices affect large
scale production, demonstrate how production and consumption are co-determined. The relation
between production and consumption, and the power that lies in ordinary people’s consumption
practices are mystified and rendered obscure to them. At stake in the current problem is what
Walter Benjamin (2003) describes as “phantasmagoria” . Benjamin defines phantasmogoria as
the condition in which subjects become enchanted by consuming specific goods that mystify the
act of consumption. They become alienated both from the economic and social dimension of
consumption  and  from  the  power  that  their  agency  entails.  Before  the  2008  crash,
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overconsumption had been very common in Greece, and an entire culture of consumption had
been  systemically  cultivated  by  the  media  and  banks.  Phantasmagoria  reveals  the  irrational
foundations of capitalism and its logics. This makes it a very useful concept for deconstructing
claims about the formalist, rational organization of economic behavior and calculative reason
that are dominant in capitalist societies. In the context of austerity, consumption practices have
been restrained, yet the supply of commodities has remained the same. I assess how people in
societies  of abundance re-frame their  consumption-based lifestyles  and adapt  to  the material
restraints  that  austerity  brings,  formulating  alternative  methods and market-less  structures  to
sustain socio-economic life (Schor, 2010). In this context, I explore ethnographically is whether
resource scarcity reveals the false consciousness of consumption and leads people to reevaluate
what  is  “needed,”  demystifying  the  hidden  logic  of  consumption  and  the  socio-economic
relationships behind it. Or, to the contrary, is it the case that the urge to consume further enchants
commodities  with  desirability,  particularly  those  that  in  times  of  resource  scarcity  are  not
affordable, which thereby acquire the “magic” properties of fetishes, as in the African and South
American economies that have historically been troubled with economic crises (Comaroff &
Comaroff, 2000; 1999; Taussig, 1980; Meyer, 1998)? Do  people, in their effort to get by and
maximize the use value of their money, incorporate capitalist logics and calculative reasoning,
thereby  assimilating  free  market  competition  and  reproducing  the  inequalities  inherent  in
capitalism? Or do  they  become more  informed consumers  and use  their  resources  as  social
investments? 
Social Solidarity
In this thesis, I make use of sociological theory on social solidarity, which I bring together with
anthropological theory on the gift economy (Komter, 2005). I do so in order to formulate an
alternative approach to the hegemonic economic Darwinism of free market competition, which I
juxtapose with the creative social forces of mutual aid and support that keep society together. I
suggest that ruptures in organic solidarity structures, the welfare state and the modern social
contract’s  promises,  initiated  a  process  of  “mechanicalization”  of  social  solidarity  that
counterbalanced the lack institutional forms of solidarity.  I argue that while money and material
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wealth  might  not  bring  happiness  (Csikszentmihalyi,  1999;  Ahuvia,  2008),  their  lack  can
generate great unhappiness and discontent.  I understand money as a commons which people
share and use in their  everyday lives, as an essential part of social  organization. Inspired by
Komter’s (2005) approach, I assess  that money, like gifts, is to be circulated, and it is the very
act of circulation that sustains the whole socioeconomic system and its culture. In other words, it
makes a social organization solid.  I therefore reject tensions in the definitions of solidarity that
blur it with non-self-interested, altruistic practices and discriminate between receivers and givers.
Instead, by focusing on the very act of circulation, we can avoid confusing social solidarity with
charity, philanthropy and humanitarianism (Theodosopoulos, 2016). This opens up a new field
for the study of grassroots expressions of social solidarity in everyday economic practices. In this
way, social solidarity is not viewed as creating asymmetrical relationships between the giving
and receiving parties but rather forms relationships of interdependence. 
Many  of  my  informants  whose  activities  were  based  in  the  commercial  sector  were
adamant that the social crisis was the outcome of austerity policies which had created ruptures in
capital circulation at the local scale, for which reason informality was the prevalent economic
field in which social solidarity was practiced. Unlike recent approaches to social solidarity in
Greece  by  anthropologists  (Rakopoulos,  2016;  Angelopoulos,  2018;  Cabot,  2016;  Rozakou,
2018; Papataxiarchis, 2016;), which draw on ethnographic observations of grassroots movements
and focus on discourses and representations of social solidarity in their political discourse, I seek
to understand social solidarity in intimate social relationships within households, kinship and
social networks of mutual support in Chalkida and beyond. I argue that institutions of mutual aid
(Kropotkin, 1988[1902], which for the Greek peasantry were the only tangible form of social
solidarity before modernization and urbanization,  are re-invented when formal institutions of
organic  solidarity  fail  to  sustain  social  cohesion  and social  reproduction.  Thus,  the  ruptures
produced by austerity in organic solidarity structures provoked mechanical types of solidarity to
emerge, in a process which I call the “mechanicalization” of social solidarity. 
Social division, by contrast, has also been widespread during the crisis, and re-surfaced as
a destructive force that  breaks  socio-economic relationships.  In the context  of  the economic
crisis,  multiple  socio-economic  arrangements  failed  and ceased to  exist.  Chalkida’s  ventures
which  sustained  local  economic  structures  lost  major  shares  of  their  clientele.  The
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discontinuation of economic exchanges eroded the social articulation of local economic life. This
has  resulted  in  social  and economic  separation  and local  people  have  become economically
disconnected. Another factor that has contributed to social fragmentation is foreign supervision
and hegemonic intervention in domestic affairs. Under the threat of imminent bankruptcy and
Grexit, the state was forced to comply with the demands of the Troika (the IMF, EU and ECB)
and lost its sovereignty over the design of domestic economic policy.
 The worst impact of crisis, as an informant of mine elaborated was that “it made us lose
our  social  cohesion” (Takis,  45)  who tried to support local  ventures  and people through his
consumption  practices.  Through  the  past  decade  of  crisis  and  imposed  austerity,  the  state’s
formal structures have collapsed. As a consequence, socially divisive forces have been unleashed
which have indicated a break in the established social consensus and the organization of civil
society.  Austerity measures were implemented by degrees through the strategy of divide and
conquer. Restructuring of the public sector was backed up by media discourses and mainstream
representations that portrayed the Greek public sector as the main cause of the public deficit,
thereby justifying cuts  to  organic solidarity  structures  such as the state’s provisioning sector
(healthcare, education and pensions). People working in the public sector were homogenized and
scapegoated as corrupt, incompetent and unworthy of their salaries; they therefore deserved to
carry the burden of the cuts. Shortly after the restructurings, neoliberal policies that reshaped the
market were applied; these favored large firms over the small and medium-sized enterprises that
dominated regional economies. Tax evasion was also portrayed as another major cause of the
sovereign debt crisis and was identified as a customary activity of the self-employed who were
driven by self-interest.
Informality
Historically, informal economic arrangements have been widespread in Greece and they have
shaped  the  Greek  economic  habitus  and  facilitated  capitalist  growth.  I  adopt  a  bottom-up
approach to informal economic practices in which I discriminate between self-interested, petty
economic activities that aim to maximize profitability versus informal economic practices that
contribute to social wellbeing. Further, in the crisis context, evading taxation and participating in
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informal circulation and production have been endowed with notions of resistance (Scott, 1985,
1976), subsistence and survival. Following contemporary understandings of the phenomenon of
informality  (Chen,  2012,  2006;  Hart,  1992,  2006;  Portes  & Haller,  2005) that  highlight  the
multiple intersections, between formal and informal economy,  I assess the ways formal and
informal  economic  practices  and  structures,  intersect,  contradict  or  even  co-operate  at  the
grassroots scale by stressing the socio-cultural aspects of grassroots economic organization.  I
evaluate dominant approaches to the informal economy through ethnographic examples from my
fieldsite.    My description of how subjects give meaning to and explain their  own informal
economic activities underscores the importance of adopting a bottom-up approach to the concept
of  informality.  In  addition,  the  concept  of  embeddedness,  which  Polyani  introduced  in  his
substantive analysis of pre-capitalist societies (Polanyi, 1957) is prevalent in the ways people
practice economic solidarity. I therefore, focus on the various ways in which people understand
the relatedness between economic activities and social relationships in practice (Narotzky, 2007).
Thus, I highlight the emic, western understandings of the economy that produce difference and
enable distinctions to be drawn between formal and informal activities. The austerity crisis in
Greece  has  dramatically  affected  the  material  resources  that  people  use  to  invest  in  the
maintenance  of  socio-economic  relationships  and  networks.  Some  social  relationships  were
broken, especially in the city’s formal market sector, while others were strengthened, especially
those at the household level and amongst first degree kin. 
Crisis
Crisis is a Greek word that derives from the verb κρίνω (to judge). Crisis is thus imbued with
notions of change and transformation and does not necessarily imply evil or horror. Koselleck
(2006)  provides  an  extensive  historical  account  of  the  “crisis”  as  an  analytical  concept  and
category. He suggests that crisis has been a constitutive part of modernity and correlates crisis
with critique and moral judgment. Given the fact that in the first instance, crisis means an abrupt
change in established social, cultural, political, economic or even environmental contexts, it can
be understood as a critical moment that changes the course of history, or a point of no return
(Roitman, 2013).  In Greece, after the structural shock and imposition of austerity, a grassroots
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process of criticism was initiated. This was a process that showcased crisis as judgment, in which
people  evaluated  the  situation,  took  difficult  decisions  and  established  a  course  of  action.
Moreover,  crisis  is  a  force  that  reveals,  and as  Wolf  states: “the  arrangements  of  a  society
become  most  visible  when  they  are  challenged  by  crisis”  (1989:  593).  For  this  reason,
anthropological research is capable of providing valuable insights, particularly in times of crisis,
when the foundations of social organization are openly questioned. 
 The outbreak of economic crisis in modern, developed economies enables us to question
and deconstruct capitalist discourses of salvation. Capitalism’s expansion needs to be judged and
reconsidered in  the long run as  (self)destructive rather  than  as  a  model  of  development.  As
Harvey (2003) puts it, through crises, capitalism reassembles itself and starts to seek out new
territories for exploitation. Crisis,  is therefore a central function that serves capitalist order; it is
a destructive force that enables the reconfiguration of capitalist accumulation in new fields, and
as Marx & Engels (1978 [1848]) elaborate, in order to overcome crisis, ruling capitalist elites
displace it, channeling it to society’s productive forces. Thus, productive forces are sacrificed, or
in  other  words  “creatively  destroyed”  (Harvey  2003),  in  order  to  open  up  new  fields  for
exploitation. 
Following Burawoy (2000) and Wolf  (1999,  1989),  I  argue that  crisis  is  a  recurring,
historical phenomenon in modern, pre-modern and ancient societies. Therefore, I suggest that
crisis is a symbolic category through with meaning is produced (Turner, 1988, 1967). Eric Wolf’s
(1982)  Europe and the People Without History  is history written on a global scale, tracing the
connections  between  communities,  regions,  peoples  and  nations  that  are  usually  treated  as
discrete subjects. “Wolf’s emphasis is on the people “without history” (i.e. not given a voice in
western histories) and on how they were active participants in the creation of new cultural and
social forms emerging in the context of commercial empire. (Roseberry 1989:130)”. Through
this thesis, I want to give voice in grassroots analyses, experiences and understandings of crisis
and deconstruct, rework, or even incorporate mainstream explanations .  Economic crisis has
disrupted fundamental elements of pre-crisis popular culture, upward mobility patterns, systems
of  provisioning  (Collins,  2008,  2012;  Narotzky  2005)  and  consumption  based  lifestyles
(Bourdieu, 1984), producing ruptures in the social fabric, with a large portion of the population
unable to reproduce itself, thus I want to unravel how the structural crisis of 2008 has scaled
down through austerity and evaluate the multiple crises it has created on the ground. 
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The dramatic increase in unemployment in Greece, affects not only the economic but also
the social life of a person and its perception of time. I therefore, locate crisis and the multiple
facets of it in the everyday realities of people. The lack of resources causes the reconfiguration
not  only of  the  conscious,  articulated  lived  experience  of  everyday reality  but  also  of  what
Raymond Williams (1977) defines  as  “structures  of  feeling.” Williams uses the term feeling
rather than thought to suggest that what is at stake may not yet be articulated and thus has to be
inferred by reading between the lines. Crisis therefore, needs to be assessed not only through
forceful, outright popular manifestations and discourses, but also in subtle grassroots reactions
and  experiences  regarding  the  condition  of  “living  in”  and  “living  with”  crisis  in  the
everydayness. 
Methodology 
This study is based on ethnographic material which I collected in Chalkida, Greece, from May
2015 to December 2016. During the first month of my stay there, I explored the area, gathered
information about the local culture and adapted myself to its routines. Since my fieldsite was the
whole city of Chalkida, I had to carefully select and evaluate my potential subfields.   
One of the first things that attracted my attention when I arrived were the laid-off cement
factory workers who had been struggling to reopen the factory since 2013, and were in a legal
battle with the factory’s owners. I joined them in the places where they assembled every morning
in Chalkida’s city  center  and was invited to  go with them to the occupied cement  factory’s
facilities  during  night  shifts.  From 8 pm until  dawn,  laid  off  workers  guarded the  factory’s
premises and patrolled the area in order to prevent thefts by scrap metal hunters who targeted the
numerous abandoned factories in the area. I conducted both personal, one-to-one interviews with
many of the workers and focused on their life and work histories. I also took part in spontaneous
celebrations and food gatherings with homegrown products that the workers brought and shared
with their peers. 
I  conducted participant observation and interviews in the local businesses of the self-
employed.  I  was  invited  for  coffee  on  numerous  occasions  and  had  the  chance  to  witness
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conditions in Chalkida’s market and observe the ways in which shop owners communicated and
related with their customers. I learned firsthand how the local market operated and investigated
the  economic  lifestyle  and  culture  of  self-employed  people  and  the  crisis  their  sector  was
experiencing. I focused on two clothes shops, an electric appliance and repair shop, a solar boiler
retail  shop a cleaning service and retail  shop,  a  clothing alteration shop, a marriage hosting
business, a kiosk, a general store, three stall owners at the open air market, three coffee shops
and  three  taverns.  Furthermore,  I  had  numerous  informal  talks  with  people  which  provided
valuable leads for grasping the wider picture and the multiple facets of the crisis in Chalkida. 
I also managed to access civil servants’ workplaces without having to acquire any special
authorization. I had been invited to give a talk about my research to high school students who
were interested in my job as a social anthropologist, and in my interest in Chalkida’s cement
factory in particular. I took the opportunity to interview the head teacher and was invited by her
to visit and do a follow up interview with her and other schoolteachers and auxiliary personnel.
Through a social acquaintance of mine in one of Chalkida’s taverns, I was invited to the city’s
taxation agency, which had recently moved in a new building a few kilometers outside the city
and was accessible only by car or bus. I interviewed some of the employees and observed them
doing bureaucratic tasks. I thought that the taxation agency would be an interesting subfield due
to the tensions and disagreements people had with the economic authorities and taxes in general.
Yet to my disappointment, I found that the taxation office was not a place which the general
public visited, and it had become an almost exclusive site for professional accountants who were
acting on behalf of their clients.  
I also had access to Chalkida’s urban planning bureau from which I gathered valuable
information about urban planning and the state of the construction sector. I intended to do some
archival research there and was encouraged in this by the employees; however, this became near
impossible due to the administrative restructuring in 2011. During the restructure, archives were
split between regional and the municipal organizations and were incomplete and therefore could
not be compared. For instance, after 2011, Chalkida’s urban planning bureau assumed authority
for a larger urban zone than previously. Before 2011, its archives’ data corresponded to a smaller
area, which is not to mention the fact that many of the former office’s archives were lost in the
moving process. Being aware of the chaotic condition of Greek bureaucracy, I had expected this
to happen. I also went to the city’s registry office in order to gather data on birth, death, marriage
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and divorce numbers. However, the data were incomplete because many Chalkidians chose to
give birth in Athens’ private clinics, so the births were registered there and did not appear in their
archives.  Given  these  conditions,  any  data  I  could  collect  would  have  been  partial  and
misleading.  
In terms of finding informants,  local taverns and coffee shops proved a goldmine.  In
these, beyond the owners and employees, I could identify many potential informants among the
clients and suppliers. After I had established my presence in the field, I worked on classifying
and selecting key informants and focused on gaining access to their households. I ended up with
a large pool of informants and information, so I had to narrow my sample down and focus on
household  arrangements  during  the  later  stage  of  my  fieldwork.  I  investigated  in  depth  the
livelihood arrangements of nine (9) households: their formation, income resources and expenses,
social and kinship networks and the life and work histories of their members. I carefully selected
households so as that their  members represented different  generations and combined distinct
income  resources.  I  followed  household  members  in  their  everyday  routines  and  economic
activities both within and outside the household, gained access to their income resources and
expenses, and focused on intra and inter-household relationships of care and kinship, and social
networks of support.  In my research,  the household served as a place of both departure and
arrival, and a main analytical category that unfolded gendered, generational and cultural aspects
of  the  organization  of  everyday  life.  Household  arrangements  provide  valuable  insights  for
assessing the impact of crisis and austerity at the grassroots scale of social reproduction.
 My research on households focuses on key issues such as credit, income, past struggles
and future  expectations  and the  way that  moral  values  are  produced and re-created  through
people’s everyday economic activities. I am therefore very interested in what has changed as
well as in what has not changed. Thus, I focus on describing the practices that people choose to
transform,  maintain  or  abandon.  The  history  of  the  aforementioned  issues  is  crucial  for
understanding  crisis  and  unraveling  not  only  why  but  also  how  and  in  which  direction
transformation occurs. How people design life projects and their past and future expectations are
undoubtedly affected by the discourse around crisis. I am extremely interested in the qualitative
shifts  in  peoples’ hopes,  dreams  and fears  as  they  are  challenged  by their  past  and present
economic  state  (Narotzky  &  Bresnier,  2014;  Ringel,  2012;  Zigon,  2006).  Researching  life
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projects and expectations provides the data necessary for analyzing the grassroots logics that
inform peoples’ everyday economies and economics. Given the fact that those economic changes
are grounded in social relationships, my research sheds light on the meanings, networks and
strategies that people devise in order to access resources in the creative process of getting by.  
Following household members in their everyday activities, I ended up visiting Chalkida’s
open air markets on a regular basis. I was introduced to various food suppliers who operated
their stalls in the open-air markets. To them I first became a customer; then they become my
“customers.” Thus, I ended up spending my Saturday mornings with them, talking and observing
the crowds as they did their shopping. Open air markets are multifunctional places where social
and economic relationships are not simply enacted but are performed. People openly addressed
current affairs in the city and to a lesser extent, in the nation in general. They used, transformed
and  even  made  fun  of  media  representations  of  crisis,  railed  against  politicians,  debated
politically,  challenged  mainstream  economic  models,  complained  about  pension  cuts  and
gossiped.  The open-air  market  was a lively space and was the most  enjoyable ethnographic
setting for me during fieldwork. People went there not only to do their shopping, but also to have
fun  and  socialize.  At  the  markets,  they  could  access  food  resources  sold  directly  by  local
producers from Evia and other food retailers and brokers; here they cost less than in the shops.
The open-air market was an ideal setting in which to study consumption practices and strategies
as well as the interconnectedness of social and economic relationships.  Laiki agora  (open air
market) in Greek means a market for the people, while the Greek term for “market,” (agora)
entails the notion of exchange in a broader social context and, beyond sales, can refer to public
speaking. 
Lastly, I volunteered to help out at Koinonikes Domes,1 a state and EU funded project that
on the one hand aimed to alleviate poverty and the impacts of the crisis, and on the other, was
supposed to tackle youth unemployment through workfare. I helped in the distribution of food at
the soup kitchen and through this, realized that most beneficiaries had been in a condition of
chronic poverty since before the recent crisis. I therefore got interested in workfare employees,
who  were  also  another  group  of  beneficiaries.  The  ethnographic  study  of  such  working
1 This translates literally as “social structures”. It  was a project that included a time bank with an alternative
currency, a barter bazaar of used clothes and other items, a soup kitchen, a homeless dormitory with bathing
facilities, psychological support, medical examination and a bureau that provided legal advice.  
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arrangements unravels multiple aspects of labor conditions under neoliberal austerity (Collins,
2012; Collins & Mayer, 2010; Peck, 2002). 
Contents 
The thesis’ first two chapters focus on history. In Chapter 1, I explore the social and economic
history of Chalkida and its  urban and industrial  development since its incorporation into the
Greek nation-state in 1833. I trace the historical developments that shaped the city to its current
state by giving special attention to the cement factory and its history, as well as to cement as a
material that enabled the implementation of sweeping urbanization and modernization processes.
I use the history of the cement factory as an historical compass, a node through which Greece’s
economic and social projects unfolded at various scales of analysis. For instance, restructuring of
industrial production and grassroots practices and livelihood aspirations are both linked with the
production of cement. Finally, I argue that Chalkida’s post-industrial era officially begun when
the cement factory was closed on March 26th, 2013. 
In Chapter 2, I focus on a number of critical moments and events in the modern history of
the Greek nation-state that shaped its social, cultural and economic projects, and particularly,
indebtedness and bankruptcy, military and economic dependence and hegemonic interventions,
socio-economic,  political  and humanitarian  crises.  The  Greek social,  political  and economic
habitus  has  been  forged  by  the  country’s  relationship  with  domestic  and  foreign  political,
economic  and cultural  powers  and authorities  (Hertzfeld,  1987,  2002).  Historical  events  are
important for understanding the current state of affairs and for unraveling the continuities and
ruptures produced by the recent crisis and a globalized economy. Furthermore, they provide the
information necessary for interpreting and explaining, in sociological terms, grassroots practices
and discourses during this most recent iteration of crisis. I begin with the foundation of the Greek
nation state and the initiation of modernization and capitalist development which I trace through
until May 2015, when I began my fieldwork.  
In Chapter 3, I introduce the main body of my ethnography with a look at labor income
and cultural economics in distinct employment sectors. I assess the impact of crisis, austerity
restructuring and neoliberal policies on formal labor income. I begin with the impact of the crisis
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on industrial employment and the disappearance of industrial jobs in the city of Chalkida. I draw
mostly on interviews from unemployed cement factory workers and analyze the reconfiguration
of  their  livelihood arrangements.  Then I  focus  on precarious  jobs  which demonstrate  strong
generational characteristics. Younger people who have never had a stable job and who had to
juggle through seasonal employment schemes adapted more easily to the crisis, since for them, it
did not bring about any major change in their existing livelihood arrangements. Next, I examine
the impact of austerity and neoliberal restructuring on self-employed income. I elaborate on the
various capital accumulation and circulation patterns of small and medium-sized enterprises in
Chalkida’s  local  markets.  For  the  self-employed,  crisis  has  been  experienced as  the  lack  of
capital circulation that austerity policies (wage cuts and general unemployment) have produced.
Finally,  civil  servants and pensioners alike were the first  to be affected by restructuring that
produced  a  radical  decline  in  their  formal  income resources.  I  examine  how people  whose
income resources depended on the state’s budget reassessed their economic situation and coped
with austerity and the precarization of their income. I first examine the impact of the crisis on
civil servants’ labor conditions, and then consider the impacts of pension income reduction and
the cuts to welfare provision such as health care. For all of the above income sectors, I explore
gendered and generational characteristics, which I underscore throughout the whole chapter. 
In Chapter 4, I present nine (9) households and their diverse social reproduction patterns.
I describe the life and work trajectories of their members. I examine the intra and inter household
relationships and networks of proximity in order to elaborate on how resources are accessed,
managed and circulated at the household level. I give special attention to caring relationships and
relationships of interdependence. Furthermore, I assess the level of financialization of household
economics and everyday life in order to identify the cultural and moral framework that guides
economic practices. I do so by examining the way in which people design livelihood projects and
frame their understandings of prosperity. 
In Chapter 5, I move to an exploration of social solidarity as it is materialized in intimate
socio-economic relationships. I find that the conditions for social solidarity lie in the circulation
of  resources  either  in  the  form  of  goods,  capital  or  services  that  people  exchange.  Social
solidarity  forms  relationships  of  interdependence  and  networks  of  mutual  support.  Further,
grassroots institutions of mutual aid that are inherent in social and kinship networks evidence
informal characteristics to the extent that social solidarity is mostly expressed through informal
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economic means. Furthermore, I examine the divisive forces that were unleashed by the ruptures
to the social contract that the regime of austerity has created, and also look at the dismantlement
of modern, organic solidarity structures. I focus on events that followed the calling of the Greek
referendum in  July  2015,  and how people  behaved  and  reacted  when  capital  controls  were
imposed to avoid a run on the banks, in a moment in which the probability of Grexit and a return
to the national currency was high. 
In  the  final  Chapter 6,  I  focus  on  grassroots  analyses  and  explanations  of  crisis.  In
particular,  I  am interested  in  the  ways in  which  people  make sense of  the  crisis  and either
incorporate mainstream representations and explanations of crisis or challenge them. Moreover, I
give special attention to historical references and justifications that ordinary people use in order
to explain the current crisis in Greece. I therefore map the geometries of responsibility, of whom
and what people blame for the persisting economic crisis. In the top three positions, according to
my informants, are politicians, the banks and the EU, and all three appear to serve the same
cause and interests that are contrary to those of the Greek people. I show that the crisis created a
new national homogeneity, given the fact that from those with lower to middle incomes, that is
the  vast  majority  of  Greeks,  crisis  was  a  common  experience  that  acquired  the  form of  a
collective,  national  suffering.  Thus  I  suggest  that  the  current  crisis,  with  its  own particular
characteristics, has been nationalized, as have many other crises that the modern Greek nation
has experienced.  




The Cement of Chalkida’s Society:
Sketches of Modern Development in
Industrializing Regions
Introduction 
In this chapter I begin by sketching the political and economic history of my fieldsite and the
multiple forces that shaped the city of Chalkida as it is today. I construct this narrative on the
basis  of  leads provided by my informants,  which I  then triangulate  with online sources  and
archival research. The account is based on information from multiple informants, interviews and
sources. I reconstruct these fragments and present them in a linear manner in order to stress how
multiscalar historical processes that were grounded in specific moments in my fieldsite affect the
social life of Chalkida and hence, how historical processes have systematically cultivated and
structured its economic habitus. In their narrations, my informants frequently navigated back and
forth in time to reflect on history through the contingency of their present status, while at the
same time appearing to have some concrete understanding of historical process as remaining
unaffected by the current state of affairs. To my surprise, I could not find any written accounts of
Chalkida’s recent economic history - apart from some research on the city’s urban development
as seen by civil engineers and architects, who examine the phenomenon of urbanization through
a more technocratic lens. As a result, I base this chapter on my informants’ leads, on archival
research and deductive reasoning.
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Key to understanding the historical processes that made Chalkida a modern Greek city is
its  industrial  sector. This sector not only provided the city with the material  means for it  to
develop in its particular way, but also constructed a cultural model which, for many decades,
guided peoples’ aspirations for upward mobility as well  as their survival strategies. Since its
annexation to the modern Greek State in 1833, Chalkida has acquired a semi-peripheral role due
to its proximity to Athens and its geographical location, both of which enabled it to act as an
interchange in the regional development of the modern Greek state. Its prominent geographical
position, close to sites containing raw materials and natural resources, made the city a center of
industrial capitalist exploitation and progress.  Located next to the sea and close to agricultural
areas, the rich, fertile soil has also always offered up top-quality mineral resources for heavy
industry.  Taking  a  historical  perspective  on  Chalkida’s  political  economy,  one  can  identify
capitalism’s different phases not only at the local scale, but also at the national and global scales.
Here I investigate the three upper layers of these scales, that is, I investigate how, since the birth
of  the  modern  Greek  nation-state,  local  economic  processes  such  as  industrialization,
urbanization,  rural  to  urban  migration,  de-industrialization  and  financialization  have
communicated with national and international trends and developments. I divide this historical
era into two significant periods in order to pin-point the shifts promoted by upper scale economic
transformations and top down developments to the shaping of Chalkida’s urban character and
culture. I introduce the reader to the deep structures that lie beneath my fieldsite and which I
place, following  Burawoy’s (2010) insight,  into the dynamics that local places and processes
have  in a globalized world, thus making my fieldsite comparable with other sites with similar
ethnographic characteristics.  My fieldsite  and  ethnography  are  part  of  the  wider  Grassroots
Economics  Project  (GRECO),  which  examines  and  analyzes  historical  and  contingent
transformations of mid-sized peripheral cities in the crisis inflicted countries of the European
south.  
Chalkida has been the site of a major cement factory that marked its industrial period. I
begin  with  a  brief  history  of  cement  and  its  uses  in  advanced  modern  capitalism  as  a
technological  breakthrough that  enabled the development  of vast  and rapid urbanization and
industrialization patterns or schemes in undeveloped areas. The wide consumption of cement
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began  around the  1850s,  shortly  after  the  modern  Greek  nation-state  was  founded.  At  first,
cement was mainly applied in infrastructure projects and its use was limited to the centers of
western capitalism. Later it was introduced to other, non-industrially developed countries and
areas. The West’s colonies were ideal sites for both the production and consumption of cement,
and it is no coincidence that until today, India ranks among the top producers and consumers of
cement globally. As a result, cement has been one of the driving forces for the modernization and
alignment of undeveloped regions with the global trends of capitalist development. My fieldsite
has the advantage of being a place that both produced and at the same time consumed large
amounts of cement in order to develop. In my discussion, I divide its history into three periods:
1) That starting with the annexation of Chalkida and the island of Evia to the newly founded
Greek State (1833) and the city’s industrial and urban development up to the time when large
numbers of Greek-speaking populations from Asia Minor settled there 2) The era of cement,
which started in 1926 when Chalkida’s cement plant was founded and set the ground for the
installation of other heavy industries contributing to an acceleration of the area’s urbanization
and  industrialization.  3)  The  age  of  financial  capitalism  and  the  various  waves  of
deindustrialization it has caused. 
I close with a brief historical account of the value and social importance of Chalkida’s
cement factory which, as I show, represents global processes and events in condensed form. The
factory’s story itself narrates a history of both macro processes at the global scale with local
processes  and  grassroots  practices.  The  factory’s  history  reveals  the  logics  of  capital
accumulation in its various phases of development, which take tangible form in the everyday
realities of locals. Cement has literally been, to use John Elster’s (1989) metaphor in a more
concrete way, the cement of Chalkida’s society which, for over 90 years, has generated capital
for the city through which multiple generations of workers have passed. Almost every local I met
had a strong relation with the factory and/or directly or indirectly relied on the income  that it
generated. The social glue that kept Chalkida’s society together and enabled a large part of its
population to successfully reproduce and aspire to upward mobility was provided, to a great
extent, by the cement factory and the other industries that used to operate in the area, producing
the industrial habitus of the city.
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1.1 A Brief History of Cement and Its Role in Undeveloped Regions
Building materials have shaped the human being throughout the course of history. Various types
of cement have been used by humans to build not only their civilizations but also to construct
and reproduce their cultures and practices. Cement has been a material known to humanity since
ancient times. Evidence suggests that even the Minoans of Crete used a mixture that is similar to
modern day cement. It was Roman engineers who used it in large scale constructions, some of
which still stand, and who set the basis for modern cement products. Up until the 19 th century,
people used various combinations of cement that had a limestone base, which was mixed with
other materials to create concrete. In 1840, William Aspdin, an English engineer to whom the
invention of “modern”  Portland cement is attributed, used an innovative method to produce a
kind of  durable,  easy to use concrete  with a fast  coagulation rate.  By the 1850s the use of
Portland cement had become very common. This was thanks to the industrial breakthroughs that
were incorporated into developing its mass production and which further enhanced its properties
in the coming decades, such as rotary kilns. From that point on, late modernity, urbanization and
capitalist  development  were characterized by the use of  concrete,  that  was firstly  applied in
industrialized  countries  (Grimshaw,  1968)  and  accelerated  capitalist  accumulation  processes
through the construction of various types of infrastructure. Shortly after, the colonies  in Asia,
South America and Africa  followed and thus the global cement market was born (Dasgupta,
2002; Gupta, 1975), a market that has been growing ever since and which is projected to grow
further in the future. 
This modern method of producing cement, which distinguishes the final product from its
natural cement predecessors, has revolutionized not only the industrial but also the construction
sector. Cement uses were gradually scaled down to into the social body and as its production
costs rapidly decreased, it was incorporated into the construction of ordinary people’s houses. In
this way, across the globe, the vast and rapid urbanization phenomena of the past two centuries
have occurred, even in areas that did not have any urban characteristic before. It is cement and its
various applications that have made possible the emergence of chaotic cities and megalopolises
in underdeveloped countries.
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Portland cement (from now on simply referred to as cement) is by far the most common
type of cement for general use and, in my view, signals the coming of advanced capitalism. It is
made by heating up limestone and other materials (usually clay) in a kiln in which temperatures
reach 1500 degrees Celsius. Vast urbanization phenomena around the globe would not have been
possible had it not been for a material like cement, which is relatively cheap and durable, and can
be used in all types of construction, from simple houses to all kinds of infrastructure. Recent
economic reports on cement consumption around the globe draw a strong correlation between
cement consumption and GDP growth. As Emma Davedison for the  Global Cement Magazine
suggested in June 2014,2 there is a striking correlation between the level of development of a
country and its cement consumption per capita.
Countries such as Brazil (McArdle, 2014), Mexico (Flores Castro & Rodriguez-Acheves,
2018),  India (Nath & Bose 2002; Cement Shows the Way, 2000; Vadiya,  2002) and Nigeria
(Adisa, 2013), as well as internal peripheries within the industrialized core countries of the west
such as Midlands and Southeast  in the UK which concentrated most of the cement factories
since   1900s  (Grimshaw,  1968) managed to develop rapidly  through varied  applications  of
cement which created the basis for capitalist development. In contrast with core industrialized
countries  in  which  cement  was used  to  back up and upgrade  already existing  infrastructure
(Jarvis, 1949) and accelerated the capitalist growth after WWII , in periphery countries such as
Greece, cement has mediated industrialization and urbanization projects and boosted bottom-up
social  movements and trends. Thanks to cement,  industrialization processes that  took a few
centuries to develop in core countries, in peripheral countries and regions happened in a few
decades. 
Greece’s modern history is a characteristic example of the uses and abuses of cement.
From the 1920s on, and especially after 1960s, cement consumption has been excessive and is
correlated with the rapid growth of GDP, the expansion of the construction sector and public
infrastructure projects. The more Greece’s GDP grew, the more consumption of cement increased
as the country modernized or developed to adhere to western cultural models. During the latest
crisis years, construction, once the national economy’s leading sector, was hit severely. Greece’s
GDP has fallen dramatically over the course of the recent crisis and so too, unavoidably, has
national  cement  consumption,  leading  to  major  losses  for  the  cement  industry  in  Greece.
2  http://www.globalcement.com/magazine/back-issues/archive/2014 (Last accessed 10/10/2019)
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According  to  the  Hellenic  Cement  Industry  Association  (HCIA),  65  percent  of  the  cement
produced in Greece is consumed within the country. Further, my sources from Chalkida’s urban
planning bureau told me that, from the 1990s till 2009, their office used to process around 3000
construction licenses annually. 
During  the  crisis,  the  number  of  construction  licenses  issued in  the  region  of  Chalkida  has
dropped: in 2010 to 805; in 2011 to 600; in 2012 to 330; in 2013 to 237; in 2014 to 182, in 2015
to 137 and in 2016 to 190.3 This decline is an indicator of low demand for cement which is
strongly correlated with the decline of GDP during the crisis years (see figure I). 
Figure I: The Greek Cement Production – Source www.hcia.gr
What is also interesting is that, in contrast with Greece, the global cement market has not
been affected by the  recent  economic crisis;  on the contrary it  has  grown its  profits  and is
expected to grow further in the coming years (figure II). As a matter of fact, the global economic
crisis has affected local/national cement production/consumption but at the larger, global scale,
consumption and production figures have remained unchanged. This is a very interesting scalar
discrepancy which I untangle through my study of the Greek cement market and the factors that
3 Data obtained through an interview with the responsible official.  
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led to the closure one of the oldest factories, not only in Chalkida but in all of Greece, which had
continued to produce cement up until 2013. 
Figure II - Source https://www.worldcement.com/europe-cis/27082015/global-demand-cement-billion-tons-449/
At an ethnographic level, my fieldsite had the advantage of being a place of both cement
consumption  and  production  as  its  industrial  character  was  defined  by  the  foundation  of
Chalkida’s cement factory in 1926. Because of Greece’s belated modernization, cement was a
protagonist in the process of urbanization and is therefore a critical  element in the country’s
cultural  socio-economic progress. The cement industry was very promising and constituted a
secure investment due to the continually increasing demand for cement in private housing and
public  infrastructure projects.  According to  records,  the first  cement  building in  Greece was
constructed in Piraeus, Athens, in the early 1900s (Burgel, 1975). Cement and its materiality can
reveal a broader set of human and non-human relationships that are imposed by the cultural
models of capitalistic expansion. As Penny Harvey (2015) puts it, extraction, construction and
transformation  bind  cultural  and  material  relationships  together.  Through  the  life  history  of
cement  and  the  cement  factory  of  Chalkida,  I  explore  the  variants  of  capitalist  logics  in
developing  countries  such  as  Greece,  while  also  considering  the  wider  global  context  of
capitalism. The production, consumption and transformation of cement, together with its nature
as a material, act as a node that links the local, national and international scales that have shaped
the world as we know it today. All in all, cement has enabled a wide set of social practices that,
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to a great extent, represent a society’s specific cultural model. This applies both to the level of
public infrastructure which aims to improve a society’s living conditions, and to that of private
housing which, in modern Greek culture, was the ultimate dream of the lower and middle classes
in their aspirations for a better future both for themselves and for future generations. In Greece,
the rising middle classes’ major struggle was to become homeowners or, as the folk saying goes,
“to have a roof over your head.” The dreams of the lower and middle classes in Greece were then
made, quite literally, of cement. 
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1.2 The Political Economy of Chalkida Before the Cement Factory 
(1833 – 1926)
Chalkida, along with the island of Evia, officially became part of the modern Greek nation-state
in 1833, five years after the declaration of independence from the Ottoman empire. In 1834,
Athens was designated the capital of the Greek state and therefore Chalkida, which had been a
significant port and an influential commercial center during Ottoman and Venetian rule, became
a peripheral region in the modern Greek state. Up until the 1870s, the population of Chalkida
remained  relatively  small  because  the  city  had  little  to  offer  in  terms  of  employment
opportunities and most rural and urban migrants chose to migrate to Athens instead. It was under
Gazepis’ mayorship from 1873-1890 that the city, because of its prominent geographic location,
underwent one of its major modern developments, the upgrade of its port facilities. The modern
character of the city started to take form when the medieval fortification was demolished and the
port  of  Chalkida  upgraded.  Modernization,  and  modernity  in  general  were  enacted  by  a
systematic  destruction  of  the  past,  mainly  the  Ottoman,  and  to  a  lesser  extent  the  Venetian
constructions that were seen as material evidence of foreign domination (Goutou-Fotopoulou,
1986; Tsaousis, 1990). The destruction of Ottoman  structures was viewed as an expression of
liberty and of the emancipation of Greeks who thereby abolished the symbols of the Ottoman
occupation and  embraced  the Western civilization. 
At  the  same time,  the  first  small  scale  industries  appeared  in  Chalkida  and  the  city
became  an  important  port  that  could  compensate  for  the  lack  of  national  transportation
infrastructures by providing easy and cheap transport routes for goods. Chalkida was connected
to the national railway network in 1906, hence those first industrial cores appeared around the
port facilities initially and then along the railway network. The first wave of industrialization and
modernization of Chalkida occurred in the 1880s and produced major changes in the existing
urban environment. 
 The establishment of industry provoked urban expansion in those areas near industrial
sites as workers chose to settle close to their workplaces. These small-scale industries included
olive oil processing, soap industries, food processing, canning and bottling industries, wineries
and  distilleries,  ice  production,  wood  processing,  textiles  and  footwear,  pottery  and  brick
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production. In fact, bricks and pottery were one of the most prominent production sectors of that
era, and the nearby fertile valley of the River Lilas, which had been at the center of a great war
between the ancient city-states of Chalkida and Eretria, was the main source of top-quality clay.
The valley of the River Lilas is in many respects similar to the famous Cauca valley which
Taussig (1980) investigated.4 Pottery and ceramics were at that time a very popular material for
household use as well, and ceramics workshops were a profitable business that would endure for
several decades.
By studying the urban expansion of Chalkida, one can discern that the city has grown
with industries which often occupied the space of ancient ruins from the Hellenistic and Roman
periods. All those industries were relatively close to the city center but at the margins of the
urban web, in the area of Agios Stefanos which was next to the sea and which had direct access
to  water  resources.  Urbanization  goes  hand  in  hand  with  industrialization  as  diverse  local
markets emerge to serve the needs of the growing population. In many instances those markets
operated  near  the  industrial  sites  where  people  traded  goods  and  services.  Yet  a  stable
employment model did not exist and since employment opportunities were varied, most people
had multiple jobs. In many instances, labor shortages were covered by the itinerant populations
who passed through Chalkida to sell their merchandise. At the beginning of  the 20th century,
Chalkida’s old bridge, which connects the island of Evia with central Greece was upgraded and
cars and trucks could move in and out of the city,  the island and beyond. Toll  booths were
installed  on the bridge  and fees  for  trucks  were calculated on the  basis  of  the value  of  the
merchandise they were carrying. 
In the aftermath of the Greco-Turkish war (1919-1922), and the population exchange,
Chalkida served as one of the hosting areas for some of the thousands of displaced people from
Asia Minor. Several neighborhoods within the urban web of Chalkida and settlements nearby
were formed by Asia Minor immigrants. Those refugees who settled in the areas in and around
Chalkida provided a cheap labor force for the industries that already operated there and lacked
laborers, while the city’s prominent location attracted further industrial investments that went
4 The only reason for which the environmental  destruction of the valley was much less significant than that  in
Peruvian Cauca is because of the belated modernization and urbanization of Greece. The emergence of cement made
clay bricks obsolete, and thus halted the further degradation of the river and its fertile soil at the hands of urban
expansion.
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part and parcel with the westernization and modernization principles that Greek governments had
opted for. According to official records, by 1928 the population of Chalkida and the nearby areas
of Nea Lampsakos and Nea Artaki, where the Asia Minor immigrants had settled, had surpassed
21,000 people. This was three times more than in 1879 when less than 8000 people lived in the
area,  and  far  fewer  than  the  1920  population  census,  when  Chalkida  had  nearly  15,000
inhabitants, while Nea Artaki and Nea Lampsakos were exclusively inhabited by Minor Asians
(mikrasiates).  Within Chalkida,  the Minor Asians had mostly settled around the industries in
Agios Stefanos and near the cement factory, in the new neighborhood of Agia Marina that was
initially populated by minor Asian cement factory workers who could easily commute by boat to
the factory. 
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1.3 The Political Economy of Chalkida in the Era of Cement – 
Major Urban & Industrial Developments   (1926 - 1980) 
The Second Wave of Industrialization (1926 – 1950)
Chalkida’s cement factory, was founded in 1926. The factory paved the way for other factories to
install in the area, and  multiple zones that concentrated industrial activity  started to appear
around Chalkida’s urban web. In section 1.5 I discuss the particular case and life-history of the
cement factory in detail; here, I trace the general outlines of industrial development. Industrial
labor  attracted  great  numbers  of  peasants  who aspired  for  a  salaried  income as  a  means  of
improving their living conditions. Many chose to move to the city and most of them sought
employment in the growing industrial sector. As Greece’s second wave of industrialization began
at the national level, Chalkida provided an ideal place for it to develop. The availability of cheap
labor  along with  its  strategic  geographic  location  provided a  good fit  with  the  modernizing
aspirations of the Greek state which was prioritizing industrial projects in order to catch up with
the advanced European economies.  
Another important industry of this  period was Afentakis steel,  which was founded in
1936 and whose main products with national circulation were its inox pots that replaced the old
ceramic ones. The modern material assets of households - their cutlery and other products made
of steel, signaled the gradual decline of pottery and the era of technologically advanced industrial
items. Another industry that  played a  major role in the industrial  character  of Chalkida was
Darigk,  an ice producing company that  was founded in the late  1920s in the area of Agios
Stefanos. At the time, electric refrigerators did not exist and there was a rising demand for ice,
for industrial and commercial use in the fishing sector as well as for households. The industrial
dynamic that had started to develop after the resolution of the Balkan Wars in 1917 and the great
expansion of the Greek state’s territories, as well as the loss of Asia Minor and the influx of
cheap refugee labor was soon halted by the global economic recession of 1929 that reverberated
into the early 1930s, and also of course, by World War Two and the Civil War that followed. 
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Along with the petty industrial activities that emerged, the political economy of Chalkida was
based on food production. The island of Evia has extensive olive oil production and a noteworthy
fishing sector. To this day, a large portion of Chalkida’s population engages in agricultural and
fishing activities. The waters of the Evian Gulf,  which are rich in fish, have been crucial  to
locals. As an elderly informant told me, during the German occupation of WWII, the locals only
managed to get through the great famine because the sea was full of anchovies. 
 The Third Wave of Industrialization (1950s – 1980)
After the resolution of the Civil War (1944-1949), the country started to recover from the
devastating effects of WWII. The third and biggest wave of industrialization started at this time
and peaked in the late 1960s to early 1970s.  From 1948-1962, during a period of economic
stabilization, the state drew up various incentives and funding schemes that promoted industrial
growth and took into account the relocation and housing needs of the mobile labor force which
mostly consisted of unskilled workers who had previously been agricultural  workers in their
hometowns. In spite of the apparent “progressiveness” of these incentives, the implementation of
an industrial growth model (Pagano, 1993) was chaotic and led to an intensification of uneven
regional development, as Labrianidis & Papamichos (1990) illustrate. Most of those industries
that eventually relocated moved into the neighboring prefectures of Attica and Thessaloniki, and
therefore created semi-peripheries that reproduced uneven development models (Hadjimichalis,
1987). 
In the 1950s, the Industrial and Commercial Chamber of Evia was founded and one of its
top priorities was to train unskilled industrial workers in the new technologies of the era. The
industrial machinery and engines which at first were imported from Italy, Germany, France and
UK had to be maintained and upgraded. Local people acquired the proper training, skills and
knowledge and started manufacturing industrial engines and machinery that the local factories
used.   Moreover,  as  I  was  informed,  by  several  of  my  interlocutors  several  workshops  in
Chalkida produced engines for ships as well. The renowned Technical School of Democritus,
which trained locals who aspired for a career in industry was very successful. I have interviewed
many of its graduates who found industry related employment and prospered in that sector. They
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told me that having graduated from Democritus School gave them a big advantage and that they
were the most desirable employees for factory work.
 The  period  from  1962  to  1973  was  one  of  unprecedented  industrial  accumulation.
National  and  foreign  capital  invested  in  the  industrial  growth  of  Greece  while  spatial
concentration  continued,  accompanied  by  increasing  regional  disparity  in  the  distribution  of
income (Kottis, 1980). During that time, and especially after 1967, the biggest industrial district
of Greece was created in the neighboring prefecture of Viotia. Very close to both Chalkida and
Athens, Viotia is located in the area called Oinofyta which in Greek means vine plantations. Τhe
military Junta of 1967-1974 put forward a plan for intensive industrialization. In implementing
it, the regime sought to attract industrial investment by offering a host of privileges to investors
(Kafiris, 1975). Loose regulation of industrial activity and the urge to industrialize the national
economy the creation of the biggest  industrial  district  in  Greece,  in  the Valley of the River
Asopos, in the neighboring prefecture of Viotia, very close to the city of Chalkida. The area by
the river and the valley of Asopos underwent an intense industrialization that was framed by little
to no regulation. Even today, the authorities are not aware of the exact number of companies that
operate  in  the area,  there  is  no urban plan  and,  as  a  result,  no detailed record  of  industrial
facilities or activities. 
In the case of the administrative area of Chalkida, many heavy industries appeared during
the 1960s and 1970s which operated at the national economic level with nationwide recognition.
To name a few, Darigk, the former ice producer, transformed itself in the 1960s, moving into
heavy industry and producing iron wire for fences and construction materials. Long after the
factory’s closure,  these products continue to be named after the company. In 1961, the toxic
factory of  Ellenit  was founded in the Nea Lampsakos settlement  of Asia Minor refugees,  It
processed asbestos construction materials and its products were also known by name all over
Greece. At the same time, the multinational company Ideal Standard opened up a production line
in  the  area  of  Ritsona,  next  to  Chalkida,  thereby  creating  another  industrial  zone.  Sanitary
equipment was directly linked with construction and modernity and was a symbol of the modern
western culture that was materialized in it. The Greeks distinguished this from their old sanitary
equipment, which was characterized as Turkish, in a symbolic contrast between the western way
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of life and the Ottoman past. In 1962, Shelman, another heavy industry facility that processed
wood, was founded in the area of Vasiliko. It thrived both in Greece and abroad. Chalkida’s
cement plant was upgraded in 1964 and became the heaviest industry in the area. Indeed, many
of the heavy industry plants that were established in 1960s were oriented to the construction
sector. 
  For instance,  the coastal  area next  to the cement factory was an important  site  for
Chalkida’s  shipyards  which  established  themselves  there,  along  with  Interkem,  a  heavy
chemicals factory that owned the only port licensed to transport chemicals in Greece. Crucial to
these investments was the capital  coming from Greek entrepreneurs from Istanbul who were
expelled from Turkey in 1964. The cement factory and Interkem were owned by businessmen
from Istanbul. Another heavy industry facility that was set up in Ritsona in 1966 was Hellenic
Pipe Industry (Ellinika Soliniourgia) which was founded by the Tsaousoglou brothers, also from
Istanbul. The company was one of the few in the world to be certified by the API (American
Petroleum Institute) and it exported its products primarily to the oil drills in the Middle East and
elsewhere.
In  the  1970s,  Linder,  a  German  company  that  produced  electric  cables  built  a  large
factory that employed around 1500 people. Peraiki-Patraiki, the biggest national textile firm also
expanded its production line to include Chalkida. It was yet another industry whose products
were endowed with the ideals of modernity. In the same decade, the triangle of Oinofyta, Tanagra
and Schimatari, only 15 km from Chalkida, became Greece’s biggest industrial district. Leading
companies  that  established  themselves  there  included  Elval  in  1971  and  Chalkor  in  1976
(members of the Viohalco), along with the public Greek Aerospace Industry (EAB) in 1975.
These created a major pole of industrial activity that drew many people in search of employment.
At the same time, a secondary, supportive industrial sector that provided various industry related
services was created, as were numerous smaller processing and manufacturing industrial units
that were interconnected with the activities of the area’s heavy industry facilities.
The Junta government also promoted the development of the construction sector which,
from the 1970s onwards, became the leading sector of the Greek economy. As a result, Chalkida
was widely urbanized and settled by industrial laborers who worked at the nearby factories. It is
no coincidence that most of the heavy industry plants that installed themselves in the wider
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region of Chalkida oriented their production towards the construction sector. Moreover, in 1970s
the development of road networks facilitated the transportation of the labor force to the industrial
sites; as many locals told me, there were buses that picked up workers from Chalkida and the
villages around it. Nea Artaki, which was closer to the food production sites of Northern Evia,
attracted companies which were oriented towards food production and the processing of local
agricultural products. In the 1960s, small, family poultry production businesses appeared in Nea
Artaki. In the ensuing decades, those companies managed to scale up and by the late 1970s, Nea
Artaki was the largest producer of poultry in the Balkans. A major contributing factor was the
development of roads that were used to carry not only people but also raw materials from all
over Evia, as well as to distribute the final products within local and national markets.
Chalkida’s  cultural  capital  was  determined  by  industrial  labor  and  production.  Its
inhabitants structured their economic habitus around their industrial income, their longstanding
urban-rural relationships and unpaid female reproductive labor. The above three elements were
common  to  every  household  in  Chalkida.  Every  economic  activity  was  either  directly  or
indirectly  connected  with  the  industrial  economy of  the  area  and with  productive  economic
processes and activities. Also significant during this period was the fact that the construction
boom was fueled by the increased need for housing and the rise in the population’s purchasing
power. Informal construction schemes were tolerated and encouraged by the state, and due to the
lack  of  urban  planning  and  an  overall  housing  policy,  the  urban  spaces  of  Chalkida  were
produced by private initiatives that led to the chaotic urban structure that still defines the city
today. As new neighborhoods were built, the city’s urban plan had to be readjusted several times
to include informally produced urban spaces that lacked basic infrastructure.  
The  process  of  urban expansion was  driven  by another  wave  of  creative  destruction
engendered by the  unique Greek phenomenon of  the  antiparochi5 (property-swap) system, a
Greek invention that involved the granting of construction land by small house and plot owners
to small or medium-sized firms in exchange for being granted modern apartment(s) in the new
multi-story buildings the promoters would construct.  On the one hand, this  was an effective
5 The antiparochi system was enabled by the 1929 law of horizontal ownership It was extensively used to 
reconstruct the demolished buildings that WWII has left in Greece and escalated in the coming decades due to 
the increased housing needs in the growing cities.
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housing solution for the dense populations of the urban centers,  on the other, it  transformed
modern Greek cities, especially Athens, into formless, borderless and placeless urban landscapes
(Aesopos & Simeoforidis, 1999). Small houses were replaced by blocks of flats and a 1968 law
accelerated this  process by increasing the building capacity of land plots in the historic  city
center. Home and land plot owners in the center lined up at the construction firms in order to
exchange their old home with a flat in a new building. This was the death knell for the city’s
remaining medieval constructions. Yet one can discern the old medieval plan of Chalkida when
one walks around the city center, in fact, the blocks of flats were built on the very same urban
plan that the Venetians had created.   
Also, of note is the fact that, according to an informant who worked at Chalkida’s port,
the  infrastructure  for  providing  electricity  to  the  Greek  islands  passed  through  the  port  of
Chalkida. Even though the city had a peripheral role in the formal economic development of the
country, it acted as a hub that mediated modern developments in the rest of the underdeveloped
regions. For instance,   Nikos (79) who used to work in Chalkida’s dockers union, told me that
the infrastructure to develop electricity network in the islands of the Aegean happened thanks to
the port facilities of Chalkida, and to a greater extent, thanks to him and the dockers union of
Chalkida that helped in the transportation of cables, wires and pillars.  
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1.4 The Era of Financialization (1980s - 2010s)
In the  1980s,  industrialization processes  in  Greece ground to a  halt  as  the model  of  capital
accumulation shifted from productive activities to financialized ones. In 1981, Greece became a
full member of the EEC and elected its first socialist government. Unionization of the labor force
affected  the  industrial  sector  which  now also  adhered  to  the  European regulatory  economic
framework. New labor laws enabled workers to enjoy a range of welfare benefits. In addition,
from  that  moment  onwards,  the  Greek  economy  was  rescaled  to  adapt  to  global  market
principles. This produced a considerable shock for national and regional economies when the
impacts of those structural shifts trickled down to the locality of Chalkida. The labor rights that
the socialist government of Pasok advanced had significantly increased production costs, which
in the preceding decades had been much lower, attracting industrial investment. In the 1980s,
Industrial laborers started to enjoy increased salaries, various benefits and modern labor rights.
As  a  result,  an  era  of  capitalist  abundance  and  a  consumption  culture  initiated.  Moreover,
because of the socialist turn, the state became one of the largest employers as it sought to provide
varied public services to its people. The number of civil servants grew significantly from the
1980s and was increasing until 2010. Consequently, Chalkida’s GDP was infused with income
that came directly from the state and its provisioning sector, all of which constituted a belated
attempt to create a welfare state (Gunther, Diamandouros, & Sotiropoulos, 2006; Allen, Barlow,
Leal, Maloutas, & Padovani, 2004).
In the preceding decades, formal female employment opportunities had been scarce and
women  usually were employed informally and were underpaid.  When they got married, most
women quit  their  jobs  to  devote  themselves  to  the  household,  that  is  to  their  offspring  and
husbands. Before the 1980s, working outside of the house was considered a socially shameful
practice for women that signified extreme poverty. Further, it was considered degrading to the
honor of the adult  male members of the household because it  suggested that they could not
sustain their family (Janssens, 1997; Horrel & Humphries, 1992), which task was the ultimate
social/natural  purpose  of  life,  according  to  the  social  norms  of  the  time.  Formal  female
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employment was underpaid and most of the women who worked at the numerous factories had
low, unskilled positions. 
 After the 1980s there were major changes in the labor sector and more women were
included in the public  sector  sphere.  The service sector,  which was backed up by industrial
income creating activities, proliferated. What’s more, this proliferation of services opened up a
large field of employment for women who in the 1980s were more emancipated than they had
ever been in modern Greek history. The vast improvement in living standards that the lower and
middle classes enjoyed during this decade was due to female labor which almost doubled the
available income of households/nuclear families with two, instead of one source of labor income.
Education was also another pillar which people in Chalkida and in Greece valued a great
deal. The number of university graduates slowly started to increase as more and more people,
especially  women,  had  access  to  higher  education.  As  a  result,  Greece’s  labor  force  was
significantly upgraded in terms of skills.  In the 1980s, Chalkida’s industrial  workers became
highly skilled in operating various types of industrial machinery and therefore indispensable to
the production line. This was in contrast with past generations of industrial workers who had
been easily replaceable. It was on this basis that unionization of the skilled labor force was made
possible,  as  were  the  structural  shifts  in  labor  law  that  the  socialist  government  of  Pasok
promoted.
The  decade  of  the  1980s  also  signaled  the  start  of  deindustrialization.  Most  of  the
factories that operated within the city center had already closed or were about to close; others
were  merged  and  downsized  their  labor  force.  The  industrial  sector  and  industrial  identity
therefore suffered minor shocks which did not scale up to the national economy. The regional
economy had  the  capacity  to  absorb  those  shocks  and those  who lost  their  jobs  had  many
alternatives. They could seek a job at the factories that operated in the nearby areas of Oinofyta,
Schimatari  and Tanagra,  they  could  become self-employed  or  they  could  migrate  to  Athens
where there were also many employment opportunities. In many instances, industrial workers
took the opportunity to become their own bosses and leave behind the demanding industrial jobs
that they had been trapped in. The decline in industrial jobs was counterbalanced by the increase
in construction and thus, economic growth and capitalist expansion were sustained (Allen et al,
2004).
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At  the  same  time  as  the  old  industrial  cores  started  to  deindustrialize,  new,  but
significantly fewer industrial companies were founded to fill in market gaps and serve popular
demand (Agriantoni, 1986). One of these, a large furniture manufacturer called Neoset, built a
factory  next  to  the  wood processing  giant  of  the  time,  Shelman.  The company thrived  and
managed to export to various countries around the world as well as to serve the domestic needs
that  the  housing  construction  boom  created.  Nonetheless,  the  process  of  deindustrialization
intensified in the coming decades. The first big closure that shook the Greek public was that of
Peraiki-Patraiki, which was considered a modern Greek miracle - a company that succeeded in
exporting its  products  to  numerous countries.  It  closed  in  the late  1980s leaving substantial
unpaid  debts  to  the  state,  its  suppliers  and workers  all  over  Greece,  and many accused the
company  of  scandalous  administration  and  political  corruption.  Afentakis  steel  factory  also
closed down after the death of its founder in the mid-1980s; Ellenit also started to decay after
publicity about the hazardous health effects of asbestos.  
Many of  the  companies  in  the  wider  region of  Chalkida  that  were mentioned earlier
shifted their productive activities to financialized ones, and between the late 1980s and the early
1990s they entered the Greek stock market. As local informants told me, many of the factories
that  had  produced  varied  goods  in  the  industrial  areas  of  Chalkida  shifted  their  activity  to
logistics, serving as distribution hubs, as most of them found it more profitable to move their
production abroad. By contrast, the construction sector was expanding, mostly because of the
housing boom - being a homeowner was the ultimate goal for the majority of Greeks. The house
construction  sector  was  a  field  dominated  by  small  and  medium-  sized  local  firms  which
prospered from increasing market demand. In 1985, a large public infrastructure project, the new
Euripus bridge, was launched, and it made car access to Chalkida and the island of Evia even
easier than before. Chalkida, which was often characterized as Athens’ ‘backyard’, started to
develop as a suburb of the chaotic capital. Moreover, a large percentage of industrial workers in
the  neighboring  industrial  district  chose  Chalkida  as  their  city  of  residence,  and so  another
population  boom occurred.  The  financialization  principles  of  capital  accumulation  provoked
many closures and transformations in the industrial sector. At the same time, modern household
needs  multiplied  and  thus  the  service  sector  expanded.  In  addition,  various  forms  of  self-
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employment provided the means for social reproduction and subsumed the shocks created by
widespread layoffs in the declining industrial sector caused by increased production costs due to
the  establishment  of  labor  rights.  In  response,  factories  sought  to  use  innovative  production
methods that required less personnel.  
Another  interesting  development  was  the  introduction  of  environmental  regulation  to
industrial activities, which was mostly an imposition of the EEC. Although the situation started
to improve, environmental groups claimed that the environmental impact studies that companies
had  to  draw  up  were  very  ineffective  and  in  fact  produced  the  opposite  result.  Instead  of
prohibiting polluting activities and obliging those factories that were in violation of the law to
protect  the  environment,  they  justified  and  enhanced  environmentally  damaging  activities,
opening up a new field for corruption. Most Greek environmental organizations point to the high
levels of political corruption in industry, as well as the fact that business owners can use their
economic power to influence politics  and policies,  both at  the national  and at  the European
levels. 
By the late 1990s, most of the remaining factories in the area were listed on the stock
market and thus had become vulnerable to fluctuations in global markets. While on the one hand
Chalkida’s industrial zones were de-industrializing, on the other, Oinofyta and Schimatari were
attracting  industrial  investment.  For  instance,  Coca  Cola  Greece  created  a  large  beverage
production  unit  in  Schimatari  in  1990,  and  large  pharmaceutical  and  cosmetics  factories
belonging to multinational groups moved their production lines there in the late 1990s and early
2000s. Thus, Barilla created its 3rd largest production unit in Oinofyta in 2000. In addition, the
coming of the age of financial capitalism led to one of the biggest scandals in Greece’s modern
economic history, the Athens Stock Exchange bubble. This bubble burst in the early 2000s and
prompted mergers, sell-offs and closures in the industrial sector. These well calculated, macro-
level  financial  (dis)investments  produced  a  radical  restructuring  of  the  industrial  labor  field
which led to the loss of many job positions. 
According to an informant who had a high post in one of the companies that contributed
to the Athens Stock Exchange bubble, the company’s owner, who had contacts with the Pasok
government, had instructed some of his own trustees to buy company shares from a specific
broker, and to then sell those shares when that broker instructed them to do so. The shares, he
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recounted, had been increasing in value when suddenly, an aggressive yet calculated sell  off
caused the bubble to explode. As a result, those who knew beforehand about the scam became
rich while the company’s owners made vast profits without producing anything. After the bubble
burst, the company’s productive activity was shut down and, he informed me, they only kept on a
few employees to take care of maintenance. He was one of those whom they retained while
firing most of the production line personnel (see Tsangari & Chatzicontou, 2016;6 Thalassinos,
Kyriazidis & Thalassinos, 2006). 
In the 2000s, after the Athens Stock Exchange scandal, the process of deindustrialization
accelerated.  Greece’s  entrance  into  the  Eurozone  produced  another  big  wave  of  de-
industrialization and delocalization for those companies which were exporting goods to the EU.
Those companies opted to produce at low cost and then import their products to sell them at
great profit margins to the Greek market which was using euros. For the citizens of Chalkida,
this  resulted  in  great  losses  both  at  the  material  and  cultural  levels.  Well-trained  industrial
workers were left without jobs and as a local informant told me, the delocalized factories often
hired  Greek  workers  to  train  the  new,  unskilled  laborers  in  the  country  to  which  they  had
relocated,  usually  Bulgaria,  but  also  Romania,  Turkey  and  other  countries  in  the  Balkan
Peninsula  that  offered  much lower  production  costs.  Moreover,  many  businesses  which  had
outstanding  debts  and  deficits,  and  which  were  wary  of  corruption  scandals,  applied  for
bankruptcy. Darigk, the last remaining factory in the center of Chalkida which, given the city’s
scale,  occupied  a  large  space,  closed  and  its  laid-off  workers  protested  against  the  owner
accusing him of economic misconduct. 
The mass closures of factories were a major shock for locals who, during the course of a
century had built an industrial identity both for themselves as individuals and for the city that
prospered because of the circulation of industrial capital. Chalkida’s commercial markets were
owned by locals and as a result, capital from the service sector was recycled through the local
market  and was  not  accumulated  in  other  areas.  For  instance,  there  were  large  supermarket
6 In their BA thesis, available at:  
https://apothesis.lib.teicrete.gr/bitstream/handle/11713/8080/TsangariCharitomeni_ChatzikontouIoulia2016.pdf?
sequence=1 they investigate the impact on listed companies at the Athens Stock Exchange after the crash in 
1999. One of those companies whose name I will not mention, is the company where my informant worked. 
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chains that operated at the local/regional scales and the same applies to other commercial shops,
such as electrical appliances, construction materials, furniture, clothes and so on. In the 2000s,
the multinationals and larger national enterprises which operated only in big cities started to
penetrate local markets. As a result, capital accumulation and re-circulation was uneven for the
city  of  Chalkida  as  the  profits  of  the  commercial  sector  were  accumulated  by  national  and
international companies that did not produce or generate income as the factories used to. 
The multinationals which entered the national market  also created many problems of
viability for smaller Greek productive industries.  For instance,  when Ikea entered the Greek
market, Neoset faced major losses in its commercial sector which affected its production. Also
worthy of  mention  here  is  the gradual  introduction  of  the internet  into the everyday life  of
Greeks. This accelerated after 2003 when high-speed broadband connections became available to
end users. Telecommunications became a thriving economic sector and by the late 2000s almost
everyone who lived in the cities had access to high-speed internet. The penetration of the internet
into everyday life also opened up new markets, both for information and goods, as Greeks, and
especially the younger generation, started abandoning the traditional media for socio-economic
practice.
The large infrastructure projects of the 2004 Olympic games generated an influx of credit
that deferred the turbulent situation that was about to erupt.  While in 2007 the GDP reached a
record  high,   the  first  signs  of  recession  started  to  appear,  and a  series  of  ineffective,  self-
imposed austerity  measures were taken by the government.  In 2009, in  the aftermath of the
global  financial  crisis,  the  banks  ceased  providing  credit.  The  construction  sector  shrank
dramatically, which contraction intensified in the coming crisis years, dragging down with it the
regional and national economies.  
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1.5 Chalkida’s Cement Factory 
Chalkida’s cement factory was founded in 1926 in the area of Vathi-Avlidos, on the opposite
coast of Viotia, very close, tracing a straight line, to the center of Chalkida. Its location is rich in
the raw materials that are required for ‘baking’ the final cement. Initially a small surface mine
and  petty  cement  producer,  it  gradually  expanded.  Today  the  factory,  along  with  its  mines,
possesses an area comparable to that of Chalkida’s city centre.7 Because of the non-existence of
regulatory mechanisms, no obstacles were posed to the factory’s location, neither on the grounds
that it was very close to inhabited areas, nor on the grounds that it was literally taking the space
of the ancient site of Avlida. The soil and land in the area in which the factory was located were
completely degraded and the factory produced tremendous noise pollution (locals report that they
used to hear the factory’s engines and mills working at night from the Chalkida’s city center). In
addition, the people of Chalkida were literally dusted by the factory whenever the wind blew in
the direction of the city. This was especially true before 2000, when no measures existed to limit
the air pollution created by cement dust.
In the name of modernity and as a personal, local and national project, factory workers in
the first instance, together with the local population of Chalkida accepted the factory as a means
of prospering and improving their  living conditions.  Yet for all  the tremendous benefits  that
cement  produces,  the  global  cement  industry  is  one  of  the  biggest  sources  of  pollution  and
environmental degradation in the areas of its production, while its excessive and irresponsible
application  in  urban  sprawl  has  devastating  effects  on  the  environment  at  the  site  of  its
consumption.  Moreover,  numerous  medical  studies  have  exposed  the  hazardous  effects  that
cement dust has on the workers who are those most exposed to it, and on neighboring residential
areas (Fell et al, 2010; Tungu et al, 2013; Penrose, 2014; Smailyte et al, 2004). 
The growing demand for cement caused the factory to expand and seek laborers from all
over Greece. In a number of cases, the factory provided food and shelter for the seasonal workers
that it employed and, in many respects,, one could argue that the cement factory itself promoted
7 The total surface of the factory’s mines and  its facilities is around 2 square kilometers while Chalkida’s city 
center is around 3,5 square kilometers  (data calculated through google maps: 
https://www.daftlogic.com/projects-google-maps-area-calculator-tool.htm# 
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internal migration into Chalkida. Moreover, beyond providing the materials for urbanization, it
also created the human subjects that would inhabit the growing city of Chalkida. During the
Second World War, its facilities were requisitioned by the Army, and as factory workers informed
me, during the war, instead of being sent to the front, they were called to serve their country by
producing cement for the army. Because of this, laid off factory workers I interviewed stressed
the fact that ‘their’ (sic) factory and the cement industry in general were a matter of national
importance. After the war, the factory changed hands and was bought by two entrepreneurs from
Istanbul. In 1964 it greatly expanded its production capacity and upgraded its machinery to meet
the increased demand for cement at the local and national levels. The factory’s location, another
fact  that  the  workers  stressed  in  their  conversations  with  me,  is  highly  significant.  They
repeatedly mentioned that the factory had direct access to the road and rail network as well as its
own port license which increased significantly the value of the factory. In addition, the nearby
limestone extraction sites and a smaller clay mine were part of the factory’s property and reduced
to a great extent the cement’s production cost.
In  spite  of the above favorable conditions,  the company had many outstanding debts
which  it  covered  with  loans  it  managed  to  secure  from  the  state,  specifically  the  Junta
government  in  1968.  In  1982,  the  company  faced  financial  difficulties  that  lasted  over  the
coming 15 years. The factory passed into the hands of investment funds that tried to dominate the
global cement market.8 In 1982, Around 2,500 regular and subcontracted workers were employed
in the factory, a number which, if we scale it up from the personal to the household level, meant
that almost a fourth of Chalkida’s population depended directly or indirectly on the salaries of
cement factory workers. Thanks to the socialist government of Pasok, workers and their trade
unions started to enjoy varied benefits and to actively claim more working rights from their
employers.  In 1985, the company’s creditors refused to provide it with new loans and in 1988,
the company was subjected to the OOAE (Economic Restructuring Organization for Businesses)
by capitalizing its debt to the state. However, that process was blocked by the EEC because of its
various violations of the code of conduct and the unfair market competition it implied.  In order
to survive, the factory’s owners did not pay taxes and social insurance fees to the state, and
because of this,  competitors sued them for unfair competition. 
8 Source: https://eviaportal.gr/i-istoria-tis-etaireias-tsimenton-chalkidas/ (Last accessed 10/10/2019).
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In 1991,  AGET, a  leading cement  company that  owned several  cement  factories  and
limestone mines all over Greece, was re-privatized. The state had nationalized it in the mid-
1980s in order to save it and secure the many jobs it provided (as, following socialist doctrine, it
had done with many other industries which were on the brink of bankruptcy). The Italian Cement
fund, Calzestruzzi bought out 50,3 percent of AGET and through subsidiary firms and 70 percent
of Chalkida’s Cement Company shares which at the time was deeply indebted.  The 1990s were,
as previously noted,  the decade during which Greece entered the era of financialization and
financial capitalism. Chalkida’s cement factory has changed several owners, as foreign funds
aimed to extract profits through financialized method of neoliberal capital accumulation in the
Greek stock market and dominate the national and international cement production.   
In 2001, Blue Circle investments bought both Chalkida’s Cement Company and ΑGET.
The two companies were merged, and the factory’s name was changed to Heracles III. After this,
the  company’s  profits  sky-rocketed  and  the  factory’s  production  capacity  was  significantly
upgraded. Subcontracting firms penetrated more deeply into the factory and the ratio of retired to
new employees became unbalanced: for every five retired regular factory workers, only one was
hired.  In the same year, Lafarge, the multinational cement giant, finally succeeded in buying the
firm. This was indeed a strategic move since Greece was about to host the 2004 Olympic Games
and the demand for cement for national consumption was very high at that time. Greece’s GDP
increased dramatically, particularly after Greece entered the Eurozone in 2001, and large funds
were dedicated to the construction of public infrastructure.  The influx of credit  fueled many
private construction schemes, and many Greeks got loans to buy or build a house. After 2004, the
factory administration started to hand out incentives and large bonuses for early retirement, and
the number of regular employees fell from 570 in 2004, to 236 in 2010. During the Lafarge
administration, safety and environmental measures were top priorities along with the voluntary
redundancies of older employees who had been in receipt of high salaries. The administration
offered  large compensation  payouts  to  union  organizers  (some  got  nearly  400,000  euros,
workers informed me) in order to voluntarily quit their jobs. In 2010, cement production fell
significantly, and rumors spread of an imminent closure. As the workers told me, apart from the
great decline in demand for cement at the national level, another factor also played a major role
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in the factory’s closure. The so-called Arab Spring, and especially the war in Libya, to which the
factory  had been  exporting  cement,  were  also  critical  factors  that  determine  the  fate  of  the
factory in the coming years.
 On March 26th, 2013, around 11 am, when the factory was in full operation, a message
suddenly appeared on administrative employees’ screens, and an announcement was made over
the  speakers  that  summoned  the  workers  to  the  warehouse.  The  administration  abruptly
announced to the remaining 236 employees that the factory was closing and that they were going
to be laid-off or transferred to other factories belonging to the group. “You should stay at home,
and you will receive your salary until further notice,” they told us, said Manolis. Of course, “we
did not stay at home, we mobilized instantly,” he added. Since then, both the factory’s Union and
Lafarge have been battling in national9 and international10 labor courts, and to this today, workers
continue to occupy and guard the factory’s facilities.  “It is not simply our job” they said in a
group interview, “it is our life, most of us have been working here since adolescence”.
What needs to be noted here is that most of the factory’s workers started working at the
factory at a very young age - many of the workers and pensioners I interviewed started at the age
of 16. Moreover, their work was both hazardous and physically very demanding. Apart from the
risk  of  developing  chronic  diseases  that  could  lead  to  early  death,  their  lives  were  also  in
considerable danger due to the work accidents which, in the past especially, were frequent. Older
workers told me that they used to work outside in severe weather conditions, half buried in mud.
Young adolescents used to carry 50 kilo sacks barefoot to load on the ships and trucks that
transported cement. As a result, many who could not endure these heavy tasks soon had to leave
the factory, for which reason the administration could not find regular employees. This fact of
9 National courts judged the mass redundancies were illegal on several occasions, yet the Lafarge appealed to the 
supreme courts source : https://www.ert.gr/eidiseis/ellada/kinonia/tsimenta-chalkidas-nea-dikastiki-itta-tis-
lafarge/ ( last accessed 12/01/2020) I was once at an impromptu celebration at the premises of the occupied 
cement factory to celebrate another favorable court decision that obliged Lafarge to pay the salaries and 
compensation of illegally fired workers. On another occasion, the workers organized an open feast to celebrate 
the cancellation of the first 118 lay offs exactly two years after the factory was closed on March 26th 2015Open 
call in the local press: https://www.eviazoom.gr/2015/03/tsimentades-giortazoun.html (Last accessed 
15/12/2019) Despite of all court decisions in favor of the laid-off workers, the factory has not opened, nor has 
Lafarge sold it to new owners.
10 On December 21st, 2016, the European Court of Justice judged the collective redundancies in the cement factory
as legal referring to the right owners have to “conduct business” Source:   
https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2016-12/cp160143en.pdf (Last accessed 12/12/2019)
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itself gave the workers great leverage and negotiating power which was expressed in the strong
factory trade union which was formed in the early 1980s. As a result, the turbulent events and
financial issues that the factory faced were met with strikes, demonstrations and in several cases,
violent  events  in  the  factory  in  which  the  police  were  called  in  to  resolve  the  tensions.
Unionization in the factory was very strong and had secured various benefits and rights for the
workers  who  in  many  instances  had  been  working  there  for  many  years  already  and  had
sacrificed their youth and wellbeing in the pursuit of improving their livelihoods. In addition,
looking to make a career at the factory and specialize in cement production was not only an
individual  livelihood  project  and  strategy,  it  was  also  a  multi-generational  aspiration.  I
interviewed second and third generation workers whose relatives, usually fathers and uncles,
worked at the factory, which made it much easier for them to get employment there. Lastly, a
small  population  of  women  also  worked  at  the  factory  but  as  one  can  imagine,  they  were
confined to administrative office posts and received much lower pay than the men. The majority
of them had been introduced by a relative (father, husband, brother or even in-law) who was
working or had worked at the factory. 
 The struggle of the laid off factory workers of Chalkida’s cement plant coincided with
the  closure  in  2013  of  Greek  National  Television  (ERT)  by  Antonis  Samaras’  coalition
government (2012-2014). The cement factory workers were in Athens protesting against Lafarge
and the government when the closure of ERT occurred. They were the first to run to the aid of
ERT’s laid-off workers and to express their solidarity and protest alongside them. Furthermore,
they aligned their struggle with the closure of the Coca Cola factory in Thessaloniki that was
delocalized  to  Bulgaria  in  2014,  and  they  supported  the  nation-wide  boycott  of  Coca  Cola
products. As soon as Syriza rose to power in 2015, ERT reopened and, in December 2016, hosted
a debate between laid factory workers and Lafarge’s administration.11 In the video, workers and
journalists asked the right questions to the company’s representative and deconstructed one by
one the arguments that led the factory to closure. Syriza’s electoral win had sparked hope for a
solution to the laid-off workers’ problems, and many of them believed that the newly elected
11 This event occurred a few weeks after I had left the field and I saw many of my informants appear on TV. I 
wanted to provide the link to the video, however to my surprise, the video was mysteriously deleted from ERT’s
online database (Last checked 12/12/2019).
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government would force Lafarge either to sell or to reopen the factory. Since they had heard
many political promises by local MPs who had visited them, they were skeptical of any promise
made to them. Among others, Alexis Tsipras has visited them during his electoral campaign in
2014, and urged them to continue their struggle, stating that he stood with them. In the elections
of January 2015, Syriza won 40 percent of the vote on the island of Evia. 
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Conclusion 
The modern history of Chalkida offers us an extended case study for understanding how top-
down  processes  of  modern  capitalist  development  were  grounded  in  local,  semi-peripheral
places.  The aspirations and promises of a modern lifestyle were grounded in people’s needs and
desires,  and  to  that  extent  they  proposed  a  new model  of  value  creation,  that  of  capitalist
development. The major, and perhaps the most significant motive driving impoverished peasant
populations to settle in the cities and to accept incorporation into the capitalist system of value
production, and hence to be exploited in multiple ways, was that of the income opportunities that
urban life had to offer. Thus, peasants started gradually to emigrate from their villages to pursue
a  better  life,  both  for  present  and  future  generations.  Top-down  processes  such  as
industrialization  facilitated  the  urbanization  phenomenon  in  Chalkida.   However,  the
urbanization of Chalkida, as well as of many other Greek cities (Burzel, 1975) was the outcome
of bottom-up initiatives which mostly materialized in an unorganized and unregulated manner
through the model of  antiparochi. People made literal use of the modern resources they could
access in order to fulfill basic needs such as housing, and to pursue upward mobility within the
project of modern capitalist development 
I  place  emphasis  on  cement  because  it  is  the  material  that  has  made  possible  the
materialization of modernity, in the first place, in its industrial applications and in the developing
of public infrastructure and the construction of houses, and in the second, in the creation of the
cash  income that  circulated  through Chalkida’s  lifeworlds.  It  is  therefore  a  material  that  in
multiple ways allows links to be drawn between the upper and lower scales of analysis. Modern
capitalism has used cement in various exploitative projects all over the world, and large capital
accumulation schemes have become possible. Thanks to cement, the construction sector emerged
as the driving force of the Greek economy and opened up new fields for capitalist exploitation.
The  recent  economic  crisis  has  firstly  affected  the  construction  sector  which  collapsed  and
produced a domino effect. This leads me to the concept of creative destruction which in Marxian
economic theory is linked with the processes of accumulation and annihilation of wealth under
capitalism (Marx & Engels 2002 [1848]; Marx 1993 [1847]).  The financialized innovations in
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capital accumulation processes led to devalue and destroy past investments and labour skills. As
Harvey (1995: 105-106) puts it 
“Creative destruction is embedded within the circulation of capital itself. Innovation exacerbates
instability, insecurity, and in the end, becomes the prime force pushing capitalism into periodic
paroxysms of  crisis.  ...  The  struggle  to  maintain  profitability  sends  capitalists  racing  off  to
explore all kinds of other possibilities. New product lines are opened up, and that means the
creation of new wants and needs. Capitalists are forced to redouble their efforts to create new
needs in others .... The result is to exacerbate insecurity and instability, as masses of capital and
workers shift from one line of production to another, leaving whole sectors devastated .... The
drive to relocate to more advantageous places (the geographical movement of both capital and
labour) periodically revolutionizes the international and territorial division of labour, adding a
vital geographical dimension to the insecurity. The resultant transformation in the experience of
space and place is matched by revolutions in the time dimension, as capitalists strive to reduce
the turnover time of their capital to "the twinkling of an eye"
The  history  of  the  cement  factory  of  Chalkida  provides  and  outright  example  of  creative
destruction under the financialized principles of globalized capitalism where profit extraction is
above everything. For instance, Lafarge, that recently merged with Holcim, owned a factory in
the Syrian war zone. In order to continue producing low cost cement in the war zone, an area that
used large quantitities of cement for military purposes and reparations, it paid the Islamic State
13 million Euro  that controlled the area in order to allow the continuation of  cement production
in Jalabiya, northern Syria12. Lafarge chose to close the cement factory in Chalkida and paid in
order to keep the one Syria active for the sake of profit  maximization.  The cement plant in
Chalkida  was  a  multimillion  investment  for  Lafarge,  and as  the  factory  workers  elaborated,
during  the  recent  crisis  of  neoliberal  capitalism,  it  became  more  profitable  for  Lafarge  to
restructure its production, drop their existing investments and sell their emission rights to other
factories in Europe, than to keep the factory open. In this circle of capital accumulation, the lives
of the workers who were left unemployed in the midst of the crisis simply did not matter and the
right “to conduct business” according to the European Court of Justice, took precedence over the
rights of people. Furthermore, as the workers elaborated, Lafarge did not go bankrupt as did
other companies in Greece that closed their production sites. Lafarge chose to keep the factory
closed. But it kept renewing the mining rights and the port license for a factory that did not
12 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/28/lafarge-charged-with-complicity-in-syria-crimes-against-  
humanity (Last accessed 13/10/2019).
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operate,  which  showed that  economic  power  entails  great  political  power  as  well.  In  2015,
Lafarge had merged with Holcim and had an annual turnover of nearly one fourth of Greece’s
GDP - thus it could exercise great political pressure through its economic power13 and impose its
interests on Greek governments. 
     Furthermore, creative destruction pertains the Greek project of modern development.
Harvey (1973, 1985, 2001, 2005, 2010) elaborates on the systemic contractions of capitalism in
the  production  of  the  urban  environment.   The  Old  buildings  of  medieval  Chalkida  were
creatively destroyed and were replaced by modern concrete constructions. Modern buildings of
the early 20th century were again creatively destroyed through the antiparochi model. Numerous
neoclassical  buildings  were  given,  via  antiparochi.  to  construction  firms  for  the  building  of
apartment blocks and offices. This illuminates Bremman’s (1987) point: not even the assets of
bourgeois society can escape since “all that is solid melts into air.”  Creative destruction through
the  practice  of  antiparochi begun  with  medieval  buildings  of  the  12th to  18th century  that
occupied the heart of Chalkida’s city; then, it swallowed neoclassical buildings that the upper
classes of Chalkida  constructed in late 19th and early 20th century; and finally antiparochi trend
moved to the areas where the Asian Minor immigrants had built their humble houses. Walking in
the streets of Chalkida, one can identify when each neighborhood was “antiparochisized”. 
 In the case of Greece and Chalkida, creative destruction has had symbolic meanings too.
Chalkida  was  a  significant  medieval  port  which  suffered  under  various  foreign  occupying
powers.  The  destruction  of  past  materialities,  fostered  the  creation  of  the  modern  national
identity  of Greece.  Ottoman mosques,  Venetian and Ottoman fortifications and infrastructure
were demolished in order to make way for modernity. The inhabitants of the city used these
materials to build new constructions and to enable the city to advance according to the dominant
western model of capitalism. Advances in capital accumulation processes in the era of cement
reshaped not only the economy of Chalkida but also its culture. First of all, when Chalkida was
established as a center for the industrial areas around it, industrial income became embedded in
its society. Even though other professions and vocations existed in the market, they had largely
been created by the circulation of capital  that the factories provided. As a result,  Chalkida’s
13 https://www.lafargeholcim.com/a-new-leader-a-new-world-lafargeholcim-officially-launched-around-globe    
(Last Accessed 10/02/2020) Nearly 50 billion euros in 2015, when Greece’s GDP was below 200 billion. 
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cultural  capital  was  shaped  mostly  by  migrant  peasant  populations  who,  at  least  partially,
transformed themselves into proletarians. Therefore, the market(s) of Chalkida adapted to serve
the needs of industrial workers that sustained it.
It was upon industrial labor that the cultural habitus of the city was constructed. Despite
the  radical  increase  in  people’s  purchasing  power  and  knowledge,  social  and  economic
reproduction practices in fact reproduced the industrial model of exploitation (Bourdieu 1977;
1990, Narotzky 2007) The livelihood projects and upward mobility aspirations for  the residents
of  Chalkida  were  shaped  by  and  orbited  around  the  industrial  sector,  and  thus  multiple
generations were recycled into the industrial labor model.    
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Chapter 2
The Quest for Modernity: A Brief
History of the Greek Project of
Development
Introduction
In this Chapter I, address the political and economic history of the modern Greek state in
order  to  lay  out  the  historical  processes  that  have  shaped  Greek  society.  In  my  view,  it  is
necessary to place ethnographic observations within the greater political and economic history of
Greece in order to understand how the national and international scales produce local models and
grassroots practices.  Therefore, I give special attention to the national level of Greece’s process
of formation which has, in many instances, shaped the social, political and economic habitus of
Greeks. One can identify numerous repetitions throughout modern Greek history; one such is
indebtedness, which has played a role in political choices and decision making processes for
dealing with every economic crisis  of the past.  No less than four bankruptcies and multiple
socio-cultural and political crises are inscribed in the Greek national habitus. In other words,
Greek people’s habitus has been forged by modern history’s crises, hence past crisis experiences
inform the present (Knight, 2015; Knight and Stewart, 2016). I want also to show how Greece’s
economic history is intertwined with various political and social changes and transformations of
modern Greek society. Much of my ethnographic data on practices, patterns, and narratives of
everyday life in Greece can be better understood by looking back to critical junctures in the
socio-political and economic history of the Greek nation-state. 
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The Greek  state  was  born  with  external  debt  within  the  wider  context  of  the  global
emergence of nationalism and nation-states. As with many post-colonial states in South America,
the 1821 Greek revolution was funded by British and French banks who provided speculative
loans to Greek rebels14 to buy military equipment. Indebtedness has been a means for creditors to
impose and direct national development projects, not only in Greece but also in Peru (Palacios,
1983), Chile (Agrawal, 1996; Halsey, 1977), Venezuela and Argentina (Maritchal, 1989). The
emergence of nationalism in the new global articulation of power (Anderson, 2016) coincided
with the fall of the Ottoman empire in the East and the collapse of the colonial regimes in North
and South America. In addition, it is linked with the rise of capitalist accumulation processes that
operate, at a global scale, through debt (Graeber, 2014). 
From 1827  until  the  dawn  of  the  20th century,  the  borders  of  the  Greek  state  were
expanding and hence a coherent plan of modernization could not be implemented. Channeling
most  of  its  resources  into fighting offensive wars,  the Greek state,  which was also severely
indebted, had neither the time nor the resources to develop modern mechanisms and institutions.
Capitalist advances in the economy and the early 20 th century’s industrialization project were
crushed with the devastating German occupation of Greece during the Second World War and the
civil war that followed. As a result, capitalism’s advance was significantly delayed. Processes
that took centuries in the industrial core countries of the West, were condensed in Greece into the
last  five  decades  of  the  past  century.  The  Greek  state  was  unprepared  and  lacked  the
organizational capacity to manage the more powerful force of capitalist invasion and the great
transformations that it would bring, such as the massive concentration of people in cities. The
widespread application of capitalist models along with the underdevelopment of state structures
and civil society produced catastrophic and unregulated development; for example, dysfunctional
and chaotic urban areas, unorganized industrial zones and ineffective bureaucratic institutions. 
The reasons for which Greece has remained a less economically developed country can
be traced to  the international  scale,  as  well  as  to  high  level  developments  in  the worlds  of
diplomacy and global  dominance.  Capitalism and modernity in Greece occurred at  the same
14 Despite the fact that the rebels had no official recognition, Rothschild bank speculatively issued loans to them 
on predatory terms (Toussaint, 2016).  The Greek state was born into a vicious circle of debt and economic 
supervision which fueled capital accumulation processes through debt and credit. Moreover, the military loans 
that were granted to Greece were channeled into the developing British and French war industries (Palacios, 
1983).
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time. The Greek economic habitus’ ‘modernity gap’ was concealed by the uninterrupted capitalist
growth that  took off  in  1950,  the  radical  improvement  of  peoples’ living  standards  and the
emergence of Greek middle and working classes. In contrast with the linear movement of the
core industrial economies where modernity produced capitalism, in Greece we can observe the
opposite - modernity was instead generated through capitalist means. 
In order to understand what crisis means and does today, and the grassroots narratives and
experiences of it that form the core of my analysis, one needs to identify historical continuities
and similarities. In the next sections of this chapter, I provide such an account, closing with a
consideration of the very recent history of Greece during the years of ‘non development’ and
imposed austerity.  I will focus on tracing an economic history of Greece that also pays attention
to geopolitics, and, in particular, the role of western European colonial states in shaping Greece’s
economic and social destiny.
67
2.1 Modernity and Development as Longue Durée Processes - The 
First Steps of Modernization (1827-1949)
The First Hellenic Republic to the Kingdom of Greece (1827-1843)
A declaration of bankruptcy immediately followed the foundation of the Greek state in 1827.
This allowed creditors to exercise political pressure and control via the financial instrument of
debt. Thus, the first Hellenic Republic was dependent on its creditors to provide it with further
loans for it to develop and sustain itself, while at the same time having to settle the debts it had
accumulated during the war of independence. In 1830, the three superpowers, Russia, Britain and
France formed the first Troika (Toussaint, 2017) to ensure both the repayment of the military
loans Greek rebels had obtained to fund the revolution against the Ottoman occupation (1824-
1825) and agreed to  provide  a new loan of 60 million French francs. After the assassination of
Ioannis Kapodistrias,15 the country came to the brink of civil war, and so the three superpowers
intervened by appointing the Bavarian prince, Otto von Wittelsbach, king of Greece. The three
superpowers compelled Otto and his council to follow their own geopolitical agenda and ordered
them not to engage in war with the Ottomans. British diplomacy prevailed in 1830s, with Britain
aiming to prevent Russian expansion in the Mediterranean. With the imminent collapse of the
Ottoman  Empire,  the  Russians,  for  their  part,  favored  the  creation  of  a  Balkan  Union  of
Christian-Orthodox states,  which  would  allow them access  to  the  Mediterranean (Tsoucalas,
1969). Since this time, Greece has remained a field for the waging of higher-level geopolitical
struggles over world dominance, a diplomatic battleground which has left little space for the
independent  evolution  of  local  and  national  projects.  Thus,  the  Greek  state  was  more  a
protectorate  than  an  independent  entity.  It  must,  furthermore,  have  been  traumatic  for  the
impoverished Greek population, who fought in the war of independence against Ottoman rule, to
find themselves hostage to  the agendas  of their  creditors.  By 1833, the territories of Greece
included Central Greece (including the island of Evia, my fieldsite), the Peloponnese and the
Cycladic islands. 
15 Ioannis Kapodistrias was a former minister of the Tsar and was appointed by the three superpowers as the first 
governor of Greece. He was appointed with forming modern structures of a constitutional democracy. 
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 The 1821 Greek revolution, which was inspired by French liberal democracy, appeared to
fail as the new regime reproduced the inequalities of the Ottoman system. Since Otto was only
17 years  old  when  he  was  declared  King,  a  Regency  council,  which  consisted  of  Bavarian
administrators, took over governance.  Hence the modern Greek nation-state’s first  regulatory
mechanisms were developed by an unpopular  Regency council  that was perceived as a new
occupying force that replaced the Ottomans. The period between 1832 and 1835 became known
as the Bavarocracy, a period which coincides with early attempts at bureaucratization,16 a term
which one could easily rename “bavarocratization”. As a result, the first coherent plan of the
modern era to develop an organized state with social, economic and political structures along
with regulatory mechanisms, was formulated by the Bavarians. This fact shaped Greeks’ initial
relations with the state;  they viewed it  as something that  was neither theirs  nor designed to
protect  their  interests.  On  the  contrary,  it  undermined people’s  interests:  the  state’s  higher
military and administrative positions were occupied by Bavarian officials who, despite imposing
financial  austerity  on  the  population,  continued  to  enjoy  plentiful  benefits.  Britain  and  the
Rothschild bank, who had underwritten Greek loans, insisted on financial stringency. As a result,
Greeks  were  soon  heavily  taxed,  more  so  than  when  they  had  been  under  Ottoman  rule
(Petropoulos, 1968). Many Greeks, including those who had actively taken part in the war of
independence,  were excluded from the formal political  system that was in the making while
others, such as the major general and hero of the Greek revolution, Theodoros Kolokotronis,17
were imprisoned and sentenced to death for threatening the social cohesion of the nation. The
imposition of monarchy in Greece therefore had neither popular support nor the necessary social
consent and representation.
 In 1833, the capital of Greece was transferred to Athens, which at that time was a small
town of 4000 to 5000 inhabitants.  As Tsoucalas (1969) notes,  in  1832, 95 percent  of Greek
citizens were living in rural areas. Thus, the majority of Greeks were illiterate and lacked the
skills and knowledge for incorporation into the modern social, political and economic system.
16 The Greek word for state is kratos, which literally means ‘to hold power’.  
17 He was issued a pardon by the King himself and died just before Otto handed a constitution to the Greeks in 
1843. Kolokotronis’ prosecution was often used as an example by some of my male interlocutors (above 50) to 
describe how unjust and problematic the Greek state has always been, as it turned against and prosecuted its 
own citizens.
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During Otto’s reign, the public education system was developed in line with Bavarian norms18
(Seidl, 1984) and Greece got its first university, named after the king. In 1843, Greece was again
forced to default, and a new memorandum was signed with the three superpowers. This included
austerity  measures  that  bear  a  striking  similarity  with  current  measures,  for  example,  wage
postponement, mass lay-offs in the public sector and cancelation of ongoing and future public
infrastructure projects. For the next 35 years, while it continued to accumulate debt, Greece’s
economy was isolated from international markets (Tsoulfidis & Zoumpoulakis, 2016). From the
loan of 60 million francs, Greece received 40 million and only 2.7 million of that amounts was
used for public investment in infrastructure, while the rest was used to repay the state’s existing
debts  (Toussaint,  2017,  Tsoulfidis  &  Zoumpoulakis,  2016).  Shortly  after  the  declaration  of
bankruptcy, the September’s 3rd rebellion forced the King to draw up a constitution and to allow
Greeks to participate  in  the political  system, accessing both administrative and high ranking
military positions (Clogg, 1979). 
It is important to note here that political and financial control through indebtedness was a
successful strategy that the British deployed not only in Greece but also in other parts of the
world. Thus Britain funded the independence wars in Latin America (Agrawall, 1996; Maritchal,
1989; Palacios, 1983) and then used debt to impose its own diplomatic and geopolitical agenda
on the new states. These new states, that emerged from successful revolutions against the rival
colonial powers of Spain and Portugal, needed financial aid in order to develop. This gave a
great deal of leverage to the lending parties in negotiations over the terms of repayment and of
the provision of new loans. As in Greece, very little of the loaned capital ended up in the new
states’ treasuries  (ibid,  Toussaint,  2017).   At  the  dawn of  the  19th century,  nationalism and
nationalist projects, which fuelled independence wars in both the Balkans and Latin America,
were  hegemonic  across  the  globe.  This  was  because  they  resonated  profoundly  with  the
aspirations  for  emancipation  of  oppressed  and,  in  many  instances,  impoverished  peoples.
Nationalism was a project which, on the one hand was mediated by wealthy western countries
and on the other, emerged from an internal grassroots process that constructed its own rhetoric.
Greek  nationalism  and  the  ‘Great  Greek  Idea’19 were,  for  instance,  byproducts  of  global
18 Elementary school in Greece is still called dimotikó which means ‘municipal’.  
19 Greek nationalism’s popular ideology centered on the idea of recovering those territories it lost to the Ottomans, 
and reviving Byzantium.
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restructurings of power. Moreover, Greece’s ancient past, which was rediscovered by the West
during  the  Renaissance  and  Enlightenment  periods  -  at  the  same  time  as  the  discipline  of
archaeology was created,  made Greece a mythological site.  The country’s territory abounded
with  precious  antiquities  whose  possession  western  bourgeois  society  hungered after.  In  this
light, ancient antiquities were equivalent to the Latin American gold that colonial powers sought
to  extract.  Although foreign  archeologists  had  been conducting  excavations  since  before  the
Greek revolution, it was during this period that various archaeological schools were founded in
the country, with the most prominent ones being the British, French and American. In many
instances,  those  schools  behaved  as  (crypto)colonial  agents  that  smuggled  archaeological
material abroad and sold it at high profits to European and US auction houses.
The Constitutional Monarchy (1843-1862) 
In  1843,  Greece’s  political  system  was  transformed  from  one  of  absolute  to  constitutional
monarchy. Full male suffrage was granted, including both the right to elect and to be elected.
This change was welcomed by the three superpowers who thereafter openly and directly shaped
politics  by  controlling  politicians.  There  were  three  political  parties,  with  each  in  turn
representing the interests of France, Britain and Russia. This fact was stressed by a few of my
informants in Chalkida, in order to underline the idea that Greeks have never had an independent
nation-state that could define its own fate without the approval of foreign powers. European
admiration of ancient Greek civilization had stirred empathy towards the oppressed Greeks and
fed into the emergence of Philhellenism, which itself provided material  to Greek nationalists
seeking to trace their nation’s roots back to ancient times, constructing a narrative of historical
continuity. Nationalism and Greek nationalist struggles were thereby endowed with nobility in
their claims over the Greek lands that the Ottomans had occupied for almost half a millennium.
In Greece, therefore, the nation represents an imagined entity not only in spatial terms but also in
temporal  ones.  Greek  nationalism’s  historical  interpretations  and  justifications  provided  a
collective vision for the future for Greek subjects and contributed to maintaining national and
social cohesion. (Tsoucalas, 1969, Petropoulos, 1968). 
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 As discontent against  him grew, King Otto made a deliberate effort  to placate public
opinion: he indulged the popular ‘Great Idea’ by allying with the Russians in the Crimean war in
1853, and opted to annex Thessaly, a region where many Greeks still lived under Ottoman rule.
That proved to be catastrophic for the Greeks; since it was a violation of its creditors’ terms, the
port  of  Piraeus  was  blockaded  by  British  and  French  ships  in  order  to  force  Greece  into
neutrality. Despite his unpopularity and his incompetence in the sphere of politics, it was under
Otto’s reign that the first modern foundations were established in Greece. 
The Crown Republic (1863 – 1924)
Otto was overthrown in 1862. The superpowers, favored the nomination of the Danish prince
William  of  Schleswig-Holstein-Sonderburg-Glücksburg  as  king.  Renamed  George  I,  he  was
crowned in 1863 when he drew up a new constitution. The British ceded the Ionian Islands to the
Greek state as a gift to the new monarch who reigned from 1863 until his assassination in 1913
in Thessaloniki.  From 1864 to 1874,  a  period of stagnation and trouble,  Greece faced great
political  instability  and had 21 different  governments.  In  1878, the Treaty of  Berlin  granted
Thessaly to Greece and in 1882, Charilaos Trikoupis, the leader of the Modernist  party was
appointed prime minister. He succeeded in putting an end to the political instability. The gradual
expansion  of  Greece’s  territory  also  generated  economic  benefits  and Greece  re-entered  the
world market after being excluded from it for the preceding 35 years as a result of the default
(Reinhart  & Rogoff,  2011).  As  foreign  credit  inflow permitted,  Trikoupis  set  into  motion  a
modernization agenda to develop public infrastructure (railroads and ports) and to establish an
organized  army  and  naval  fleet.  Greece’s  largest  infrastructure  projects  to  date  were  the
development of the railway network and the opening of the Corinth canal. He also managed to
attract  industrial  investment  and  the  first  industrial  cores  developed  further  away  in  Syros,
Piraeus, Thebes, Volos and in my field site, Chalkida (Chapter 1). Another important reform that
Trikoupis  implemented  was  the  land  reform  and  redistribution  of  large  tsiflikia to  Greek
Christians (Patronis, 2015).  Tsiflikia were large estates run according to the Ottoman empire’s
land tenure system, similar to that of European feudalism, in which the ruling Ottoman elite
owned the land which peasants lived and worked on (Thompson, 1971, 1964). This reform was
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made imperative after the annexation of Thessaly in 1881 which incorporated the largest area of
agricultural land in Greece, the valley of the Pineios River. 
During this  period,  the industrial  sector’s development was at  a very early stage and
Greece’s based its plans for economic growth  on upgrading its existing agricultural methods in
order  to  satisfy  internal  consumption  (Tsoulfidis  &  Zoumpoulakis,  2016).  Trikoupis’
modernization plan required vast  loans and as a result  the state’s foreign debt  rose from 75
percent of GDP in 1886 to 220 percent in 1896. In 1893, Trikoupis declared the third sovereign
default. Although Greece received 639.7 million French francs, only 20 percent of this sum was
ultimately  invested  in  productive  uses,  since  the  rest  was,  once  again,  used  to  repay  old
obligations  plus  the  accumulated  interest  on  the  previous  1832  loans  (Tsoulfidis  &
Zoumpoulakis,  2016).  The restructuring  of  the  external  debt  as  well  as  the  founding of  the
‘Etairia ton Monopolíon’20  were drastic measures that were taken immediately after the default,
and which  maintained a  credit  flow that  further  increased  Greece’s  external  debt  (Romaios,
2012). In 1897, Greece suffered a humiliating defeat during its 31 day war to annex Crete. It was
forced to seek military aid from its allies (and creditors) and to call a cease fire in order to avoid
a  retaliatory  Ottoman  invasion.  Greece  exited  the  war  without  territorial  losses  but  with  a
humiliating war reparation debt to the Ottomans that was added to the existing one. Moreover,
the Greeks were obliged to submit to an International Financial Commission (IFC) that consisted
of  Britain,  France,  Austria,  Germany,  Russia  and Italy,  which  extended its  jurisdiction  from
taxation  management  to  the  ways  in  which  the  government  conducted  its  monetary  policy
(Waibel, 2014).    
The  Greek  economy  managed  to  recover  quickly  after  the  default  and  the  capitalist
development of the country was boosted. From 4000 inhabitants in 1833, Athens’ population
reached 44,000 in 1870 and in 1896, it had 123,000 (Tung, 2001) of the 2.5 million who lived in
the  Greek  territories  (Kotzamanis  & Androulaki,  2000).  As  a  result,  economic  growth  was
centered  on  the  Greek  capital  which  attracted  most  of  the  industrial  investment  and  made
imperative the development of an infrastructure to serve a centralized capitalist  development
20 A company that imposed a special tax in the consumption of tobacco, playing card decks, petrol, matches, salt 
and other goods. The company’s funds were given over as a guarantee to the creditors. Later it was renamed the 
Public Debt Administration Company.
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(Hadjimichalis,  1987).  In  the  early  1900s  the  first  heavy  industries  appeared  in  Athens  and
Piraeus, however their scale of operation was rather small. First of all, there was no skilled labor
force to do the work and since most Greeks were relatively poor and lacked financial resources,
the  national  market  could  not  adsorb  industrial  production.  The  high  import  taxes  that  the
advanced economies had set on foreign goods made it impossible for Greek industries to operate
at  the  international  scale.  Therefore  industrial  production  remained  low  as  demand  in  the
domestic market was low and the majority of the Greek population lived and operated at the
margins of the capitalist  system. The leading industries were the textile production and food
processing units which were mostly small family owned businesses. The annexation of Thessaly
in 1881 enabled the foundation of a small scale textile sector and the upgrading of the means of
agricultural production. Therefore, the use of the word ‘industry’ in those times refers to small
scale light manufacturing units that incorporated machinery into the production process (shoe,
cloth,  and  textile,  wood  and  metal  processing,  ice  production)   as  well  as  food  processing
industries (olive oil, soap, alcohol, pastry production) that operated at the limited local scales
(Agriantoni, 1986). 
The Great Expansion of Greece and the Fall (1910 – 1924) 
Venizelos’ shrewd diplomatic skills played a determining role in the geopolitical restructurings in
the Balkans that the fall of the Ottoman empire provoked. A great number of Greeks wanted to
join the military campaigns not only to serve nationalistic ideals but also as a way of prospering
and improving their livelihoods.  In 1913, after the resolution of the First Balkan War (8th 
 October 1912 - 30th May 1913), Greece expanded its northern borders to include Thessaloniki
along with southern Macedonia, Epirus and Crete. Thessaloniki was a major city of 150,000
which in 1913 had a mixed population of Christian-Slavs, Christian-Greeks, Muslims and Jews,
equal to the population of Athens.  The spoils of war became a matter of dispute among the allied
forces of Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia and Montenegro, that led to the second Balkan War (16th June
–  18th July  1913).  The  Greeks  captured  a  big  part  of  Western  Thrace  while  the  region  of
Macedonia  was  split  in  three  with  the  Greeks  and  the  Serbs  having the  biggest  share.  The
aftermath of the second Balkan war found Bulgarians being isolated from having access to the
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Aegean fueling revanchist ideas that would take effect in World War I. By the end of the First
and Second Balkan Wars, Greece had expanded its territories by 68 percent and its population
had grown from 2.5 to 4.4 million (Grenville & Wasserstein, 2001: 50).  
In this project of expansion, women played a central role. Until 1910, women, who still
did not have the right to vote or participate in the political sphere, were not included in the nation
formation process, and were recognized by the state only as mothers, daughters or wives. In
1911, the Lyceum Club of Greek Women was founded in order to promote women’s rights to
work and education. In terms of the timing of its precise goals, the Lyceum Club was established
to support and empower women who had been widowed by war. Its main activity was to promote
female literacy by assigning women the role of safeguarding and promoting Greek customs and
tradition. Folk songs, dances and craft(wo)manship were married with modern ideas, in a sense
reinventing  tradition  and  locating  it  within  the  dominant  national  narrative  and  the  nation
formation  process  (Hertzfeld,  1982).  As  Stoler  (1989)  has  argued,  modernity  and  the  social
reproduction  of  the  nation  were  carried  out  by  women  who  were  held  responsible  for
implementing  modernity  at  the  household  level.  The  national  conscience  of  Greeks  was
constructed on tradition which was reinvented to adhere to the nationalistic project.  Tradition
was facilitated by the Greek state in national formation of Greece in order to produce collective
symbols, meanings,  and practices  and to construct a historical continuity (Hobsbawm, 1983).    
 On the eve of World War I, Greece was divided between royalists/conservatives who  had
sympathy towards the Axis powers, and liberals that supported Venizelos who wanted Greece to
be allied with Entente.  Greece was led to the National Schism (Leon, 1974; Mazower, 1992)
and  the  country  was  split  in  two.  A provisional  government  was  founded  by  Venizelos  in
Thessaloniki and another one with the King’s support was formed in Athens. Military pressure
by the British and the French navy that, once again blockaded the port of Piraeus, forced the
King  to change his mind. As a result, Greece entered the war belatedly on the side of the Allied
forces of the Entente. Venizelos’ diplomacy triumphed once again after the end of World War I,
and even though Greece had entered the war late and without any promises regarding territorial
gains, Greek demands were all accepted. While Greek nationalism advanced, the Ottomans, who
fought on the side of the central powers, suffered major losses. In Asia Minor, the region around
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Smyrna - another important city were many Greeks lived and thrived – would hold a plebiscite in
5 years time in order to decide whether it would become part of the Greek state or remain in the
Ottoman empire. The Greek population in Smyrna was larger than that of Athens which, in the
1920s, had around 473,000 inhabitants (Tung, 2001) while in the region Smyrna, 400,000 to
620,000  Greeks  were  estimated  to  resided  in  1910  (Dragistineva,  2011;  Montgomery,  1972
Pentzopoulos,  2002;  Zamir,  1981),  still,  a  significant  number  of  people  compared  to  the
demographics of Greece. Venizelos along with the British support that controlled the Ottoman
government launched an offensive attack to secure the area of Smyrna and to liberate other areas
that  were  inhabited  by  Greek  speaking  populations.  The  constant  warfare  had  wounded
Venizelos’ popularity and he lost the elections to the royalists. 
The Royalists  who initially  planned to  disengage from the  offensive war in  Anatolia
continued  further  instead  and  marched  towards  Ankara.  The  French  and  British,  who  were
Greece’s allies, with the Royalists and King Constantine, withdrew their support. The country
was headed to one of its greatest national catastrophes, that which resulted in the population
exchange between Greece and Turkey.  Hundreds of thousands Greeks had to flee their homes
and thousands were murdered or imprisoned during Turkish retaliation. This was a crisis which
profoundly  marked  Greeks  and  hurt  their  national  pride.  A deep  wound  of  the  lost  patria
(hamenes patrides) was opened which still stirs feelings of collective suffering and has strong
nationalist overtones. The crisis of 1922 crushed plans to take back Konstantinoupoli (Istanbul)
and wounded Greek national ideals. 
The Interwar Period (1924-1940)
After the end of the Greco-Turkish war, a compulsory exchange of populations between Greece
and Turkey, based on religious identity, was agreed in the treaty of Lausanne (1923). Turkey
formalized the flight of its native Greek population while Greece redistributed the lands of the
nearly 400,000 expelled Muslims to the population of 1.6 million displaced Orthodox Greeks
(Howland,  1926;  Motta,  2013).  As  Shields  (2013)  asserts,  the  population  exchange  was  an
internationally administered ethnic cleansing process that produced a homogenized population,
in which citizenship became equal to nationality, and nationality in turn was defined by language
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and religion. Greeks saw that their allies had betrayed them, doing nothing to stop the Turkish
army’s slaughter at Smyrna. The exchange of Christian and Muslim populations between Greece
and Turkey completely reconfigured the demographics of the Greek state, which also lost Eastern
Thrace and the Islands of Imbros and Tenedos to Turkey. Major Greek cities filled with refugees
who were piled up in camps and temporary reservation settlements. These events produced an
identity shock for Greeks who not only saw the Great Idea collapse, but who also viewed the
new Christian populations as a threat to the nation (Clark, 2009). Those populations who had lost
almost  everything  had  to  build  a  new  life  in  Greece  from  the  ground  up.  They  were  an
exploitable workforce for the developing capitalism in Greece, and their bodies were used as
vehicle to advance industrialization (Hirschon, 1989). The population of Athens nearly doubled
after the population exchange.  New neighborhoods and districts  appeared on the Greek map
which were exclusively inhabited by immigrants from Asia Minor (in Greece the term prosfigas
or refugee is used). The exchange of populations created a homogenous social body with distinct
national  characteristics.  Greeks citizenship was granted on the dual  basis  of    language and
religion.  The  annexations  of  southern  Macedonia  and  the  migration  flows  from Asia  Minor
almost tripled the number of inhabitants of the Greek state before WWI. These new inhabitants
did  not  share  a  common language and in  many instances,  with  the  exception  of  the  Slavic
speaking populations who were Orthodox Christian, the new populations were Muslim, a fact
that was largely a product of the population exchange and the acculturation project in those areas
where  non  Greek  speaking  populations  used  to  live.  As  a  result,  the  1821  revolution  was
reinterpreted on the basis of Greekness instead of the general discontent that Ottoman rule had
caused in  the  Balkans,  and which  united  oppressed  people  regardless  of  their  language and
religion. The class characteristics of the independence war and the organized revolution in the
Balkans were therefore disregarded, and the focus placed on its national characteristics. From
1925 to 1928, the Greek state changed the names of over 2500 villages and towns that did not
have a Greek name. It did so in order to support nationalistic discourse and the myths of the
Greek nation, and to put an end to Bulgarian claims over the regions of Thrace and Macedonia
(Lithoksoou, 1991; Karakisidou, 2000). However even today and all across Greece, many Slavic,
Turkish and Vlach toponyms survive. 
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The aftermath of the catastrophe and the population exchange created one of Greece’s
largest social and political crises. The radical increase of displaced populations created the need
for extensive urbanization and produced a wave of unorganized urban expansion that provoked
structural shocks for the underdeveloped Greek state. The state’s formal regulatory mechanisms
were not fit for coping with the migratory flows and as a result, anarchy prevailed. For a great
majority of the impoverished masses, economic growth was not evident and the development of
modern structures and cultural paradigms was delayed by ongoing warfare. 
In economic terms, political  instability  was expressed in  an economy that  lacked the
modern bases of industrial  development  (Patronis,  2015,  Dertilis,  2005).  Thus far,  economic
growth in modern Greece had been achieved through territorial expansion rather than through
rationalization or an overhaul of socioeconomic structures. At the national level, the focus was
mostly on expanding the nation’s borders. Very little attention was paid to improving the living
standards of the people, which was a secondary political project, bound up nevertheless with
territorial expansion. In an extensive study of Greek economic history, Patronis (2015) shows
that the state was the sole large-scale employer in Greece and half of the urban population got
permanent or sporadic access to the job market through it. The job market was not yet a capitalist
one and the state was the sole employer providing modern waged labor contracts. Industrial
waged laborers were therefore very few and there were no organized labor unions, no protests for
labor  rights  or  other  organized,  class  based  claims  regarding  labor.  The  state  was  a  rather
privileged field that everyone sought to have access to as it could provide a stable cash income
and a radical improvement in livelihood. Further, until the dawn of 20th century, it was also the
exclusive agent of modernity. Since that time, it has been a common perception that becoming a
civil servant is an employment move that can solve an individual’s economic struggles.21 The
rural to urban migrants who sought employment in the city had very few regular employment
opportunities outside the public sector and, according to Patronis’ figures (2015), one fourth of
the working population was dependent on the public sector in 1870, with the rest being occupied
21 The Greek folk expression that people often use to describe the condition of being a civil servant is ‘minas 
mpainei, minas vgainei, vreksei, hionisei, o misthos mpainei’ (Month comes in, month comes out, [whether] it 
rains [or] snows, the salary comes in), which means that one does  not have to worry about one’s monthly 
income as it flows every month. This folk expression has its roots in the peasant background and habitus of rural
to urban migrants. 
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mostly in agriculture and to a lesser extent in self-employment, ratios that remained unchanged
until 1923. 
 During the interwar period, established patterns of making a living changed. The peasant
populations who sought to improve their livelihoods in the cities had to compete with the large
migrant populations who settled in the centers of the major cities. In many instances the question
of Greekness - which was tied to nationality and citizenship, along with the privileges these
entailed - was raised, and the newly arrived refugees faced social racism and exclusion (Clark
2006; Hirschon, 1989). The state was faced with the task of socially, culturally and economically
assimilating more than a million displaced people, and finding employment for them.  The job
market for the growing industrial sector became very competitive among unskilled workers who
sold their labor cheap. The upper class shifted their interests to industrial investment as they had
at  their  disposal  a  large,  desperate  labor  force  with  no  established working rights,  no  class
conscience and a political system which, easily manipulated, favored their interests. Industrial
capitalism was thus established late in Greece,  which up until  the 20 th century it  had a pre-
modern,  pre-capitalist  economic  base.   In  1926 the  heavy industrial  sector  was almost  non-
existent (Agriantoni,  2011; Tzokas,  2002) and, as Pizanias  (1993) shows, due to the lack of
waged labor, during the interwar period, impoverished populations in the cities developed self-
employment as a survival strategy. Street vendors sold items that people needed, from food to
commodities,  and  various  service  providers  (transportation,  construction,  on-demand  labor,
tailors,22 waiters)  literally  invented  themselves  in  order  to  fulfill  various  social  and  modern
needs, thereby becoming what we might call petty entrepreneurs. The state could not control
these grassroots economic activities and self-employment was to a great extent unregulated. In
many instances,  when the task required it,  they employed others (kin and friends) in  varied
working patterns (Pizanias, 1993). In this way, they created informal co-operatives to adapt to
the lack of regular employment and resource scarcity. This so called informal economic sector
proved life saving and ensured the social reproduction of the impoverished masses in the cities.
More interestingly, this informal economic sector was produced by capitalist development. It is
therefore  not  the  case,  as  mainstream economists  (Lewis,  1954;  ILO,  1972)  argue,  that  the
22 Women who owned a sewing machine. 
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informal  economic  sector  in  undeveloped  countries  fades  as  soon  as  industrialization  is
completed.
 In 1928, a project to settle refugee populations in rural areas by providing them with land
ownership rights  so that they could cultivate the land was implemented.  More than 140,000
families benefitted from the project and settled in rural areas of Greece that had previously been
inhabited  and exploited  by  Muslims.  In  the  cities,  the  state  created  settlement  schemes  and
provided  loans  to  develop  small,  usually  cooperative  workshops  and  small  (in  terms  of
employment) production units (Patronis, 2015: 167). The government promoted cooperativism as
a way of tackling the refugee crisis, and various cooperatives emerged. However, as Mazower
(2002)notes,  most of the cooperatives’ members did not develop mutual responsibility and a
sense of solidarity, rather, they saw the cooperative as an instrument for extracting credit from
the banks (Patronis & Mavreas 2004). Another major economic development was the foundation
of the Greek Central Bank in 1927, which tied the Greek drachma to the gold standard. The Bank
was in fact a private institution, its shareholders were unknown to the public and the state could
not hold more than 35 percent of its shares. Until 1927, the National Bank of Greece (NBG)
counted amongst its duties the printing of money, and its was argued that since it was also a
commercial bank, it should not operate at that institutional level and design monetary policy.
 In  1929, the Agricultural  Bank of Greece was founded in order  to provide loans to
farmers, while the National Bank of Greece dominated the industrial and manufacturing sector.
During the Great Depression, the Agricultural Bank issued loans equal to 1.3 billion drachmas to
support  agriculture  (Stefanides,  2006).  In  addition,  in  1929,  EOT,  the  Greek  Tourism
Organization was founded and it attracted tourists from all over the world who came to enjoy
Greek summers (Tzokas, 2002). Last but not least, between 1928 and 1932, 3167 new schools
were built all over Greece (ibid).  In 1929, Venizelos foresaw that Communist and Anarchist
ideas  would  appeal  to  the  emerging   urban  proletariat.23 As  a  result,  he  passed  a  special
legislative act known as the  Idionymon which prosecuted those who tried to apply or express
ideas that could pose a threat to the established liberal democracy.24 Strikes and unionization
23  Indicative of industrial advance of Greece was the foundation of Seke (The Socialist Labor Party of Greece) in 
1918, the period in which a proletariat first appears in Greece.  
24 Interestingly, two of Venizelos’ major political collaborators, Papanastasiou and Kafantaris, suggested including
fascists in the Idionymon, an idea that Venizelos refused, probably because he was in diplomatic negotiations with
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were regarded as acts that threatened social cohesion and by 1930, most workers’ organizations
had been banned or dissolved. Hence unions and protest became illegal, and this was the first
legal  act  against  the left-wing in  Greece  (Mazower,  1992).  Venizelos  was after  all  a  liberal
influenced  by  French  and  British  political  philosophers  of  liberalism,  and  he  wanted  to
modernize Greece according to western principles of liberal democracy and using Britain and
France’s capitalist  economic development as models.  For example,  anticommunism was very
well established in Britain, given that the Russian Revolution and Stalin’s plans had constituted
the most important threat to their global domination. 
 The effects  of  the  Great  Depression,  a  consequence  of  the  1929 U.S.  crisis,  became
evident  in  Greece in  1932. Economic growth once again ceased and a fourth declaration of
sovereign default became inevitable. Venizelos’ government took measures such as devaluing the
drachma by 60 percent in order to boost exports of tobacco and raisins, and to promote domestic
self-sufficiency by boosting production and limiting imports. For instance, in 1924, two thirds of
national wheat needs were fulfilled by imports while in 1932, Greece had become self-sufficient
(Tsouflidis,  2015; Agrιantoni & Panselina,  2003 ). Moreover,  the government refused to pay
foreign  creditors  and in  April  1932,  when national  debt  had  risen  above  70  percent  of  the
government  budget,  declared  a  default  (Tsoulfidis  & Zoumpoulakis,  2016;  Tsolufidis,  2015)
which prompted Venizelos to lose the following elections.
 Between 1933 and 1936, Greece experienced three military coups and five governments
led by the royalist Laikó Kómma (People’s Party or Popular Party). In 1935, a heavily rigged
plebiscite to reinstall the monarchy was held, and the Royalists won it with 98 percent of the
vote. A year later, after failing to form a government, one of the main representatives of the
Royalists, Ioannis Metaxas, organized a coup and installed a totalitarian regime that was in tune
with other southern European authoritarian regimes such as in Mussolini’s in Italy, Franco’s in
Spain and Salazar’s in Portugal. Metaxas was a military officer and a Royalist who had taken an
active  role  against  the  Venizelists  during  the  National  Schism of  1917.  He banned political
parties,  prosecuted  the  Communists  (using  Venizelos’  Idionymon)  and  imposed  harsh
the Italians who were still occupying the islands of the Dodecanese . 
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censorship.25 In 1937, industrial production increased by 51 percent (Tsoulfidis & Zoumpoulakis,
2016), a development that was led by Greek magnates such as Mpodosakis,  the patriarch of
Greek capitalism. Despite his ideological affiliation with Franco, Metaxas did not hesitate to
collude with Stalin and provided large quantities of ammunition to the anti-Franco forces in
Barcelona, thereby securing massive profits for the regime and for PYR-CAL (ΠΥΡ-ΚΑΛ) a
Greek ammunitions factory that Mpodosakis had founded. Under the Metaxas regime, the slogan
‘Patris,  Thriskeia,  Oikogenia’ (Fatherland,  Religion,  Family)  was  widely  used  in  order  to
describe the three pillars of Greek society. Gazi (2011) examines the history of the slogan which
has been used by extreme right wing parties and regimes since 1880. It links the Greek nation
with religion and tries to recuperate the idea of the lost Fatherland that was expressed in the
Great Idea. Family was understood in the patriarchal sense, with fixed gender roles. The use of
the slogan not  only pointed to  the three terms’ moral  values,  but was also used in order  to
highlight that these were undermined by traitors, enemies of the nation. 
The Second World War and the Greek Civil War (1940 – 1949)
Greece’s  capitalist  elites  were  strongly  Anglophile,  and  even  though  Metaxas  himself  was
ideologically  closer  to  Mussolini  and Hitler,  when Mussolini  demanded the  right  to  occupy
strategic Greek posts, he refused. After this, Greece entered the Second World War on the side of
the Allies.  Metaxas was proclaimed a national hero for having said the famous  Oxi (No) to
Mussolini that led to the heroic victory of the Greeks against the powerful Italian army in 1940,
generating international admiration for the Greek resistance and fueling the national pride of
Greeks all over the globe. He died in January 1941, a few months before the German invasion.
Metaxas remains a controversial figure in Greek history. Greece entered the Second World War
and suffered great losses under its occupation by Nazi forces. For instance, despite being a very
small country, the number of the human casualties it suffered was larger than those suffered by
Britain. Apart from the major losses in human lives, the country’s wealth was either dispossessed
25 Many books were banned, including Plato’s Republic, Goethe, Freud and Shaw (Petrakis, 2011; Koestler, 1969).
Under his regime, IKA, the social insurance institute (which exists to this today) was founded, and he established the
eight hour working day and founded the National Labor Service, for which Mussolini's regime served as a model.
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by occupying forces or was completely destroyed by the war. Modernization was once again at a
halt  and worse still,  whatever developments had been achieved to date were,  in one way or
another, destroyed. 
The German occupation was another  collective traumatic  experience,  which this  time
took place within Greece’s borders. My elderly informants, those who were more than 80 years
old,  still  have  vivid  memories  from this  period.  Ordinary  people’s  armed  resistance  to  the
occupation forces, which had been the first such resistance during the course of WWII, faced
severe  repression  by  the  Germans  who  sought  to  exploit  Greece’s  economy  by  any  means
necessary.  Hitler’s  policy  on  Greece  was  based  on  retaliatory  measures,  and  to  that  end,  a
company named Deridges was formed with branches in all major Greek cities. Its purpose was to
requisition the economy’s assets in order to sustain the German army. The plunder of all Greece’s
productive means resulted in the Great Famine of 1941 in Athens, when more than 40.000 people
died. Overall, it is estimated that by the end of the occupation, more than 300.000 people had
died of hunger and malnutrition (Mazower, 2008; Voglis, 2006: 22-24), and the industrial sector
was severely destroyed as was major infrastructure such as roads, ports and bridges. The Jewish
population of Greece was decimated with only around 10,000 out of the 77,000 surviving, either
by  going  into  hiding  or  by  joining  the  resistance  (Munoz,  2018).  The  Germans  forced  the
collaborationist Greek government to issue a compulsory war loan of 471 million reichsmarks to
Germany, and to pay the costs of occupation, in this way producing hyperinflation. 
The Greek resistance was formed mainly around EAM (The National Liberation Front)
and ELAS (The Greek Resistance Army) led by communist guerillas. Both however also had a
base of non-communist support. EDES (The National Republican Greek League) was formed
later and consisted of liberal Venizelists. They both fought on the same side and faced the so
called  Tagmata  Asfaleias (Security  Battalions)  of  the  Nazi  collaborators  who  were  hunting
communists  just  as  Metaxas  had  done  in  the  years  before  the  war.  Moreover,  at  this  point
Bulgaria seized the opportunity to fulfill the revanchist dream it had harbored since 1913, and
occupied most parts of Greek Macedonia and Thrace. By 1943, as the war came to an end, these
groups were fighting each other and preparing the ground for the Greek Civil war that followed.
When the war was over, Greece became the site for a struggle between the superpowers of the
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era. Britain supported EDES, while the Soviet Union dreamed of installing communism in the
Balkan region and furthering its influence in the peninsula. Since EAM-ELAS was the strongest
military formation of  the time,  and had great  popular  support  -  mostly  by non-communists,
Churchill feared that Greece might elect a communist government and the incidents known as
Dekemvriana therefore occurred.26 
When the Germans left the country in October 1944, it was agreed that all parties that had
taken part  in  the resistance struggle would be included in the government  as well  as  in  the
formation  of  a  new national  army under  the  command  of  the  British.  Britain’s  commander
Ronald  Scobie  demanded  a  unilateral  disarmament  of  EAM-ELAS on December  1st.  EAM-
ELAS’s  ministers  resigned  and  called  a  rally  on  December  3rd in  Athens  to  demand  the
punishment of Nazi collaborators and the retraction of Scobie’s order. More than 200.000 people
participated in the peaceful demonstration. Nonetheless the British and the Greek government, in
order to prevent the possibility of Greece becoming a People’s republic (Gerolymatos, 2017),
released many of the imprisoned Greek Nazi collaborators and positioned them in key roles in
the police and army. These forces ordered the crowd to dismantle and 28 people were killed and
hundreds wounded during the ensuing repression. Athens fell under British occupation, even as
the majority of Greeks thought of the British as liberators and allies.27 This caused a direct armed
confrontation between EAM and the government and later with British forces in Athens. EAM-
ELAS managed to take over Athens by mid-December 1944 and the British, being outnumbered,
were forced to flee. The armed conflict in Athens with the British did not escalate outside of the
Greek capital. Eventually EAM-ELAS could no longer hold Athens and signed an agreement to
disarm known as the Varkiza Treaty. At the time the country was in a state of anarchy with
numerous anti-communist gangs roving Athens and hunting communists and their supporters.
The historian Dunny Gluckstein (2012) suggests that the British deliberately delayed German
26 See https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/30/athens-1944-britains-dirty-secret (last accessed 
3/12/2019)
27 “The 1944 December uprising and 1946-49 civil war period infuses the present,” says the leading historian of 
these events, André Gerolymatos, “because there has never been a reconciliation. In France or Italy, if you 
fought the Nazis, you were respected in society after the war, regardless of ideology. In Greece, you found 
yourself fighting – or imprisoned and tortured by – the people who had collaborated with the Nazis, on British 
orders. There has never been a reckoning with that crime, and much of what is happening in Greece now is the 
result of not coming to terms with the past.” (source https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/30/athens-
1944-britains-dirty-secret ).
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withdrawal in order to prevent the liberation of Greece by ELAS. They did so, he writes, both for
symbolic reasons and because the Germans would have handed their weapons over to ELAS.
However, most of the countryside had already been liberated by EAM-ELAS before the allied
troops had reached them.  As a result  of these events,  Greek society was devastated,  highly
polarized and terrorized by the armed conflicts that continued to occur. The Greek Communist
Party had followed Stalin’s order not to engage in armed conflict with the British, yet EAM-
ELAS did not follow, especially given the ongoing attacks on communists by the other side’s
armed forces. 
In 1946, the royalist United Nationalist Party won the elections and in the same year they
held a plebiscite on whether to keep monarchy, which they won. This move caused an escalation
in  the  war  and ELAS-EAM formed the  Democratic  Army of  Greece  (Dimokratikos  Stratos
Ellados – DSE) which had its operation bases outside national borders (battalions in Egypt, the
Middle  East  and  Northern  Epirus)  had  support  from Albania,  Bulgaria  and Yugoslavia and
expected  help  from the  Soviet  Union.  On  the  other  side,  the  National  Army  of  the  Greek
government was backed up by the British at first and then by the USA (Gerolymatos, 2017).
With the support of its western Allies, both in terms of weapons and the definition of tactics, and
helped by the  political  split  between Stalin  and Tito (Service,  2010),  the government  Army
gained decisive ground. The war ended in 1949 when the National Army, backed by the US  air
force,  dropped  Napalm  bombs  on  the  mountains  of  Pindos,  Grammos  and  Vitsi,28 the  last
remaining strongholds of the Democratic Army. Thus Greece acquired a new protector, the USA
and, as various historians suggest, the Greek civil war was the first act and the initiation of the
Cold War between the USA and the USSR (Gerolymatos, 2017). 
28 The first use of Napalm bombs was in the mountains of Pindos. The Greek civil war was a military test and 
experiment for the emerging US hegemony.
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2.2 Greece in the Post War Period (1950-1974)
The Advance of Greek Capitalism (1950s – 1973)
The pre-war history of Greece is characterized by significant political developments while at the
same time, economic progress and modernization were disrupted. In the post war era, the country
experienced  sudden  economic  growth  that  was  facilitated  by  its  commitment  to  capitalist
development.  The  Marshall  Plan  which  the  USA elaborated  to  help  Greece  recover  had
tremendous impact on developing advanced capitalist structures.  In 1950, The drachma was tied
with the US dollar and devalued by 50 percent, thereby boosting tourism and foreign investment
(Thomopoulos, 2012). By 1952, although the economy had recovered to pre-war levels, Greece
remained a poor country. In the early 1950s, most of the population lived in rural areas and
towns with less than 10,000 inhabitants, a situation that was about to change. Industrialization
went mostly hand in hand with urbanization as Greeks began to be able to aspire for a better life.
The war reparation project boosted the national job market while the factories that started to be
built provided diverse employment opportunities to the country’s impoverished and devastated
populations.  The  first  heavy  industries  and  large  capital  investment  appeared  in  Athens,
specifically in Piraeus, and in the area around Thessaloniki. Until the postwar era there was a
dense concentration of industry around the two biggest cities which was directly connected with
internal migration and with the development of these cities at the expense of the rest of Greece
(Labrianidis & Papamichos, 1990; Patronis, 2015). Critical developments in the industrial sector
were  firstly  the  foundations  of  ΔΕΗ  (Dimosia  Epiheirisi  Ilektrismou  –  The  Public  Power
Corporation) in 1950, the Scaramagkas Shipyards and the oil refinery owned by the magnate
Stavros Niarchos. The Public Power Corporation was critical for providing power to households
all over Greece and it played a significant role in the modernization of households. Moreover, it
enabled the installation of heavy industry factories as it was able to supply them with adequate
energy. The Scaramagkas shipyards and the oil refinery upgraded the position of Piraeus which
became the most important port  in the Eastern Mediterranean. From 1948 to 1962, during a
period of economic stabilization, the state created various incentives and funding schemes that
promoted industrial growth and took into account the relocation and housing needs of the mobile
work force which mostly consisted of unskilled workers who had previously been agricultural
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workers and/or  small  land owners in their  hometowns and villages.  In  spite  of  the apparent
‘progressiveness’ of these incentives, the implementation of an industrial growth model (Pagano,
1993) was very confused and further enhanced uneven regional  development  (Labrianidis &
Papamichos, 1990). The Athens region absorbed the major capitalist investments and absorbed
Greece’s cultural capital as its population increase had been radical. From 1.3 million in 1951, it
grew to 1.8 million in 1961 and to 2.5 million in 1971, nearly 30 percent of the total population
(Kotzamanis,  1997:  5,  Table  1).  The  concentration  of  the  general  population  in  Athens
condemned small  and medium-sized  provincial  cities  to  developing mono-cultural  economic
bases in order to serve the national model of development. Athens and Thessaloniki became the
only university cities where graduates could find adequate employment relevant to their skills,
while smaller cities could not sustain the country’s emerging human capital. Uneven regional
development led to abandonment and emptying of rural areas as people had no other alternative
to improve their living conditions but to move to the big city centers or abroad. 
Greek society, both in terms of its cultural dimensions and traditional values, started to
change and adapt to the principles of modern life. In 1954, women were allowed to vote, and in
1956, for the first time in Greek history, women were elected to the Greek parliament. In fact, the
first woman who was appointed as a minister in the Karamanlis government was Lina Tsaldari.
Both her father, Spyros Lambrou, and her husband, Ioannis Tsaldaris, had been Prime Minister in
the  past.  Indeed  a  vast  gender  inequality  gap  existed  that  was  reproduced  by the  model  of
development being pursued, that was based on male income and female reproductive labor. The
model of the male bread winner was the established cultural and structural norm of household
organization and the idea that women served the nation through their reproductive household
labor  (Mazower,  2000)  was  normalized.  Delayed  capitalist  development  created  a  strange
marriage between modernity and tradition, where in many instances, modernity produced and
reproduced pre-modern aspects of social  life and also naturalized them. While adhering to a
liberal  economic  orientation,  the  political  system remained  deeply  conservative  in  terms  of
facilitating cultural change and progress. During the 1960s, a large movement of male economic
migration  to  West  Germany  took  place  to  fill  the  need  for   industrial  laborers  after  the
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construction of the Berlin wall prevented migrant workers from Eastern block countries from
entering West Germany. 
The pace of capitalist expansion and economic growth in the 1960s were so rapid that
they  provoked radical  changes  in  the  political  geography of  Greece  which  the  state  and its
structures were unable to control and regulate – both at the level of capitalist development and
also  of  grassroots  practices  and  initiatives.  Pre-modern  social  structures  were  reproduced  in
urban  environments  and  kinship  played  a  significant  role  in  the  structural  organization  of
everyday life. In many instances, entire extended families would follow younger male members
and move, in phases, to the city. In this period, a boom in construction occurred to fulfill the
increased need for housing and since no state-led housing policy existed, illegal construction of
houses was tolerated and in many cases encouraged. Despite its informal and extralegal nature,
the housing construction sector nevertheless contributed to boosting economic growth. Urban
plans were continually readjusted to include new residential areas of sprawl urban expansion. As
I show in Chapter 1, Chalkida was a typical example of that process, a fact confirmed by my
informants’ life  histories and socio-economic backgrounds.  Rural  to  urban migration was an
intergenerational project of upward mobility that was supported by the pre-modern structure of
the extended family. In the 1960s, child labor shrank significantly, yet it did not disappear. Most
adolescent males (and many of my male informants, today over 50) of the lower classes worked
in a kind of apprenticeship to support family income which itself consisted of multiple, usually
kin-based sources of earning such as family businesses, agriculture and waged labor. 
Economic growth also stabilized political life, especially after the economic recovery in
1952  and  the  accession  of  Greece  to  the  North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization  (NATO).  The
aftermath of the civil war had placed Greece outside of the sphere of Soviet influence and the left
was  widely  accused  of  having  caused  the  civil  war.  Although  the  left  was  ostracized  from
political life, in 1951, the EDA (Enomeni Dimokratiki Aristera – United Democratic Left) was
founded. It was the only legal leftwing party and become a significant player,  despite being
excluded from decision making processes. In 1958 it won 22 percent of the vote and became the
main opposition party. New politicians, who did not come from military circles, emerged such as
the  prime  minister  Kontantinos  Karamanlis  of  the  ERE  party.  As  there  were  no  financial
problems with resources flowing in from the US, foreign policy was the main issue that troubled
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the government. The Turkish state’s hostility towards the Greek minority in Istanbul and the
pogrom of September 1955, as well as the Cyprus dispute were the hot topics of the day with the
potential to threaten Karamanlis’ government. 
The governing ERE (Radical Nationalist Union) party was the descendant of the Popular
Party which had become hegemonic after 1932, and which held conservative political views on
social issues. The rise of the EDA in the 1958 elections concerned the government, the crown
and the USA, so Karamanlis had to take action in order to politically isolate the EDA. He was
given funding to carry out a propaganda project against the left through the Greek Intelligence
Organization.  He  funded the  creation  of  secret  organizations  whose  mission  was  to  collect
information and devise measures for fighting communism and the left (Stefanides, 2011). The
Cold  War era  was a  critical  period for  the  nation  formation process,  and Karamanlis  was a
confidant  of  the  USA both  in  terms  of  geopolitics  and  also  of  economic  policy.  Royalist
conservatives and liberals excluded the left from the national narrative, as they had already done
with  non-normative  political  and  national  subjects  in  the  past  (Muslim  Greek  speaking
populations or non Greek Orthodox). The displacement of the Greeks who fled the pogrom in
Istanbul  sent another  shock through national  identity since most of them were bilingual  and
lacked  the  Greek  national  habitus  and  collective  experiences  and  understandings  that  had
developed within national borders.
In 1962, Greece became an affiliated member of the European Economic Community
(EEC),  which  had been a  major  aspiration  within  liberal  ideology in  Greece.  The Common
European  market  was  thereafter  open  to  Greece,  a  fact  which  empowered  export  oriented
capitalist  investment  in  the  industrial  sector.  The  period  from  1962  to  1973  was  one  of
unprecedented industrial  accumulation through large scale metallurgical,  chemical and textile
factories  along  with  investments  in  the  energy  sector.  During  that  time,  industrial  investors
acquired great political leverage and were able to influence state bodies to act in their favor. A
number of large industrial investments by foreign and domestic capital require special mention.
One  is  Pechiney,  a  French  business  in  the  region  of  Vioitia,  which  focused  on  aluminum
production  through  the  exploitation  of  the  nearby  bauxite-rich  mountains,  completely
transforming  an  area  which  in  the  past  had  been  used  exclusively  by  small  shepherd
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communities. Pechiney’s extractive practices caused severe damage to the natural environment
around the bauxite mining and processing zones and changed the way in which local people
made a living.29 Pechiney’s project was endowed with a discourse that promoted it as part of a
masterplan for more even regional development and the relocation of factories to zones outside
the  urban  centers  (Labrianidis  &  Papamichos,  1990).  After  Pechiney,  other  large  aluminum
plants30 were established in Greece, which made aluminum one of the country’s main exports
(Kostis, 2013). The other major industrial venture was the foundation of Esso-Pappas oil refinery
by Tom Pappas, a Greek-American businessman with a shadowy involvement in the country’s
internal politics. His initial investment was in a large oil refinery unit in Thessaloniki, along with
a  number  of  smaller  fertilizer  factories.  Another  significant  industrial  enterprise  was  Larko,
which  was involved in  the  production of  ferronickel.  It  was  founded in 1963 by the Greek
magnate Mpodosakis and later became one of Europe’s major ferronickel producers,  owning
mines all over Greece, including on the island of Evia. Along with the industrial restructurings
that  took  place  and  the  regional  development  ‘plans’,  several  waves  of  internal  migration
followed  that  co-determined  industrial  activity,  shaping  the  country’s  modern  industrial
landscape (Katohianou, 1994; Kanelopoulos, 1995; Kotzamanis, 1990). 
The 1963 national elections were won by the EK (Enosis Kentrou – Union of the Center),
a liberal party led by Georgios Papandreou (the former prime minister who had resigned after the
Dekemvriana events of 1944). Georgios Papandreou’s government put forward socialist policies
and proposed a restructuring of the labor sector, a fact that troubled large industrial  owners.
Pappas, who had signed an agreement with the previous government to monopolize the national
fuel market, used his contacts in the US government to subvert Papandreou’s government. As
Drousiotis (2002) reveals in his book, Tom Pappas admitted that he bribed several governmental
members of parliament to defect in order to cause the government to fall. The political instability
29 In 1987, Greek National Television produced a documentary on the effects of the Pechiney plant that was 
entitled ‘The Valley of Fluorine.’ Fluorine is a by product of the aluminum production process and its disposal 
causes great damage to the natural environment. Near the factory, Pechiney built a small town called Aspra 
Spitia to host the workers and their families. Indeed this small town in the middle of nowhere, inhabited by 
industrial workers and their families, is a subject of great anthropological interest. The documentary can be 
found here: https://archive.ert.gr/72640/
30 Indeed as I describe in Chapter 1, several of my informants either had worked or still worked in the aluminum 
plants that were later founded near Chalkida, including in ELVAL (Greek Aluminum Industry) which is now owned 
by the Belgian multinational Viohalco. 
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created by the defections led to the installation of the military regime known as Junta, on April
21st 1967. One of the members of parliament who were bribed was Konstantinos Mitsotakis who,
in 1989, was elected prime minister of Greece.
The Junta (1967-1974)
During the junta, the industrial growth model was accelerated and national and foreign capital
invested in industry, while spatial concentration continued together with increases in regional
disparities in the distribution of income (Leontidou, 2006). Pappas managed to monopolize the
internal fuel market and acted as a link between the Junta and the USA. The industrial growth
rate reached a peak in the late 1960s and during that time the Coca Cola Company invested in
Greece. Like Pinochet’s Chile, Greece became an attractive country for capital investment, even
under a totalitarian regime. Indeed, liberal economists from the Chicago school, describing the
Chilean Miracle and praising Pinochet’s regime, showed that capitalist growth performs better in
totalitarian regimes (Friedman & Friedman, 1998). Another major development that played a
critical  role  in  economic  growth  was  the  private  construction  sector,  and  in  particular  the
antiparochi (see Chapter 1). The Junta drew up a plan to create road infrastructure all over the
country using the Greek Army’s construction units. Public transport and the railroads remained
significantly underdeveloped in Greece since there had been a vast  expansion of the private
automobile market after 1970s. In the 1970s, material indicators of upward mobility and success
centered around the possession of modern equipment such TV sets, home telephones and electric
appliances and of course, private cars.
During the Junta, the regime’s political rivals were imprisoned, tortured and exiled, all
with the consent of the USA. The USA found in the Junta a naive, inexperienced and easily
pliable  puppet  government  that  could  be exploited  in  order  to  promote  its  own geopolitical
agenda in the critical area of the Middle-East (Miller, 2009). The Church also supported the
regime which  imposed censorship  on  the  press  and media  and prohibited  the  circulation  of
various  popular music albums. Civil  rights  were reduced to a minimum and Greece became
isolated  once  again  from  the  on-going  socio-cultural  revolutions  in  Europe  and  the  USA.
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According to the regime’s ideological doctrine, the modern ideas of socialism, education and
women’s rights, as well as rock music, were threats to social order. In many respects, the Junta
closely resembled the preceding regime of Metaxas, whose slogan ‘Patris, Thriskeia, Oikogenia’
(Fatherland, Religion, Family) it frequently referred to in framing its ideology. As a result, it had
the unconditional support of the leadership of the Greek Orthodox Church (Gazi, 2011). 
The Junta fell in 1974, after its failure to resolve the foreign policy problem raised by
Cyprus’ invasion by Turkey. Apart from the students’ uprising on November 17 th 1973 at the
Polytechnic school in Athens, which was violently suppressed by the police and armed forces,
who killed 21 people, there had not been any serious acts of resistance in the seven years of its
lifetime. An artful act of passive resistance was carried out by school students who, obliged to
listen to a speech by the dictator Georgios Papadopoulos, pretended to be so overwhelmed that
they did not stop applauding, in that way preventing him from speaking.  During the dictatorship,
more than 8000 people were arrested of whom an estimated 3500 were tortured, 6188 suspected
communists and political opponents were imprisoned or exiled to remote Greek islands (Blum,
2014). Citizens had no right to assembly, political parties were banned, and there was constant
open surveillance of  public  spaces  and of  people’s activities.  While  films and rock concerts
representing  the  dominant  cultures  of  the  UK  and  the  USA were  allowed,  citizens  were
nonetheless living under a police state in which a culture of fear was widespread. 
The Dictatorship  faced little  resistance  and in  propaganda terms  tried  to  present  and
justify itself as a modernizing force that aimed to protect ordinary people from the Communist
threat  and  ‘cure’  the  nation  from  those  elements  that  were  holding  it  back.  It  therefore
implemented large infrastructure projects and because of the expansion of the industrial sector,
unemployment  fell  dramatically  all  over  the  country.   Papadopoulos’ popular  image  as  a
benefactor of the poor was backed by the populist tactic of writing off agricultural loans of up to
100,000  drachmas.  Public  infrastructure  as  well  as  the  intensification  of  industrialization
provided  diverse  employment  opportunities  and  increased  living  standards  significantly.
However,  the  unregulated  growth  of  the  industrial  and  touristic  sectors  ravaged  the  natural
environment and condemned whole areas with pollution.  Greece’s largest industrial  area,  the
triangle of Inofyta - Schimatari – Tanagra (see Chapter 1) was established in this period, an area
that attracted sprawl and unregulated industrial activity especially after the ban on new units  in
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Athens in 1980s and the incentives for old factories to relocate and upgrade their old polluting
equipment. As an informant told me, when he started working in one of the aluminum factories
near Chalkida at the age of 20, his salary was almost double that of his father who was a low
ranking civil servant. During the Junta years, the great demand for industrial workers provided
many peasant populations with the opportunity to change and pursue a career in the numerous
small and heavy industry factories that were founded. 
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2.3  The Metapolitefsi31 (1974 – 2009)
 
The re-establishment of democracy in 1974 was followed by a referendum in which the people
voted to abolish the monarchy;32 thus the Third Hellenic Republic was born. The republic was
defined by a bipartisan model rotating around two large parties, Pasok (The Panhellenic Socialist
Movement) led by the son of Georgios Papandreou, Andreas, and ND or Nea Dimokratia (New
Democracy), a successor of ERE. Although in 1975 the leaders of the military coup were tried
and imprisoned, still the police and military continued to be dominated, both in the higher and
lower ranks,  by pro-fascists,  supporters  of the dictatorship who were left  untouched (Katris,
1979). Karamanlis was considered a balancing force and the face of a kind of general acceptance
that would not overly shake the state and army’s established order, which was accessible only to
right wing political subjects. In 1979, Greece was on the verge of becoming a full member of the
EEC and was therefore about to rescale its economy to meet European standards. Karamanlis
signed Greece’s accession to the EEC and then, in 1980, resigned. The elections of 1981 were
won by Pasok and Andreas Papandreou, who had tremendous appeal for the masses. The 13.5
percent vote that Pasok got in the national elections of 1974 rose to 25 percent in 1977, and in
1981 it won the elections with 48 percent of the votes. 
Andreas  Papandreou  was  a  charismatic  leader  who  appealed  to  the  general  public's
discontent with the hegemonic powers and their neocolonial interventions that had caused great
suffering in Greece and elsewhere. He strove to incorporate a large section of the population that
had remained isolated from social and economic progress. He also managed to win over voters
from the KKE (the Greek Communist Party) and to reshape the Greek left which was now, for
the first time in Greece’s history, in power. Thus in 1981, the Greek state officially recognized
EAM as part of the national resistance and allowed the civil war’s exiled leftists to return. Pasok
and Papandreou’s discourse promoted nationalistic  themes which made him appealing to the
military and police as well.  The police force was restructured and the archives and personal
records that they had been collecting since 1936, of thousands of Greeks who were suspected of
holding communist ideas, were shredded. This development opened up the state to leftists who
31 Metapolitefsi in Greek refers to the transformation of the political system and the birth of ‘The Third Hellenic 
Democracy’ that was signaled by the abolition of the monarchy. 
32 The precise result was 70 percent against and 30 percent for the monarchy. 
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had previously been banned from acquiring jobs and administrative positions if they did not sign
a  formal  letter  of  repentance  that  denounced their  political  beliefs  and ideology (Carabot  &
Sfikas, 2004). Moreover, he renegotiated the terms of Greece’s accession to the EEC, which he
partially  achieved by acquiring the IMPs (Integrated  Mediterranean Programs).  In  1985,  the
IMPs were established by the EEC following Papandreou’s initiative, and he did not hesitate to
threaten Jacques Delors, the newly elected president of the European Commission, with a veto
on Spain and Portugal’s accession to the EEC. This was the first time that a Greek prime minister
stood up to European elites to defend Greek social interests. IMPs were later used in order to
facilitate the integration of semi-peripheral countries of the European south (Spain, Portugal and
Greece) in the EEC’s enlargement project (Clogg, 1988).  
Andreas Papandreou’s political discourse managed to unite diverse social and political
forces that longed for profound social, cultural and political change. During the two consecutive
Pasok governments (1981-1985 and 1985-1989),  heavy industries  belonging to  the country’s
economic elite became public or were rescued by the state following its socialist agenda. Pyrcal,
Larko, the Scaramagas Shipyards, Esso-Pappas, Peraiki-Patraiki and AGET-Heracles (a leading
cement  factory) were among them. Numerous labor  unions were founded in this  period and
employment rights were granted to workers in order for the country to comply with European
standards. Noteworthy here is the restructuring of health care and the foundation of the universal
national health care system which, according to a World Health Organization report in 2000,
ranked 14th worldwide and 11th in terms of service, leaving Germany and the UK (who ranked
25th and 18th respectively) behind (WHO, 2000).
 During the 1980s, social aspirations began to be geared toward social progress rather than
rational  economic growth based on Weberian principles.  Many Greeks first  gained access to
higher education, including many women who managed to enter the job market and political life
on equal terms with men.  On the one hand, women’s entry into the labor market restructured
intra  household  relationships  and  on  the  other,  it  started  to  de-naturalize  their  apparently
predetermined  fate  which  was  tied  with  marriage  and  housekeeping,  and  thus  economic
dependence on men. Yet in many instances, reproductive labor tasks were and still are unequally
distributed in modern households, and women, whether working outside the home or not, usually
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undertake most of them. Because of women’s proletarianization, many public nursery schools
and  kindergartens  were  founded  as  the  modern  solution  to  child  rearing.  In  addition,  civil
marriages were instituted late in Greece, in 1982, though they would only become popular in the
2000s. Moreover dowry, which had remained enshrined in Greek law, was cancelled in 1983. 
Between 1974 and 1990, public debt increased from 25 to 80 percent of GDP, yet over the
same period, inflation also fell significantly, from 30 to 13 percent (Konsolas, 2017). 80 percent
of total public debt was owed to  Greek banks that were under state control.  Public expenses
rose greatly  to  50 percent  of  GDP due to  the  government’s  socialist  policies  on developing
welfare structures. The socialist project was funded by national credit  and not foreign loans
(Varela, 2002). The 1980s signaled the beginning of a period of over-consumption for the low
and middle classes who could now fulfill not simply their basic needs but also their desire for
upward mobility. The drachma was devaluated twice in order to battle inflation and to boost
consumption of nationally produced goods, as well as exports and tourism, a strategy which once
again proved successful.  Upward mobility  was established as  a  life  aspiration  that  could be
achieved  through  hard  work,  thus  an  era  of  abundance  was  initiated.  The  working  classes
indulged  in  over  consumption  and conspicuous  consumption  practices,  enjoying  various  the
privileges and benefits of socialist welfare. Industrial growth followed the western trends of de-
industrialization  and therefore  became negative.  At  the  same time,  a  huge expansion of  the
service sector occurred, and this was dominated by small and medium-sized firms that operated
at the local scale. The commercial markets and the retail sector in small and medium-sized cities
such as Chalkida was almost exclusively dominated by petty local entrepreneurs and retailers.
The  first  supermarket  chains  and  department  stores  were  only  to  be  found  in  Athens  and
Thessaloniki.
 Papandreou’s  governments  have  frequently  been  characterized  as  populist,  and  that
populism is suggested in the fact that many Greeks referred to him by his first name, Andreas,
even  when he  was  prime minister.  He had  a  personal  charisma which  was  reflected  in  the
international recognition he received and the various initiatives he took to promote global ideals
of peace and prosperity, all of which even his political rivals could not help but acknowledge.
His political presence gave Greece international prestige as a country that was concerned with
global problems such as imperialism and the need for nuclear disarmament (Clogg, 1996). The
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populist aspects of his policies can also be seen in the promises of prosperity that were made, and
in the expansion of the public sector. Civil servants’ salaries increased significantly with Pasok
and in the 1990s, becoming a civil servant once again became an aspiration for many. In this
sense, the public sector continued to facilitate and reproduce a patron-client culture and indeed to
scale it up; from that time, civil servants were guaranteed permanent job positions that ensured
their future socio-economic reproduction. 
Another significant development were the numerous decentralized public infrastructure
projects that rescaled the country’s political geography (Hadjimichalis, 1987). After 1978, an
increasing number of regional incentives led to a geographically more even development model.
This was in part  due to the materialization of the adverse consequences of inequality in the
spatial distribution of population, resources, financial development, cultural activities and so on.
It  was  also  a  result  of  the  prospect  of  Greece  becoming  a  full  member  of  the  EEC,  and
specifically,  of the fact  that  EEC policy discouraged almost all  state  incentives except those
concerned with regional development. This fact led to a gradual shift of emphasis in the Greek
incentives  system  towards  regional  development  (Gianitsis,  1983;  Vaitsos,  1982).  The  first
incentives  of  the  1950s,  together  with  those  that  followed,  were  non-transparent  and  very
complex, and due to a lack of capital markets, only large and well organized firms could benefit
from them. The evaluation of those investment projects and access to such incentives was under
the regulation of the banks which at the time were under the tight control of the state (Xanthakis,
1986).  The  state  sought  to  promote  relocation  of  industries  to  poorer  regions  by  providing
various benefits such as interest-free loans, taxation relief and low cost access to building etc.
(Labrinidis & Papamichos 1990: 462-464, Table 1). However, due to a host of factors including
irrational administration, confusing laws, complex bureaucracy, corruption and the role of the
EEC, the plan was doomed to fail (ibid). Moreover, the state's inability to impose and manage
such  incentives  led  to  the  fostering  of  unregulated  industrial  activity  that  caused  severe
environmental degradation in major industrial zones. 
In  1991,  a  privatization project  was launched and the  cement  giant  AGET-Heracles,
which had been public since 1983, was, along with other public assets, privatized. The 1990s
were an era of financial capitalism during which most public and private companies sought entry
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into national and international stock markets. As soon as the Maastricht Treaty was signed in
1992, EU economic policies were oriented towards monetary union and national economies were
therefore  placed  under  restructuring  schemes.  The  fall  of  the  Soviet  Union  along  with  the
collapse of Yugoslavia and other global geopolitical developments shifted US interests from the
Balkans to the Middle East. In 1992, the American government voluntarily closed some of the
NATO bases in mainland Greece, while however maintaining the one in Souda bay in Crete,
which has always been a major operational base for NATO during wars in the Middle East. In the
same  year,  the  dispute  over  Macedonia’s  name  erupted.  This  was  an  event  that  revitalized
nationalistic interpretations, manipulations and justifications of history, and which challenged
Greece’s national habitus with the prospect of a neighboring country having the same name as
the  historic  region  of  ancient  Macedonia  with  its  exclusively  Greek  heritage.  Massive
mobilizations were organized in which priests were at the front lines. Even school teachers, in
violation of their code of conduct, urged high school students to take to the streets and join the
manifestations.  . The political crisis which this foreign affairs incident created led to the fall of
the ND government and Pasok’s return to power in 1993.
 In Greece,  until  the late 1990s religious belonging was specified on citizens’ identity
cards. In order to comply with Schengen Treaty standards and the unionization project, Pasok
introduced new identity cards. which did not state religion. The Greek Church and extreme right
wing organizations saw this  as  a  direct  attack on religion and picked up the famous slogan
‘Patris, Thriskeia, Oikogeneia’ in order, they argued, to prevent the dissolution of Greek national
identity within the project of europeanization.  The Church, along with a relatively large segment
of the conservative opposition and extreme right wing organizations cooperated with each other
against  the  globalization  and ‘digitalization’ that  they  saw the  new millennium as  bringing.
Protestors employed various conspiracy theories on globalization that spanned from the coming
of the age of the Anti-Christ to the EU and US backed Zionist interests of Israel and, as the new
millennium approached, these were often endowed with apocalyptic references.33  
33 I need to note here that the vast majority of Greek citizens are officially recorded as Christian-Orthodox. The 
Greek Church has always played an active role in the regulation of public and social life and has accumulated a 
large amount of tax exempt assets and wealth. Despite capitalist development and modernization, the 
relationship of the Greek state with religion and the Church continues to enable the latter to hold great economic
power and the ability to intervene in and influence political affairs if needed.
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Greece  entered  the  Eurozone  in  2001,  after  having  met  the  structural  and  economic
criteria set  by the Maastricht Treaty.  The devaluation of the drachma by 12 percent in 1998
established the exchange rate 1 euro for 341 drachmas. Entry into the eurozone made imported
products cheaper while radically increasing domestic production costs and as a result, both Greek
exports and national production and consumption of Greek products declined. As a consequence,
many  industries  merged  and  delocalized  their  productive  activities  abroad.  The  entrance  of
Greece into the eurozone happened shortly after the Greek Stock Exchange crash in 2000, and
many listed companies had seized the opportunity to gain profits by bubble schemes and then
when the  bubble  exploded  they  delocalized  abroad  (see  Chapter  1)  thereby adhering  to  the
methods of financialized profit extraction. A credit boom occurred that created a false image of
abundance and unlimited economic growth. Banking products were aggressively advertised and
many Greeks became indebted while public debt increased.  In addition, with the adoption of
euro as a currency, the prices of everyday goods and the cost of living radically increased. Socio-
economic reproduction was based on loans and many households and family firms based their
activities  on  credit  that  the  banks  provided.  Credit  became  the  instrument  of  neoliberal
governmentality which scaled down to the level of household and family organization (Vaccaro,
Hirsch & & Sabaté, 2019). This was due to the overcapitalization of German and French banks
and the low rate of the interbank credit market. It was with force that indebtedness and credit
entered into the organization of people’s livelihoods and the dreams and expectations which the
influx of credit itself made possible.  
In the years leading up to accession to the eurozone, the Simitis government had to make
Greece compliant with the Maastricht Treaty’s prerequisites. He presented data to Eurostat that
showed great progress on the issue of battling inflation which, in 1999 had fallen to 3 percent,
and on reducing both the public deficit and public debt. Purchasing power and living standards
improved greatly between 1996 and 2003. Salaries in the public and private sectors grew along
with various sector based benefits that increased the state’s income from taxation and boosted
consumption. However the statistics on debt and public deficit were later revised and questioned
both inside and outside of the country. In 2003, the dismantling of the state monopoly in the field
of telecommunication enabled the country to enter the information age as for the first time, fast
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internet  connections  became  available  to  businesses  and  households.  OTE,  the  National
Telecommunication Organization, a leading firm in the Balkans, was privatized. In 2004, Nea
Dimokratria  came back to power and Kostas Karamanlis,  Konstantinos Karamanlis’ nephew,
became prime minister. 2004 to 2008 were the years during which the Greek bubble was inflated
to its maximum capacity as credit penetrated every aspect of daily economic life. Indebtedness
trickled down to the scale of households and individuals, constituting a new form of economic
enslavement.  In  2008,  Greece’s GDP reached a record high of  354.5 billion USD, however
Karamanlis  was  pressed  to  impose  mild  austerity  measures  which  were  met  with  great
disappointment  by  the  people.  In  the  aftermath  of  the  financial  crisis  in  2007,  Greece  was
entering a recession. 
Karamanlis resigned and declared early elections in 2009. The bad omens in the global
economy and the discontent his policies had caused in the social body assured Pasok’s victory,
under the leadership of George A. Papandreou, son and grandson of two former prime ministers.
Papandreou claimed that ‘lefta ypathoun’ (there is money, or money exists). He did so as a way
of addressing the worries of many Greeks who, since the 1950s, had experienced continuous
improvement  of  their  economic  situation,  with  the  majority  never  having  lived  through  a
recession, with the exception of a few minor crises.
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2.4 Modernity in the Years of Non-Development (2010 – 2015)
After  the  global  financial  crash,  the  banks  stopped  providing  new  loans.  As  a  result,  all
productive activities that were based on credit were halted. This had a tremendous impact on the
construction sector that had been the Greek economy’s driving force since the 1960s. George
Papandreou initially tried to revert the previous ND government’s self-imposed austerity and
fulfill his government’s promises. Yet at the 2010 Davos summit, he agreed to introduce austerity
measures to control foreign debt and the public deficits that had appeared. The great popular
enthusiasm for the new government (which was probably due to its bringing back memories of
the Andreas Papandreou government) was replaced with disappointment. From 2010, when the
first memorandum agreement was signed, till 2017, fourteen austerity packages were introduced.
These  included  numerous  cuts  in  pensions,  salaries  and  benefits,  as  well  as  cuts  in  public
expenditure within the provisioning sector and a radical increase in taxation on lower incomes.
Austerity  measures  firstly  targeted  the  public  sector  and  consisted  in  wage  reductions  and
pension  cuts,  coupled  with  the  neoliberal  restructuring  of  the  welfare  state.  Mainstream
discourses around crisis  centered their critique on the public sector as having contributed to the
public deficit. However, the shock that Greeks experienced in 2010-2011 was nothing compared
with what happened in 2012 when, in less than six months, unemployment doubled to reach 30
percent (Giannitsis & Zographakis, 2015) which fact forced Papandreou to resign. A ‘national
unity’  government was then formed with MPs from Pasok, Nea Dimokratia and Laos (Laikos
Orthodoksos  Synagermos  –  People’s  Orthodox  Alarm),  which  agreed  to  appoint  the  former
manager of the Greek Central Bank, Lucas Papademos,  prime minister who had as a mission to
implement the austerity policies as Troika dictated and prevent Greece from defaulting. Seeing
their livelihoods threatened, people organized protests, demonstrations and strikes at the national
level, which became a regular part of the everyday reality of crisis. 
As in other historical crises, economic failure translated into a total failure of the political
system. The current crisis has revealed the shaky foundations of the so-called Greek miracle
which began in the 1950s and which produced major reconfigurations and fragmentations of the
voting body. The imposition of austerity has not made any positive difference, on the contrary,
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the financial  situation of businesses and households has been deteriorating. In the May 2012
elections, Pasok collapsed and Nea Demokratia recorded a historic low while Syriza emerged as
the major opposition party. At the same time, a neo-Nazi anti-austerity party, Gold Dawn (Chrysi
Avgi), gained votes. These results suggest that Greeks have lost faith in the mainstream parties of
Pasok and ND, that have ruled since 1974. New parties appeared on the right and for the first
time in the  metapolitefsi period,  the  right  was  fragmented  into  4  parties  with  parliamentary
representation. The economic crisis had challenged unity amongst the right under the umbrella
party of ND34 which lost a large share of its voters to the new, smaller right wing parties that
emerged during the crisis, notably To Potami,35 Anel36 and Chrysi Avgi.37 Because ND and Pasok
had  too  few seats,  negotiations  for  forming a  coalition  government  failed.  A new round of
elections that polarized the vote around ND and Syriza took place a month later and it led to the
formation of a coalition government of ND, Pasok and Dimar.38 Votes were polarized between
pro- and anti-austerity parties and the established bi-partisan order collapsed. Minority coalition
governments became the new crisis norm as voters evaluated crisis conditions and sometimes
partially or fully blamed those who ‘have been governing the country for the past 40 years’. 
The  pro-austerity  coalition  government  led  by  Antonis  Samaras  (2012-2015)  applied
severe austerity measures and reforms, and the crisis deepened as hope was exhausted and no
light shone at the end of the tunnel. In addition, ND tried to win back the extreme right voters it
had lost and put forward a nationalistic project of protecting the nation from the invasion of
immigrants. Lower and middle class incomes shrank by 50 percent while direct and indirect
taxation  on  lower  incomes  increased  by  337  percent  from  2010  to  2014  (Giannitsis  &
34 Antonis Samaras, in his effort to win the Greek right back to ND and prevent a further loss of votes, opened up 
the party to representing extreme right ideology and rhetoric that appealed to their voters.
35 To Potami (The River) was a neoliberal party that attracted a younger generation of voters. It incorporated many
former MPs who had abandoned ND. 
36 Aneksartitoi Ellines (Independent Greeks) was a right wing anti-austerity party that expressed the traditional 
popular right ideology of former ND MPs.   
37 Crysi Avgi (Golden Dawn) was a neo-Nazi party appeared with force in Greece. Even though the party openly 
stated that its ideology was national socialism or ethnikosocialismos in Greek, their members denied any 
relationship with Hitler. The Greek term ethnikosocialismos is made up of two elements that have always had 
positive meanings in Greek society, ‘nation and socialism’. These appealed as something good to the masses 
who were ignorant about how the abbreviation ‘Nazi’ was coined. The Greek version of Hitler’s national 
socialism proved very useful in attracting the uneducated poor. 
38 Dimokratiki Aristera – A leftist party that was founded in 2010. 
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Zografakis, 2015). At the same time, unemployment established itself at around 30 percent, one
out  of  three  of  the  working  population.  In  2010,  in  order  to  combat  tax  evasion  and
undocumented labor, the state introduced a law that obliged employers to pay their employees
via the banking system, and stipulated that any transaction above 500 euros should be conducted
through the banks. By 2012, when many private households and businesses had become indebted
to the banks, a large portion of the population was blacklisted because they could  not repay their
loans and thus, could not access the banking system. Exclusion from the banking sector was
catastrophic for businesses that were increasingly obliged to operate through the banking system,
and small personal and family businesses that were indebted to banks could not survive. Lack of
creditworthiness  creates a state of exclusion and systemic isolation, and what was occurring to
individuals was similar to what was happening to Greeks as a nation and to Greece as a country –
for having ‘behaved badly,’ they were being financially isolated and restrained. The punitive
aspects of austerity,  as if  Greece were the  enfant terrible  of Europe,  trickled down to affect
indebted firms, households and individuals who had been behaving badly.  Society was once
again confronted with overtaxation through the new austerity packages. Moreover, tax evasion
and  informal  activity  were  in  the  spotlight.  Mainstream media  referred  to  tax  evasion  as  a
‘national sport’ and traced its origins to the Ottoman era when tax evasion was an act of patriotic
resistance.39 In 2014, the cost of tax evasion was estimated as 11 billion euros.40 During this time,
austerity  measures  aiming  to  eliminate  tax  evasion  and  informal  economic  activity  were
introduced  while  the  self-employed  (one  third  of  the  working  population)  were  publically
accused  of  having  created  the  public  deficit.  Tax  evasion  and  the  informal  sector  were
propagandistically blamed for having caused the public deficit and hence needed to be controlled
and minimized. Further, austerity measures systematically ruptured organic solidarity among the
different labor sectors, divided people and encouraged accusations that traced crisis in the so
called ‘pathologies’ of the Greece society. These discourses on tax evasion failed to acknowledge
39 In an interview, Jean Claude Junker explains tax evasion through history and frames it as a national habit that 
has is originates in the Ottoman state. In this way, he obscures the intervening history of Western hegemonic 




tax-evasion/article582943/  (Last accessed 11/10/2019).
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how austerity measures, overtaxation, bankarization and resource scarcity made tax evasion and
informality imperative for survival, and therefore multiplied informal economic arrangements.
To the contrary, these discourses, which continue to circulate today, demonized and criminalized
those who sell goods and services without receipts, namely the self-employed.41  
A major social transformation that is unrelated with the current crisis but which in my
view played a critical role in the way people interacted and experienced it is the spread of the
internet and social media. In 2000, nearly one million Greeks had access to the internet via slow
dial-up connections. In 2003, when fast internet became available, that number doubled. From
2004 to 2010, there was significant annual growth of internet penetration amongst the general
population, and in 2010, 5 million Greeks had access to the internet, while in 2016, the number
of internet users surpassed 7 million.42 The crisis therefore coincided with the IT revolution. In
2010,  social  media,  and  especially  Facebook  dramatically  increased  in  popularity,  and  by
October 2018, almost 5.5 million Greeks were using Facebook.43 The internet is by default a
bottom up structure that  enables  peer  to  peer  interaction among users  and the bypassing  of
hierarchical flows and control of information. Thus the general public was exposed to a much
broader web of information that included varied sources. As a result, the way in which people
were informed and the information they were exposed to was no longer filtered by hegemonic
top-down ‘traditional’ media  such as  television  networks.  With  public  discontent  increasing,
people’s access to online information exposed, to a great extent, the propagandistic nature of
most  traditional  media  sources.  Today,  most  Greeks  do  not  trust  traditional  media  anymore
because they believe that the media are a means of gaining political influence and manipulating
public opinion, given that they are owned by political and economic elites. Indeed, the distrust is
such that Greece has the lowest level of trust in traditional media in the world.44 In addition, in
2010 smartphones were introduced to the market, and by 2018 almost everyone possessed an
internet-enabled smartphone, which gave them instant access to information. A trend emerged,
41 Tax evasion is correlated with the high rate of self-employment in Greece (31 percent) compared to the EU 
mean (15 percent) (Skartios, 2014).
42 Source : http://www.internetlivestats.com/internet-users/greece/ (Last accessed 11/10/2019).
43 Sources: https://napoleoncat.com/stats/facebook-users-in-greece/2018/10 and  
http://www.digitalnewsreport.org/survey/2017/greece-2017/ (Last accessed 11/10/2019).
44 Source: http://www.pewglobal.org/2018/01/11/publics-globally-want-unbiased-news-coverage-but-are-divided-
on-whether-their-news-media-deliver/ (Last accessed 11/10/2019).
104
especially  from 2012  onwards,  of  discovering  alternative  news  and sources  that  were  more
credible and trustworthy based on the fact that they were at least financially independent. The
above facts contributed,  in the January 2015 elections, to Syriza’s victory and coalition with
Anel. It was the first time in modern Greek history that a leftist party had come to power with an
anti austerity agenda, managing to convince the social body. After six months of fruitless re-
negotiation with Greece’s creditors, Syriza called a referendum. The question that the population
was called to answer  with a ‘yes’ or ‘no’, was whether they agreed with the measures proposed
by the creditors. 
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Conclusion 
In popular understandings of history, an interesting articulation can be observed, one that
blends lived with non lived experiences to construct a linear evolution in terms of the sequence
of  events  and  causality.  Past  historical  events  and  collective  memories,  as  Knight  (2015)
elaborates, inform the present crisis experiences of ordinary people . In this sense, the past is a
domain  that  is  constantly  being  re-envisioned  and  re-interpreted  in  the  light  of  present  day
reality. History is crucial for understanding not only how people think about the past and use it to
explain the present, but also how past events and practices create the conditions of possibility for
ongoing processes in the present. In this chapter, I have focused on key historical events and
facts  from modern  Greek history which have  shaped both Greece’s social  formation and its
relationship with national and international power. Taking account of these events is critical for
framing  the  ethnographic  data  I  present  in  the  following  chapters  as  these  events  suggest
numerous similarities with the past, appearing as either continuations or repetitions of it (Knight,
2015; Knight & Stewart, 2016). 
The Greek state was born with a debt that the three superpowers provided though British
and French banks. This was during an era of industrial advances in the growing war industry and
the  establishment  of  banks  as  global  regulatory  mechanisms  which,  through  indebtedness,
controlled the resources of the new states. Neocolonial control and repeated interventions by
hegemonic powers have been critical features both in the foundation of the state and in its social,
political and economic transformation. The Greek economy has always faced problems with its
creditors and the external public deficit in a system in which, after an agreement was reached and
certain measures taken, new loans were issued to cover previous debt obligations. The vicious
circle  of  debt  reveals  Greece’s   dependence   on  its  protectors,  which  fact  transformed  the
country’s  territories  into  a  battleground  for  geopolitical  restructurings  at  the  global  level
(Chomsky, 2003). 
While  it  bares  striking  similarities  to  previous  crises,  the  recent  iteration  of  crisis  in
Greece, which I explore ethnographically in this thesis, is different from these in one significant
sense: it is the first time in Greek history that the future appears bleaker than the past (Sarkis &
Amarianakis,  forthcoming).  The recent economic crisis has provoked an existential  crisis  for
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several generations of Greeks who had been accustomed to constant growth and improvements
in  their  livelihoods.  The  potential  for  upward  mobility  was  shattered  by  austerity  and  the
economic scarcity that prevented people from making any attempt at new beginnings. Unlike
past crises in which the majority of Greeks lived at the margins of the capitalist system, in this
most recent crisis, Greeks have been more integrated into capitalism than ever. This high level of
capitalist organization of society made the crisis more profound, penetrating deeper into people’s
lifeworlds through the economic suffocation of household resources which produced challenges
at the level of social reproduction.   
Crisis has made numerous appearances in Greek and world history. In Greece, one can
discern multiple repetitive patterns which are reproduced in the present iteration of economic
crisis.  Indebtedness,  military  and  economic  dependence,  hegemonic  interventions  and social
division  and exclusion  have  repeatedly  appeared  during  almost  every  critical  event  that  has
shaped  modern  Greek  life.  In  the  next  chapters,  I  address  the  ethnographic  rather  than  the




Austerity, Εmployment and Income:
Working Lives in Crisis
Introduction
Work is a constitutive aspect of contemporary societies, and through it people organize their
lives.  In  sociological  terms,  work  is  an  institution  of  socialization  which  produces  and
reproduces social relations. In distinguishing between “relations of production” and “relations in
production”,  Burawoy (1979) gave emphasis  to  the social  and cultural  relationships  that  are
enacted  in  the  workplace.  Furthermore,  varied  anthropological  and sociological  studies  have
shown  that  specific  types  of  labor  produce  not  only  material  goods  but  also  manufacture
identities based on gender, nationality and class (de Neve, 2001; Salzinger, 2003; Cross, 2012).
Goffman (1978), in his extensive study of the presentation of the self in everyday life, showed
how during almost every new social acquaintance, people ask and speak about their profession
and what they do in order to make a living. This then becomes an index through which they
frame their social relationships and act according to their established social identity. 
The first step in approaching my field sociologically was to investigate people’s work
trajectories through personal work-histories and participant observation in diverse workplaces
and settings.  The work histories  of  many families  in  Chalkida  were  tied  with  the  industrial
income that funded their livelihoods and aspirations for improving their situation. Narotzky and
Goddard’s (2016, 2015) approach on industry, work and livelihoods in relation to the crises of
contemporary capitalism demonstrates the interconnectedness of labor projects and models and
their relationship with global economic and cultural power structures. Indeed, the rise and fall of
industry  in  Chalkida  is  tied  with  several  inter-scalar  processes  and  restructurings  that  were
imposed on Greece as a means of modernizing it and turning it into a consumer society, thereby
facilitating the establishment of a capitalist culture that would be to the benefit of industrially
advanced economies (Escobar, 1995). From industrialization to de-industrialization, the multiple
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restructurings of the industrial sector that Chalkidians have experienced in the course of local,
national  and  international  history  have  produced  specific,  place-bound  understandings  of
political  and  economic  power.  In  the  crisis  context,  industrial  work  in  Chalkida  could  be
approach through its  absence,  therefore  I  follow,   Mollona,  de Neve,  & Parry  (2009)   who
provide  an  extensive  account  of  industrialization  and  modernity  and  the  global  capitalist
processes that make and unmake identities. I therefore wish to expand this approach not only to
the industrial laborers but also, to the whole city of Chalkida, and add up to the discussion on the
reconceptualization of the concept of labour (Narotzky, 2018) in the contemporary world.
Changes  in  labor  conditions  and  income that  affected  the  majority  of  Greek  society
(Giannitsis & Zografakis, 2018) have produced multiple socio-cultural ruptures of fundamental
aspects  of  the  organization  of  everyday  life.  In  this  chapter,  I  provide  an  ethnographic
examination  of  how austerity  and  crisis  have  affected  distinct  labor  sectors  and  challenged
historically constructed approaches to labor  income and to work culture itself.  I  assess how,
people employed in diverse settings reacted to the resource scarcity brought about by austerity,
and  how they  sought  to  maintain  their  social  reproduction  in  times  of  work  insecurity  and
precarization. The severe devaluation of labor provoked numerous socio-cultural changes and
shifts in the ways in which people got by and interacted with each other. Here I explore how
people from different work backgrounds and situations approached work and strategized in order
to make ends meet and confront the socio-economic challenges to social reproduction that the
recent crisis has created. In my account, I pay special attention to the generational dimension. 
Over the course of my fieldwork, two key facts became apparent to me. When I arrived in
Chalkida and started speaking with locals about the recent crisis, everyone, regardless of their
age or gender, began their narration of the crisis in Chalkida by referring to the multiple factory
closures.  Through  my  interviews  and  participant  observation,  I  soon  realized  that  every
economic activity in Chalkida was related with the factories. The presence of heavy industry
acted as a capital interchange node which linked the local society of Chalkida with the global
economy and with financial capitalism. This is an uneven, inter-scalar relationship that makes the
social  organization  and cohesion  of  a  local  place  vulnerable  to  global  economic  trends  and
fashions. The second thing that stood out was the preservation of the rural habitus, which was
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due to the fact that people have not lost contact with the land and sea. People knew how to
produce their own food and had the means to do so. 
 I begin by looking at the impact of crisis and austerity on industrial labor, given that this
is a prominent sector of the local economy. According to the president45 of Evia’s trade union,
between 2009 and 2015, 3100 people lost their jobs due to multiple factory closures and mass
lay-offs. The severe contraction of the industrial sector was a shock not only for those who were
directly affected by it, but also for Chalkida more generally, as a traditionally industrial city,
shaped by the presence of industrial workers. By the time the global financial crisis of 2007 hit
the industrial sector, the whole city of Chalkida entered the crisis earlier than other places in
Greece. The Greek economic crisis has epitomized the post-industrial era, as it has made the de-
industrialization process more acute. When I arrived in Chalkida, in 2015 the whole city had
already fallen into decay. In several of my interviews, people from diverse backgrounds provided
both logical explanations and evidence (Narotzky, 2019) that the city’s wealth was its industrial
background that had created a dynamic local economy that had allowed people to improve their
socio-economic position. 
Next, I examine precariously employed people in the public and private service sectors.
In this category I also include people who had fixed term job contracts in the public sector and
who were  paid  by  state  and EU funds.  While  the  industrial  sector  was  dominated  by  male
laborers usually above the age of 35, jobs in the service sector were mostly oriented towards
female employees. This was especially true for serving, customer service and secretarial posts.
Precariously employed people have a different approach to life than those in other employment
structures. The crisis has had a very different impact on those already precariously employed,
who, because of their employment status, were more resilient and adaptable to crisis conditions.
For precarious workers, the  economic crisis has not been a major, sudden shock as they have
always  been  in  ‘crisis’.  Although  they  have  felt  the  impact  of  the  economic  crisis  in  their
economies, the changes and lifestyle reconfigurations it caused were minimal. In this category,
people below 35 who were university degree holders but had not secured a permanent position in
their vocational field, had to wade through part-time jobs and workfare projects to get by. 
45 Source: https://www.ert.gr/eidiseis/ellada/sto-40-i-anergia-stin-evvia-o-proedros-tou-ergatikou-kentrou-s-
basinas-milai-sto-ert-gr/ (Last accessed 12/12/2019).
110
Another broad category of employees is that of civil servants. In this category I include
people who possessed permanent,  indefinite contract jobs in the public sector.  Civil  servants
constitute a distinct cultural category because of the security that the public sector historically
offered and the fact that many Greeks aspired to gain state employment. Employment in the
public  sector  created  a  different  labor  culture  and  livelihood  organization  since  economic
planning was based on a steady and secure income, and it was also rare for a civil servant to lose
their position. After the imposition of austerity measures, wages in the public sector were the
first to be affected. The combined reduction of benefits and salaries challenged civil servants’
livelihood arrangements as their annual income decreased by 30 to 50 percent (Giannitsis &
Zografakis, 2015). This unprecedented development produced various ruptures that shook the
foundations of civil servants’ lifestyles. These reductions were catastrophic for those who had
gotten loans based on their pre-crisis salaries. Further, austerity measures not only reduced their
salaries but also introduced  public employees to precariousness, as they started to fear being
made  redundant.  Moreover,  cuts  in  public  expenditure  decreased  the  number  of  auxiliary
employees who had been hired under fixed term contracts, in this way burdening permanent
employees with additional tasks beyond their responsibilities. The lack of funds and personnel
have  produced  a  deterioration  in  public  services.  Major  cuts  in  the  provisioning  sector  and
especially in public health, which from 2012 has been totally restructured (see Economu et al,
2017, Liaropoulos,  2012),  further fueled the population’s accumulated discontent with public
administration and services. 
Self-employment is another pillar of the Greek economy, since nearly one fourth of the
working population is self-employed. Petty entrepreneurial activities that historically provided a
viable  alternative  to  waged labor  were  hit  hard  by  the  recent  crisis  and  austerity  measures
(Williams & Worley, 2015). For self-employed people, the process of capital accumulation varies
depending on the specific object of their  labor. However in all  cases, there is no guaranteed
income as  market  demand follows  seasonal  patterns,46 and  for  that  reason,  self-employment
consists  of  another  cultural  category  as  it  imposes  a  totally  different  approach to  grassroots
economics and household organization than the waged laborer of other sectors. Self-employment
46 For instance, taverns earn money during weekends and national holidays while during the week they have far 
fewer  clients. Consumption of clothes is boosted when seasons change, and during those times clothes, retailers
get most of their annual income.   
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has proven to be a resilient labor sector which partially subsumed past crises caused by industrial
restructurings  and  provided  an  outlet  to  the  wageless.  In  many  instances,  self-employed
businesses  orbited  around  services  and  supplies  for  factories  and  the  construction  sector.
Moreover, many industrial workers who wanted to stop being subordinate to others and aspired
to be their own boss sought to become entrepreneurs. The president of Evia’s trade union has
stated that 60 percent of small and medium sized firms closed during the first years of crisis. The
recent austerity crisis has produced great shocks in self-employment and entrepreneurialism. It is
unlike  past  crises  which  boosted  grassroots  economic  initiatives  and  practices  that  allowed
money/capital to circulate among people who worked at the local economic level. The small and
medium sized enterprises, personal and family firms with 0 to 10 employees (these consist of
99.9 percent of all firms in Greece, (see Gianitsis, 2013; Kapsinis. 2017) that used to dominate
regional markets, have faced multiple challenges from the austerity restructurings. 
 Once they retire and start getting paid by the state, pensioners, even though they might
have  a  diverse  work  history,  tend  to  become  institutionalized.  In  this  sense,  austerity
restructurings of public expenditure have affected civil servants and pensioners equally. In times
of crisis, younger generations rely more and more on the stable incomes of their elderly kin and
these are considered by many not simply as a safety net, but as an essential income resource that
ensures intergenerational social reproduction. In several instances, pensioners households cover
the large gap that the austerity restructurings and cuts  caused in people’s income and public
provisions. Moreover, the restructuring of the pension system and the vast reduction in pensions
revealed the collapse of the national project of progress and prosperity. The retirement system is
essential for modern societies as it institutionalizes intergenerational solidarity at the national
level. Apart from an economic redistribution structure of the modern state, through the institution
of retirement, modern cultural values and moralities are expressed and exercised. Those who had
managed to  enter  the  pension  system saw a  dramatic  reduction  in  the  anticipated  pre-crisis
pension which disrupted the plans of younger pensioners. Older pensioners usually already had
their lives settled and their financial needs were limited to the basics; their savings and part of
their pensions were channeled to sustaining the social reproduction of younger generations. 
I conclude by elaborating on the distinct micro-cultures of each labor sector and how
people  in  diverse  sectors  evaluate  their  labor  income.  Important  here  is  that  all  the  above
mentioned  sectors  are  interdependent.  Capital  in  Chalkida  was  generated  by  industrial  and
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agricultural production, by the sale of people’s labor in production related activities that created
capital.  Capital  was  also  channeled  from the  national  scale,  to  the  local  space  of  Chalkida
through pensions and salaries of civil servants. This capital was accumulated and circulated in
Chalkida’s markets, and linked the society of Chalkida through the various commercial activities
that are inherent in local societies. The local economy of Chalkida was severely challenged by
the  time  the  de-industrialization  escalated  during  the  crisis  along with  the  austerity  cuts  on
pensioners and civil servants. The organic solidarity of the different labor sectors has failed since
money in many instances is the social “glue” that keeps the social organization together, and the
lack of money leads to several ruptures beyond the economy.   
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3.1 The Disappearance of Industrial Labor
Historically,  industrial  employment  has   been   the  most  prevalent  livelihood  pattern  for
Chalkida’s local population, and it used to be a stable and secure income resource. Almost every
local  person  has  had  a  relative  or  a  friend  that  used  to  work  at  the  factories.  Historically,
livelihood projects in Chalkida departed from  industrial income and over the course of time
livelihood patterns in Chalkida have diversified, especially after 1980s. Industrial labor was the
most prominent livelihood strategy towards upward mobility for the lower strata of the Greek
society.   From the 1980s onwards, many of the local industries factories that used to operate in
Chalkida had started gradually to close, and by 2009 only five heavy industry plants remained
near the city. These five industrial factories were Chalkida’s Cement, Shelman, Neoset, Interkem
and Ellinika Solinourgia,  all of which had been closed down by 2015. The closure of the cement
factory alone, which had been in operation since 1926, produced a major identity shock for the
city which thereby had lost a constitutive aspect of its character.  Narotzky and Goddard (2015)
highlight the importance of heavy industries that link local livelihoods with the global economy
and materialize global economic procedures into lived experiences (Katz, 2001). 
   From the 1990s on,  the factories’ working force was mostly male,  with very few
women employees. Before the 1980s, when the living standards were relatively low and many
working class households were in need of extra income, women in the lower strata  found low
level posts in some of the several small and bigger food processing industries in the area, and
from 1960s to early 1990s in the textile factory of Peraiki-Patraiki (see Chapter 1). In that time
women occupied low and badly paid job posts which, as soon as their husbands  started to earn
more, they left, especially   after having their first child (Janssens, 1997). After the 1980s, when
men’s  industrial  wages  greatly  increased,  several   women  chose  to  dedicate  themselves  to
reproductive  labor  tasks  and  through  unpaid  labor,  saved  income  instead  of   producing  it.
Grigoris, a 53 year old cement factory worker told me that by the time overtime at the factory
became well paid, his wife, earned less than his overtime wage, decided to quit and dedicate
herself  to  householding.  Male  multi-employment  has  also  undermined  the  emancipation  of
women from the male breadwinner model. Lastly, many women that entered the labor market
and become self-employed had their business initiatives funded by their husbands’ labor income
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and  thus  depended  on  them.  Husbands  were  in  their  majority  industrial  laborers  or  had
professions related with the industrial sector. 
As a result, the industrial labor force of Chalkida shaped the male identity which was
unavoidably wounded by the gendered reversal in income opportunities that the crisis brought
about.  Very  few,  usually  older  women  worked  in  low level  industrial  jobs,  mostly  in  food
processing factories, one such was Maria (56) who had been working in a poultry production unit
for many years when I interviewed her. On the opposing end, Georgia (42), a highly specialized
chemist, had a well-paid job (even during the crisis) at a pharmaceutical factory and earned more
than her husband. After the 2000s, very few women managed to become technicians or managers
and to outrank men in high posts in the production process, this they usually achieved through
education.  Low administrative positions in the factories, especially in logistics, were another
field in which women could find employment. The cement factory laid off 12 women out of 232
employees in total. In addition, men who pursued a career in the industrial sector and developed
their skills accordingly were most affected by the disappearance of the factories. They were the
ones who lost not only their jobs but also their specialization and the object of their labor. This
implied the loss of a constitutive part of their identity that was constructed around the ability to
fulfill,  through work, the social expectations of the hard-working male breadwinner ideotype
(Goffman, 1978). This was mostly the case for laid-off cement factory workers given that the
production of cement relied solely on male labor. The loss of their jobs also had a profound
impact on their identities and their sense of self-worth and dignity, because the skills which they
had devoted great effort to developing were suddenly rendered useless. 
How did the wageless  masses  who were laid off  from the factories  during the crisis
manage to get by, and what did this loss mean to them? The case of the cement factory workers
with whom I spent many hours sheds light on the wider sociological question. Most of them
were aged between 45 and 55 and had spent most of their adult working life in cement factories.
This is mainly because before the crisis years, the factory administration provided incentives for
early retirement. As many workers told me, the company had initially targeted unionists and
offered them amounts from 70,000 to 400,000 euros, depending on their years of service, their
position/salary and their age. Quite a few had accepted the offer back in 2007, and voluntarily
left. On the other side, there were very few workers under 40 when the factory closed in 2013
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since the last round of hiring regular personnel had occurred in 2005. I met only a few people
who were between 29 and 40 years old, and they were the ones who got fired first. The main age
group was from 40 to 55 years old, which means that the main body of the factory’s workers had
spent  most  of  their  lives  as  cement  factory  workers,  and had invested  in  skill  development
accordingly, in the field of cement production. Those above 45 had started to work at the factory
when they were as young as 16 and referred to the factory as their “second home”, the place
where they had spent most of their lives. 
 The cement  factory provided a  stable  income that  was used as  a  financial  base for
investment in other sectors. Several cement factory workers had done so, usually by founding
firms in their wives’ and children’s names. Even though they were attached to what we might call
an industrial lifestyle and culture, they never considered themselves traditional proletarians in the
Marxist sense, since as Mingione (1995, 1990) has shown they developed other labor income
resources.   They  made  use  of  the  resources  their  hard  work  generated  to  enhance  their
household’s economic resources by investing in other members of their household. As a result,
when the factory stopped operating,  they automatically put their  efforts into supporting their
household-based ventures. One person was working informally in a kiosk that he had opened in
his son’s name in the 2000s. He had also opened a clothes-shop in his wife’s name during the
same period, which they had to close due to the crisis. In another case, a factory worker had
started to develop animal breeding and dairy production units before the factory closure. After
the closure, he started to employ laid off colleagues while supplying free meat and dairy products
to his colleagues families who were in need. All of the laid-off workers supported his venture,
shopped at his store and promoted his products. Another factory worker who got fired a year
before being able to retire lived in a nearby village where he owned and maintained with his wife
a small animal breeding production unit. Cement factory workers were never proletarians in the
traditional  Marxist  conceptualization,  even  though  they  used  their  profession  to  present
themselves to me. “Emeis eimaste tsimentades” (We are cement producers) was their collective
discourse about what they do for a living. In general, Greeks were never fully proletarianized as
most of the lower classes had private assets that provided them with supplemental income. Since
people could not rely on a sole means of income generation, they struggled to make a living
through a combination of waged labor and self-employment, a tactic that was prevalent in the
years during which multiple opportunities emerged through the expansion of capitalist markets.
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Many informants referred to a period of abundant employment opportunities in the 1970s. Local
factories were in desperate need of workers and placed job adverts not only in Chalkida but all
over Greece. Recalling the first years after he finished his training, Theofilos (62), a graduate of
the  Dimokritos technical school in Chalkida,  said: “One day you worked there, and the next
another company offered you more. Work was plenty then, they needed you.” He said he had
received numerous personal  letters  offering  him jobs  in  the industrial  sector.  He used to  be
employed in  several  settings  in  the  construction  and the  industrial  sector,  and then  later  he
opened up his own construction firm (see Chapter 4, Household 2).
In Greece’s growing socio-economic centers, internal economic migrants were in their
majority.  Employed in  multiple  jobs,  they  strove  to  develop more  than  one  source  of  labor
income. As soon as they were able to, rural migrants in Chalkida purchased private means of
transportation and maintained ties with the countryside, developing agricultural incomes out of
small plots of land that they owned or had inherited. Construction was another important field in
which industrial waged laborers worked for extra money and it provided them with the potential
for  finding  employment  on  a  regular  basis.  Others  used  their  industrial  wages  to  develop
entrepreneurial  activities and to exploit market dynamics to accumulate more capital in their
pursuit of forging a life worth living. In the midst of the economic crisis,  Sotiris, 50, another
cement  factory  worker,  decided  to  develop  a  small  wine  production  unit  and  upgrade  the
vineyards he had inherited.  He had worked at  the cement  factory since he was 16 and was
specialized in welding, a middle ranking post. “I am not only a worker (ergatis),” he said, “I am
a  boss  too,  I  hire  people.”  He explained  that  throughout  the  year  he  employed  agricultural
laborers on a seasonal basis to work in his olive groves and vineyards. Shortly after he was fired,
he started subcontracting out the harvest and maintenance of the olive groves. Sotiris lived in
Vathi, a small town near the cement factory’s industrial zone, an area which has long been known
for its vineyards, even after the industrialization of the surrounding areas.47  
47 Inofyta literally translates to fields “planted with wine”. In 1970, during the Junta, the region was transformed 
into Greece’s biggest industrial district and as Panagiota, 78 (see chapter 4, household 1), informed me the 
people in Vathy, next to Inofyta abandoned the field and actively supported the Junta’s plan of sprawl 
industrialization. They  were  right wing supporters during the civil war and the Junta of 1967 recompensated 
them for their support. They sold their land at high prices for the sake of industrialization. Nowadays, it is one 
of the most polluted areas in Greece. Nowadays, due to the de-industrialization, the environment has, slowly, 
started to recover. 
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Industrial employment was once the driving force that transformed the peasantry into
waged laborers (Narotzky, 2016), and in some cases, recent industrial unemployment has sent
people “back to  the  earth”  in  order  to  get  by.  After  the  1970s,  when private  car  ownership
eliminated the spatial barriers that the transportation needs of the work force imposed, rural to
urban economic migrants no longer had to abandon agricultural  activities.  In the past,  when
factories  needed  working  hands,  people  in  nearby  villages  combined  industrial  labor  with
agricultural  income,  and  they  were  employed  seasonally.  This  arrangement  allowed  for  the
maintenance of an agricultural income for industrial workers who owned small plots of land. Up
until the 1980s, for instance, several factories employed people seasonally, during the months in
which agricultural activities were not demanding.  
 This pattern continued into the late 1980s with subcontracted labor, and even the regular
factory  workers  who owned small  plots  near  Chalkida  maintained petty  agricultural  income
sources. I encountered only a few cases in which factory workers relied solely on their factory
wage and had, as they stated, no other source of income. Grigoris (55) was one of them. After
being fired, he rented a kiosk with another laid off factory worker, and they did so by using their
wives’ names.  As  first-degree  relatives  of  the  owners  they  could  legally  “help”  their  wives
without having to be registered as employees. This constituted another gender reversal - in the
past,  it  was usually wives who were formally recognized as supporting the ventures of their
husbands.  I will return to this issue later in the self-employment section, as well as in the next
chapter on household organization.
 Through the life histories of industrial workers, it became apparent that industrial labor
income was in many instances used as a basis for funding other livelihood projects. Industrial
laborers, especially those who had in the past experienced extreme resource scarcity, did not
simply receive a salary and grow complacent, on the contrary, they sought to maximize their
income’s potential  by investing in  their  household reproduction and in strategies  for upward
mobility. Thus they managed their waged income from the factories in such a way as to secure
the present and future social reproduction of their families. The principal investment that they
aspired to, initially, was to obtain a house, an asset that would be used by generations to come -
both in terms of having a roof over their heads and, in some cases, as collateral for getting a loan
from the banks to fund intergenerational projects. Moreover, investment in their children, either
in terms of education or of helping them to develop their own businesses, was also common. For
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instance, the children of two cement factory workers who had retired a year before the factory’s
closure had used their  fathers’ severance pay to open a bar in Chalkida where many cement
factory workers hung out. In another instance, a cement factory pensioner used his severance pay
to fund his two sons who opened an internet café, and who got a business loan by using the
family house as collateral. 
For these reasons, industrial workers in Chalkida endorsed the capitalist spirit and were
not  simply  exploited  by  capitalist  development,  but  also  exploited  its  opportunities  to  their
benefit  in  order  to  secure  their  assets  by  investing  their  capital  in  other  income generating
schemes. This was a recurring strategy for the majority of cement factory workers, and this is
mainly how they managed to get by when they lost their waged employment. In this sense, they
were  in  tune  with  capitalist  culture  and  pursued  livelihood  improvement  through  capital
investments.  The  problems  started  to  occur  for  them when  financialized  capitalism  became
dominant,  since  they  were  in  line  with  the  traditional,  liberal  capitalist  culture  which  they
nurtured and favored. Most of them did not want to be proletarians and remain stuck, both as
persons and as families, in a working class “caste”, and they nurtured individualistic capitalist
ideals of upward mobility and progress for their households.   
 The ways in which job losses affected livelihoods and identities can be divided into two
categories which are determined by the generational factor. On the one hand, there are the older,
experienced cement factory workers who conceptualized the loss of their job as an identity shock
that threatened their  established livelihood arrangements and the representation of the self in
everyday  life  (Goffman,  1978),  as  well  as  provoking  a  major  deskilling  of  their  labor.  For
instance, cement “millers” (mylonas) or “bakers” (psistis), two of the highest ranks in cement
production,  could  only  find  adequate  positions  in  another  cement  plant.  The  majority  of
specialized factory workers over 45 did not want to lose their skills by being formally employed
elsewhere, and they were the ones leading the struggle to reopen the factory. On the other hand,
younger  workers,  those with less experience (and labor rights/claims) at  the factory,  faced a
severe  crisis  of  social  reproduction  since  they  had  not  managed  to  create  a  safety  net  for
themselves and their families. 
 The latter were not in a position to take leading roles in the union’s struggle and sought
other jobs, usually in factory settings and warehouses near Chalkida They relied mostly on their
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kin and social networks to access resources while many of their wives were also forced to seek
extra employment. Of course there were some who were not married and lived with their parents.
Aliki (49) moved in with her father after being laid-off: “I did not have the money to pay rent, so
I  moved  with  my  father.  I  take  care  of  the  household  and  he  financially  supports  me.  It’s
demeaning having to live with my father and rely on his money as if I were a teenager.” Jimena
(48), my Spanish tutor, whom I ran into, informed me that she was hired at the factory as a
translator/interpreter  in  1992 when the factory needed someone to  translate  documents  from
Greek to Italian and vice-versa and to help in the negotiations with the Calzestruzzi group that
wanted to buy the factory. “I come here and see the factory, it feels like it’s sleeping, everything
is sleeping here, and I hope we will wake up from this bad dream,” she said. Thanassis (42)
never left his parents’ house in a village nearby. He worked as a driver in the factory and after he
was laid off, was occasionally employed at a transportation company where his cousin worked:
“I also used to work in construction, there are many builders in Fylla (his village) nowadays,
with the crisis and the rest, the scaffolding material has all been burnt in peoples fireplaces.” He
informed me of this in order to stress the fact that there was no future in construction anymore.
Among younger workers there were some who were thinking of migrating, especially after their
unemployment benefit ended.  
These internal inequalities were soothed and made invisible by their common interests.
The process of completely laying off all remaining workers took nearly 2 years to complete and
the older, high ranking factory workers and unionists continued to receive their monthly wages
which they used to fund the expenses of their union’s struggle against Lafarge. Through their
longstanding struggle, the cement factory workers developed strong ties of solidarity. The union
even received contributions from pensioners of the factory. However, the cement factory stands
as an exception to other industrial closures. In other large factories that closed, laid-off workers
did not react dynamically and “accepted their fate.” Their stance was severely criticized by the
cement factory workers who took pride in the uniqueness of their struggle and idealized their
cause. For them, the significance of their labor was not only confined to their own interests, but
extended to the wider local and national good.
Another  aspect  of  the  economic  crisis  is  that  many  factories  produced  less  and  on
demand, therefore they did not want to have a regular working force. These needs were covered
by subcontracting firms that become prevalent in the 1990s. Many of these firms closed during
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the crisis and the employees they hired did not have the same working rights as regular industrial
workers. Subcontracted workers were not insured as having worked in arduous and unhealthy
conditions and had significantly fewer working rights than regular employees. As I was told by
several interlocutors who had first hand experience of these arrangements either through having
worked  for  a  subcontracting  firm  or  through  co-working  with  subcontracted  workers,  large
employers such as the factories appeared smaller in official documentation and thus avoided
paying high taxes while having at their disposal an alienated work force that had no legal rights
over the company. Moreover, some of the high ranking cement factory workers had also been
subcontractors  and  had  employed  other  specialized  workers  in  construction  and  regular
maintenance  of  the  factory’s  machinery.  The  outsourcing  of  the  servicing  of  the  essential,
periodic needs  of the factories  led to  the creation of  a  secondary service sector  that  orbited
around these needs. 
What is  also interesting is  the fact that  since industrial  labor  has become precarious,
many younger people who used to find employment in the industrial sector, have started to think
about migration. Migration of workers was a common pattern in Greece especially during the
1960s, when they sought employment in the industrial sectors of Northern Europe, especially in
Germany (see Bottomley, 1984;  Fakiolas & King, 1996). This is a pattern that has re-emerged in
times of crisis. Migration abroad was a difficult choice not only for those who had families but
also for those who did not. Industrial employment possibilities were scarce in European countries
and most former industrial workers considered migrating, in the short term, to the Middle East
where there were many jobs in the construction sector. 
Dimitris (28) had worked in various construction schemes since adolescence as well as in
Chalkida’s shipyards where he learnt the profession of welding. He got fired from the shipyards
in 2012 and luckily for him, he quickly found a job at a small fertilizer (compost) production unit
in Nea Artaki in 2014. He felt happy with his job and confident enough, especially because he
had managed to find a relatively good job despite the crisis. One day in 2015 I received a call
from him saying that he wanted to speak with me. He had suddenly been fired and shortly after
that, got a job offer from a Greek construction firm to work in Bahrain on a two-year contract.
He was dubious about it and sought my advice on what to do. For him, crisis was not something
relevant to his present condition even though it had directly affected his livelihood. He told me
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that  he  had  never  been  integrated  into  the  “system”  and  had  never  followed  the  capitalist
consumption culture and ideology that was widespread during the pre-crisis years. He drew a
clear  line  between  his  own  conceptualization  and  “philosophy”  of  life  and  that  of  others,
especially the older generations who had gone on the “trip” of conspicuous consumption. To him
crisis was not the problem, and he distinguished himself from other people who had based their
lives and their identities on being able to consume. He engaged with the dominant discourse of
crisis  as  being  caused by the  bad behavior  of  the  older  generations  who had indulged in  a
capitalist lifestyle. Moreover, he broke up with his girlfriend Marina (27) who had just been
hired for an administrative job at the public Greek Aeronautics Factory (EAB) in Tanagra. This
happened thanks to  a  favorable law; her father,  who had recently died,  had been a  military
officer, and in order to compensate the family, the state offered a job to one of his children.
Marina said “it  was an offer that simply could not be rejected.” Dimitris  explained  that he
despised civil servants’ lifestyles:  “being stuck in a petty job that earns little and ruins your
creativity and freedom to move, making you settle and conform to the miserable life aspirations”
of the Greek capitalist dream. As soon as Marina accepted the job, she started thinking about
marriage and having children, something that clearly frightened Dimitris who finally decided to
take the job in Bahrain and put an end to their eight year long relationship. 
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3.2 Precariously Waged Employees in the Public and Private Service
Sector
Private employees in the service sector were also profoundly affected by the crisis. The crisis
created  difficulties  for  their   employers  who  in  many  instances  could  not  maintain  their
businesses  if  they  had  to  pay  extra  salary  for  employees.  Many  were  left  unemployed,
underemployed or habitually underpaid. In numerous cases, employers asked them to understand
the difficult situation and help them survive the crisis together (“na valoun plati”). That usually
meant delays in payment and wage cuts, and many employees complained that their bosses owed
them several  months  of pay.  This  forced them to confront  several  dead-ends and they were
ambivalent  about  what  to  do:  stay  and  work  without  pay  or  leave  and  face  long  term
unemployment and the possible loss of the money that their employers owed them. In many
cases, service sector employees consented to having their salaries delayed and accepted salary
reductions for fear of losing their jobs. They described their situation as one of being trapped and
unable to do anything because in many cases they had known their bosses for years and were
friends or, in some cases, relatives. Within the private sector, there were several generational and
gender aspects that are worth mentioning as they shaped how employees approached the recent
crisis and life in general.
 Waitressing and service jobs are usually an entry point into the job market for many
young adults (and in many instances adolescents) who work for pocket money and to fulfill
personal aspirations such as traveling, purchasing a bike or a car. In today’s crisis reality, these
seasonal jobs have transformed into permanent ones, and many people in their 30s and in some
cases 40s have found themselves in this  situation which reminded them of their  youth.  This
peculiar time reversal was conceptualized as a failure by my interlocutors, a failure both of the
“system” and a personal failure to do something meaningful with their lives.
Young people who struggled to enter the job market in a field relevant to their studies,
found seasonal or part-time jobs. It was usually easier for women to find waitressing jobs than
men, due to the gendered social stereotypes that find wide application in the market. Cafes and
taverns at  the nearby beaches that  attracted myriad locals and Athenians during the summer
months absorbed the younger generation’s labor. Others tried their luck in tourist destinations in
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other,  cosmopolitan  Greek  islands.  These  seasonal  jobs  were  usually  considered  well-paid,
especially during the pre-crisis years, in comparison with other types of employment, yet they
did not offer the security and convenience that might allow a person to settle down and design
projects for the future. Most of the younger people who juggled through seasonal labor, preferred
to work uninsured and thus earn more net income from their labor thus avoid paying income
taxes.48 This situation existed even before the crisis when many younger and older, in many
instances well educated persons, used this as a pattern for generating their annual income. What
has changed with the crisis is that this seasonal labor has tended to become the main income
source for many younger people who have limited incomes and hence rely on their parents’
assets to cover basic needs such as housing. Panos, a 20-year-old university student back in 2009
when the crisis hit, quit his studies to become a waiter, a job that he started for pocket money but
which by 2015 had become a regular job for him. He rented a small apartment of 30 square
meters (possibly less) for 150 euros in the center of Chalkida, which every summer he sublet to
people who came to work in Chalkida, while he went to work at a hotel on the island of Skyros.
Dimitra (32) was precariously employed in work-fare schemes and had worked on one of the
Greek islands as a salesperson for 4 months during the past three summer seasons before she was
accepted  on  the  municipality’s  latest  workfare  program.  Fanis  (25)  who  had  studied  at  the
technical university, had started as an apprentice in Chalkida’s shipyards. With the recent crisis,
he could not find employment in the shipyards after having finished his studies.  During the
winter, he worked as a delivery boy at a coffee shop and sold marijuana for an income. In the
summer, as he told me, he would quit  the delivery job to work as a waiter either in one of
Chalkida’s all-day beach bars and taverns or at a big hotel in Crete where a cousin of his worked.
He was living at his grandmother’s house in a village near Chalkida. Christos, 31, was employed
at his mother’s small clothes repair business. He had quit his studies in graphic design in order to
get a job and sustain himself. After spending 2 years searching for a job, he became desperate: “I
was  asking  around  in  companies,  both  here  in  Chalkida  and  in  Athens.  I  submitted  CVs
everywhere, they were telling me to leave my CV on top of a pile of other people’s CVs. It was
impossible to find a job.” And so his mother encouraged him to work in her small venture. As he
understood it, unlike older generations who had left their jobs to study, his generation (20-30) of
48 In 2009, the annual income from salaries and pensions below 12,000 euros was not subject to taxes. Today 
this amount has fallen to 6500 euros and there are talks reduce it to below 5000. 
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the lower working class did the opposite; they quit their studies in order to seek employment.
Christos had a strong class-based discourse and was a member of the KKE (Greek Communist
Party). He went on to say that even his mother was acting as every other boss in capitalist society
did and was exploiting her own son; he criticized his mother’s view that he should be grateful for
having a job. With the money he earned he was unlikely to be able to marry and have a family of
his own. Although he was in a long term relationship and both him and his partner wanted to
marry,  have  a  proper  household  and start  a  family,  they  could  not  do  so  with  the  financial
obstacles and impossibilities created by the crisis. I followed Christos on Facebook where he
shared posts on a daily basis about various lottery competitions he had taken part in (to win
furniture, TV sets and household appliances). Each competition post he shared on his personal
wall gave him a chance to win electric appliances, living room and kitchen equipment and trips
abroad, in what appeared as a frantic effort to be able to enjoy what pre-crisis generations had
been able to. To my knowledge, he did not win. One day I saw a post of his about a smartphone
competition that said “Oh my precious phone, come to my hands please.”49 Younger generations
who were raised in the pre-crisis society of plenitude did not have the consumption power or the
amenities  that  older  generations  enjoyed.  Consumption  of  high  tech  goods  was  fetishized.
Commodities such as smartphones were in such instances treated as if they were persons, the
(post)modern  commodity  fetishes  of  neoliberal  capitalism.  This  resonates  with  what  Meyer
(1998) says about failed consumption practices in Ghana after the crisis of the 1990s and the
restrained consumption of western goods and commodities that most Ghanaians could not afford
after Structural Adjustment. TV advertisements of western commodities during that time “fed
desire without ever granting satisfaction.(759).” To a certain extent, those younger generations
who were just beginning to establish their lives or were about to do so, were severely affected by
the crisis. They were accustomed to the abundance of the pre-crisis yet were unable to make a
livelihood of their own. Commodities which the older generation had the money to invest in the
past,  for  younger  generations  remained in  the  sphere  of  unfulfilled  desires.  Austerity  meant
restrained consumption which signaled a rupture in society’s capitalist, economic habitus which
had cultivated and nurtured consumption practices as a means of socialization (Bourdieu, 2015).
49 That expression in Greek rhymes and goes “Oh Agapiméno mou kinitó, Éla sta héria mou se Parakaló.”
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During the crisis, several EU and state funded programs were targeted at unemployed
people  below  30  who  held  a  university  degree  but  could  not  acquire  the  necessary  work
experience  to  advance  their  careers.  However,  the  jobs/internships  on  offer  were  usually
irrelevant to the subject they had studied. For instance, Dimitra, who held an MA in migration
studies and had several times applied for the work-fare programs that were launched in 2007,
told me that she was asked for many forms of accreditation such as the ECDL (knowledge skills
for operating MS office) as well as other skills like certified knowledge of one or more foreign
languages. Laughing, she told me that back in 2008, when she had first entered one of these
yearly “internship”50 programs at the magistrate’s court of Chalkida, the office she was appointed
to did not have any PCs. After having worked as a salesperson for three seasons, she applied as
an administrative worker to the latest work-fare program for youth unemployment in the new
institutions  and social  solidarity  structures  that  the  EU and the  state  had  funded to  combat
poverty in Chalkida. After having been prolonged for three months, their contract ended, and
Dimitra and her co-workers were not eligible to apply for the new contracts because they had far
fewer  employability  credits  than  others  who  had  been  unemployed.51 Starting  in  2014,  the
recently  hired  employees  had  to  develop  the  new  services  (time  bank,  soup  kitchen)  from
scratch; these included acquiring basic equipment such as chairs, desks, tables and PCs through
donations. A few months before the funding was due to end, they were told that the project was
going to be discontinued and transferred to the regional administration. This meant that their
effort of building up and developing the social solidarity structures would end up in the rubbish.
“They are throwing our efforts into the bin … this is really frustrating and disappointing, our
work simply does not matter to them” said Katerina (29), an administrator working in Chalkida’s
social structures. These working conditions were severely disruptive to the mental health of my
interlocutors  who  felt  unworthy  and  disappointed  at  seeing  all  their  effort  and  hard  work
destroyed. A few representatives of those precariously employed at social solidarity structures
across Greece had a meeting with the general secretary of the Ministry of Labor in 2015, a few
months after Syriza won the elections, which was considered by many an opportunity to end
50   Workfare projects that target young people in order to give them work experience. 
51   Each  applicant  for  these  workfare  programmes  summed  credits  according  to  the  number  of  months  of
unemployment,  social and economic status, age and education. Precariously employed in short term projects  were
thus, technically excluded from upcoming ones since others who were unemployed for months or even years had
priority.   
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austerity policies. As a government official explained to Dimitra when they protested against the
termination  of  the  project  and its  re-initiation,  “the  EU does  not  want  to  recycle   workfare
beneficiaries.”  In  terms  of  employment,  young  people  have  been  facing  numerous  difficult
realities since before the outbreak of the recent crisis. People with higher education in Chalkida,
whose labor potential could not be applied in construction or in the industrial sector, migrated to
Athens or Thessaloniki where they had a better chance of finding employment in their field of
study. Nowadays, even this option has been closed off by the crisis and migrating abroad seems
to be the only “choice”. A “forced choice” as Dimitra, who did not want to leave Chalkida and
her friends, told me. Before the crisis, young people who were trained such as Nikos or Dimitris
and who possessed technical skills could easily find employment either in construction business
or in the factories and hence the population of Chalkida was dominated by manual laborers.
Those with higher education were absorbed into Athens’ large market which used to offer more
diverse employment opportunities.
Older people above 45, faced multiple challenges in times of crisis and feared losing their
jobs.  Unlike their  younger counterparts,  they did not have the same flexibility and were not
accustomed to working with the latest  technologies.  Moreover,  the multiple closures of both
small local firms and larger nation-wide firms during the crisis created a culture of fear and
precarity that made many employees feel thankful for having employment even if it was badly
paid.  Increased  unemployment  in  the  industrial  and construction  sectors,  where  mostly  men
worked, and which had been the main source of income for many households in Chalkida, put
the pressure on secondary household incomes such as a female wages from the service sector.
Another  set  of  practices  which  also  became  prevalent  were  the  numerous  workfare
projects that aimed at alleviating the social  exclusion caused by unemployment.  Most of the
workfare programs targeted unemployed people aged between 18 and 30 and above 50 - the age
groups that faced the greatest difficulty entering the job market. Those above 50 who had been
left  unemployed  could  apply  for  fixed  term  contracts  in  public  institutions  such  as  the
municipality. Their only chance for accessing the job market was through the public sector as
private firms hardly ever hired  50+ individuals, especially if they lacked basic qualifications and
had  lost  their  jobs.  For  instance,  a  56  year  old  unemployed  man  had  been  hired  by  the
municipality of Chalkida for 9 months to help a high school principal with her excess workload.
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Yet he did not know how to operate a PC and, in practical terms, could not deliver the task he
was hired for. Another 55 year old man told me that in the past, he had worked for many years in
the municipality of Chalkida’s cleaning sector. When austerity cuts were implemented, he was
made redundant, but thanks to his personal relationship with the vice mayor, he had managed,
the past 4 years, to get hired on the municipal programs. In the past, when he had had a stable job
contract at the municipality, he had also been informally self-employed in the construction sector
where he used to take on tiling jobs. Since the construction sector had collapsed, he did not have
enough clients and relied solely on the 6 month job contracts the municipality offered for half of
each  year  and  the  unemployment  benefits  he  was  entitled  to  receiving  when  the  contracts
ended.52 He was not married, had no children and lived at his mother’s house. For those who had
not  created  a  family,  their  parental  household  played  a  central  role  in  their  livelihood
organization.
Younger  generations,  including  those  who  had  managed  to  find  some  type  of
employment, were in the odd and contradictory position of not being able to live on their own
and having to rely on their older kin to sustain themselves. More and more people relied on their
parents, a pattern which was common even in the pre-crisis years when many young people
continued to reside with and be financially dependent on their parents during their 20s. During
the past 10 years of crisis, the situation has further deteriorated hence the average age of people
who continue to reside with their parents has increased. Several of my younger interlocutors
resided with their parents to avoid paying rent, including Niki (23), who had just finished her
studies. When she returned, instead of staying at one of the flats her parents owned, she returned
to her parents’ house so that they could rent out the other properties they owned in a family block
of flats they had built on credit before the crisis, which was now at risk.  
The minimum wage in Greece fell below 600 euros in 2012, while for people below 25, it
was even less.  This  prompted large  companies  to  seek  out  young,  low paid  and disposable
personnel to cover their  needs, thereby further marginalizing the 25+ unemployed masses. A
project  to  tackle youth unemployment was first  launched in 2012 and continued until  2015.
Through it, the state provided a fixed amount to vocationally train and find internship positions
at private firms for people aged between 25-29 – these were the so-called voucher programs. “It
was a waste of time, at least we got some money out of nothing. But with many months of
52 The salary he earned was around 640 euros per month and then the unemployed benefit was around 420 euros.
128
delay,” a 28 year old university graduate of psychology told me. He was employed through one
of these workfare programs at a big private clinic in Athens, in the administration department. “I
had hoped that I would learn something and I might be hired afterwards since I believed that they
would assign me to a  position relevant  to  my studies.  But  I  was there from 9 am to 3 pm
everyday doing nothing and learning nothing. Also, the permanent staff in the company saw us
(the workfare people) as a potential threat. I stayed for six months and got around 1800 euros
net, two months after the project had ended.” He explained that the total amount that they were
entitled  to  get  was  2500  euros,  which  was  subject  to  taxation.  He  later  gave  me  his  own
explanation of what these funded workfare programs actually did: 
The KEKs (Kentra Eppagelmatikis Katartisis - Centers for Vocational Training) that took
on implementation of the workfare programs got large amounts of money to place us in
one of the firms that participated in the project. I heard that for each person who was
appointed at a company, the center got 1000 euros plus 500 for a training course that we
had to attend. In (name of the company) there were around 100 people like me. I saw
them when I had to sign the attendance book everyday. In my office there were 4 others,
all university and postgraduate degree holders. We just sat there waiting to be delegated
pointless tasks like changing the labels on the office doors or making sure that company
leaflets were distributed in the guest areas.
 He had applied to the voucher project in 2012 when he was 27 years old, and did not want to
apply for the next voucher program in 2015. Instead, he found a job at a bar in Athens where he
was  employed  3  days  a  week  and  shared  a  flat  with  his  brother  who  was  studying  at  the
university. In 2016 he applied to work for an NGO at the refugee camp in Ritsona near Chalkida,
where I had met him. Three of my interlocutors who had applied for these programs stated that
many  of  the  firms  that  participated  in  them  did  not  actually  opt  to  hire  anyone,  but  took
advantage of the programs to get free working hands. The positions they offered were very vague
and hence beneficiaries did not have a specific work focus which they could learn and advance
in; they were the “kid” for all types of work (“to paidi gia oles tis douleies”53) and most of the
time they did not have any work to do and just sat at their desks doing nothing.
53 It is derogative term for someone who does not have a responsible job position and is asked to do many 
insignificant tasks (such as bringing coffee to others).
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In their majority, younger generations were university degree holders, yet that was not
enough for them to find employment. As soon as they finished their studies, they entered a race
to certify  their  knowledge and skills  and to  accumulate  degrees  which in  the end could not
provide them with employment (Papagaroufali, 2018). As a deliberate strategy, they volunteered
to work for free so that they could have better chances of being employed, since most positions
demanded work experience. Chalkida’s younger generation of people with higher education had
almost no chance of finding employment in the city in a field relevant to their studies. 
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3.3 Civil Servants
Civil servants’ wages and benefits were the first to be affected by prescribed austerity
measures  which  demanded  cuts  in  public  expenditure.  On  the  one  hand,  the  extensive
restructuring of the public sector significantly downsized civil servants’ salaries and on the other,
the state stopped employing special personnel to cover essential positions. As a result of the
understaffing these measures created,  many civil  servants were overburdened with additional
workloads. Moreover, understaffing led to poorer services which in turn fed anti-civil servant
narratives,  which  charged them as  incompetent  and incapable  of  serving public  needs.  In  a
populist manner, civil servants in general were targeted as being unworthy of their salaries. My
interlocutors were schoolteachers, tax officers, employees of the urban planning bureau, officers
in  the  citizen  services  bureau,  nurses  and  doctors  at  Chalkida’s  public  hospital.  Apart  from
complaining about the reduction of their salaries, everyone pointed to the understaffing that cuts
in  public  expenditure  had  caused  as  well  as  the  fact  that  they  were  recipients  of  negative
criticism from people  who worked in  other  economic  sectors.  “We are  de  facto  considered
corrupt and incapable,” said a high ranking civil servant in Chalkida’s public water company.
This image was widely cultivated by mainstream media and politicians who wanted to justify the
cuts that they had been enforcing since the start of the crisis. 
To begin with school teachers, one can say that the crisis has had a multilayered impact
on their profession. Apart  from the general cuts which they estimated amounted to about 30
percent and the cuts on their 13th and 14th month salary which were combined with increased
income and indirect consumption taxes,  they faced various other challenges and problems in
their work. Firstly, they had limited resources at their disposal in order to teach and do their job
properly. Schools lacked basic resources and relied on donations from children’s parents who
contributed  whatever  they  could  according  to  their  own  good  will.  Moreover,  general
unemployment and the loss of industrial jobs caused many economically challenged families to
move into their paternal houses resulting in a change of school district for many children. As a
result, some schools were left with very few children and others were flooded with new students
who had recently moved with their families to the areas where older generations of industrial
workers  had  built  their  houses.  The  generalized  socio-economic  crisis  which  parents  were
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experiencing affected their children who behaved difficultly, making school teachers’ jobs even
harder. The anxiety and instability that many children experienced at home was transferred to the
school environment. In some cases, teachers had to deal with critical incidents in which children
fainted because of  malnutrition,  and anger  and anxiety  were  common amongst  children and
adolescents  alike.  Thus teachers  were confronted with the immense psychological  burden of
dealing with and managing the effects of the crisis in the wider social body.
Similarly,  I  was  shocked  by  the  recollections  of  nurses  and  doctors  who  worked  in
Chalkida’s public health system and the situations and incidents they experienced daily. Apart
from the  incidents  that  they  had  to  deal  with,  they  also  faced  extreme  scarcity  of  medical
supplies.  As they  told  me,  the  hospital  did not  have  bed linen  so many patients  in  need of
hospitalization had to bring their own sheets and in many instances, if an operation was required,
the patient had to buy the basic supplies in order for the surgery to be carried out. To keep the
system running and to be able to provide dignified care in emergency cases, hospital staff had to
disregard work protocols.
Other civil servants whom I interviewed worked in the taxation agency of Chalkida. The
agency had moved to a new building in 2011, outside the city.  Administrative restructurings
along with the austerity measures that coincided with them had overburdened existing personnel
with additional tasks. Moreover, they had to face public anger towards the state and citizens
frequently shouted at them as if they were the ones who made the laws and invented taxation.
The public was confused and infuriated by unjust taxation on homeownership, car ownership and
lower labor incomes (Giannitsis  & Zographakis, 2015),54 and they were angry about them. I
encountered a similar situation at Chalkida’s urban planning bureau where one of my informants
worked. Vangelis (53) pointed to the administrative restructurings and the transfer of personnel
and responsibilities; he was burdened with training the employees who were transferred to his
agency. Moreover, since he had a loan and his wife was dealing with severe health problems, the
cuts to his salary were catastrophic. In order to save his house, he appealed to the national courts
and made use of the Katseli Law that protects over-indebted households of waged employees
from losing their main residence. He was not from Chalkida and along with his wife had decided
to move there from Athens in 1990s because of the better quality of life it offered. Having been
54 Before 2012, a civil servant for instance earned around 16,200 euros (14 pays) annually, and would have gotten 
a tax return (nearly 500 euros) after the clearance. In 2012, salaries were reduced and the same employee earned
11,000  euros (12 pays) and would have to pay income taxes (300 euros) instead of receiving a tax return. 
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self-employed before, he seized the opportunity to become a civil servant in his area of expertise,
civil engineering. When he became a civil servant, he was not allowed to undertake construction
jobs, however, since he was in need of money, he continued taking on jobs as a civil engineer by
using a fellow engineer’s signature for the jobs. Once one of his superiors discovered this and
asked him about  this  informal  arrangement,  he  justified  his  actions  by  saying “I  have  been
working in this job for more than 20 years and I have never stolen money or taken bribes, this is
my work and I am in need. If I did not do this I would be forced to steal and to accept bribes. I
am not a thief, I am just doing what I know best.”
A critical  moment  which  every  civil  servant  mentioned  was  the  restructuring  of  the
regional administration system in 2011, the so called ‘Kallikratis’ project that was designed with
the pre-crisis standards, however it was executed parallel with the austerity restructurings of the
2010  bailout  agreement.  Public  administration  agencies  were  merged  and  acquired  more
responsibilities with fewer employees. Merged agencies such as the taxation agency or the urban
planning  bureau  faced  several  organizational  problems  and  conducting  coherent  archival
research on their database was nearly impossible. Another issue which was raised by all of my
informants who worked in the public sector was the increased bureaucracy which was introduced
in order to battle corruption. However, the steps that one had to follow in order to comply with
the formal, bureaucratic procedures were so complex that they led to many delays even with
those issues that demanded urgent resolution. For instance, if something broke in a public school,
the principal had to follow a time-consuming procedure, get offers from various professionals
and wait for the responsible funding institution’s approval, a process that took weeks or months
to be resolved. 
Alexandros (47), a high ranking official at Chalkida’s public water company, described
how they were obliged to go through a painstaking process in order to fix a problem in the water
system,  a  process  which  ended up being more  costly.  The maintenance  of  water  equipment
became the monopoly of the official service in Athens and not of local professionals who used to
fix problems instantly. “I used to call a local professional who could fix it. He would come,
identify the issue and buy the necessary material to fix it by himself.” Alexandros’ office would
then prepare all the necessary paperwork in order to proceed with the payment. “Nowadays, if
something breaks we have to wait for the official service to come and evaluate the cost, and then
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wait more time for them to come and fix it.”  Such informal practices and manipulations of the
system  came  handy  when  something  urgent  happened,  and  civil  servants  came  up  with
innovative solutions and improvised. They had the flexibility, Alexandros explained, to fix the
problem and then follow formal procedures afterwards, while now they had to wait for a slow-
moving bureaucratic structure to verify the problem that they reported and approve the necessary
funds.  With  increased  bureaucracy,  the  state’s  structure  became  more  problematic  and  this
inevitably fueled general popular discontent with the public sector.  As Periklis (55), the head of
Chalkida’s taxation agency (eforia), told me: “we [civil servants] have been stigmatized as being
incompetent corrupt thieves. People blame us and complain but they do not care that recently,
according to the last MoU, the ministry of economics will co-manage the Public Financial Office
with a board of foreign officials.” Becoming a civil servant had been a historical aspiration for
many people since the foundation of the Greek nation-state as it was considered the solution to
resolving one’s livelihood. This is a notion that continues to hold even in the face of severe wage
and benefits cuts. However, the prospect of acquiring a permanent position in the public sector
has ceased to be a possibility for two main reasons. Firstly because of cuts in public expenditure
and secondly because of the gradual increase in the retirement age to 67 for all civil servants who
were below 60 in 2009. 
All of my civil servant informants who had permanent positions were above 40 and most
of them had (at least) a university degree. Having a university degree used to be a competitive
advantage in searching for employment in the public sector, which certainly fueled grassroots
aspirations for higher education and shaped patterns of upward mobility. Only two women who
were close to retirement had basic education and occupied low administrative posts in Chalkida’s
taxation agency. One of them admitted that she ‘entered the public [employment]’ (“mpika sto
demosio”) in the 1990s thanks to a local MP who owed her father a favor and ‘helped’ in the
approval of her application.  According to the principal of a high school in Chalkida, the mean
age of the teaching staff  in  their  school  was 50 and the last  time the state hired permanent
teaching staff was back in 2010.  
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3.4 Self-employment
Self-employment is a prominent economic field in Greece and has historically absorbed almost
one fourth of the working population. Tsoucalas (1986a, 1986b) observed that a majority of those
who could not find waged positions in the public and private sectors turned to self-employment
in order to prosper. In Chalkida, thanks to the expansion of industry and construction that began
after  the  civil  war  ended,  self-employment  offered  various  possibilities  for  upward  mobility
projects and contributed to the modernization processes. The continual increase in purchasing
power over the past 70 years enabled the commercial and the service sectors to evolve, and after
the  1980s,  many  women,  usually  the  wives  of  industrial  workers,  entered  the  labor  market
dynamically by becoming self-employed.  In this section I deal with small firms which employed
up to ten people, with the majority of cases being ones in which the owner(s) was the business’
sole worker. 
The self-employment sector was a dynamic economic field which had partially subsumed
previous crises in Chalkida’s industrial sector by providing an alternative path to prosperity for
many individuals and households. During the present crisis, the self-employed sector has been
profoundly affected by neoliberal restructuring which has creatively destroyed outdated small
firms which could not complete and sustain themselves in a hostile neoliberal environment. In
numerous instances, small businesses that could not leverage large capital profits and adjust to
the new free-market principles were considered an impediment to neoliberal economic growth.
They therefore had to be closed down and their  market share taken over by large – usually
foreign - neoliberal firms. 
Small firm owners who based their income on the sale of goods suffered as a result of the
major decline in people’s purchasing power. Their annual planning was very different from that
of waged employees and, as many said, their income varied significantly throughout the year.
For instance, for those who owned clothes shops, their main workload and the months in which
they made significant profits  were at  the beginning of each season. In September,  when the
school year starts,  parents bought new clothes and footwear and this  period used to be high
season for the clothing market, as were the periods before and during Christmas, before and
during  Easter  and  of  course  when  the  summer  season began.  The  dead  months  when their
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incomes fell  were the in-between periods when in order to boost consumption and sell  their
stock, two sales periods were set. When the crisis began in Chalkida, and especially after 2012
when austerity showed its full impact, most merchandise remained unsold and as a result, offers
and  sales  were  instituted  throughout  the  year  in  a  desperate  effort  by  local  chambers  of
commerce to boost consumption. 
Dina,  a  57-year-old  clothes  shop  owner,  explained  with  great  energy  how  she  had
managed her shop for the past 27 years. For her, the present economic crisis came as something
unforeseen. She was unable to meet all her monthly obligations and therefore prioritized her
monthly payments. First of all she covered her bank cheques with her suppliers, then she paid the
electricity and telephone bills and the monthly shop rent. She was a few months behind with the
rent, and when I was interviewing her, the owner came by and asked her for money. She left for
last her fees to her Social Security Fund (OAEE), which constituted a fixed amount of money the
self-employed were obliged to pay on a bimonthly basis, which was calculated regardless of their
actual income. In 2015, these fees, which gave one the right to access public healthcare and
pensions, amounted to nearly 900 euros every two months. Dina had been unable to pay since
2012 and had accumulated a large debt (around 20,000 euros in 2016). Because of this she did
not have health insurance, yet as part of her overall debt, healthcare fees were still calculated.
Half of the self-employed were in the same position of being indebted to the state and excluded
from the public healthcare system - if they paid their insurance fees would have no money left to
cover even their basic needs. As Dina elaborated, it was with the money she did not pay to the
self-employed insurance fund that she managed to get by. Moreover she was furious with the
state because, even though she did not have access to the public health system once she had
stopped paying social contributions, her insurance fund was charging her fees for it. She said “It
is not only me, everyone is more or less in the same position. What are they [the state] going to
do? Shut us down, shut down half of the market? I do not think that can happen.” 
Nikos (56), who had owned a small shop with electric appliances for the past 25 years,
was  unable  to  cover  his  bank cheques  in  2012.  In  2009,  in  order  to  cover  his  outstanding
cheques, he took out personal consumption loans and, in in his attempt to keep his business
afloat,  ended  up  deeper  in  debt  (James,  2014).  As  the  austerity  crisis  progressed  over  the
following years, he was black listed and excluded from the banking system and his suppliers no
longer trusted him and only accepted cash. That caused an immediate and severe rupture in the
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way his business operated, from which he was unable recover. He became deeply indebted to the
state (the insurance fund and taxation agency), to several banks and some of his suppliers. As a
result, he could barely find merchandise to sell and based his activities on repairing rather than
selling electric appliances. This provided him with a small, usually informal income. Austerity’s
overtaxation of the self-employed was designed on the presupposition they that they evaded tax
and hid income from the state de facto55. This had the opposite of the desired result for the state’s
coffers, as it made tax evasion a survival tactic. High taxes made it impossible for small ventures
to sustain themselves in neoliberal free market competition with large, multinational firms that
benefited from state incentives to attract investment. As Stavros (55), self-employed, who closed
down his shop in 2015, elaborated: “when I first opened my shop in 1987, I had low taxes and
social contributions which made it easy for me to cope. From the profit I made through the sale
of a solar boiler, I could pay my monthly fees for Social Security, my monthly rent and my
electricity bills. After 2000, I had to sell two solar boilers just to pay for my Social Security
fees.”   On  the  one  hand,  inappropriate  taxation  of  the  self-employment  accelerated  the
restructuring  of  the  welfare  state.  On  the  other,  it  forced  many  small  and  medium  sized
enterprises that could not follow the markets’ rescaling, to close down.  
During  the  crisis  years,  the  retail  sector  in  provincial  cities  was  penetrated  by  large
multinational firms which were able to operate at a large scale and sell products with smaller
profit margins. Small shop owners could not compete with the low prices these firms were able
to offer to cash-strapped consumers. Moreover, the penetration of the internet into everyday life
changed the way people accessed the markets and acquired information. People searched online
for the lowest prices in the national market and shopped online. Local retail businesses faced
harsh market competition which jumped from the local to the national and even the international
scales.  Online  nation-wide  price  comparison  platforms  such  as  skoutz.gr  first,  followed  by
bestprice.gr changed market rules, and many small local firms could not keep up with the free-
market economy.  
Businesses that based their activities on food and beverage services had different patterns
of capital  accumulation.  These businesses saw their  greatest  workloads from Friday night to
55  Self-employed were asked to pre-pay taxes based on the previous year’s annual turnover. As everyone said 
“Kathe Persi kai kalytera (Every last years is better)” that suggests for another time reversal the crisis has 
brought
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Sunday evening when they made up for the rest  of the week when they did not have many
clients. An exception to this are the main name days which are usually celebrated with group
outings.  Holidays are the other high season during which these types of businesses have the
greatest  workload,  and as  several  owners  of  bars  and  taverns  told  me,  they  waited  for  the
holidays to make up for the rest of the year. Taverns, coffee shops and bars were severely hit by
the effects of the crisis since one of the first things that people significantly reduced under the
pressure of austerity was spending on outings.  
Andreas,  a  46  year  old  canteen  owner  who  had  strategically  located  his  canteen  in
Ritsona, one of Chalkida’s industrial zones, suffered greatly from the mass job losses and factory
closures. He had worked at an industrial warehouse in Ritsona and in the 1990s, opted to pursue
an entrepreneurial livelihood in Ritsona’s industrial zone, where he had built up a social network
with former co-workers. After the closures and mass lay-offs in nearby factories, he estimated
that he lost 80 percent of his clientele, moreover, since his former clients were regulars, he used
to provide most of them with an informal monthly credit.  When his clients were fired,  their
outstanding debt was above 3000 euros. Although he continued to operate his canteen, he had to
stop employing the woman who used to work there. Describing his situation, he said that he kept
his business open because he had nothing else to do and through it, he managed to earn a few
“euros” so that he could financially move. Metaphors of financial and economic movement as a
sign of life were often used by self-employed people “Na kinoumaste stin agora (to move within
the markets – to exchange)” or “I agora kinitai” (the market moves) are widely used to describe
the movement both of people and resources in the market. Of course he was not able to pay fees
and taxes. 
Another business that I devoted attention to was that of Manolis (51, see Household 6,
Chapter 4) who had inherited and continued his father’s family business in hosting and catering
for wedding and christening feasts. Most of his work took place during the warmer months of the
year, from May to October, though in the pre crisis years he told me that he used to have some
customers  during  the  winter  as  well.  During  the  high  season  when  he  hosted  an  event,  he
employed around 10 to 15 people (not on a daily basis), including him and his wife who worked
without being registered as an employee but was recognized by the system as a ‘helping hand’.
Employing family members either formally or informally was a common pattern in the self-
employed sector, and younger generations could also work in the family business. Quite often,
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the children of business owners wanted to work in their parents’ businesses. This could be either
as an intentional choice, in which case they studied something relevant that could be adapted to
the family business, or as an emergency solution to unemployment.
 Kostas (55) was a commercial retailer of a well-known brand of vacuum cleaners and
cleaning appliances, and he also offered cleaning services to industrial facilities. He had started
as an industrial worker in the Greek Aeronautics Industry (EAB) and had then decided to change
occupation. As he explained, he wanted to be his own boss as he did not like being an employee
and taking orders. For him, owning his own business was a major step forward as it improved his
social status. EAB was a public company, and he therefore had a permanent job position; still, he
was unhappy being an employee. At first he worked two jobs simultaneously, keeping on the one
in the factory that provided capital, while at the same time setting up his venture and repaying
the loans he had taken out to invest in machinery and the private venue which he had bought in
the 1990s. He made use of his contacts in the industrial sector and quickly managed to develop a
clientele  of  several  factories  in  and  around  Chalkida.  When  he  expanded  his  business,  his
younger brother who was employed at Shelman, decided to invest in Kostas’s firm and became a
partner. 
 Both of the above cases are of successful business ventures which, despite the crisis,
managed to maintain some of their profits. They were both challenged by the  austerity crisis,
Kostas by the multiple factory closures and Manolis by the sharp decline in marriages. Manolis
explained that new couples initially have civil marriages and when their first child is born, they
have a religious marriage alongside the christening of their child, and it is then that they arrange
a  big  celebration.  This  new  trend  became  the  prevailing  one  in  the  2000s.  Moreover,
notwithstanding the limited amount at their disposal for organizing a celebration, fewer couples
decided to  proceed to  marriage  because  there  was also  a  severe  decline  in  births.  Shifts  in
people’s  grassroots  economics  and  the  ways  in  which  they  design  livelihood  projects  and
envision  the  future  inevitably  provoke  socio-cultural  shifts  in  practices,  structures  and
institutions of social organization such as marriage. For Manolis’ family business, the period
during which he earned income got reduced to 6 months per year, and so during the rest of the
year, he was occupied in maintaining and upgrading his venue’s facilities on his own. “When
times are tough you need to adapt and see how to gather yourself/ put yourself together (na
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mazefteis), to invest in your own skills and not get stuck.” he said. While Kostas had lost some of
his regular clients, he still maintained some industrial clients in the neighboring industrial zone
of  Inofyta-Tanagra-Schimatari  which  enabled  him  to  sustain  his  business  and  not  become
indebted to his insurance fund. However he had a business loan which had been restructured
according to his creditors’ demands. For this reason, he had to reduce the working hours of 4 of
his employees and negotiate salary reductions with them. In the end, two had voluntarily decided
to quit after their contract become part time, and he kept the other two on full time but at reduced
pay. As he stated, the worst years were 2012 and 2013, while in 2015 he had brought his annual
income back up to its 2010 levels and his business was back on track.
Self-employment is a very vague category and includes various types of business owners
who sell their goods and services directly to the market. In this section I examined only cases in
which  self-employment  was  formalized.  I  intentionally  left  out  various  informal  self-
employment  initiatives and well-organized ventures. Since the informal market in goods and
services was significant and expanded further during the crisis, I dedicate a whole chapter to it.
Thus,  in  Chapter  5,  I  provide  a  detailed  analysis  of  my  interlocutors’ informal  economic
arrangements  and of  the role  of  the  informal  sector  in  Chalkida’s  local  economies.  What  is
important to note here is that self-employment has always been a node that has mediated formal
and informal economic practices and arrangements.
A productive field for observing grassroots economic activities were the local open-air
markets. I spent many hours with small agricultural producers and retailers of raw and processed
foods who ran stalls in Chalkida’s daily open-air markets as well as with consumers whom  I
followed during their shopping. The open-air market (laiki agora) is a market for the people, as
the Greek term  laiki56 suggests. In times of crisis, cheaper products, which in many instances
were sold directly by the producer, provided an outlet to the economically challenged masses.
Yet,  the “entrepreneurs” in the open-air  market also experienced crisis  in their  businesses as
people spent much less and consumed significantly smaller quantities, while not caring about
quality as much. The reduction of individual/household consumption at the open-air markets was
counter-balanced by new consumers who sought cheaper products there, especially raw fruit and
vegetables, while more and more people started buying cheap, imitation clothes there. New stall
56 Laiki, an adjective that derives from laos meaning ‘the people’ or general public, can often acquire derogative 
overtones and can mean plebs and the masses. 
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holders appeared, especially after the state, in order to help new farmers, gave out licenses and
lowered taxation for those who wished to sell their products themselves. In the open-air market, I
encountered people who had had proper shops in Chalkida and who had been forced to close
them because of the crisis. Others, by contrast, had been doing both: they had a regular shop and
participated in the open-air market as well. In many instances their wives worked full time under
the informal but legal status of first degree relative.
Vasilis (38) used to work at a factory that produced plastic cables, that closed in 2012.
The company owed the  workers  several  months’ worth  of  wages  as  well  as  severance  pay.
However, since the company had declared bankruptcy, Vasilis was unsure if he would ever get
his delayed pay at the very least. He and his brother decided to rent a kiosk and become self-
employed as a solution to the lack of waged labor. He explained that he had never gotten into the
mindset of being an “entrepreneur” and preferred his previous salaried position. Formally the
business was registered in his brother’s name yet they operated the kiosk on a 50-50 basis and
shared the workload, profits and risks. For him this type of work entailed detailed calculations
and demanded many more hours of work than a salaried position which was more suitable for
him. Several other self-employment schemes such as coffee shops and bakeries opened up in
Chalkida in the crisis years, as a response to the contraction in the availability of waged labor
positions, yet they struggled to survive and usually closed shortly after. 
Many self-employed people stopped declaring their activities to the taxation agency and
their  insurance  fund  and  continued  to  offer  their  services  informally.  This  included  car
mechanics, electricians, plumbers, hairdressers and other service providers. For instance, in the
same street where I was living, Evdokia (42) had built a two-story house with her husband a few
years before the outbreak of the crisis. The ground floor hosted her business, a small hairdressing
company whose main customers were women from the neighborhood. In 2016, I noticed one day
that Maria had suddenly taken down the hairdresser’s sign and I wondered what might have
happened.  As  I  soon found out,  she  had discontinued her  formal  registration  and continued
informally to offer her services to her regular customers. I asked her what had happened, and
although she was reluctant at first, she explained that she could not afford to pay taxes and her
insurance fund,  to  which she had started to be indebted.  She did not  want  to  become more
indebted and had therefore decided to go informal.
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Another  noteworthy  case  is  that  of  Theofilos  (62)  who  had  started  working  at  the
factories and had been switching employers until he founded his own firm which undertook petty
construction activities, as well as having a shop with construction materials which he closed in
2001. After this he bought a taxi license which he sold in 2012 when the demand for taxi services
was very low and he had started getting indebted to his insurance fund. He decided to stop any
professional activity and to get by on the money he got from the sale of the taxi license, and to
wait  4 years until  his  retirement.  As he told me, he had accumulated the necessary working
stamps needed for retirement, yet with the pension system restructuring he could not retire before
the age of 62. He finally managed to get his pension in 2016, but it was only two thirds of what
he had anticipated that he would receive (from around 1200 he got only 850).  Giannitsis &
Zografakis (2015) show that people who were close to the retirement age and who lost their jobs
hardly  ever  entered  the  formal  job  market.  Instead  they  tried  to  take  advantage  of  early
retirement schemes, a trend which put extra weight on public pension funds. 
The new neoliberalized regulatory framework for the self-employed sector, along with
increased taxation and the dramatic decrease in purchasing power made formal self-employment
no longer worth the effort. Several self-employed interlocutors who had owned small firms for
many years described their situation as being similar to or worse than unemployment since they
barely had clients and could not make a profit. The firms they owned and had devoted great
effort to building and maintaining had, in just a few years, become unprofitable and they were
confronted with a harsh dilemma: close down their businesses and become unemployed, or try to
endure the crisis and wait for it to pass as they went deeper into the hole of indebtedness.  The
invasion of multinational firms created ruptures in the way capital circulated locally, and the
ways in which the market socialized people in Chalkida. Ordinary people who made a living
from commercial activities reasoned that the crisis was a condition in which money stayed still
and there was “no movement” in the market de kounietai fylo57 is an idiom they used to describe
the condition in the market, Furthemore, a common expression was that “every last year has been
better” in terms of their annual turnover and their psychological condition (Apostolidou, 2018).
When people shopped at the local shops, a great part of the surplus value was channeled back
57 This literally means there that “the leaves (figuratively of a tree)  do not move” to suggest a condition of 
stillness
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into the local market thus making possible the city’s social reproduction, as both buyers and
sellers, regardless of their economic background, were interdependent.
Self-employment initiatives were crucial for the development of regional economies and
provided an  economic  structure  which  capital  circulated  and from which  the  state  extracted
taxes. After the 2015 referendum and the imposition of capital controls, the banks seized the
opportunity to reintroduce POS (point of sale) machines and e-banking services to consumers
and businesses. From 2015 on, every business was obliged to accept card payments, a fact that
gave the banks a more central role in petty, everyday economic transactions. Businesses with
outstanding debts either to the bank or to the taxation agency, could not access the banking
system as their money would be automatically confiscated from their bank accounts. Moreover,
in Greece the banks charged higher commissions on plastic money payments58 than in other
countries. As becomes evident, self-employment recycles locally produced wealth and fuels local
socio-economic activities with money. Regional markets were dominated by firms owned by
local people who lived in Chalkida and spent their profits locally, whilst large multinational firms
extracted local capital and accumulated it centrally. Greece’s centralized development model and
regional underdevelopment (Hadjimihalis, 1987) made entrepreneurial initiatives crucial to the
development  of provincial  cities.  Self-employment,  whether  forced (Parker,  2004;  Tsoucalas,
1986a, 1986b) due to the lack of waged labor positions or chosen, was primarily a bottom-up
initiative  that  developed  to  interconnect  economically  local  communities  and  societies  with
market structures, to facilitate capital circulation and tax collection, and to serve the needs of the
growing population. 
58 See https://www.keeptalkinggreece.com/2015/12/21/greek-banks-charge-higher-commission-for-cards-
payments-than-in-other-eu-countries/ (Last accessed 12/12/2019).
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3.5 Pensioners
Pensioners are a broad category of diversely situated people with varied work backgrounds and
distinct  work  and  life  histories.  By  the  time  they  retire,  they  become  institutionalized  and
standardized under the protection of the state.  The public pension system, which is universal,
obliges working people to pay social contributions to the state which guarantees pensions and
other  social  provisions.  The  pension  system  is  an  intergenerational  solidarity  structure  that
maintains social cohesion and it has been a fundamental aspect of Greece’s social contract. The
multiple cuts in welfare, benefits and the net pension had a severe impact and affected middle to
high income pensions,59 which were reduced by 30 to 50 percent (Gianitsis & Zografakis, 2018).
Moreover, the cancellation of the two additional pension payments during Christmas and Easter
were also a major setback which my pensioner interlocutors pointed to along with cuts to the
welfare state, access to the public health system and the state’s contributions to their medication.
Pensioners consist of a diverse category in which formerly employed people from all the
above-mentioned  labor  sectors  are  included.  In  Greece’s  case,  pension  income  is  a  male
dominated field and very few women have entered the pension system.60 New pensioners were
dispossessed  of  many  benefits  and  provisions.  For  instance,  civil  servants  as  well  as  some
industrial  workers  who had special  social  security  funds,  paid  a  monthly,  obligatory  special
contribution  from  their  labor  income  with  the  future  promise  of  a  one  time  payment
(ΕΦΑΠΑΞ)61 when they retired. However the amount of the EΦΑΠΑΞ was either significantly
reduced  or  even  completely  eradicated  even  though  working  people  had  paid  for  it.  Civil
servants for instance were still paying for it though obligatory automatic contributions from their
monthly salaries even though they knew they would either get much less than expected or get
59 The maximum pension that an interlocutor of mine used to earn was 2900 euros. Stefanos (80) used to work at 
Dei (the public electricity company). After the cuts his pension fell to 1700. Spyros, a former head teacher at 
one of Chalkida’s high schools saw his pension to fall from 1800  to 1250 euros in 2012.
60 In Greece, every person above 65 who has not formally worked before is entitled to receive a minimum national
pension. Unmarried women who in the past were very few and had no other source of income, were eligible for 
it. Given the conservative political situation in Greece, a working class woman was hardly ever able to pursue a 
career. Women’s livelihood aspirations were centred around managing the household and having a family thus 
they were de facto under the protection of male bread-winners. Therefore, married women who had not paid 
social contributions were not entitled to receive any pension. If their spouses died, they received a widow’s 
pension. 
61    Pronounced EFAPAX which in Greek means “once and for all”.
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nothing, depending on their age. ΕΦΑΠΑΞ used to be a significant sum for people who entered
retirement and many counted on it for their long term plans. Restructurings created generational
inequalities among those who managed to get it and those who had paid for it but would not be
able to get it.  Age played a determinant role in internal  differences amongst pensioners.  For
instance  older  pensioners  who had been retired  for  more  than  10 years  had  the  capacity  to
accumulate wealth especially when their expenses were minimal. Pensioners below 70 could not
enjoy  all  the  benefits  that  older  people  had  enjoyed  before  the  introduction  of  austerity.
Moreover, people in their 40s and 50s, having seen sweeping austerity restructurings and the
economic condition of public pension funds which had been radically reformed, complained that
they might never get a pension. 
The restructuring  of  the pension system has  been the apple of  discord  over  the  past
decades. Several governments tried unsuccessfully to reform it since 1991, but at high political
cost in the form of massive mobilizations of pensioners and working-class people. In the midst of
the recent crisis, the restructuring of the pensions system occurred and finally the Greek crisis era
government managed to reform it. As soon as the crisis hit Greece, the pension system was the
first to be affected by austerity measures, and almost every new austerity package has further
reduced pensions. This created multiple shocks, especially to younger retirees who had based
their plans for life after retirement on certain calculations of their pensions, and who confronted
many ruptures and discrepancies between what they had envisioned and what they experienced.
Despite  pension  cuts,  there  was  an  accumulation  of  wealth  amongst  the  elderly  who
supported  the  younger,  unemployed  or  underpaid  generations  in  their  struggle  to  get  by.
Pensioners were transformed into valuable assets and the economic organization of the extended
family model reappeared. An increasing number of people relied on pensioners, both in terms of
housing  and  in  terms  of  capital  funds.  The  death  of  a  pensioner,  beyond  constituting  an
emotional loss, also entailed economic consequences for their close kin who lost a stable source
of income. In some ways, pensioners can be viewed as a new type of “employer” who provided
capital and housing to their children in exchange for care. In many instances, pension income
was recycled within the kinship network and created a kin-based grassroots job “market” for the
unemployed.      
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Nikos, a 79 year old pensioner felt extremely uncomfortable when the government cut the
13th and 14th pension payments  and he could neither  give pocket  money nor presents to  his
grandchildren,  something which  grandparents  had traditionally  been expected  to  do.  He felt
ashamed of being in that position after having worked hard all his life. Nikos’ pension had been
reduced from 1300 euros per month (14 pays) to 890 (12 pays). He used to work at a union of
transport of goods in the port of Chalkida, an egalitarian scheme in which every employee had
equal pay, a share of profits and an equal workload. He had managed in his lifetime to fulfill his
duties towards the next generation and since he was a homeowner, he had very low monthly
expenses. His wife had worked in the household; hence she did not receive a pension at all. His
main concern was about the future of his grandchildren and the coming generations who were
the ones whose future was ruined. In the course of my fieldwork, I encountered only one woman,
who was 76 years old, who was receiving a pension because of past employment. Other elder
women  received  the  widow’s  pension  of  their  deceased  husbands.  Widow’s  pensions  were
further cut and older women in need of medication have been challenged. I encountered one 80-
year-old  woman  who  had  never  married  and  who  received  the  minimum  national  pension
everyone in Greece is entitled to, regardless of whether or not they have working stamps, if he or
she has no other  household income. Georgia had never worked formally in  her life  and she
managed to  get  by with  her  tailoring  skills  and a  sewing machine  while  living  next  to  her
brother’s family. 
I  also  encountered  a  couple  who  were  both  pensioners  in  their  80s,  Christos  and
Panayiota.  Christos had worked in several sectors and for the last  16 years of his  work life
worked at the cement factory from where he retired. Panayiota had worked in several factories
such as Darigk. She described the working-class struggles and corruption scandals that led the
factory to  close,  as  well  as  memories  from the civil  war  and the social  exclusion they had
experienced since they both had leftist family backgrounds. Panayiota received a small disability
pension (less than 400 euros) since she had a severe health issue and could barely walk. She said
that she had stopped working as soon as she became pregnant with their first child and never
worked formally thereafter. All of their children were facing severe economic difficulties due to
the recent crisis and they described their life as always having been full of toil and trouble. The
livelihoods of three more households were dependent on their two pensions and, because they
were  over  80,  Christos  and  Panayiota  were  preoccupied  about  what  would  happen  to  their
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children  if  Christos,  who  received  around  1100  euros  a  month,  died.  Their  older  son  was
divorced and used to work at the cement factory as well. Their two daughters (43 and 40), both
married,  were  unemployed  and  found  occasional  day  labor;  both  their  husbands  were
underemployed.  The daughters,  especially  the youngest  who was living upstairs  in the same
family building and taking care of them, cooked and cleaned and conducted all the necessary
household tasks for them. Otherwise, they said that they would have hired a nurse or another
woman to help them. 
When their parents died, younger generations who relied on their pensions had to face not
only the emotional burden of losing a loved one, but also the economic casualty that would make
life much harder for them. In many cases, younger generations could not even afford to receive
the inheritance of their deceased relatives because of the taxes attached to them. There have been
many cases around Greece of children renouncing their inheritance rights to assets that belonged
to  their  relatives  because  apart  from the  assets,  they  inherited  debts  as  well.62 In  terms  of
inheritance tax but most importantly, if someone possessed assets that their income could not
justify, they would automatically but elevated in the taxation scale and would have to pay an
enormous amount of income tax. Owning a house for instance requires that one justify it with an
adequate  income  resource.  A  house  of  150  square  meters  presupposes  that  the  owner
demonstrates at least 17,000 euros in annual income. If someone earned, for example, 10,000
euros, they would be taxed as if they earned 17,000 euros. The same applies for cars. This is a
Greek  particularity  that  is  called tekmirio (proof)  and  it  was  devised  in  order  to  battle  tax
evasion.  Greek  tax  payers,  when  they  appeared  to  possess  a  car,  their  un-taxable  income
increased and they had to present proof that they had the sufficient income resources to maintain
it. Many unemployed people who did not have formal income to present, transferred their cars to
their pensioner relatives to avoid income taxes for a car they possessed and an income that they
did not have. 
The crisis has created various abnormalities: wealth has become concentrated amongst
the elderly while young people have become unable to imagine a future worth living since, they
have been excluded from the job market. Access to public resources became mediated by older
62 Source : https://www.kathimerini.gr/963619/article/oikonomia/ellhnikh-oikonomia/stis-130000-ektinax8hkan-
oi-apopoihseis-klhronomiwn (Last accessed 12/12/2019).
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pensioners who provided money and supported younger generations who had limited access to
capital for all the reasons described above. An incident that  occurred while I was out having
dinner with some of my interlocutors, which made me feel uncomfortable, is worth mentioning.
Out of ethnographic curiosity, I asked the waiter, who was a man of around 55, about his work as
a waiter. He informed me, in front of everyone, that he was a military pensioner but that the
money  he  got  after  the  cuts  was  not  enough,  so  he  worked  informally  at  the  tavern.  My
informants were rather irritated by his response and attitude, saying “he is stealing the job from a
younger person in need”, they found his stance immoral, individualistic, self-centered and since
it was  illegal, one of them was thinking of reporting him to the work inspection authority. That
made me feel guilty, and made me realize how sensitive ethnographic knowledge can be. One of
my co-diners was Andreas (59), a chemist who, after an accident at the age of 52, was receiving
a disability pension (half of the pension he would normally have received on reaching the age of
62).  He  had  been  multi-employed  in  the  past,  both  in  industrial  settings  and  in  several
entrepreneurial initiatives he took in Chalkida which his expertise allowed.63 The money was not
enough and so he had been informally renting out some flats he owned at one of Chalkida’s
popular  beaches.  Renting  out  properties  was  a  passive  income  resource  and  many  Greeks
invested in private property as a rental income. Second home-ownership has been a livelihood
strategy in the countries of southern Europe (Allen et al, 2004), and in times of crisis, income
from rentals aided social reproduction. There were a few instances in which people move out of
the houses they owned so that they could rent them out. In Chalkida, though, the demand of
housing was not high, firstly because of the underdeveloped tourist industry and the lack of jobs.
There were, however, several summer rentals for Athenians, who wanted to stay close and do
their  summer  vacations.  Furthermore,  since  2010,  private  property  has  been  severely  taxed,
which has caused much distress to the masses of homeowners. 
There were a few cases in which people could retire early. Military and police officers
could retire in their 50s before the restructuring of the pension system. Women aged 50 who had
an under-aged child could retire early too, though I did not have such an ethnographic encounter.
In addition, a contradictory and outdated law that enabled unmarried daughters, regardless of
their income, to receive their deceased father’s pension if their mothers had died was canceled
after public outrage at a 50 year old politician’s daughter receiving her father’s pension. The
63 Chemists were amongst those who had the strongest employment potential. 
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pension system was designed around the male breadwinner model. Pensions usually covered the
needs of two or more household members and insured generations of Greek housewives who
normally married older men and had never worked outside of their households. 
The pension system’s construction is informed by the cultural values of Greece’s national
project for prosperity and a better future for coming generations. Pensioners, especially the older
ones who had experienced hardship and struggle making a livelihood, wished for a better future
for their children and were shocked by the crisis’ resource scarcity and austerity. In this way,
crisis  was seen as a movement backwards in time, a time reversal that resembled past lived
experiences and collective memories (Knight, 2016). The experience of leading an austere life
was common amongst people over 70 who, in one way or another, had endured numerous crises
and passed through multiple struggles in order to build the bases of a life worth living, if not for
themselves, then for coming generations.    
 Lastly, most retired people in Chalkida were actively engaged in agricultural activities
since they had plenty of time to maintain and further develop the plots of land they owned. With
both capital and personal effort, pensioners funded the development of the assets that the next
generation would inherit.  Moreover, the elderly were actively engaged in the rearing of their
grandchildren and in offering vital childcare services to their children. Households with pension
income acted as a family based welfare institution for younger generations in numerous ways




In this chapter I have shown how different employment sectors have been affected by crisis and
austerity, and illuminated the intergenerational and gendered divergences that emerge. Labor is a
constitutional  force  of  modern  societies  which  has shaped  social  and  economic  life  and
organization. The different labor sectors make organic solidarity structures necessary as a web of
multiple  relations  of  interdependence  and  thus  social  cohesion  is  maintained.  The
implementation of austerity as a remedy to the crisis has caused severe ruptures in labor income
which in turn accelerated the neoliberal process of the rolling back and rolling out of the state. 
On the one hand, the neoliberal restructuring of labor followed the dominant recipe of
trying to attract foreign capital investments to absorb the radical increase in unemployment. On
the  other,  austerity  governments  opted  to  tackle  tax  evasion  and  the  informal  economy,
combining them with cuts in public expenditure, in order to eradicate the public deficit.  The
austerity reforms that were implemented caused a general devaluation of labor and created a
generalized uncertainty that introduced precarity into every labor sector, for which reason people
sought  out  other  sources  of  income.  Neoliberal  restructuring  of  the  ways  in  which  people
accessed income sources led to the financialization of everyday life, as calculative reasoning
prevailed.   
The disappearance of industrial  employment was a great shock to Chalkida as it  had
sustained local  markets.  The many employment opportunities it  had offered since the 1920s
shaped the industrial culture and character of the city. Industrial laborers often took pride in their
profession that generated capital and contributed to the economic growth of Greece. Working in
the industrial sector was a livelihood strategy that used to provide a stable and secure income,
and after the 1980s when most modern working rights were established in Greece, industrial
laborers started to earn sufficient income to pursue upward mobility projects.  The crisis has
accelerated the process of de-industrialization that started in the 1980s, and which is based on
neoliberal, financialized principles of global economy. Production costs were higher in Greece
than  in other countries where multinational firms had branches. The case of the cement factory
is an example of the neoliberal financial logic in which speculative profit matters more than
people’s livelihoods. The closure of the cement factory was a social index of Chalkida’s very
difficult position. In financialized capitalism, neoliberal economic projections have the power to
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affect the way people earn their living and thus penetrate further, triggering social restructuring
and transformation as well. Crisis is a process that originated at the higher scale of the global
financial system and trickled down, passing into Chalkida’s local society through the  industrial
restructurings and closures it provoked. Goddard (2017) acknowledges that the disappearance of
industrial labor and restructuring in the globalized industrial economy led to the emergence of
new  types  of  workers  and  provoked  intra  class  reconfigurations  (Hardt  &  Negri,  2000;
Codellupi,  2008; Fumagalli 2011). Radical shifts and abrupt transformations in the industrial
sector affected other economic sectors and activities that emerged out of the capitalist model that
was facilitated by industrial income (Narotzky, 2016).
As I have shown in previous chapters, Greece’s industrialization and thus its industrial
labor,  were  linked  with  modernity  and  industrial  commodities  had  a  modernizing  agency
(Appadurai, 1986). Various industrial workers linked their profession with the national collective
project  of  modernity  and  differentiated  themselves  from  other  professions  that  instead  of
producing, recycled capital. Industrial workers’ identities and subjectivities were systematically
constructed  as  the  driving  force  behind  the  national  economy’s  development,  as  producing
consent with the capitalist model of development (Burawoy 1979). Industrial production not only
improved the living standards of those who were directly involved in it, but also those of the
nation/society as a whole, and to that extent the local decline of industrial labor was understood
within the wider context of the national failure of Greece in times of crisis.
Wages  and pensions  from the  state  were  another  channel  which  brought  capital  into
Chalkida’s local economy. Austerity cuts in wages and pensions paved the way for restructurings
in waged labor at private firms and established precariousness in the job market. Civil servants
constitute a distinct cultural category as once someone secured a position in the public sector,
they could enjoy a care-free life and design livelihood projects based on stable income resources.
Civil servants had the best profile for the banks to provide them with credit based on the fixed
monthly amount they earned. Those who had gotten loans based on their pre-crisis salaries were
unable to socially reproduce and pay their monthly installments to the bank, as the money they
earned was barely enough to cover a family’s basic needs. Cuts in wages and pensions provoked
shocks in the commercial sector as many small and medium sized firms had waged people and
pensioners as their main clients. For this category of people, austerity and crisis have brought an
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end  to  life  as  they  knew it.  Feelings  of  being grateful  for  at  least  having a  job were also
widespread as unemployment escalated and remained above 25 percent in the austerity ridden
economy. 
The economic culture of the self-employed, a constituent part of the Greek middle class,
is characterized by uncertainty and instability and includes taking risks and conducting varied
calculations about profit making. This particular aspect of its culture made many affected self-
employed  people  who  believed  that  “it  will  pass,”s  unable  to  face  the  certainties  and
impossibilities that crisis brought to their sector. Many small firms were on the verge of closure
and their owners trapped in the financial stagnation that the markets had fallen into after the
imposition of austerity and the country’s unstable economic and political situation. The rational
choice to close down their  businesses appeared frightening and uncertain since there was no
alternative. Many self-employed people who had set up their businesses from scratch saw their
businesses as an extension of themselves, a livelihood investment and longstanding commitment
that  sustained  their  family’s  needs.  In  other  instances,  the  firms  they  owned  were
intergenerational  projects  that  they had inherited,  continuing their  parents’ and grandparents’
businesses. To close down a three generation old firm was a prospect that presented a heavy
emotional burden. In the midst of the crisis, numerous mainstream economists and the media
reproduced popular discourses around the significance of small and medium sized firms, using
the cliché “the backbone of the economy.” They also frequently suggested (Kotsios & Mitsios,
2013) that Greece’s entrepreneurial model had to be upgraded and “rationalized” to meet the
demands of the global economy. These trends favored capital accumulation at the upper scale
while condemning ventures that operated at the local scale.  
Harvey (2003) has pointed to the fact that the working classes can be divided into two
levels, a lower and an upper strata, with certain intra-class hierarchies apparent (Kasmir and
Carbonella, 2008) in relation to skill, education and age. The majority of cement factory workers
who, since the 1980s, had enjoyed hard won labor rights and unionization, struggled to maintain
those benefits and preserve their former pre-crisis situation and the abundance that the pre-crisis
model  had offered.  Walter  Benjamin (2002) argued that  the  last  stage  of  alienation  that  the
capitalist model achieves is for it to become incorporated and naturalized in people’s emic way
of thinking and to acquire the socio-cultural power of an economic religion (Mirowski, 2013;
Benjamin,  2002;  Peck  &  Tickell,  2002).  Numerous  people  who  witnessed  the  collapse  of
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capitalist promises of growth were brought to realizations and conclusions about the pre-crisis
period’s problematic lifestyle. As one said, “we only cared about buying the latest car model.”
They did not understand the faulty model of development and, struggling to preserve the past,
resisted  neoliberal  restructuring  of  the  labor  sector  which  had  reconfigured  their  living
arrangements in a negative way. To that extent the pursue of capitalist dreams and consumption
patterns in pre crisis years, as well as concrete beliefs and ideals towards prosperity and leading a
good life have failed. In that sense some people redefined what a “life worth living” means while
their  ideas  are  entangled  with  notions  of  dignity.  “We  [refers  to  the  society]  judge  people
according to money, is he rich, oh, kalos gampros (good groom) they said. Money matters more
than dignity and other qualities a person can have. That is how we ended up here” said Manolis
(51).  Money  and  commodity  fetishism  on  the  one  hand  reveal  the  power  and  the  great
importance of money in all scales. Wherever there is a lack of money circulation there is crisis.
This neoliberal austerity that was enforced in Greece underscores the importance of resource
circulation which maintains social  cohesion.  Money may not  bring happiness as the popular
saying goes, but definitely, the lack of money and resources brings about great anxiety, stress,
depression one the one hand, and on the other, an introspective process that might lead to greater
but subtle revolution and a new renaissance. 
The multi-employment model (Mingione, 1995, 1990), in which people combine various
sources of income, has not produced a homogenous proletariat and the working class is marked
by  diverse  intra-class  variations,  interests  and  contradictory  claims.  Income  was  a  male
responsibility that was embedded in people’s social habitus. The organization of labor and the
formation  of  the  public  pension  system  in  particular,  reproduced  several  gendered  and
generational inequalities. Women in Chalkida hardly ever had the opportunity to pursue a career
and earn more than men. The gendered reversal of income that households experienced wounded
masculine pride and the social identities of traditional male breadwinners. Austerity restructuring
of the labor sector affected distinct age groups differently, with the unemployment rate for people
below 35 as the highest, despite the fact that these generations constituted the most educated and
specialized workforce Greece has ever had. Younger generations did not only lose income, they
were dispossessed of their future. This is illustrated in the decline in birth rates and marriages as
younger  generations  do not have the capacity  to envision a livelihood in the way that older
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generations  could.  On  the  other  hand,  the  hard-won  livelihood  achievements  that  older
generations had accomplished were at stake, a fact which caused great discontent and social
unrest amongst the new class of the dispossessed. 
The  male  breadwinner  model  in  Chalkida  established itself,  not  only  because  of  the
presence  of  heavy industry,  but  also  through the  multi-employment.  Thus  it  reproduced the
traditional,  conservative  household  and social  organization  into  capitalism even  after  1980s.
Male income creation potential, especially with multi-employment and the increasing salaries of
industrial  labor,  enhanced the gendered division of labor within the household.  Indeed, after
1980s,  women started to  become multi-employed too as  they entered the formal  job market
dynamically, yet they were almost exclusively responsible for unpaid reproductive labor within
their kinship networks. It took several decades for the shifts in household organization to show,
mainly due to the massive access of women in higher education and the cultural shift towards
more progressive ideas that have shaped the liberal west in the 1960s. To date, with the recent
iteration of crisis, the male breadwinner model in Greece has been questioned and altered. In
Chalkida, male employment in Central Greece decreased nearly 30 percent (42.000 men) from
2007 to 2012 while female employment during the same period decreased 13 percent (nearly
10,000 women) (EIEAD, 2013: 50-51). As a result, women not only in 2010s have had more
equal income opportunities at the labor sectors, but also, after the outbreak of crisis, women’s
income got promoted as the main income resource of many households, especially in Chalkida,
an area which the labor sectors were male dominated.  Thus it remains to be seen, how all of
these structural and cultural shifts that the crisis has provoked in the local society of Chalkida,
will evolve over the course of the coming decade and how younger generations will reproduce,
reform or abandon traditional socio-economic practices and livelihood models based on gender
and what other implications these cultural shifts will have, in other aspects of social life. 
The recent crisis and the imposed neoliberal austerity in Greece have brought about a
reconfiguration in the way people understand work. In the capitalist system, production came to
be segregated from reproduction as “work” from “life” (Kasmir & Carbonella, 2014). In the next
chapter I investigate those shifts in meaning and practices of work have at the household level
and  in  social  reproduction  practices  and assess  how production  as  reproduction  came to  be
reintegrated under neoliberal austerity. What is particularly relevant to the present iteration of
crisis,  is  that  austerity  occurs  within  a  capitalist  market  that  despite  the  crisis  has  abundant
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commodities for sale. Crisis in neoliberal capitalism in Greece derives from the impossibility of
people to consume. Crisis is therefore expressed as restrained consumption (Chatzidakis, 2018)
while the market supply of all sorts of capitalist commodities remains high and people through
new means such as the internet, can access national and international markets from their homes.
Austerity in the context of market abundance is a paradox that Greeks have never experienced




Patterns and Austerity from Below: 
Social Reproduction in Times of Crisis
Introduction
Households are dynamic grassroots structures which provide their members with the necessary
bases  for  socialization.  Within  the  space  of  the  household,  people  learn  basic  socio-cultural
norms and use resources to develop various skills that help them integrate into the wider socio-
economic system. In his book Economics as Culture, Gudeman (1986) shows how everyone is
an economic actor. Economic  practices are learned and reproduced in everyday life and stem
from  what  Bourdieu  (1977)  has  termed  habitus.64 Much  of  the  research  conducted  at  the
household level builds from the assumption that both intra and inter household relationships,
structures and functions are determined by the wider sociopolitical and economic context. The
formation of household units can trigger changes to the wider cultural system. Chayanov (1966)
found that peasant household organization in the USSR posed an obstacle to industrialization and
the  maximization  of  production.  Collins  (1986;  1985)  elaborates  on  how  nuclear  family
organization fostered capitalist development in the Peruvian Andes where the extended family
household  production  model  was  prevalent.  Shifts  in  household  organization  mirror  greater
transformations of the wider cultural, economic and social context  (Goody, 1972; Kertzer, 1991;
Mayer, 2018; Janssens, 1997; Narotzky, 1997, 1991; Smith & Wallerstein, 1992; Wilk, 1991;
Wilk, Netting & Arnould, 1984; Yanagisako, 2015). Therefore, one must assume that the recent
64 Such knowledge is crystalized in various folk sayings about the grassroots economy in general which are of 
great ethnographic and sociological interest.  
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economic crisis in Greece has provoked changes and reconfigurations in household organization
and social  reproduction practices. In this chapter I examine the practices and structures of 9
households in Chalkida in which I conducted participant observation, both in the space of the
household and by following members as they went about their everyday activities and I  further
elaborate on the household economics and life histories of some of the interlocutors I introduced
in Chapter 3. Some of the fixed household expenses in contemporary societies include electricity
and  water  and  telecommunications  which  vary  according  to  the  number  of  people  each
household hosts65. I was interested in how household functions and morphologies were being
altered or adjusted by the current crisis and how crisis and austerity were re-configuring inter and
intra household relationships. Before proceeding with my ethnographic analysis, I need firstly to
define what a household unit consists of. According to Eurostat’s census guidelines, “a private
household is either: a) A one-person household, that is a person who lives alone in a separate
housing unit or who occupies, as a lodger, a separate room (or rooms) of a housing unit but does
not  join with any of the other occupants of the housing unit  to form part  of a  multi-person
household as defined below; or b) A multi-person  household,  that  is  a  group  of  two  or  more
persons  who  combine  to  occupy the whole or part of a housing unit and to provide themselves
with food and possibly other essentials for living. Members of the group may pool their incomes
to  a  greater  or  lesser  extent”  (Eurostat  2010:  107).66 This  conventional  definition  enables
statistical  standardization  and  cross-country  comparative  analysis  of  the  household  unit.
However,  it  ignores  what  really  happens  in  practice  and  underplays  the  relationships  of
interdependence which can only be grasped through ethnographic methods.  Narotzky (1997)
suggests that we should instead discriminate between household morphologies and household
functions. In the current Greek social context, households are based on the nuclear family model.
This is a consequence of modernization and the construction boom of the past 6 decades of
continual capitalist growth (1950-2007). The individualization of household units was mediated
by the specifically Greek model of antiparochi which made it possible for nuclear families to be
65 For a two person household electricity bills were around 50-60 euros per month on average, that amount nearly 
doubled for a family of four members. Landline and internet was fixed to 20-30 euros per month while watering 
bills were 10 to 20 euros per month. 
66 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/3859598/5916677/KS-RA-11-006-EN-TOC.PDF/5f1defb8-0c5c-4bed-  
b7a9-4d849620cd38?version=1.0 (Last Accessed 14/01/2020).
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accommodated in separate housing structures and to have their own distinct household spaces
and created a particular model of housing and welfare system in Greece and the European South
(Allen et al, 2004). The extended household which was common to rural and urban settings in
the past, both in Greece (Dubish, 1974, 1986; Friedl, 1975; Hirschon, 1978, 1979) and in other
parts of the world (Chayanov, 1966; Collins, 1985; Janssens, 1997; Kertzer, 1991; Mayer, 2018;
Narotzky, 1997) was reproduced in the growing Greek cities where many of the rural to urban
immigrants settled. Chalkida’s neighborhoods were initially formed by kin households and were
created  by  people  with  a  common  rural  origin.  The  Greek  antiparochi housing  project
reconfigured  the  dwelling  practices  of  extended  family  households  and  produced  the
infrastructure  for  hosting  the  growing  population  of  modern  Greek  cities.  As  Wilk  (1984)
contends,  household  morphology  can  change  while  its  functional  group  remains  the  same;
conversely,  household  morphology  can  remain  the  same  while  its  functions  change.  In  my
fieldwork,  as  I  show  below,  I  encountered  both.  Moreover,  household  morphologies  and
functions need to be considered together with the social system’s social, economic and cultural
components  and  its  preconfigured  power  relations.  After  the  1960s,  Greek  middle  class
household structures (Cavounidis, 1983; Hirschon, 1979; Hirschon & Gold, 1982; Pollis, 1992;
Vaiou, 1992) were based on the male breadwinner model, with reproductive labor tasks being the
near exclusive responsibility of women. Through the family histories of my interlocutors, I show
how the male breadwinner/female housewife model was structured over time and I argue that
this naturalized model has been challenged, amongst the younger generation, by the present day
crisis.  Moreover,  through my ethnographic data,  I  assess  how the extended family has  been
transformed by a process which I call the individualization of the household unit, and how this
segregation of the extended family household has created new forms of interdependence between
generations. Following Narotzky (1997), who emphasizes function over morphology, I examine
the  inter  and  intra  household  relationships  that  place  the  household  unit  within  the  web  of
intimate social relationships. The forms of interdependence among kin households blur the limits
of the household unit and open up a field of inter-household relationships or household networks
which resembles the extended family organization of the past,  when housing resources were
scarce and more than one nuclear family shared the same household space with their kin. 
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Unlike mainstream statisticians, Smith and Wallerstein (1992) define a household as a
resource pooling, collective consumption and distribution unit, and they do so by focusing both
on intra and inter household practices and structures. This definition has many advantages for
understanding household dynamics in which people are closely dependent on each other but
might be living in separate spaces. It also enables us to grasp relationships of interdependence
among  kin  households,  and  how  resources  circulate.  For  instance,  transnational  households
(Basch et al., 1994; Jones and de la Torre, 2011) or ethnographic examples from my fieldsite,
such as the adult university students who live in other cities and are financially dependent on
their parents, cannot be considered as having a household of their own. Resource pooling and
distribution  bring  to  the  fore  kinship  networks  which  have  developed   relationships  of
interdependence similar to the domestic networks which Stack (1974) analyzes. 
I argue that the recent economic crisis has bolstered such relationships and shed light on
the  soft  boundaries  of  the  household  as  it  is  defined by dominant  (macro)economic  models
(Narotzky,  1997).  Smith  and  Wallerstein’s  definition  (1992)  enables  us  to  unpack the  inter-
household relationships of dependence which are crucial for understanding the transition from
the extended family to the nuclear family model. The idea of households as resource pooling
units  enables us to unpack the grassroots dynamics of resource management.  I  focus on the
grassroots economic organization of households in order to assess how people cover their basic
needs and design intergenerational livelihood projects in the midst of the current austerity crisis
in Greece. I give special attention to care and reproductive labor relationships which are highly
feminized  (Narotzky,  1991)  and  have  naturalized  females  as  caregivers.   These  embedded
gendered inter and intra household roles have in many instances shifted the burden of the crisis
onto women’s shoulders (González de la Rocha, 2001). 
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4.1 A Household that Provides Income Resources and Receives Care
Household 1
Panayiotis (82), a pensioner from the cement factory and Maria (79) live on the ground
floor of a family compound building. Their 43 year old daughter Anthi lives upstairs with her
family. Both Panayiotis and Maria come from poor backgrounds. Panayiotis’ family settled in
Chalkida in 1923 after the population exchange. In the 1950s, the state granted his parents a plot
of land with a one room house in order to compensate them for having lost their homes. Maria’s
mother was also from Asia Minor and her father was from Avlida. Her father died during the
civil war fighting for EAM-ELAS and from then on her family were persecuted as communists.
Panayiotis’ father had opened a tavern where leftists used to hang out. He told me stories about
his father’s tavern and how the police had persecuted his family and raided their home numerous
times. In the 1950s, the neighborhood was gradually populated with other working-class families
whose male members worked in Chalkida’s factories. The state provided them with low interest
loans for building or buying houses in the area.  
 Maria had grown up without her father, and her mother had to work various petty jobs in
order to make ends meet. She was hired by the cement factory to cook for the seasonal workers
who lived near it. Maria started to work at the age of 16 at a small pastry factory in Chalkida and
later, from 1958, worked for a few years at Darigk which by then had been transformed from an
ice production unit to a metallurgical factory. Later she took a job at Peraeiki-Patraiki, a textile
factory, and got married to Panayiotis in 1960. Panayiotis’s parents were unable to raise him and
when he was 9 years old, they had given him to a rich family in Athens to serve as a “maid”.67 He
stayed there until the age of 14 after which he returned to Chalkida and became an apprentice
(kalfas) to a tailor. After he had learned the profession, he started working for a clothes and shoe
production unit in Chalkida as a subcontractor. Maria and Panayiotis had their first son Anestis in
1963, and then started to extend Panayiotis’ parents’ house in order to host their growing family.
They  had  two more  daughters,  Georgia  and  Anthi  in  1968 and 1970.  The money  from his
tailoring business was not enough to raise three children, so Panayiotis found employment at the
cement  factory  where  his  work  consisted  in  lubricating  the  factory’s  machinery  (ladas).
67 He used the Greek term ypiretria which means servant in its female form.
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However, he did not abandon the tailoring business and his wife and son carried it on at home. In
the 1990s they added a second floor to the house, in which their son, who was actively engaged
in its construction, lived with his new wife. The upstairs house was intended as their youngest
daughter’s dowry. As soon as she married in  1996,  their  son rented a house for his  family.
Anestis, as the son of a former cement factory worker, found employment at the cement factory
and worked there from 1994 until 2015 when he was fired. Their second daughter got married
and moved to her husband’s house in 1991.  Since having an operation at Chalkida’s public
hospital in 2005, Maria faced severe health issues and could barely walk. For this reason, their
youngest daughter took care of their household while their other two children helped them move
around, do their shopping and go to the doctor for their monthly checkups.   The culture of
austerity proved to be intergenerational. Panayiotis received a pension of 1080 euros and Maria,
a disability pension of nearly 400 euros.68 All of their children had lost their jobs due to the crisis
and relied on their parents’ financial help, who distributed their pension income among three
households. Their main expenses were medication and medical exams, and they paid nearly 200
euros per month for medication.69 Anthi, who lived upstairs and had two children, was the one
who  cooked  for  both  her  own  and  her  parents’  household.  Food  expenses  for  these  two
households were mostly covered by Panayiotis and Maria’s pension incomes. They had also been
giving some financial help to their son’s son who was studying at university. This was especially
true after 2015 when Anestis had lost his job and started to work informally at a tavern. Clothing
expenses for their younger grandchildren, aged between 10 and 16, were also covered by their
pensions. The elderly couple also  provided financial help to their children’s households in order
to cover their electricity bills or any other emergency expenses. For instance, their grandson who
was doing his military service in Evros at the Greek-Turkish border, did not have the money to
pay for the train ticket. Given his age, Panayiotis was worried about what would happen if he
died.“With this situation, with the crisis and everything, what will happen to them if I die?” he
said.  Maria  suffered  continuous  pain  and  often  exclaimed  that  their  lives  had  always  been
difficult, “but what to do? That’s life” she said. As she lit another cigarette, she continued “and
this is the life we have to live.” She was a heavy smoker and her son supplied her with smuggled
68 Before the cuts, he used to get 1400 euros. The disability pension remained unchanged. 
69 Before the restructurings of public health care, they paid 50 euros less per month for their medicines. 
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cigarettes. During the crisis, the price of cigarettes has radically increased. This has led to a
growth in the smuggling of cigarettes of unknown quality,  especially after the imposition of
special taxation on ‘luxury’ (sic) items such as tobacco and alcohol. 
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4.2 Care Giver Households
Household 2
In the second household,  Theofilos  (62)  and Panayiota  (58)  live.  In  1969,  at  the age of  11,
Theofilos moved to Chalkida with a cousin of his and two other adolescents. They all came from
the same mountain village in Evia. Theofilos’ father had sent him to Chalkida so that he could
get access to elementary education and then apply for admission to the  Dimokritos70 school in
order  to  develop  his  technical  skills.  His  family  economic  background  combined  petty
agricultural production with petty trade, since his father regularly visited Chalkida to sell both
his own and others’ - kin and non-kin -agricultural products. While he was studying at evening
school, Theofilos started working as a waiter and then as an apprentice to a carpenter. His father
and uncle pooled their savings together and bought a plot of land in the city in 1967. A few years
later, Theofilos and his cousin started to build a house. First they built a basement where they
could sleep and little by little, started adding adjacent rooms and the rest of their kin gradually
moved in. Theofilos’ father, who had a general store in their village, planned to move to Chalkida
and expand his business in the city. The house in the village had been left to Theofilos’ older
brother  who took over their  father’s shop and the family’s small  agricultural  property.  Their
mother had an active role in her husband’s business although she was formally registered as a
farmer.  In 1976, as soon as he finished his military service, Theofilos married the woman he had
fallen in love with, Panayiota, whose family lived in the same street. Unlike past generations, for
whom marriages  were  arranged  by  elders,  during  Theofilos  and  Panayiota’s  generation,  the
established cultural norm had started to change and the institution of proxenio (matchmaking) to
decline. Panayiota was born in Chalkida and her parents ran a general store in the neighborhood
from 1959 till 1999. Their house was at the back of the general store, which fact blurred the
boundaries between their workplace and household. Her parents had built their house through
informal means as soon as they had married in the late 1950s. It was built on a plot which was
70 A technical high school, founded by the commercial and industrial chamber of Evia in the 1950s, that trained 
young males in skills that could be applied in industrial professions. 
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split between four sisters (adelfomoiri),71 which their parents had bought to give as a dowry to
their daughters who were born and raised in Setta, a mountain village in Evia One of the four
sisters was Panayiota’s mother. Panayiota was an only child and hence was due to inherit all of
her parents’ assets. Her dowry was therefore considered as something that would ensure her
future. Thus she was raised and trained to be a good housewife (noikokyra) who would not have
to work outside of her future household. In those times, a married woman working outside of the
house (family businesses excluded)  was a  shameful  thing,  an index of  poverty and a man’s
inability to provide for his family72 (cf Horrel & Humphries 1997).  Panayiota and Theofilos got
married in 1979 and their first child was born in 1981, after Theofilos had finished building a
second floor above Panayiota’s parental house. Before that, they had cohabited with Theofilos’
parents  who  lived  nearby.  Their  daughter  was  born  in  1984.  In  1988  Theofilos  begun  the
construction of a third floor with a smaller apartment that was intended to provide them with a
rent income. Theofilos worked hard and even helped in his in-laws’ business, and in 1992 he
started building another house on another plot of Panayiota’s inheritance that was intended as a
dowry for their daughter. Theofilos worked for several factories that were in desperate need of
specialized laborers in the 1970s, then in the 1980s, he founded his own construction firm. In
1991 he opened up a shop with his brother that sold construction materials. Due to numerous
disputes  between  the  two siblings,  the  venture  failed  and  they  closed  it  in  1996.  Theofilos
decided to leave the construction business as he had several health problems with his knees, and
instead bought a taxi license.  Both Panayiota and Theofilos were preoccupied with providing
their children with all the necessary skills and resources for a good life. Their common goal, a
vision which they both shared, was to give their children more than they had received from their
parents, and this they presented as an intergenerational moral obligation that older generations
have always had towards the younger ones, “to live the country in a better shape.” Of course
with the crisis and the austerity regime, future livelihood projects were blurred, and many of the
young, people in their productive age were forced to leave the country. When Theofilos narrated
71 Adelfomoiri is the folk term which literally means the “fortune of siblings” [adelfia (siblings) + moira 
(fortune/destiny)]
72 The social control of women’s labor was stricter in smaller societies like Chalkida’s. There, the conservatism 
which characterized Greek society in small cities was personified. In Athens, by contrast, despite the dominance
of conservative socio-political ideals, people could maintain their anonymity and avoid stigmatization. The 
latter is another reason why many people opted to migrate to the Greek capital; in this way they could escape 
from the backwardness of small cities that upheld retrograde social dynamics. 
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the hardships he had endured during his childhood and early adolescence, he explained that he
had never mentioned these to his children. “I have struggled for my children not to experience
the hardships I have endured in my life,” he said. 
 Apart from the housing assets which both Theofilos and Panayiota struggled to develop,
they invested in their children’s education. Their son who studied medicine moved to the UK in
2009 in order to specialize.73 He was offered a job after he completed his specialization and
decided to stay in England. Panayiota, who was responsible for managing the household income,
informed me that their son’s education cost them around 100,000 euros in total (private lessons
to pass medical school + housing and expenses while studying in another Greek city + expenses
for him to move abroad). Although Panayiota and Theofilos were disappointed by their son’s
decision to settle permanently in the UK, they justified it as the only way for him to progress
with his  career  and live a life  worth living.  “There is  no life  anymore in Greece for young
people” both said, wondering “how can a young person begin his life here?”  Their son got
married to a Greek woman he met in the UK and had his first child in 2015. Their daughter
studied at a public institute for vocational training (IEK) to become a secretary. When she got
married,  Theofilos and Panayiota  decided to sell  the house which Theofilos had built  in  the
1990s for their daughter. They sold it for 150,000 euros, nearly 8 times its initial cost.74 They
used some of this money to fund their son’s emigration, with the greatest part given as a dowry
for their daughter’s marriage. Moreover, Theofilos helped with the construction of the new house
which the groom’s parents gave to the newlywed couple. In the meantime, Panayiota’s mother
and Theofilos’ father died, and they had to take care of their elderly parents. Theofilos’ mother
was independent enough and could take care of herself,  however,  she did not know how to
handle bureaucratic procedures and to operate within institutions and formal structures. Thus,
Theofilos  took  over  his  deceased  father’s  responsibilities.  The  exact  opposite  was  true  for
Panayiota,  whose  mother  died.  Her  father  was  unable  to  cook and  clean,  in  other  terms  to
undertake  any  reproductive  labor  task.  Thus,  Panayiota  was  burdened  with  her  deceased
mother’s responsibilities, and transformed herself from a daughter to a “wife” for her father. She
73 The queue for acquiring a specialization at a Greek hospital was long and one had to wait several years before 
being admitted to a trainee position.  
74 For Theofilos, the cost of building a house was low - since he was the one who undertook the construction work.
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had to maintain two separate households and nurse her father who died in 2015, a few months
before I arrived in Chalkida. When the crisis set in, Theofilos and Panayiota decided together
that Theofilos would stop his professional activity as a taxi driver/owner, sell both his license and
the taxi in 2012, and wait for four years until he could retire at the age of 62. Because of this, in
order to get by they had to manage their income and savings carefully. This was Panayiota’s task.
She made detailed calculations of everything that their household spent so that they would not
run out of money. Their difficult economic situation was obvious to me because they were my
landlords. I was renting Panayiota’s deceased father’s house, which they rushed to rent shortly
after his death. I had asked Panayiota to hire a house cleaner on my behalf to clean my house
while I was away, and she agreed. When I returned, I asked her to introduce me to the cleaning
lady she had hired. Then I figured out that it was her who had been cleaning the house but was
ashamed to admit having done so. 
 They managed  to  save  money by cutting  back  and keeping  strict  accounts  of  their
expenses while at the same time engaging in household production to save money resources.
They started selling the surplus of their olive oil production which during pre-crisis years they
had usually gifted to friends and relatives. Theofilos’ construction skills were also very important
in helping them save money resources. For instance, he did the necessary renovations and repairs
to the house which I rented and also maintained their property. In addition, they stopped hiring
agricultural workers to harvest their olives, and instead did it by themselves with the help of their
kin, as they had done in the old days. From May to October, Theofilos’ mother stayed in the
village where she cultivated seasonal vegetables such as tomatoes, cucumbers, zucchinis, green
beans  and  carrots  which  she  gave  to  Panayiota  who,  by  processing  or  refrigerating  them,
managed to cover their household’s needs for the whole year.75  Panayiota took care of their 5
year old granddaughter and she informed me that “when I have my granddaughter here, I want to
have freshly cooked food for her, so I plan my shopping accordingly. When she is scheduled to
stay with us I plan ahead and cook her favorite food.” They restricted their household’s expenses
to covering basic needs in order to be able to provide what they believed they should to the
younger  generations.  For  instance,  they  would  not  pass  over  buying  a  present  for  their
75 Our team regrouped in Barcelona for two months between December 2015 and January 2016. Panayiota noticed
that I had not unplugged the fridge in my house and asked if she could store some carrots there while I was 
away since her own refrigerator had run out of space. 
166
granddaughter, but in order to do so they restricted themselves from even petty expenditures and,
as Theofilos told me, he had stopped going to the local coffee shop (kafeneio) as often as he used
to do,  thereby managing to save 5 euros per week. “I  try to save even a euro,  even a euro
matters,” he said. They did their shopping at the open air market where one can find cheap raw
vegetables, fruit and fish, and they had regular suppliers who gave them discounts. They also had
access  to  certain  types  of  raw  food,  such  as  eggs,  cheese  and  wine  which  the  producer,
Panayiota’s second cousin, delivered to their house on a weekly or bi-weekly basis. Theofilos
became a pensioner in 2016 and earned 850 euros per month. This was 450 euros less than he
had been expecting before the implementation of austerity measures and the restructuring of
Greek  pension  funds.  Before  2016,  their  income  resources  came  from  three  rentals  which
brought  them  700  euros  per  month.  The  imposition  of  the  property  tax  (ENFIA)  in  2010,
burdened  this  household  with  500 euros  annually,  a  significant  amount  of  money  that  they
desperately  needed.  They  therefore  reduced  heating  expenses  to  a  minimum  and  became
obsessed with heating costs. 
 
Household 3
Next to Panayiota and Theofilos lived Katerina (67), Panayiota’s first cousin, and Vasilis (70).
Their household organization was similar to that, of Household 2. They had two daughters in
their 40s and four grandchildren aged from 3 to 12. Vasilis and Katerina married in 1968, and the
dowry that Katerina received consisted in some money and the plot of land on which they later
built their home. Vasilis had settled in Chalkida with his parents in 1949 when his parents had
chosen to build a better life in the city. His father got a job at Chalkida’s port through a relative
of his and joined the docker’s union. They rented until his father bought a house in 1960, which
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he did after selling some property in his village of origin in a remote part of Evia. Vasilis started
an apprenticeship when he was 13 as an electrician and later specialized in vehicle maintenance.
After finishing his military service, he got married, through a matchmaker, to Katerina who had
been born in a village near Vasilis’ place of origin. Katerina lived with her in-laws until they
completed  the  construction  of  their  house  in  1970,  which  was  adjacent  to  the  house  of
Panayiota’s (Household 2) parents. Vasilis changed occupations several times and during certain
periods of his life, was multi-employed. His main expertise was in vehicle maintenance and he
worked as a mechanic in industrial facilities. He also worked informally for a cousin of his who
had opened a mushroom production unit. In 1990, Vasilis and his brother in law (kouniados)
decided to open a car repair workshop, which they closed two years later after having several
financial disputes. As he told me frankly: “one should never start a business with a relative.”
After having closed his business, he worked at Theofilos’ (Household 2) shop for a while and as
a bus driver for the municipality of Chalkida, before finally finding a job at the port of Chalkida
as a truck driver, in which position he worked until his retirement in 2007.
Katerina’s parents lived in the village. Her father had been much older than her mother
and had died in 1995 at the age of 73. Dimitra (86), Katerina’s mother, had a serious health issue
and had to move in with Katerina and Vasilis in 2006. For the past 9 years, Katerina had been
taking care of her mother who lived in an independent room that Vasilis had built at the back of
their single-story house. Apart from the responsibility of nursing her mother on a daily basis
(changing diapers, feeding her, giving her medication), Katerina had to take care of her 3-year-
old granddaughter who had been diagnosed with autism, so that her daughter could go to work.
She therefore had to cook three different meals, one for her own household, one for her mother
would could only eat specific foods, and one for her granddaughter who also followed a special
diet. The whole neighborhood witnessed Katerina’s everyday struggle and was critical of her
brother’s stance: he did not offer any kind of help to his mother, even though he had received the
lion’s share of their parents’ property. 
 In this household’s nuclear kinship network, Katerina acted as a care giver and offered
unpaid services that were comparable to those of a professional nurse, cook and tutor. As far
back as she could remember, in her life she had never rested and had always been on call to serve
others. When I asked why Katerina had never sought paid work, the answer that Vasilis gave was
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clear: “why would she work? And then what? Paying another woman to raise our children? The
money  she  would  earn  would  be  equal  to  what  we would  spend on a  housekeeper-nanny.”
Katerina and Vasilis’ children found jobs through their social network in the local market and did
not go to university. The younger one worked in a secretarial position at a local newspaper and
the older one was employed at a bank. They left their paternal household when they got married,
even though they could have afforded to live on their own. Both married in their late 20s, much
later than the older generation of women. 
For this  household,  the open-air  market also played a  central  role  for accessing food
resources. Vasilis and Katerina did their shopping twice a week, either on Tuesdays or Thursdays
and  every  Saturday  when  the  open-air  market  was  near  their  neighborhood.  Their  weekly
expenditure on raw vegetables and fresh fish from regular suppliers, was around 30 to 50 euros.
They visited the supermarket on a bi-weekly basis and searched for special offers and discounts
beforehand. On an average they spent around 50 to 150 euros for various goods and household
items. Supermarket discounts and offers were a frequent topic of discussion among neighbors
who exchanged information about what each supermarket chain was offering and had on sale.
Since the outbreak of the crisis, they had started buying non branded goods which had lower
prices. When it came to their granddaughter who only ate special food, they spent a further 30
euros per week as Katerina wanted to give her top quality food.76 Katerina and Vasilis also had
access to informal networks that circulated food resources, either in the form of gifts or as paid
goods. For instance, they bought cheese and wine from a third cousin of Vasilis while one of
Katerina’s cousins brought them food she produced (green beans, apples, tomatoes, chestnuts) as
gifts. Another cousin of Katerina’s, who lived in the same street as them, bred rabbits which he
sold exclusively to relatives and friends. Austerity was something which characterized their lives
and  especially  their  childhood  years.  They  had  never  taken  out  loans,  did  not  consume
excessively and followed a humble lifestyle. The crisis had had a major impact on their available
resources; however, they had a habitus of poverty and hence their economic activities were easily
adjusted to a mode of resource scarcity. Vasilis’ pension had been reduced to 950 euros from the
1300 euros he used to get in 2009. A major issue for them were the heating expenses which they
76 I had Katerina write down the food she cooked. For instance, Vasillis and Katerina had green beans, Katernia’s 
mother boiled rice with chicken breast, and their granddaughter, bon fillet and expensive part of the beef.  
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could not avoid because of Katerina’s mother, who received a widow’s pension of 450 euros. In
2016 the price of oil was relatively low (0.85 euros/liter)77 and Vasilis arranged to fill their tank
in April 2016 and save it for the coming winter when prices were expected to increase.  
77 Heating oil prices were as high as 1.5 euros in 2012 due to the austerity taxation on fuel. 
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4.3 Households with Adult Children
Household 4
Dina (57) and Nikos’ (64) household was structured differently from those discussed above. Dina
was born in the prefecture neighboring Evia, Voitia. In 1976, she moved to Chalkida where she
met Nikos, in order to find work. Nikos was born and raised in Chalkida and worked at the
cement factory. They got married in 1977 and rented their own house in Chalkida. In 1990 they
bought a plot of land and in the same year built their own house. In order to fund their project of
becoming homeowners, Dina opened up a children’s clothes shop with financial help from her
husband.  They  had  three  children  who  had  grown  up  in  their  mother’s  shop  since  their
grandparents lived in the village and could not babysit for them. As a result, Dina’s husband was
more supportive with the daily running of the household. He learnt how to cook basic recipes
and helped with some of the housework. However, it was still Dina who was the one primarily
responsible for their household’s reproductive labor. 
She and her husband had struggled to provide their children with higher education and to
equip them with the tools for having an easier and better life, “not to start their lives from zero as
we did,” Dina explained. As is common in Greece, their children’s education was the common
ground of their family’s aspiration and what they struggled to offer to the younger generation.
Stefanos  (36)  had  a  university  degree  in  Information  Technology  (IT).  Tassos  (34)  initially
started studying IT in Athens, but then quit his studies and went to London to study website
development  and  graphic  design.  Angeliki  (29)  had  studied  business  administration  and
management at the Technological Institute of Chalkida and had thus never lived away from her
parental household. Two of Dina and Nikos’ three adult children were co-habiting in their house
and contributing financially to some of the household’s expenses. Their younger son Tassos, had
quit his studies and returned to Chalkida in 2013. Since then, in the midst of the economic crisis,
he had been informally employed in a part time job at a local bar. Their older son Stefanos had
married in 2010 and had a 4-year-old daughter. He had been hired as a high school teacher in
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2011 and was transferred to a remote island for the first two years. In 2014, he managed to move
to Kymi, a small town in Evia, about two-hour drive from Chalkida. He was the only one who
had formed a  household  of  his  own and hence  had received a  part  of  his  inheritance.  This
included his share of a large family olive grove of 200 trees and a smaller vineyard in Viotia
which his uncle (his mother’s brother) was responsible for cultivating on behalf of his mother.
Dina told me that the agricultural income that she received varied from 8000 to 10,000 euros per
year,  of  which  a  third  was  given  directly  to  Stefanos.  Tassos  implied  that  his  uncle  took
advantage of their absence and was cheating them. Even though their parents’ assets were to be
equally  divided between the  three  siblings,  he  was not  sure about  his  little  sister’s  attitude.
According to Tassos, she had always, since she’d been a child, wanted more than her fair share. 
Nikos  took  advantage  of  the  early  retirement  schemes  that  the  cement  factory’s
administration  was  offering  and  had  voluntarily  left  the  factory  in  2007,  two  years  before
retirement. He had received a good severance pay of 90,000 euros, for which reason he had not
kept up good relationships with the rest of the cement factory workers. In 2008, Tassos and his
older brother decided to open up an internet cafe. They got a business loan of 40,000 euros using
their  parents’ house  as  collateral.  The  first  three  years  had  been  successful,  and  they  had
nominally  employed  their  father  for  it  to  appear  that  he  was  paying  national  insurance
contributions which would entitle him to a full pension in 2009. Their father kept the shop’s
books since  he  was  skilled  at  accounting  and very  knowledgeable  about  economics  and,  as
Tassos informed me, he was the one who managed their household economics and kept track of
their  financial  situation.  In  2011 the  internet  cafe’s  annual  income started  to  drop and after
consulting  their  father’s  books,  they  saw  that  profits  and  expenses  had  equalized.  In  the
intensifying crisis environment and with the projected deterioration of the situation, they decided
to close their  business.  They repaid the outstanding 4000 euros of  their  loan by using their
father’s severance pay. While Tassos went to London, Stefanos had already applied to ASEP
(Anotato Symvoulio Epilogis Prosopiko – The Supreme Council of Personnel Recruitment) for
the  civil  service  in  order  to  become a  schoolteacher.  He was  hired  in  2011.  After  multiple
austerity cuts, schoolteachers’ initial salaries had been reduced to 850 euros and, in the first years
of their employment, teachers were sent to remote areas. Stefanos had to move in the island of
Skyros to teach, taking with him his wife and their newborn child. In order to help them make
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ends meet, his parents Dina and Nikos, together with his wife’s parents, had provided them with
financial help. Finally, he managed to return to the vicinity of Chalkida where his wife could
work at her parents’ company’s mini market.
In this household, adult children contributed to expenses when their parents ran out of
money by for instance paying for food or electricity. Tassos told me that his father had asked him
several times if he had any money to contribute since they had run out of food. Both children
contributed to the household’s expenses, yet both also had their own money for personal needs
and managed their own budgets. As Tassos explained, they always had a “solid family”, meaning
that they had close relationships and supported each other. Over time his father’s pension was
significantly reduced and the severance pay he had gotten disappeared because he had to support
his wife’s venture. 
When  Tassos  moved to  London,  his  parents  funded his  tuition  fees  and covered  his
relocation costs. He found work easily, yet as he explained, even though he found a job as a
graphic designer, he did not like the way of life: “it was not something that I wanted to do, in the
end I was just working and the money I earned was only enough to cover my basic expenses. In
order to make money there you have no life. So, I packed up my stuff and came home.” Since
2013 he had been living with his parents and was informally underemployed at a local bar. He
worked nights and got paid from 0 to 40 euros depending on the night and how much money
customers left at the bar (usually he got 10 to 20 euros except on Saturdays and holidays when
the bar had more customers). Tassos managed to earn at best 450 euros per month, which barely
met  his  own expenses  and struggled  with  mild  depression,  an  issue  which  both  he and his
mother, who was worried about her son, raised.   
Their sister was not in a relationship and had never lived alone. She was comfortable with
her present living arrangements and, as her mother and brother told me, showed no signs of
wanting to leave the parental household. She had a regular job that paid a 790-euro salary and
she contributed to some household expenses such as electricity bills and food. In 2010, their
parents  had started  to  build  an upstairs  floor  which  they  intended to give  to  their  daughter.
However, the crisis had halted its development, and it was left half built. Reproductive labor in
this household was shared among its members and the children who had always “helped their
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mother with housework.” However, the main caregiver was Dina, who organized the household.
She continued to cook the night before as she had done in the past when her husband worked,
and she had to  juggle  her  three young children and the shop.  Doing the shopping for  their
household  needs  was  Nikos’ responsibility  but  always  under  the  Dina’s  strict  instructions.
Moreover, Dina sometimes did the daily shopping on her way home, going to selected vendors
who have been   her clients too. The household’s income counted on a stable income resource,
Nikos’ pension. He was receiving 1180 euros; 600 euros less than he had received in 2010. If we
count the fact that she was indebted to her social insurance fund, Dina’s business did not make
any profit, on the contrary it was making a loss. However, since she did not pay her insurance
fees, she had capital with which to move and shop around. She explained that if she paid her fees
she would not have any money left to buy food or pay rent and bills for her shop. 
Household 5
Household 5 was formed by Georgia (59), a high school teacher, and her mother Fani
(83). Georgia had never married and had lived abroad for several years, returning to Greece in
the 2000s. They lived in an apartment which was built through  antiparochi in the 1980s, and
which had been Georgia’s  father’s  parental  house.  Next  door,  in  a  much smaller  apartment,
Georgia’s aunt from her father’s side, Elpiniki (80), lived. She had also never married. Georgia’s
father had been born in Chalkida and had worked at the cement factory. Fani was born in Xanthi,
Northern Greece, and met her husband during his military service. They married and moved to
Chalkida in the 1950s, where they cohabited in Georgia’s father’s parental house. They had three
children - two sons and Georgia, their youngest child. In the 1980s they decided to give the old
house they were living in over to antiparochi and in return got two new apartments, a big one for
Georgia’s father and a one-bedroom apartment for his sister. For its part, on the ground floor, the
construction company got two shops. It sold these for a high price as they were located in the
center of Chalkida.   
Fani had persuaded her husband that all of their children should study, and she had been
adamant about this. She had given great importance to her children’s education, and her husband
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had agreed to save money so that they could go to university. Fani had understood the benefits of
higher education and wanted to ensure her children’s future, especially after being encouraged by
their high school teachers. Georgia studied pedagogy and later German literature in Thessaloniki.
She migrated to Germany in the 1980s were she lived and worked at a private school for the
children of Greek migrants. She returned to Greece in 1996 and worked as a tour guide and a
private German tutor. Later she decided to apply for a position as a German teacher at a public
school in Athens. In 2003 a position opened in Chalkida and she returned to her hometown. After
the death of her father in 2007, she moved in with her mother. She had planned to build a house
on a plot of land that she had bought, however she was cheated by the real estate agent: one
could not get a building license for the plot. Therefore, having taken out a loan that she had to
pay back, she moved in with her mother.  
 Georgia looked after her mother’s needs. However, since Fani was able to undertake
numerous  household  tasks,  they  often  competed  about  who was  the  head of  the  household.
Georgia’s  two older  brothers  regularly  visited  their  mother  and they  very  often  held  family
gatherings there bringing along their own families. Although Georgia’s aunt’s house next door
was separate, it can be understood as a common one. That is because the three women had lunch
together  almost  on  a  daily  basis  and cooperated  with  the  cooking and cleaning,  and shared
heating and other common expenses. Georgia was a progressive woman who had travelled a lot
and nurtured feminist ideas, while her mother was a traditional housewife who criticized her
daughter’s lifestyle and choices, especially that of choosing not to marry. Georgia, inspired by
progressive political change in Greece in the 1980s, had assumed a revolutionary stance and
chosen to  break with traditional  household reproduction strategies,  gendered stereotypes  and
conservative social practices and institutions, “that kept back society ” and this fact had affronted
her mother’s cultural ideals. Moreover, since their household was Fani’s “queendom”, there was
much friction between the two women around issues of hierarchy. 
Georgia’s salary had been reduced to 1200 euros from the 1800 euros she had earned
before the implementation of austerity. Fani’s widow’s pension had been reduced from 850 to
650 euros.78 Their standard common food expenses (including those of Elpiniki) were around
78 Since 2011, apart from the cuts on their monthly salary and pensions, they lost the 13th and the 14th extra pay for 
Christmas and Easter. 
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400 euros per month. They spent 100 euros on other household items plus another 50 on various
items. Fani’s medication cost 70 euros per month, Georgia spent around 60 euros per month on
gasoline and nearly 200 euros in outings, and she paid 400 euros per month for her bank loan.
Through the course of the year, various other expenses came up which could not be calculated on
a monthly basis or even on an annual basis. These included clothing, visits to the doctor and
other household expenses that popped up unexpectedly. Fani was at an age in which she could
not provide care, on the contrary, she required care from her children. The burden of taking care
of her had fallen to her daughter Georgia, who was responsible for her and took advantage of her
mother’s house. Fani pooled her resources and had specific demands about how these resources
were managed by her daughter. She told me in private that she was secretly saving money for her
funeral expenses. Fani had vivid memories of the Nazi occupation in her home town in northern
Greece, an experience which shaped the way in which people understood poverty. For her, she
explained, the present-day crisis was nothing compared to the hardships that Greek people had
endured during the German occupation (cf Knight, 2015). She was deeply religious and often
challenged her daughter’s leftist  and feminist  ideas.  Georgia,  who had been a  schoolteacher,
experienced a great reduction in her salary, as did Fani with her widow’s pension. However,
since they were two women with modest needs, they did not face any issues with their social
reproduction. Fani’s major expenses were her medications which her doctor prescribed. Along
with the cuts, people had been obliged to contribute more to buying medication since costs were
not fully covered by their insurance funds. Georgia, who had a loan to repay, could no longer
afford visits abroad and the long summer vacation trips that her profession allowed. This was the
major expenditure cut she was forced to make in her lifestyle when her salary was reduced. She
explained that she did not have any responsibilities as families with children did, and that was
why she could handle her salary reduction more easily than them. After all she did not have to
pay rent and upon her mother’s death, she would inherit the house. 
Food resources were mostly accessed through the open-air market where Georgia went
every Saturday when she was not working. Georgia introduced me to her regular suppliers and
informed me about  which  products  to  go  for  and which  to  avoid  as  they  might  have  been
polluted  by  industrial  waste.  They  had  an  extensive  kinship  and  social  network  and  varied
resources entered the household in the form of gifts. These were not hugely significant yet were
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appreciated by both of them. For instance, in September, a neighbor of theirs would always bring
them grapes from his vineyard, while in August, another friend would bring them a bag of figs.
During  the  winter,  Georgia’s  cousin  supplied  them  with  tangerines,  lemons,  oranges  and
bergamots. Fani liked bergamots a lot and processed them which sugar to make a traditional
sweet that she offered to her guests. Through small gifts, the household was full of sociality, and
on numerous occasions (name days, religious feasts), they held dinners for the whole extended
family. 
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4.4 Independent Households with Dependent Children
Household 6
Households whose main income resource was the family business preserved traditional models
of organization. This was the case with Manolis and Maria’s household. They were a couple in
their early 50s with three dependent children who lived in a family block of flats that Manolis’
father had built in the 1980s. Their older son Miltiadis (21) was studying political science in
Athens and had chosen to join a master’s program in International Relations. Their second son
Makis (17) was about to go to university and join his brother in Athens where he was renting a
house, and their teenage daughter Asimina (13), had just started high school. Both Manolis and
Maria had been born in Chalkida. In the 1960s, Manolis’ father had been the first person in
Chalkida to develop a family business hosting wedding banquets and by the 1980s, he owned
three venues which hosted wedding celebrations for the local middle and upper classes. Maria’s
parents were descendants of Asia Minor refugees. They were born in Chalkida and lived in an
area originally designated for Minor Asians (Mikrasiates). Maria had an older brother who was
married and lived in Crete and she was therefore responsible for taking care of her parents. Her
father  had  recently  died  and  since  then  she  had been  supporting  her  mother.  On numerous
occasions,  they  shared  cooked  food  and  had  lunch  together,  either  at  their  place  or  at  her
mother’s. Manolis had an older brother who had lived next door and had suddenly died at the age
of 56. When I met Manolis, the family was organizing the 40 days memorial service for him
which I attended. On the top floor, Manolis’ parents had their own apartment, yet they rarely
stayed there. They spent most of their time in a new house they had built next to their business
venue, outside Chalkida’s city center. When Maria first met me, I was looking for a house and
she thought that I could rent the fully furnished apartment upstairs. Manolis was sure that his
mother would not consent. “Agree to rent their house with their furniture, to a stranger! No way,
I’m telling you, I know my mother too well,” he said,  discouraging his wife who had been
hoping to get a rent income from me.    
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Manolis and his brother had inherited their father’s family business when he had retired
in 2007. His brother chose not to work and had appointed Manolis to run his share. He therefore
received a monthly payment from Manolis as a rent, which in the pre-crisis years could be as
high as 2500 euros per month, and which fell to 1500 or even less after the start of the crisis.
Manolis did not look up to his older brother and described him as a rentier, implying that he was
rather lazy and self-centered. Although Manolis had significantly upgraded and developed his
father’s business,  he operated it  following his parents’ model.  Manolis’ mother  was actively
engaged in the family business and worked on the preparation of the banquet dinners, as did
Maria.  Both  women  took  an  equal  part  in  the  decision-making  process  of  their  husbands’
businesses and their opinion counted, yet the officially recognized owners were their husbands.
At  the  level  of  the  household  however,  roles  were  reversed.  The wives  were  the  ones  who
directed  their  households  while  their  husbands  played  secondary,  supportive  roles.  Manolis
inherited  not  only  a  family  business,  he  also  inherited  a  model  of  household  and  business
organization. 
   Neither Manolis’s mother nor his wife were formally employed but were providing a
legally recognized helping hand to the family business. This status was formally accepted by the
state, but only for first degree relatives who could not as a result establish pension rights for
themselves, and instead accessed the state’s provisioning sector through their husbands’ social
insurance.  After  the  death  of  Manolis’  brother,  ownership  of  the  business  was  officially
transferred to Manolis’ mother, because his father was already a pensioner and could not have the
dual  status  of  being  a  pensioner  and  a  business  owner.  Yet  it  was  Manolis  who  did  the
management.  His  brother’s  share  was  paid,  thereafter,  to  his  widow,  and  since  they  were
childless, Manolis’ children would eventually inherit all of it.  
Maria once complained of not having legal status as an employee. She raised a feminist
question about housewives who, as many feminist scholars and activists have noted (Federici,
2013), should at least receive work stamps and be eligible for a pension. “What if we broke up,
what would happen to me given that the business is not in my name?” she wondered.  With
compassionate, her husband replied “darling, isn’t it ours? Are you thinking of breaking up with
me? Don’t worry, as soon as you decide to,  I will grant you half  of it.” I had a one to one
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conversation with Manolis on this issue, in which he explained that Maria had graduated from
EPAL (vocational  senior  high  school)  and  was  trained  to  be  a  childcare  assistant.  Manolis
recalled suggesting to Maria “do you want me to open a nursery school for you to run?” and
Maria refusing the offer. 
Maria had a clear understanding of the value of the women’s unpaid reproductive labor
that enabled men to focus on income creation. Moreover, she regretted not being registered as an
employee at her husband’s firm; by now, in her 50s, she would have been eligible to receive a
pension as the mother of a dependent child. As she explained, when her second son was born in
1998,  her  and her  husband had  decided that  she  would  stop  working  in  their  business  and
dedicate herself to raising their children. In addition, she said, she did not want their children to
grow up spending most of their time in the business, and she was against having another woman
take care of them. She was on top of her children, pressing them to do their homework and pass
their exams. “I learned all the subjects the children were examined in by heart. If I were to take
the exams someday (panellinies), I would definitely pass,” she said and laughed. Since neither
boy performed very well at school and did not manage to get into a “good” school that offered
good employment prospects, both were steered towards inheriting their father’s business. The
weight of pursuing a career outside of the family business was put on their daughter, Asimina’s
shoulders. When she began high school, her parents worried and pressured her to do well so that
she could study law or medicine.  
As a professional in the catering sector, Manolis had access to a wholesale supermarket,
which only those with a professional tax registration number (ΑΦΜ) could use. As a result, he
bought food both for his business and his household at the same time, which further blurred the
boundary between the two. Thus family business arrangements were inseparable from those of
the household. Moreover, his two sons occasionally worked in the family business in order to
learn the ropes so that they could take over in the future. This household was oriented towards
the  present  and  future  reproduction  of  the  family,  as  well  as  the  family  name  which  was
embedded in Chalkida’s local society as their business’ brand name. The boys’ future, especially
after the crisis, was attached to the venture, and the parents encouraged their second son to study
something that could be used in the family business. The older son aspired to a political career
and joined a mainstream political party early on during his studies. His father was opposed to its
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ideology, but his grandfather encouraged him and used some of his connections to promote him
within the party’s hierarchy.   
  One  day,  when  I  was  interviewing  him  in  a  relaxed  manner  at  his  workplace,  a
topographer came by to map and register the geolocation of Manolis’ property in order to be able
to transfer it to his children. That is how it came to my knowledge that Manolis owned a couple
of venues more which he rented and earned roughly 1000 per month and as he told me he used to
earn nearly double before the outbreak of crisis. Manolis and Maria had already calculated how
they were going to split their assets among their three children. The family business would pass
down to their sons, while the house in which they lived would be given to their daughter. Their
older son had already started to take an active role in their business as he had struggled to find a
different job from which to make a living.  
Within their standard household expenses Manolis and Maria had to include the rent plus
pocket money for their son who was studying in Athens, as well as the cost of private lessons for
their second son who was about to start his studies in September 2016. The total amount of
money spent on their children’s activities amounted to 1500 euros per month. As soon as their
second son managed to get into a management school in Athens, their two sons lived together.
They visited Chalkida quite often,  almost every week, so that their  mother could wash their
laundry and cook for them so that they had homemade food during the week. The household’s
expenses had increased substantially while income from the family venture had significantly
decreased. Manolis estimated a 50 percent decrease of their net annual business income, down to
30,000 euros. In order to support their children’s education they had restructured their spending
several times. First of all, Manolis invested in buying an advanced pellet and wood stove, which
decreased heating expenses significantly, saving 2000 euros annually. Moreover, he invested his
own labor during the business’ dead time, upgrading and maintaining the facilities on his own
and  with  the  help  of  his  friends.  This  household’s  social  status,  unlike  that  of  the  others
discussed, entailed numerous social obligations which in turn required extra money. For instance,
when they were at school, the children were frequently invited to parties, so they had to buy
presents for their friends. In addition, parents had to pay for school trips and spend elevated sums
on clothing accessories.  In the pursuit  of conforming to social  expectations,  the household’s
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budget  was burdened with additional expenses that were aimed at  socially reproducing their
position and status in local society. 
Household 7
Giannis (44) and Georgia (43) were also homeowners. Both worked and shared reproductive
labor  tasks.  They  divided  their  household  tasks  according  to  what  each  one  could  do  best.
Giannis was born and raised in Chalkida and had worked at the cement factory from 1995 until
2014 when he got fired. Georgia was born in Pyrgos, a town in the Peloponnese, and was raised
in Athens. When she met Giannis in 1998, she moved to Chalkida where she found employment
in a private English school.79 In 2001 they got a loan to buy a new house in Chalkida. As soon as
their children were in nursery school, Giannis encouraged Georgia to open up her own English
language school.  Although he  helped his  wife  in  her  new venture  both  psychologically  and
financially, it still demanded more working hours from her. Since Georgia’s work was in the
afternoon and evening and Giannis’ shifts at the cement factory in the morning, the two shared
the housework. However, with both continuing to work long hours, even after they had their
second daughter in 2006, they had to hire a child minder. They did not want Giannis’ mother to
be responsible for their children and have her interfere with the couple’s arrangements. It had
been Georgia who had first objected when that possibility had been put on the table. Giannis
supported his wife which, he told me, caused friction with his parents and especially his mother
who felt rejected. As his wife explained, she did not want her mother in-law to interfere in their
domestic matters,  especially when they could afford to  pay a child minder.  The household’s
social relationships were Georgia’s responsibility, and she was the one who kept track of their
social obligations and managed the family’s public image. Interestingly, Giannis took care of the
household’s economics. He described how they had come to a mutual decision about this by
holding a competition. Each had a month to manage the household’s economy and in the end,
79 Even though she did not have a university degree she could teach English with a proficiency certificate that the 
universities of Cambridge and Michigan granted. Any high school graduate with an English proficiency 
certificate (and in the 1990s there were very few) can legally teach English in Greece. Learning English is a 
must for every child and parents register their children, usually at the age of 7, in private frontistirio schools to 
learn English in order to improve their future employment potential.    
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they  evaluated  the  money  spent  and  their  level  of  satisfaction.  They  agreed  that  Giannis’
management had been better, and since then,  it was he who handled their  income. From the
beginning of their common livelihood, in this household gender stereotypes were de-constructed.
This continued even after they had children, and when Giannis lost his job. The loss of Giannis’
employment rescaled the intra household economic hierarchy and promoted Georgia’s income as
the main and only stable resource. Giannis did several informal jobs in order to earn some money
and  also  helped  to  bolster  Georgia’s  clientele.  He  came  up  with  the  idea  of  offering  free
transportation to children who lived outside Chalkida. The general contraction of wages and over
taxation had directly affected Georgia’s venture since many of her clients could no longer afford
their monthly payments and she had to restructure her prices. Giannis was infuriated with the
situation they had been put in and vented his anger at the gym. He also became actively engaged
with their daughters and started taking on more responsibilities in household reproductive tasks.
Since the potential  to  earn more was slim,  the household focused on saving money through
consumption. His father in law, who bred animals in his village, supplied them with their annual
meat requirements. For this reason, Giannis invested in a big refrigerator. In exchange, when his
in-laws visited Chalkida, they didn’t pay for anything while being hosted. 
Giannis estimated that they spent 400 euros at the supermarket, plus 100 euros for both
daughters’ activities (ballet & basketball training) and 100 for their pocket money. Since they
were in the first grades of high school, they did not have to spend extra on private tutors for
schoolwork. They had just repaid their mortgage which was a great relief for them. Giannis had
managed to save money from his former job at the cement factory. His wife’s business generated
around 20,000 euros annually and with that money, plus some sporadic income Giannis could
obtain  through  informal  employment,  they  managed  to  get  by  and  to  maintain  their  social
reproduction practices.  Georgia’s business  was going well  despite  the  crisis,  as  most  people
continued to invest in their children’s education and skills. Knowledge of the English language
was an essential skill for the younger generation to progress and prosper in the future. 
A critical factor which shaped the household’s calculative reasoning was the loan which
they had gotten in 2001. Moreover, when Giannis lost his job, his extended kin helped him find
employment. When I met him, he had been informally employed in a pellet production unit for
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the past ten months in which the manager was his best man (koumparos). Since it was relatively
new, the unit’s owners, who owed money both to the state and the banks (from their previous
venture), demanded that staff work for less pay with the promise of better future pay and a stable
position. Giannis was furious with the owners’ position, especially after several delays in his
payment. He was not registered as an employee at the company and had been promised a high
position when the venture’s economics stabilized. Pellet production was a dynamic sector since
during the crisis, many households and businesses sought alternative and cheaper methods of
heating. Moreover, the fact that his best man was the manager was the main reason that he had
not already quit, and was putting up with the undignified position he was put in.   
Household 8
Takis (45) and Eleni (45) had two sons aged 14 and 16. They had both studied chemistry
in Thessaloniki and had stable jobs. Takis worked at Chalkida’s public water company and Eleni
at a pharmaceutical company in a demanding position in which she regularly worked long hours.
As Takis started work at the same time as Eleni, it was imperative that they hire a house helper to
clean, cook and take care of the children. Finishing work earlier than his wife, Takis took care of
more of the household responsibilities and reproductive labor tasks such as cooking, shopping
and  child  rearing.  Takis  and  Eleni  met  during  their  university  studies  and  as  soon  as  they
graduated in 1995, they married and moved to Athens. They lived in a house in Acharnes (North
East of Athens) which Eleni had received as a dowry from her parents. In 1996, Takis found a
job at a paint and coating factory in Inofyta near Chalkida, to which he commuted every day by
train while Eleni worked at a chemical company in Piraeus. As Takis explained, even though the
distance from Acharnes to Chalkida was greater, it took him less time than it took his wife to
commute from Acharnes to Piraeus by car.  He therefore persuaded her to move to Chalkida
where they could enjoy a better quality of life. By the time Eleni got pregnant with their first
child, Takis’ father, who had already retired from the cement factory, moved with his wife to his
maternal house in Nea Lampsakos (Chalkida), giving his paternal house in the center of Chalkida
over to antiparochi in 1999. The newly built apartment he got in return was granted to Takis and
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Eleni.  When Eleni  had their  first  son,  her  mother  moved in with them in order  to  help her
daughter with her first child, and she stayed for almost a year. 
Monthly expenses for their children’s education were around 650 euros (400 euros for
their elder son’s private lessons and around 150 euros for the younger one’s English lessons). In
addition, they paid 650 for the house helper. Since they were both employed and had above
average salaries, with Eleni earning significantly more money than her husband whose pay had
been severely cut, they could get by quite easily and were in position to save money and help
close kin who were in need (Takis earned 1490 euros while Eleni earned nearly 1900 euros).
Takis told me that he did the shopping at the supermarket where they spent about 600 to 700
euros a month (food + other items).  Eleni’s kin in the Peloponnese owned olive groves that her
father cultivated, supplying households in his close kin with olive oil for their annual needs (60
liters of oil per year).80 Takis’ parents, who were both descendants of Asian Minor immigrants
who had settled in Chalkida, did not possess any agricultural land.  Household 8  did not face
social reproduction issues, although the austerity cuts have affected it’s income along with the
new austerity taxation on income and property. For that reason it took a supportive role and acted
as a ‘bank’ that provided credit to first degree relatives in need, or helped and reciprocated with
money resources their parents households81 who were challenged by the pension cuts and could
not for instance afford the maintenance of their summer house.  
80 On the market, bulk olive oil costs between 4 and 8 euros per liter. 
81 Both Takis’ and Eleni’s parental household had a male pension as the only source of income.
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4.5 The Formation of a New Household
Household 9
During my fieldwork, I had the chance to investigate a household in the making. Household 9
constituted a peculiar case which traditional economic models are unable to account for. This is
because,  lacking  a  space  that  we  could  call  a  “house”,  it  raised  multiple  theoretical  and
methodological questions as to what a household is. A young couple, Alexandros (33) and Sofia
(28) had been in a relationship for two years and had decided to live together. At the time,
Alexandros was renting an office at a very low rate (150 euros) through a friend of his mother’s.
Since it was an office space, it lacked basic utilities and was very small. It had only one room
with a small sink and a small bathroom, for which reasons Alexandros relied on his mother’s
household for numerous jobs such as doing the laundry. When it presented itself, Alexandros and
Sofia seized the opportunity to buy a tavern and work together. This was the first act of their
marriage and common life which symbolized the creation of a new household. In order to save
money, they left the office space that they had used as a home, and for the first year they slept on
a couch in their new business, planning to find a house in the near future when their economies
allowed it. In the meantime, they went to Sofia’s father’s house to bathe and ate at the tavern.
Both were officially registered as living in their parent’s houses. Both Alexandros and Sofia’s
parents were divorced. Alexandros’ mother had married in 1982 in order to escape her father’s
authority and village life,82 an arrangement that did not turn out well, and she got a divorce when
Alexandros was eleven. She opened up a book shop and studied psychology at the Greek Open
University and now practices her profession. In the meantime, she re-married, had another son
and ended up divorcing again. Alexandros’ father had also remarried, had two more daughters
and got divorced as well. Sofia’s mother had been working at a poultry production unit for the
82 Before the 1980s, because of its conservative cultural, religious and political context, there were few divorces in
Greece. Since the 1980s, when women have become more emancipated and can access the job market more 
easily, the divorce rate has been increasing (Eurostat: 
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=File:Crude_divorce_rate,selected_years_1960-
2017(per_1_000_persons).png  Date accessed 20/11/2019.
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past 23 years and her father, who was near retirement, had been working at ELVAL, a heavy
aluminum plant in Inofyta, for 25 years.
Alexandros did not go to university. He said that he had never been a good student so
studying something would have been a waste  of time and money. He started working in an
insurance company in 2003 and earned good money. He bought a new car and had a credit card
at a very young age. However, he did not enjoy his work and life as an insurance broker and
chose to quit his job in 2006. He used the credit card unwisely and the bank had been “chasing”
him until, after the outbreak of the crisis, they gave up. However, he was not worried about this
as he had nothing to his name. Over the past decade he had made a living as a DJ at local bars
and clubs. He worked informally up until 2011, when strict labor regulations and large fines were
introduced for employers who did not register their employees. This had created a problem for
those in his profession since many employers did not want to hire them, and so DJs were forced
to register as self-employed and to provide services rendered on receipt. For a DJ who worked
only 2 to 3 days per week, being registered as a self-employed would be catastrophic since they
would have to pay more to the self-employed insurance fund (OAEE) than what they earned.83
Sofia had studied civil engineering in Larissa, however she had never found a related job and
made a living out of waiting (servitoriliki).84 Even though they had lived on their own since their
20s, neither Sofia nor Alexandros were accustomed to maintaining a household and lacked basic
housekeeping knowledge and skills.
Household  9  provides  a  striking  example  of  how  difficult  the  formation  of  new
households and new families has become during the years of austerity crisis. Alexandros and
Sofia faced multiple difficulties in their struggle to make a living. They took up the chance to
buy a tavern which had a regular clientele and operated mostly during lunch times. The idea of
working during the day was appealing to both of them. The former owner of the tavern had
explained that he did not want to keep the tavern anymore and had showed them the rental
83 The nightly fee for a DJ used to be between 60 and100 euros before tax during pre-crisis years. This amount fell
to 30 to 60 euros after 2011. After deducting taxes and fees, the amount comes to even less. 
84 An emic term which people usually use in a derogatory sense. I deduce that it connotes another derogatory term,
chamaliki. Chamalis (χαμάλης) is a noun that refers to unskilled workers who do heavy jobs and are paid very
little, usually in the docks and other industrial settings. This neologism, which has become a very popular way
of referring to the profession of waiter, was coined by combining chamalis with servitoros (waiter).
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agreement  as  well  as  the  daily  budget.  They  started  opening  during  the  same  hours  and
maintained  the  original  clientele  while  also  keeping  the  tavern’s  name.  They  made  an
arrangement to pay 7000 euros upfront and the remaining 8000 in 10 monthly installments. The
initial capital was covered by Sofia’s uncle who provided 6000 euros as a loan to Sofia’s mother.
They experimented a great deal in the beginning with different approaches to Chalkida’s public.
First, they turned to their social and kinship networks. Sofia’s mother went almost every day to
help out, as soon as she finished her job. Sofia’s father also provided some financial support and
the couple used his household’s facilities while living at the tavern. He was housing his son who
had recently gotten married and had a little baby. Sofia’s parents did not have a good relationship
after the divorce, however they put their differences aside and it was mostly Sofia’s mother who
tolerated the presence of her ex-husband. Sofia’s mother was preoccupied with her son’s family
and with helping Alexandros and Sofia with their tavern on a daily basis. In addition, Sofia’s
mother claimed that she was alone and that, when she had been raising two children, she had
received help from no-one, for which reason she expected Sofia to manage the same way she
had. However, she did not have the same expectations of her son who was in a similar position to
Sofia. 
Since both Alexandros and Sofia were accustomed to working at night, when people not
only eat but also drink, they put emphasis on night hours. As they told me on many occasions,
booze  was  more  profitable  than  food.  People  went  there  and  ordered  multiple  alcoholic
beverages but ate only one dish. Locally produced, non-standardized alcohol such as wine and
tsipouro  have  much  greater  profit  margins  than  other  types  of  alcohol  and  can  be  obtained
through informal or semi-formal procedures and arrangements with the supplier. Moreover, most
of  their  clientele  were  friends  who  in  many  instances  demanded  discounts  and  sometimes
“forgot” to pay. Sofia said that “the largest fesia (unpaid bills) are left by our supposed ‘friends’.”
Alexandros’ father gave them advice as he was subletting  and operating a kafeneio on behalf of
its owner.
 They expected to start earning an income after the first 10 months when they had repaid
their debt. Their venture was registered as new form of company – an “IKE”,85 which paid lower
85 Law 4072 of 2012 introduced a new type of company, the Private Company (“PC”) (“Idiotiki Kefalaiouchiki 
Etaireia” or “IKE” in Greek) in order to meet the growing needs of modern and flexible middle-sized 
companies. The Private Company is a company with legal personality. It is qualified as a commercial company, 
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tax but entailed higher costs in terms of accounting services. Alexandros said that it was very
important  to  have  a  good  accountant  who  knows  how  to  wade  through  the  complex  tax
legislation. In their business, Alexandros was the owner and had the right to work and employ
other people while Sofia was registered as a shareholder. In that guise she could be present at the
tavern and observe, but she was not allowed to work as she was not officially registered as an
employee. Further, because she was not married, she could not either provide a “helping” hand as
a first degree relative of Alexandros’. This arrangement enabled them to save money by paying
less  for  social  insurance.  Moreover,  they  took advantage  of  a  special  law for  new business
initiatives which granted reduced taxation fees for the first 12 months. After settling their debt,
they were planning to rent a house, however this plan got postponed as they decided instead to
rent the neighboring shop and expand their tavern to accommodate more people, especially in
winter.  They  mobilized  a  wide  network  of  social  acquaintances  in  order  to  renovate  it  and
bargained the rent with the owner. Most of those who worked on the renovation project were
clients and in many cases suppliers of Alexandros and Sofia’s tavern.  For the next year, the
couple continued living in a small attic on top of the tavern’s kitchen. 
  Although the search for a house had been postponed, it became a priority when Sofia got
pregnant. In terms of reproductive labor, neither Sofia nor Alexandros were capable of sustaining
a household as their mothers had. Yet neither of them had a problem with that, nor did they
expect the other to take the initiative. Things changed however, when Sofia gave birth and took
on care of the newborn while Alexandros assumed a greater share of the responsibility for their
venture. However, Sofia did not know how to do household jobs and it was Alexandros’ mother
who tried, in vain, to school her in proper house cleaning and basic reproductive labor. Since
they all ate at the tavern, they rarely shopped for anything for their household. The house lacked
even basic utensils such as dishes and cups and, for instance, they only had a refrigerator but no
cooker. Their monthly expenses were 320 euros for their two-bedroom apartment, 350 euros in
rent for the original space of the tavern plus 400 euros for the adjacent property. They had a
even if its object is not to carry out commercial activities. A Private Company may be incorporated by several 
persons (called “members” or “partners”) or by a single person, in which case it is termed “single-membered”. 
Members may be natural or legal persons. The PC’s capital is determined by members without any restriction in 
terms of the law as there is no minimum share capital requirement. Members may participate in the company 
either through capital contributions, non-capital contributions or guarantee contributions.
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friend install a switch in their house so that they could bypass the electricity meter, as they had
an increased need for heating with the newborn baby.  
  They married in a religious ceremony two months before Sofia went into labor. They
managed to receive a considerable sum of money in gifts (15,000 euros), which they used to pay
off their business’ outstanding debts. Sofia’s mother continued to support them by providing free
labor in the kitchen. They were focused on earning more money and stopped offering free drinks
and discounts to their old clientele who were accustomed to eating and drinking for free. Thus,
their  social  circle  and  their  clientele  was  renewed.  Alexandros  and  Sofia  tried  to  open  the
business up to a wider public with a higher disposable income than that of clients for their social
network. Alexandros started working late at night to boost alcohol consumption amongst clients
and managed to make better profits, while Sofia stayed at home with their newborn son, working
at the tavern whenever Alexandros’ mother could babysit.  
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Conclusion
Households embody wider social,  political,  cultural and economic systems; thus the study of
household and family histories unravels the greater transformations taking place in society. In
today’s austerity ridden Greek economy, restructuring was also grounded and embodied in inter
and intra  household relationships.  Krezmer (1991) suggests that we adopt  “an approach that
focuses on the interplay of political economy, demography and culture” (ibid :157) in order to
study household formation. In Greece, there was a continual increase in living standards from the
1950s on, when urbanization intensified throughout the country and changed dwelling practices.
Peasant  household  and  family  organization  was  reproduced  in  cities  where  many  rural
immigrants concentrated. Having a roof over your head had been the longstanding aspiration of
the  emerging middle classes  since  the 1950s and the  primary  investment  they  made for  the
future.  Thus,  homeownership  was  the  investment  that  enabled  intergenerational  projects  of
upward mobility to unfold.  Owning a house meant owning the means of social reproduction in
Marxist terms. In that sense, Greek people had a clear understanding of how capitalism worked
and aspired to become homeowners – this  was the ultimate expression of the working class
dream.  Older generations were usually the ones that provided housing assets to their children
and they did so either through the antiparochi system or though the investment in land and self-
built housing. 
One of the great transformations of the Greek family and thus of Greek households was
the  transition  from the  extended  family  to  the  nuclear  family  household.  Housing  practices
through  private  initiatives  such  antiparochi and  self-built  houses  on  private  property,  made
possible the transition to nuclear family households but in a very particular sense as kin networks
of  proximity  replaced  intra  household  relationships  of  the  extended  family  and  household
structures. The cultural and economic trend towards homeownership enabled intergenerational
projects to evolve in the wider project of modernization and development of Greece. Gendered
and generational aspects of household organization of the extended family were reproduced in
inter and intra household relationships of dependence. Another great transformation of household
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structure had been the dynamic  entrance  of  women into  the job  market  since the 1980s.  In
households with female labor income, reproductive labor tasks were more evenly balanced, and
males started acquiring housekeeping skills and engaging more with child rearing. Hence, the
generational factor is  highly significant in  order to identify cultural  shifts  in intra-household
practices.   
Along  with  the  generational  discrepancies,  both  the  educational  level  of  household
members  and  household  income  shape  intra-household  relationships.  Men  and  women  with
higher  education and income had the skills  and knowledge to question and at  least  partially
deconstruct, past generations’ gendered stereotypes upon which social, economic and political
organization were constructed. Increased unemployment in the male dominated industrial and
construction  sectors  promoted  female  labor  income  as  the  main  income  resource  in  many
households in which men lost their jobs. Apart from housing provision, education was another
main concern for Greek households. Since the 1960s, people had struggled to equip the younger
generation with the skills to develop professional careers. Even today, in an austerity ravaged
society, household expenses on children’s education remain a priority for parents. 
Access  to  higher  education  has  dramatically  affected  household  formation  processes.
There has been a generational shift in marriage and family formation as young men and women
have started to marry later in their lives. Marriage postponement has delayed the formation of
new households  as  in  many instances,  unmarried children chose to  reside with their  parents
and/or were dependent on their mother’s reproductive labor in their late 20s and early 30s. As a
result,  the younger generation,  regardless of gender,  lacks basic house-holding skills  such as
cooking and cleaning. The current crisis has pushed up the age limit of co-residing adult children
in their parental households and increased the dependence of the younger generation on their
parents’ household resources. 
The austerity crisis squeezed income resources which were compensated for by unpaid
labor  at  the  household  level.  Self-subsistence  and  self-maintenance  practices  by  men,  and
reproductive labor by women enabled households to save money (na kanoun oikonomia).86 The
role of middle-aged women is critical  for inter-household relationships. On the one hand, as
86 In Greek the expression kano oikonomia literally translates as to “make economy”, which means to wisely 
manage household resources and thus save income. That conceptualization adheres to the original ancient Greek
concept of oikonomia which means household management. 
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mothers they provide help with their children’s household reproduction practices, especially in
child  rearing.  On the  other  hand,  as  daughters,  the  are  the  main  caregivers  to  their  elderly,
pensioner parents whose pension income takes the form of grassroots welfare and is used to
sustain the social reproduction of their challenged first-degree relatives. Further, households in
Chalkida have maintained agricultural  income and access  to  subsistence  resources  thanks to
second- and third-degree kinship relationships. Mutual help and support among kin households
has  also  been  critical  for  social  reproduction.  During  the  current  economic  crisis,  a  certain
resurgence of the extended family’s functions can be observed in relation to the ways in which
people access resources. 
Throughout  modern Greek history,  the  state’s underdeveloped welfare structures  have
maintained the function of the household as an informal welfare institution which has always
been the safety net for social reproduction. In the aftermath of the collapse of the welfare state
and organic solidarity structures that austerity produced, Chalkida’s society had to establish a
new balance in order to achieve social reproduction. To a certain extent, this fact sparked a re-




Renegotiating the Social Contract
and the Grassroots: 
Austerity, Informality and Social
Solidarity   
Introduction 
In  this  chapter  I  argue  that  the  austerity  measures  that  were  imposed  by  the  Troika  and
implemented by crisis era governments have reconfigured Greek society’s social contract. The
restructuring of power that the imposition of austerity and foreign supervision has entailed has
reconfigured the ways in which Greek people relate with power and with each other, and this
discontent  has  also  altered  their  economic  relationships.  Greek  citizen-taxpayers  have  been
transformed  from subjects  of  a  sovereign  state  to  subjects  of  a  state  in  default  who  were,
moreover, held liable for paying back the country’s sovereign debt. The rolling back and the
rolling out of the state (Peck & Tickell, 2002), the deregulation of labor, privatization and the
financialization  of  ever  more  aspects  of  daily  life  along  with  over-taxation  (Giannitsis  &
Zografakis, 2015)  and cuts in public welfare have undermined the value of life in the country.
Such extreme measures were unilaterally accepted by crisis era governments who had neither
public  consent  nor  legitimacy  for  jeopardizing  future  generations’  prospects.  Mainstream
economic models undermined the fact that the dictated top-down policies lack the social consent
that is necessary for formulating a viable solution, one that would be publically debated. With the
2015  referendum,  Greeks  at  least  had  the  opportunity  for  open  discussion  about  possible
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solutions to the crisis and their respective costs. However, a serious debate between pro and anti-
austerity projects did not occur. Instead of relying on knowledge about recent economic research,
which “is highly critical of economic retrenchment in times of crisis, the public must rely on
which politician sounds most plausible” (Hopkin & Rossamond, 2018: 645)
Top  down  imposition  caused  a  bottom  up  reaction  to  austerity  policies,  and  their
implementation was resisted on the grounds of everyday life.  However, the divisive dynamics of
a society in crisis were reflected in mutual accusations made by different groups from across the
various labor sectors. Intra-class conflicts became prevalent, as did the need for people to defend
themselves by supporting each other and enduring the hardships of crisis together. Both social
solidarity and social disunity were core repercussions of the severe attack that austerity made on
middle- and working-class livelihoods. In this chapter I explore how austerity’s ramifications and
reconfigurations  of  the  social  contract  provoked  both  divisive  and  uniting  practices  and
discourses and created new moral economies at the grassroots level. 
Firstly, I examine the multiple facets of social solidarity and disunity that are at play in
the  formulation  of  the  social  contract  and shared  ideals,  memories  and experiences.  I  bring
together Kropotkin’s views on social  solidarity and community dynamics in the provision of
mutual  aid  with  the  sociological  theory  of  solidarity  in  order  to  unravel  how  solidarity
relationships are inter-played in the intimate and ongoing socio-economic relations of everyday
life. In an innovative approach, Komter (2005), combines sociological theory on solidarity with
anthropological  theory  on  gift  exchange  and  argues  that  solidarity  structures  require  the
circulation of material assets. González de la Rocha (2001, 2007) argues that informal economic
resources  are  critical  in  the  maintenance  of  social  and kinship  networks  of  mutual  support.
However, she stresses the fact that informal resources by themselves are not sufficient, but rather
form a band aid for resource scarcity. Reframing the gift economy (Godelier, 1996) in relation to
how it unites, connect and organizes people, gifts can be seen as a socio-economic investment
which sustains social and kinship networks that are critical for the social reproduction practices
of a whole society.  Money, therefore, can take the properties of the gift (Mauss, 1990 [1925]). 
Keith Hart (2008, 2007) identifies that money is a social token, a commons at the base of
social organization of the human economy and can both take the personal and impersonal form
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and function in modern societies. Parry and Bloch (1989) in their book Money and the Morality
of Exchange,  show that people personalize money and attribute to it social character. The cash
based Greek economy started to change when capital controls were imposed shortly after the
declaration of July’s 2015 referendum. Capital controls resulted in a lack of cash and pushed
people into electronic economic transactions using debit cards. After the imposition of capital
controls, every retail shop was obliged by law to accept e-payments and Greeks started using
their  debit  cards instead of cash even in petty economic transactions.  A general store owner
explained that if for instance, someone bought a packet of cigarettes, his eventual profit would be
captured by the bank’s commission fees.  The introduction of cashless transactions through e-
banking services and POS (point of sale) machines reconfigured the ways  people evaluated,
calculated  and  used  cash  in  their  everyday  economic  transactions  and  produced  new moral
distinctions between cash and cashless payments. In many instances, cash was intentionally used
by people in order to help local shops and businesses to avoid paying commissions. On the other
hand, shop owners could not offer discounts had the customer wanted to pay by card. Money, in
the form of cash became endowed with a sense of social solidarity, a grassroots pact against the
banks and the state that aimed to control even petty economic exchanges. Payments with cash,
maintained the  personal  and often informal  character  of  economic  exchanges,  whereas,  card
payments  open  a  new  domain  of  impersonal  relationships  between  bank  accounts.  The
fetishisization of money in neoliberalized environments (markets), passes into digital numbers,
however, people who were (re)introduced to that new money fetishisism  often rejected using e-
payments in their economic relationships that are embedded in social relationships.  Instead of
pay by card, they paid in cash in small local shops, while in big ventures such as supermarkets,
they preferred using the debit cards. 
As I have shown in previous chapters, many of Chalkida’s inhabitants come from rural
backgrounds and have, maintained the structures and habitus of village life. This characteristic of
my fieldsite resonates with Kropotkin’s (1902) view on social solidarity and the institutions of
mutual aid that were predominant in what he calls village communities. Grassroots structures of
micro-communities such as neighborhood, kinship and social networks are formed on the basis
of common interests and mutual help, thus ideas of social solidarity are inherent to them. I argue,
moreover,  that  the  social  contract  has  two dominant  expressions.  One of  these is  its  formal
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expression through the state’s structures and power agencies (such as social welfare, the police,
courts,  etc.).  It  can  also  assume  an  informal  expression  through  what  Rousseau  names  the
“general will”. In Greece, society is misrepresented in politics, and over the years there have
been various struggles to include people in decision making processes. Until 1974, for example,
a considerable portion of the population was excluded from political and economic life (leftists,
women). Thus, the grassroots “general will” and its practices were often not in accordance with
the regime of power. In the recent iteration of the crisis, a major discrepancy between grassroots
“general  will”  and  top-down  austerity  policies  can  be  traced,  which  is  indicative  of  the
reconfiguration  of  the  social  contract  through  economic  practices  and  stances.  Grassroots
economic practices evade institutional control and thus, in the creative process of getting by,
(re)produce  locally  based  institutions  of  mutual  aid  and  support  and solidarity  is  expressed
through economic means, through money whch takes the form of the gift.
Economic  crisis  in  Chalkida’s  local  market  economy  materializes  in  the  lack  of
moneycirculation. In times of crisis, the informal capital that circulates locally becomes vital for
the maintenance of the local  economy.  Central  in my analysis  are  the role  of taxation,  as it
provides the basis for redistribution, and the materialization of organic solidarity through the
state’s structures and resources. Taxation under austerity and foreign financial supervision has
lost the redistributive qualities through which it maintained social welfare and provisions. The
economic solution which was fixed at the political level between Greek crisis era governments
and the Troika shifted the burden of austerity to citizens who did not agree with the idea of
paying for a “debt and a crisis that was not of their making”. Reinhart & Rogoff write in 2013
that:  “Austerity  seldom  works  without  structural  reforms  –  for  example,  changes  in  taxes,
regulations and labor market policies – and if poorly designed, can disproportionately hit the
poor and middle class.” 87  The austerity  treatment  has caused both a  liquidity  trap and the
paradox of thrift88 (Keynes 2016) as people instead of circulating and investing their  capital
withheld their money and spent wisely. 
87 https://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/26/opinion/debt-growth-and-the-austerity-debate.html   (Last accessed 
12/02/2020)
88 See https://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/03/17/how-much-of-the-world-is-in-a-liquidity-trap/ (Last 
accessed 14/02/2020).
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The recent austerity crisis has provoked grassroots reconfigurations of everyday life and
economic activity. On the one hand, as I discuss at the start of this chapter, the lack of resources
has broken social and economic relationships and reconfigured economic practices and activities.
Thus social cohesion in Chalkida has been affected by the financialization of everyday life, by
new modes of resource management by households and individuals, and the fact that people
access consumption and the market through multinational firms. The old, pre-crisis model of
regional  economies  that  was  dominated  by  local  SMEs  has  been  reconfigured  to  meet  the
neoliberal standards of the free-market. Calculative reasoning and self-interested consumption
practices  have  broken  local  socio-economic  relationships  and  promoted  savage  market
competition. This Darwinist approach to economics further deepens social division. At another
level, necessity89, as the folk saying goes, is the mother of invention. In the creative process of
getting  by,  people  invent  new  ways  of  sustaining  social  reproduction.  Crisis  has  in  many
instances made it imperative for people to collaborate in order to get through everyday life. This
collaboration,  I  argue,  takes  place outside of formal  structures  and can only find expression
through interpersonal relationships.
Next, I explore the informal economic activities and practices that proliferate in times of
crisis and that provide people with the means for remaining socially and economically active in
local  society.  Recent  interdisciplinary  approaches  (Chen,  2012,  2006;  Hart,  1992,  2006;
Narotzky, 2000; Peebles, 2011; Portes, 2005; Sassen, 1994) do not treat informality as a marginal
phenomenon, but rather as a concrete reality that unfolds a history of power relations between
people,  the  state  and the  global  economy.  Therefore,  informality  should  be  considered  as  a
constitutive part of economic life in every part of the world. Regardless of the underlying reasons
that  drive  people  towards  informality  (self-interest,  survival,  undeveloped  formal  structures,
cultural and moral traits or, recently, political projects), informal economic activities produce and
circulate capital which is partially channeled into the formal market structures of the national
economy. In many cases, most of the money which people earn through informal means, either
by  avoiding  or  refusing  to  pay  taxes  and  social  contributions,  is  channeled  towards  social
reproduction, with much of it ending up in the formal economic system. For instance, by not
paying  their  social  contributions  to  the  state,  shop  owners  can  then  afford  to  pay  for  rent,
89 The original saying comes from Greek, it suggests that poverty or hunger (penía) is the driving force of social 
breakthroughs.
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municipal fees, electricity, employees and business partners and suppliers.  In times of resource
scarcity, informally produced value, derived either from the provision of services or material
resources,  provides  people  with  the  means  of  sustaining  social  networks.  In  other  words,  it
allows them to socialize and to remain active members of society. Thus the formal and informal
economies are two distinct sectors marked by collaboration, contradiction and intersection. 
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5.1 Social Solidarity and the Gift Economy
Gifts are not simple, disinterested gestures, but rather socio-economic practices which reproduce
cultural  affinity  and  establish  unity.  After  all,  no  network  can  exist  in  which  members  are
disconnected or in disunity. Numerous religions use the idea of solidarity to ensure prosperity
and  promote  peaceful  symbiosis,  and  applaud  the  strong  social  unity  and  harmony  that  is
produced through moral obligations such as generosity, hospitality and mutual aid. Solidarity is a
practice  in  which  people  give  and  receive  not  only  goods  but  also  acceptance,  a  sense  of
belonging and material and immaterial gestures. Further, the utility of gifts is not limited to the
economic; through gifts, people exchange cultural modes, communicate and show their social
commitment.  Instead  of  focusing  on  the  object  that  circulates,  I  highlight  the  practice  of
exchange, circulation itself, which is what the gift economy brings to cultural anthropology’s
table. Society is maintained through the circulation of people and ideas and of goods and services
- anything that its members share becomes social in a way. In Christian tradition, sharing and
solidarity90 were among the duties of a good Christian. A point of confusion is the well known
parable of the good Samaritan. The story opens up a false interpretation of solidarity as many
confuse it with charity, Margaret Thatcher, for example, being one of them.91 Solidarity is not a
two way relationship or one that joins two “ends”, instead it has no ends since the expectation is
that it continue perpetually. Its conceptualization  derives from anarchy,92 an everlasting process
with no end and no beginning. Indeed it is impossible for social life to exist without any type of
solidarity amongst its members. Studying solidarity amongst animals, Kropotkin (1902) argued
that group solidarity helps members to survive food scarcity, extreme weather and attacks. In
addition,  he  suggested  that  all  social  animals  have  an  instinct  for  solidarity.  He  showed,
moreover,  that  it  was  cooperation  rather  than  competition  that  leads  to  social  progress  and
growth. One cannot prosper without sharing, contributing, giving and receiving from others, no
matter how much money one might have. The French revolution reinvented and reinterpreted the
90 In addition to austerity, leading a plain, self-abnegating lifestyle, which was Christianity’s ascetic ideal.
91 https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/politics/from-thatcher-to-corbyn-why-are-politicians-so-fond-of-the-good-  
samaritan-parable (Last accessed 29/01/2020). 
92 In Greek Christian texts, God is often represented as an anarcho on (timeless, infinite being) with no beginning 
and no end. 
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ideas of social solidarity, institutionalizing it within the power of the state. Solidarity was central
in the formation of the modern welfare state and in the definition of human needs. Indeed, the
state incorporated social solidarity as a central element of the social contract (Baldwin, 1990)
which materialized through welfare. Kropotkin criticized the paternal role that the modern state
takes in mediating social solidarity relationships. He wrote:
The  number  and  importance  of  mutual-aid  institutions  which  were  developed  by  the
creative genius of the savage and half-savage masses, during the earliest clan-period of
mankind and still more during the following village-community period, and the immense
influence which these early institutions have exercised upon the subsequent development
of mankind, down to the present times, induced me to extend my researches to the later,
historical  periods  as  well;  especially,  to  study  that  most  interesting  period –  the  free
medieval city republics, whose universality and influence upon our modern civilization
have  not  yet  been  duly  appreciated.  And  finally,  I  have  tried  to  indicate  in  brief  the
immense importance which the mutual-support instincts, inherited by mankind from its
extremely long evolution, play even now in our modern society, which is supposed to rest
upon the principle "every one for himself, and the State for all," but which it never has
succeeded, nor will succeed in realizing. (Kropotkin 1998 [1902]: Introduction) 
During  the  same period,  Durkheim was  developing  his  ideas  on  social  solidarity.  He
formulated  a  theory  to  explain  the  transition  from  less  organized,  primitive  societies  to  the
advanced sociopolitical formations of the early 20th century. He coined the terms “organic” and
“mechanical solidarity”, which a few years later he came to reconsider. For Durkheim, organic
solidarity was an institutionalized form that was a byproduct of advanced societies with their
division of labor, while mechanical solidarity was predominant in ‘primitive’ societies. The latter
constituted an unconscious reaction that allowed the group to survive. As Hawkings (1979), who
thoroughly examined Durkheim’s texts concluded, even Durkheim was forced to reconsider some
part  of his theory. Nonetheless, he argues that Durkheim’s concepts are useful in sociological
theory  given the  fact  that  mechanical  solidarity,  does  not  exist  exclusively  in  less  organized,
primitive  societies,  but  in  fact  exists  in  modern  societies  as  well  in  the  form of  conscience
collective. “To see society only as an organized body of vital functions is to diminish it, for this
body has  a  soul  which is  the composition of collective ideals” (Durkheim, 1974: 93 cited in
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Hawkings,  1979).  Hawkings suggests  that  this  affirmation of Durkheim’s implies that  he had
reconsidered  his  theory  about  mechanical  and organic  solidarity.  Collective  ideals  and  moral
disciplines  are  to  be  found  both  in  primitive,  small  social  formations  with  high  levels  of
homogeneity,  as  well  as  in  complex  social  organizations.  “Diversification  is  essential  for  an
advanced  society  whose  members  should  receive  an  education  which  equips  them  for  the
performance  of  specialized  roles;  but  in  addition  they  must  also  be  imbued  with  common
sentiments and values in order to prevent this structural differentiation from attaining pathological
proportions” (Hawkings, 1979: 159). For the purposes of my research, I found it very fruitful to
bring together Durkheim’s sociological theory of solidarity adjusted, and institutions of mutual
aid, with Kropotkin’s village communities and the anthropological theory of the gift economy.
Based on a cross-pollinations of these various insights, I examine the process which I call the
“mechanicalization” of social solidarity, as it takes place during the collapse of organic solidarity
structures.
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5.2 Conditions of Solidarity  During the Greek Crisis
The idea of  social  solidarity  has  been brought  to  the  fore  by the recent  economic  crisis  and
austerity, and varied grassroots initiatives have appeared across the country. The Greek solidarity
boom  during  the  first  years  of  crisis,  and  the  formation  of  grassroots  self-organized  groups
sparked the interest of numerous anthropologists. Through a series of publications, Rakopoulos
(2014, 2015, 2016, 2018) has thoroughly mapped the anti-middleman movement in Thessaloniki;
examining its practices, organization and political demands, as well as its challenges and internal
conflicts. The “movement without intermediaries”93 was very popular and enjoyed widespread
social support in big city centers as it made political arguments and demands for an alternative
model for the consumption, production and distribution of food. These claims were articulated
along the principles of social solidarity and they advocated radical social change and a shift to
bottom up organization that  could foster  ‘healthy’ economic relationships  among participants.
Some of these initiatives were organized by anarchist groups, and maintained an informal status
was  an  ideological  stance  which  was  inspired  by  Kropotkin’s  ideas  that  opposed  formal
regulation.   Leading  role  in  the  organization  of  markets  without  intermediaries  have  various
anarchist groups and collectives all over Greece, with the most prominent one being in Exarchia,
Athens (Poulimenakos & Dalakoglou, 2018).  The initiative was formed by food producers in
rural areas (Angelopoulos 2018) and channeled resources mainly to the three biggest cities of
Greece, Athens, Thessaloniki and Patras. Rakopoulos (2016) attributes the movements’ success to
the rural habitus and embedded peasant values and practices that rural migrants reproduced in the
city (Panourgia 1995). Cabot (2016a, 2016b) has investigated the resurgence of social solidarity in
self-organized social clinics in Athens. These aimed to provide primary health care to the public
and to compensate for the large gap in provision that  austerity restructuring has created.  Her
research shows how participants understood crisis through solidarity and vice versa and, as they
said, that solidarity emerged out of need. Thus, many participants in solidarity clinics stressed the
93 The movement without intermediaries was started in 2012 by the so called “potato movement” (see 
Angelopoulos 2018), in which potato producers distributed low cost potatoes to the country’s large urban 
centers. It later expanded and organized in other areas of production.
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fact that solidarity emerged because of capitalism and its crisis, and that their initiative offered
only a short-term solution, a ‘bandage’ (Cabot, 2016). 
Solidarity is a concept that several groups and political formations used to give meaning to
their  activities.  Anarchist  groups  in  Exarchia,  Athens  (Poulimenakos  &  Dalakoglou,  2018)
organized grassroots structures of sociality and social inclusion. Rozakou (2012, 2016, 2018) has
investigated the formation of groups that aimed to provide legal and social support to detained
immigrants and refugees.  Such groups, who self-identified as “solidarians”, not only provided
material and legal support but also social support to detainees.  Social inclusion is another facet of
solidarity  which  appears  as  a  necessity  in  times  of  crisis,  given  the  multiple  conditions  of
exclusion that crisis fosters (for example, in terms of unemployment, political status, illness). The
refugee  crisis  also  set  the  ground  for  extreme  right  wing  groups  to  launch  their  own
demonstrations of exclusive solidarity. Golden Dawn members organized free food distribution to
Greeks nationals excluding immigrants. For them, the migrant population did not deserve help as
in their  logic,  migrants were scapegoated as those who were stealing national resources from
Greek  citizens.  Support  should  therefore  be  channeled  towards  Greek  citizens  who  were
struggling because of the crisis, and not to foreigners.94 By contrast Syriza, which in 2012 became
the  main  opposition,  strongly  promoted  inclusive  social  solidarity;  indeed  it  appropriated
solidarity in its political discourse as a way out of crisis and social depression. Thus, it endorsed
the  political  claims  of  the  solidarity  movement,  incorporating  them  into  its  anti-austerity
discourse, and many members of the movement hoped that Syriza could bring about change. As a
result, the crisis has created a new economic field for neoliberal exploitation: the management of
crisis. In a very short space of time, a large number of NGOs came to Greece. Their mandate was
to tackle the humanitarian crisis and to help Greece get through either the national economic crisis
or the refugee crisis. In 2013, an NGO called Solidarity Now emerged. Solidarity Now aimed to
institutionalize grassroots  citizens’ organizations  and was funded,  among others,  by the Open
Society Foundation, the UN Refugee agency, UNICEF, and the Iceland, Lichtenstein and Norway
Grants. Last but not least, the Orthodox Church also ran many charities and owned NGOs that
framed their activities with the concept of social solidarity.95  Anthropological approaches to social
94 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-19084584   (Last accessed 22/10/2019).
95 The NGO O Kalos Samareitis (The Good Samaritan) is a clear example of how solidarity is used and often 
misunderstood as charity.  
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solidarity  in  the  context  of  the  Greek  crisis  have  focused  on  robust  expressions  of  it
(Papataxiarchis, 2016) that required a certain level of organization to become possible. Writing on
the anti-middlemen movement, Rakopoulos (2018, 2016, 2014) traces an extensive network of
consumers and producers which local solidarity groups have to coordinate. Cabot (2016, 2014)
shows  how  municipalities  first  supported  and  later  institutionalized  the  solidarity  clinics’
grassroots initiatives. Rozakou’s case study (2018) unravels the extensive networks that offered
legal support to detained migrants and refugees. 
In my field site I did not encounter a strong presence of the anti-middlemen movement. I
did however, meet several producers from the rural areas around Chalkida who regularly sent their
products to the solidarity market in Exarchia square. People in Chalkida already had social and
kinships networks through which they could access food and thus they did not need the anti-
middlemen movement.  In my research, I depart from the notion that austerity has produced great
ruptures  in organic solidarity institutions which have been substituted through the creation of
loosely organized grassroots institutions of mutual aid based on friendship and kinship. Instead,
through a process which I term the “mechanicalization” of social solidarity, I choose to focus my
analysis of social solidarity on intimate social and kinship relationships and economic practices.
These are usually referred to as “support” or “help”. Further, I argue that apart from solidarity,
social discord and disunity have also assumed forceful expressions. Greek society has been deeply
divided by the austerity crisis and neoliberal policies that have increased levels of alienation as
people adapted to the new forms of economic practices and resource scarcity. The imposition of
capital  controls  in  June  2015,  for  instance,  produced  a  lack  in  cash  based  transactions
(Amarianakis, 2016). Small shops and local ventures that did not have the infrastructure to accept
card payments and could only accept cash as a method of payment struggled to operate while
large chain firms such as supermarkets had their sales boosted by the possibility that consumers
had to do their shopping without cash.    
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5.3 Divide and Conquer: The Calculated Imposition of Austerity 
Measures 
Austerity measures were introduced in Greece in 2010, through the stealth of divide and conquer.
They were assembled in  packages that  the Greek government  had to  impose under  ongoing
surveillance by the Troika. Each austerity package targeted different social groups and interests.
At first, they affected the interests of those who were paid directly by the state: civil servants and
pensioners. The gradual implementation of austerity provoked social division among the Greek
working classes. Mutual accusations and blame (Theodossopoulos, 2013) among working class
people proliferated. By the time people realized what was happening it was too late for them to
coherently and effectively resist, since they were divided. Further, many saw the restructuring of
the public system and the economy and markets as a process that was setting things straight.
People  from  distinct  labor  backgrounds  reacted  when  their  direct  economic  interests  and
privileges were at stake. Demonstrations and strikes proved ineffective in resisting austerity and
over time, they became normalized as part of crisis reality. What’s more, fragmented strikes and
demonstrations produced and enhanced social discord, especially when violent incidents were
manipulated  to  disorient,  frighten  and  dishearten  people  (Herzfeld,  2011).  Herzfeld  makes
explicit the fact that politicians and technocrats followed the doctrine of austerity in dealing with
the public debt crisis, and that this was a unilateral move which the majority of Greeks had not
agreed to. People were furious with politicians who, in the midst of the crisis, continued to enjoy
financial privileges and legal immunity while presenting austerity measures as necessary in order
to avoid a default and exit from the eurozone.  
Mainstream media disseminated popular discourses that framed the high number of civil
servants  as  the  main  cause  of  the  increasing  public  deficit.  Moreover,  the  high  levels  of
corruption and patron-client  relationships  that  were inherent  to  the  state’s  structures  and the
public  sector  were also  singled  out.  In  the  midst  of  the  crisis,  with  their  incomes  suddenly
reduced, the self-employed asserted that civil servants were in a privileged position because they
at  least  had a  stable  income,  and private  sector  employees  argued that  if  they  had been as
unproductive and incompetent as most civil servants were, they would have been fired. Even
civil  servants  themselves  agreed that  the  public  sector  was  the  main  enclave  of  generalized
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corruption that was partially  responsible for the public  deficit,  and was therefore in need of
restructuring (Theodossopoulos, 2013). Because of crisis and austerity,  the onetime dream of
becoming a civil servant for whom “vrexei, hionisei, o misthos erhete (whether it snows or rains,
the  salary  comes  in)  has  faded.  The  destruction  of  this  dream  occurred  both  morally  and
economically  (if  we  are  to  think  them  separately),  and  at  the  same  time.  Many  of  my
interlocutors realized that long-standing aspirations of becoming a civil servant, “na voleftoun se
mia thesi sto dimosio” (to settle down in a public post) had contributed to the present-day crisis
and had enabled the development of patron-client relations.
           When I asked people to specify which civil servants they were referring to, because they
had mentioned the very broad category of “public employees”, almost immediately, they would
identify bureaucrats in the public administration, those who sit behind a desk and are usually
appointed by the government to managerial positions. In divisive discourses, civil servants were
homogenized and demonized, grouped together in the public’s mind by the fact that they were
paid  with  public  resources.  Many of  my interlocutors  spoke negatively about  the quality  of
services provided by the public sector. Almost everyone has had a bad experience with the state,
either because of its complex, time-consuming and irrational bureaucracy, or because of civil
servants’ uncooperativeness or incompetence. In the public imaginary, civil servants were lazy,
unproductive  people  who  acted  as  if  they  owned  the  state  (Theodossopoulos,  2013).  Such
manifestations legitimized the process of rolling back and rolling out (Peck & Tickell, 2002) the
state since everyone believed that the public sector was overstaffed, irrationally structured and
ineffective, wasting public money and resources. In other words, it needed “rationalization”. 
             Many of my non-civil servant interlocutors argued that civil servants should not
complain about the crisis  and their  income reduction because they,  unlike others,  still  had a
stable income resource. This statement downplayed the struggles against austerity that public
sector labor unions organized.  The social  unrest  caused by prolonged austerity indicates that
austerity has not (yet) become part of the social contract. In other words, people in their majority
did not consent to taking responsibility for “a debt they did not create”, or to keep funding a state
that had been reduced to a puppet tax collecting mechanism for Greece’s creditors. The state was
conceptualized as an alien structure which, instead of protecting its citizens, acted against them,
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with its main concern being to attract and protect large capitalist investment. These discourses
drove  the  imposition  of  neoliberal  structural  reforms  in  the  public  sector  and  shaped  the
collective narrative of what went wrong. 
             That corruption exists in public administration was common knowledge and provided a
tangible  way  of  explaining  the  malfunctioning  of  public  organizations.  The  enforcement  of
austerity in the public sector opened the way to structural reforms that dramatically affected
salaries in the private sector, in addition to which, hard-won work rights came to be renegotiated.
As a result, the self-employed, whose clientele consisted of public and private employees and
pensioners whose income had been severely cut, saw their  annual income drop dramatically.
Because social division disrupts both organic solidarity institutions and intra-class solidarity ties,
social disunity enabled the gradual imposition of austerity shocks in every economic sector and a
vast rescaling of the country’s regional economies to the standards of global markets (Narotzky,
2000). In Chalkida, social discord was directed towards those groups of workers who earned
most. For instance, the cement factory workers who used to earn high salaries had very little
support from the local community in their struggle to reopen the factory. “Do you know how
much money they got?” was a common rhetorical question people posed when I asked them
about the tsimentadiko (cement factory worker) struggle. For example, to celebrate Tsiknopempti
(Fat Tuesday),96 the cement factory workers held an open barbecue at the factory, inviting locals
to join them. However, some people criticized them for being inconsistent, arguing that while on
the one hand they claimed that the decision to close the factory had led workers into misery and
despair, at the same time they wasted all that money on a party. Public opinion in Chalkida
regarding the closure of the cement factory was ambivalent and many asserted that those to
blame were the cement factory workers and their union. Even quite a few pensioners from the
factory stressed the fact that it  had closed down because their  trade union would not accept
proposed wage cuts. The workers’ stance was considered arrogant and self-centered, and one that
eventually backfired, resulting in a major, multilayered social, cultural and economic loss for the
city. For their part, the workers believed that their struggle was leading the way for the working
96 The exact translation would be smoky Thursday the week before Carnival and the beginning of the pre-Easter 
period of fasting. It is celebrated widely in Greece and people roast meat souvlaki at home or even at the streets 
in front of shops, where owners treat those who pass by.  
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classes to resist the “neoliberal invasion of capitalism.”97 Their common struggle enforced the
solidarity bonds within their group and they idealized their cause as a struggle for hard-won
labor rights at the national level. These rights were being renegotiated in the context of the crisis
and in order to enhance the national economy’s competitiveness so as to attract investment. 
Another pillar of the social state which has been molded by the notion of solidarity are
the social insurance funds. The state administers this system of funds in order to provide health
insurance and pensions to everyone, with the system being based on intergenerational solidarity.
This means that each generation is obliged to pay and sustain the public insurance system with
the future promise of reciprocity.  The problem is that given current economic prospects and
considering the ageing of the general population and high unemployment rates, the pension and
health care systems have become unsustainable (Symeonidis, 2016). Hence the restructuring of
the sector and of welfare mechanisms started with the 6th, 7th, and 9th austerity packages (2012-
2014) on public health cuts and reforms, and pension reforms and cuts were included in almost
every austerity package from 2010 to 2017. The restructuring of the pension system, or more
accurately, what the state will be able to pay for pensions in the future, alters the established
social contract. Many people believed that the system would eventually collapse and they would
lose the national insurance contributions that they had been obliged by law to pay.  
Despite the cuts, pensioners have in many cases taken up the financial burden of the crisis
and provided capital to sustain the social reproduction of the unemployed masses (as described in
Chapters  3  &  4).  Thus,  a  weakening  of  structural  solidarity  was  counterbalanced  by  a
strengthening of mechanical solidarity between kin and social peers. In the past, caring between
generations was a moral obligation, a form of reciprocity from children to their parents, and it
revealed the lack of  social  structures  to  support  the elderly who had to  rely on their  kin to
survive. This particular welfare system in southern Europe (Allen, et al., 2004) has come in use
and reinforced the mechanical solidarities of the extended family rural household. In many cases
people in their late 50s and 60s, and especially women, are burdened with the care of both their
parents and their grandchildren. During hard times, as in the past, people seek to capitalize on
97 Amongst their supporters they counted the KKE (Greek Communist Party) and in some parts of their discourses 
they  incorporated the communist party’s rhetoric.  
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their family and kinship resources, a process which can be described as the “mechanicalization”
of solidarity, a process that reverses modernity. 
Public health care is based on social solidarity and the provision of institutional support
to  anyone  in  need,  regardless  of  their  social  status.  This  fact  sparked  racist  attacks  against
foreigners who, it was claimed, took advantage of public wealth without having contributed to it.
This was a central argument of extreme right discourse which nurtured xenophobia on the basis
that migrants used the national health system at the expense of Greek citizens and taxpayers.
Between 2010 to 2014, the public health system was restructured (Economou et al, 2014) and its
functions financialized. Henceforth, it excluded those who did not have social security, such as
undocumented  immigrants  and  unemployed  Greeks  alike  who  had  to  pay  for  the  medical
services they received. Instead of promoting public healthcare as a prerequisite for social well-
being, austerity reforms have reduced human rights to financial principles. Institutional forms of
solidarity divided people between those who had established economic citizenship rights and
those  who did  not  (Athanasiou,  2018).  Through  austerity,  organic  solidarity  institutions  and
structures such as public healthcare  have been financialized and assessed at a strictly financial
level.
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5.4 The Financialization of Everyday Life and New Forms of 
Grassroots Economic Solidarity
As the crisis progressed, it was the turn of the self-employed to take the blame. Tax evasion was
portrayed as the other major culprit of the persisting economic crisis in Greece, that which had
created the public deficit. The self-employed were those who could hide income from the tax
agency either through the sale of goods and services without receipt or by hiding some of their
profits with the help of their accountants. The self-employed were also accused of stealing from
the state. When I was conducting ethnographic observation at the occupied cement factory, a
leading figure of the workers’ union said: “all these years, freelancers and entrepreneurs have not
been paying their taxes. To sum it up, all those years that they did not pay what they should have,
and you get a total amount, that is where the public deficit comes from.” In this way, he openly
accused all the self-employed of de facto tax evasion. Small and medium-sized enterprises faced
new challenges and were subject to neoliberal capitalism’s economic Darwinism; that is, the rule
of the survival of the fittest.  Many SMEs faced the additional  struggle of not  being able to
compete with supra-local firms because the internet had nullified the markets’ spatial barriers.
The rescaling of commercial activity that the internet enabled, intensified competition which,
according to  capitalist  doctrine,  leads  to  progress  and constant  improvement  since  whatever
cannot adapt, dies. Many SMEs found it hard to survive in the savage market. Small shop owners
who struggled to make ends meet did not close down their businesses because they did not want
to  be  stigmatized  for  having  defaulted,  which  would  make  them socially  and economically
isolated. Overtaxation was the tombstone for many SMEs that could not cope with the crisis and
the rescaling of the regional commercial and retail sectors with the global economy. Complete or
partial informalization of their activity was the only option that would allow them to keep going
(Antonopoulos & Hall, 2014). Petty tax evasion transformed into a cooperative act of solidarity
that sustained local society’s social cohesion. As a tavern owner explained when talking about
the question of whether to issue tax receipts, “it is because of not issuing receipts that the [local]
market still runs, with that money we get by.”  
Andreas (59) highlighted another dimension of tax evasion by large firms. Andreas had
been multi-employed in the past and worked in a high production post in one of Chalkida’s
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factories. He was specialized in chemistry and food production and preservation and had set up
several businesses from industrial disinfection services to a pizzeria and an initiative to create a
fish farming unit. He had also worked for other major food production companies in Greece. As
he was narrating the history of his working life, he stopped and shared with me what one of his
former employers, the owner of a leading Greek confectionery and baking firm, had confessed as
being the secret to success. “He told me that the key to success is to owe a lot to the state. He
owed millions in the 1990s. The state did not want to lose money and prosecuted his company in
a very slow-moving bureaucratic procedure that took years to settle. Meanwhile the company did
not close and continued to operate formally98 and kept producing and selling without charging
VAT, which meant that it could sell its production much cheaper. This forced its competitors to
adapt  to  a  market  price  that  was  unattainable  and  so  they  fell  out.  That  is  how unhealthy
competition that the state tolerates ruins healthy ventures.” Andreas identified himself politically
with the popular right (laiki deksia) which New Democracy used to represent. He had stopped
voting for ND as he was in favor of state interventionism and not for the free-market model that
the  party  had  come to  endorse  lately.  The  forced  neoliberalization  of  the  economy and the
financialization of everyday life caused great ruptures in people’s perceptions of the role of the
state.
 Taxation is the cornerstone of state formation, where the state bases its existence on the
administration of the common fund. Without taxation, there cannot be redistribution. Foreign
supervision and the imposition of austerity measures that further dispossessed people caused
many to reevaluate their economic obligations towards the state. The austerity doctrine did not
yield more income to the state, which would have been the logical outcome of its tackling of tax
evasion and efforts to eradicate informality; rather, it had the opposite effect (Antonopoulos &
Hall, 2014; Williams, 2015). Being overtaxed, businesses could not afford to pay the increasing
fees, and so they stopped paying. Lower annual incomes for firms generated fewer taxes and so
the  government’s  tax  earnings  dropped.  Overtaxation  in  retail  businesses  had  an  impact  on
household budgets and altered  consumption practices as it increased the cost of living. In the
context of crisis, new methods of shopping were introduced. The crisis  structured a new type of
consumer-hunter  of sales and offers.  An on-line  flâneur in  the virtual markets of the world,
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driven  by  self-interest  and  the  phantasmagoria  (Benjamin, 2003)  that  globalized  capitalism
offered. 
Even  though  many  accessed  the  markets  online  and  gathered  information  (on  price,
specifications, reviews) there, people wanted to support the local economy. The way in which
local businesses could lower their prices and increase their margins was through tax evasion. In
many  cases,  the  sale  of  goods  and services  without  receipts  occurred  as  the  product  of  an
agreement between buyers and the sellers, with consumers opting for the discount (instead of the
receipt). When I was observing the shop floor of a small business selling heating equipment, a
customer went in and the following dialogue occurred: 
“I’ve seen that heater online for 100 euros” he said, pointing at the price tag that stated 120. He
continued, asking “will you come down to 100?”
“Sure,” replied Stavros, the owner, and politely asked the customer “do you want a receipt?” 
The customer said nothing in response. 
I followed the customer on his way out and persuaded him talk to me about what had just
happened. He specified that he preferred to support local businesses and local people since their
prices were only slightly more expensive than those of online shops and big chains. He said that
he did not care about VAT because public funds were “a bottomless pit,” by which he implied
that whatever you threw in would be wasted. Peebles (2011) describes an identical situation in
Sweden. However Sweden has a strong welfare state and tax evasion there is driven by self-
interest that undermines organic solidarity. In the Greek crisis context, organic solidarity is re-
imagined through tax-evasion and the tolerance of buying goods without receipts. This practice
is  also  highly  political  as  many define  it  as  the  structure  of  resistance  to  foreign  economic
control.   
In a similar manner, Manolis (Household 6) wanted to buy a new TV. He searched the
web for the available brands and models, prices and specifications. When he had decided which
TV to buy, he  asked a friend and former client of his, who owned a medium-sized shop in
Chalkida,  to  buy it  for  him at  the  price  he had found online.  Over  the  years,  Manolis  had
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developed a network of mutual support with his former clients. “If I need something, I will first
look for it through my clientele. I want to reciprocate and give them the money back,” he said.
The  economic  attitude  that  Manolis  articulated  resonates  with  the  gift  economy  with  the
difference that it was money, rather than personal items, that was used. This is the opposite of
Marx’s  commodity  fetishism.  Here,  commodities  are  used  to  maintain  socio-economic
relationships between people who are not simply driven by self-interest; economic exchanges are
personified and shaped around the reciprocity  of  moral  economy (Mauss,  1990[1925];  Hart,
2007). In this instance, self-interest stems from the maintenance of the network of reciprocity
rather  than  the  search  for  the  best  offer.  Over  the  years,  such  durable  socio-economic
relationships have developed their own dynamic. The same is true for many local people who
accessed the market through their social and kinship networks and thus bypassed formal market
structures. Manolis also elaborated that, if the quality was in both cases good, he would prefer a
slightly more  expensive  product  made in  Greece to  an  imported  one,  even if  the  latter  was
cheaper. 
Unjust and punitive austerity in consumption taxes has facilitated the solidarization of
grassroots  economic  practices.  As  opposed  to  calculative  reasoning,  political  consumerism
(Lekakis, 2015), as a stance that aims to boost the local and national economy, has been on the
rise. Consumers started to favor and consume goods produced in Greece, even though they might
be more expensive.  An economic nationalism has emerged in response to the crisis  and has
spread spontaneously across the country. Within it, social and economic solidarity are mobilized
as economic practices that help to maintain the common good. This economic nationalism is
based on the argument  that  if  everyone consumed Greek products,  this  would revitalize  the
national economy and promote consumer awareness. For example, there were many posts within
social  media  informing  the  public  about  the  benefits  of  consuming  national  products,  or
instructions on how to identify Greek produced products. These were endowed with a strong
narrative of social  solidarity based on nationalist discourses that suggested that if all Greeks
consumed  domestic  products  (produced  or  manufactured  in  Greece),  public  revenues  would
increase,  jobs  could  be  secured  and  the  public  deficit  would  decrease.  Many  local  trade
associations also supported a Christmas campaign against the “big sharks.” It that “when you
shop at a small local business, you’re not helping a multinational executive to buy a third country
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house. You’re helping a little girl to continue her ballet lessons, you’re helping a boy to get a new
pair of shoes, you’re helping a mother to stock the family table, a father to repay his bank loan, a
student to complete his/hers studies. Support small businesses – they are the backbone of the
Greek economy.” 
 Despite the surge of economic nationalism, the reconfiguration of consumption practices
and the financialization of everyday life has had a negative impact on local businesses. A cheese
dealer who used to have three shops in Chalkida had to restrict his business to the floating open-
air markets. He complained that most of his former customers who had preferred to pay a bit
more for quality  cheese,  were now going to  the big supermarket  chains.  His  customers had
included “doctors, lawyers and businessmen,” he said. Now, he saw their in-laws and parents at
the open-air market, and they would pass by without even saying hello. Dina (Household 4) said
she  felt  angry  and  disappointed  when  she  discovered  that  the  young  members  of  the  local
communist party, who regularly asked for and received her financial support, did their shopping
at Zara. She said: “on Sunday they were outside Zara, protesting against the obligatory Sunday
opening of shops and against multinationals… and on Monday they were there again shopping
for clothes.” In the above examples, the calculative reason that the crisis has engendered, shows
how social alienation occurs through the economic practices of local people and may even lead
to  ideological  and  practical  contradictions.  The  economic  actions  of  ordinary  people  entail
multiple social meanings and are constitutive of the formation of society (Carrier 2005). In fact,
there cannot be society without economic activity and  vice versa. In both of the above cases,
cash strapped peoples’ consumption practices fueled social dismemberment. Multinational firms
took  advantage  of  the  crisis  and  increased  their  sales  and  profits  (Zara  opened  in  2011  in
Chalkida). At the same time, they benefited from the various austerity laws that counterbalanced
tax increases. As Dina, the clothes shop owner explained, these firms accumulated their profits
abroad, which produced a break in reciprocity. A local shop would spend it profits in the local
economy,  whereas big firms extracted local  wealth and accumulated it  in  Athens or abroad.
“How come consumers don’t realize that the economic gains from supporting multinationals are
only temporary?” She continued: “if you do some market research at the local shops, you can
find cheap products there too!” 
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I was curious about Zara’s customers and went there to have a look and talk with them. I
talked to a few, mostly women, who were doing their shopping or just hanging around. They told
me that they were hunting for bargains and that they preferred Zara’s designs to those of other
cheap products they could find. Most of them were looking for clothes not only for themselves
but also for family members, especially for their children whose clothing needs were high. Thus,
they  regularly  visited  Zara,  and most  of  the  time ended up consuming more  than  they  had
initially  intended.  In a  related  vein,  a  large  Greek-owned firm,  Jumbo SA, which  had been
expanding during the pre-crisis years, increased its sales of very cheap household retail items,
which it imported, at a massive scale, from Asia. During the crisis, its sales skyrocketed, and its
annual turnover has been increasing99. At the same time, it expanded all over Greece and opened
new branches in the Balkans. When people are in need, they often disregard the labor conditions
of the items they consume. Cheap prices are enticing to everyone and despite their ideological
positions, people often indulge in low-cost consumption, especially when they must count every
cent  of  their  household  budget.  In  free  market  doctrine,  the  phantasmagoria  which  Walter
Benjamin conceptualizes as the power that commodities exercise over people, is endowed with
the instant gratification that affordable, low cost products offer. Beyond this, new online markets
enforced a new mode of doing shopping. The paradox is that in times of crisis and austerity,
people got access, through their computers, to shopping in the national and global markets. Thus,
restrained  consumption  practices  were  coupled  with  the  great  availability  of  products  that
national and international markets had to offer. 
These abovementioned moralizations of economic behavior brings to the fore the social
dimension of economic practices. Grassroots economic solidarity can scale up from the local
level and recreate the organic forms of social  solidarity  at  the national  level that  have been
destroyed by austerity.  Localized and nationalized solidarities make political  claims over  the
economic spaces in which ordinary people make a living. Once again, the national interest and
the “nation” shaped notions of solidarity among Greeks who became homogenized as they were
confronted by the unforeseen economic crisis which had violently taken hold of their everyday
realities.  The collapse of the middle classes in Greece became obvious in 2012, when society
was  impacted  by  the  regime  of  austerity.  Widespread  discontent,  social  depression,  and
99  Source : https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/trending/ekexiiyccrvcyefu84leag2 
(Last accessed 12/02/2020).
216
hopelessness (Stuckler & Basu, 2014) were prevalent in everyday life and the challenges that
people confronted were once again nationalized, and organic solidarity was sustained through
nationalistic ideas. The process of rendering middle class livelihoods destitute led to the creation
of a new social class; the national class of the dispossessed that was constituted by people from
various  work  and  socioeconomic  backgrounds.  Hence  notions  of  intra-class  solidarity  were
promoted through nationalist and patriotic ideals as a reaction to the deterioration of everyday
life and to foreign financial supervision and control. 
In smaller cities such as Chalkida, people are less alienated by capitalism, both in social
and economic terms. As I showed in the previous chapter, social solidarity was facilitated at the
household level through networks of intergenerational solidarity that circulated capital resources
and  made  possible  inter-household  social  reproduction  practices  that  sustained  the  local
economy. Social and kinship networks enabled mechanicalized solidarities to remerge. However,
the  maintenance  of  such  networks  would  have  been  impossible  if  people  did  not  have  the
material  resources  to  invest  in  them.   The  so-called  solidarity  boom and the  appearance  of
grassroots  solidarity  movements,  which  social  anthropologists  working  in  Athens  and
Thessaloniki have investigated (Cabot, 2016a, 2016b; Rakopoulos, 2015, 2016; Rozakou, 2012,
2018; Poulimenakos & Dalakoglou, 2018; Theodosopoulos, 2016) occurred in a distinct way in
Chalkida, a small provincial city. A probable explanation for this is the fact that in small cities,
mechanical  solidarity  is  easier  to  achieve  through  everyday  social  interaction.  In  Chalkida,
people did not need an organized movement “without intermediaries” because they maintained
various  socio-economic  relationships  that  were  unmediated  by  institutions. Furthermore,  in
Chalkida, social division and mutual accusation could be tamed through everyday interactions
between diversely situated people who lived and worked there, and who shared similar socio-
economic backgrounds, life histories and experiences. In this sense, smaller cities can produce
social consent and achieve harmony more easily than chaotic urban centers such as Athens. That
is to say, small cities such as Chalkida promote inter-class interaction, which distinguishes it
from the class-based residence and segregation patterns which are prevalent in larger cities such
as Athens (Panourgia, 1995). Neighborhood relationships are also very important, and on many
occasions,  I  had  the  feeling  that  I  was  living  in  a  small  village  rather  than  a  city.
Mechanical solidarity, as Durkheim conceptualizes it, is present in these social arrangements of
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everyday life in Chalkida. Institutions of mutual aid are therefore shaped by the quotidian needs
of people who share the same spaces and similar experiences of crisis and most importantly, have
already had social bonds amongst them. It is the case that in order for solidarity and social unity
to exist, people need to know and trust each other and to interact socially. Smaller cities promote
social interaction and intimate solidarity reactions as people more or less know each other either
personally or through their social and kinship networks, or, as in Kropotkin’s terms, through their
networks of mutual aid.
 The village communities which were recreated by rural to urban migrants in growing
Greek cities provided the grounds for people to relate with each other in a cooperative manner,
based on their common origin. Many of Chalkida’s neighborhoods were formed by settlers with
common origins who often also shared kinship relationships. For instance, in the neighborhood
in  which  I  lived  during  fieldwork,  people  recalled  how,  during  the  times  when  the  whole
neighborhood celebrated important religious festivals such as Easter, childcare was provided by
the community and households were kept open. These community structures had been eroded
over  time  with  the  increase  in  people’s  living  standards  and  the  growth  of  individualistic
aspirations for upwards mobility. Yet, they were still present enough to absorb some of the crisis’
negative impacts. 
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5.5 Informality and Social Solidarity: Resistance, Subsistence and  
Metaphors of Survival 
The concept of informal economy has been a major topic of interest  for varied disciplines that
concern  themselves  with social  organization,  for  example,  urban studies,  sociology,  economics,
business and management, and of course anthropology. Keith Hart’s (1973) work in Accra, Ghana,
which  made  the  term  informal  sector  popular  in  academia,  has  shown  anthropology  and
ethnographic research to be the most suitable tools for approaching and untangling its inherent
complexities. Early dualist approaches defined the ‘informal’ as totally contradictory to its opposite,
the ‘formal’.  For  liberal  economists  and international  organizations,  the development  of formal
structures (ILO, 1972, Lewis, 1954) in post-colonial states was viewed as something positive that
would  contribute  to  the  improvement  of  people’s  livelihoods.  From this  perspective,  informal
economic activities were interpreted as signs of poverty and the lack of socio-economic progress;
they  were  regarded  as  a  survival  tactic,  an  endemic  characteristic  of  undeveloped  economies.
Indeed even today, academic articles ascribe the increased rate of informal economic activity and
tax evasion to a lack of education and social progress (La Porta & Scheifer, 2014). Structuralist
approaches (Castells & Portes, 1989), by contrast, bring into focus the articulation between formal
and informal sectors, and focus on the investigation of informal economy in advanced economies.
Another perspective is offered by De Soto’s legalist approach (1989).Despite widespread criticism,
it has been very influential within mainstream economic thought and (neo)liberal ideology. The
legalist approach is  able to account for the fact that rural to urban migration is a determinant factor
of informal economies, and it correlates informality with complex bureaucracy, corruption and labor
regulations.  Lastly,  another  influential  perspective  on  informal  economy  comes  from  another
mainstream economist, Maloney (2004) of the Voluntarist school, who suggests that informality is a
matter  of  “free  will.”  Each  of  the  above approaches  succeeds  in  explaining  certain  aspects  of
informality and the primary motives that drive people into it. 
Today it  is  widely accepted that the informal economy forms a vast  part  of the world’s
economy and that fiscal austerity produces more informality (La Porta & Scheifer, 2014), as it has
done in Greece (Bitzenis, Vlachos & Schneider, 2016).  Even Yiannis Stournaras,  the appointed
Governor  of  Greece’s  Central  Bank  and  former  minister  of  the  economy  during  the  crisis
government (2012-2014), highlights the fact that austerity policies and unemployment have lead to
an intensification of informality.100 In Greece, the informal economy is estimated to equal one fourth
100 Source: https://www.bis.org/review/r190412e.htm  (Last accessed 29/01/2020). 
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of annual GDP (Bitzenis, Vlachos & Scheinder 2016), hence the formalization of shadow economic
activities could yield sufficient income to the state in order for it to repay its debts and recover from
the crisis.
 However,  mainstream economists  seem to disregard the fact that,  to a great extent,  the
informal economy recycles capital to the formal sector. Ulyssea (2018) identifies three main views
on what causes informality. Firstly, that the informal sector harnesses potential entrepreneurs who
are held back by the strict legislation, high entry fees and lack of credit (cf de Soto, 1989) in the
formal sector. Secondly, the view of informal firms as ‘parasite forms’ that chose informality in
order to avoid taxation and the costs of complying with regulation (cf Maloney, 2004). The third
view argues that informality is linked with the survival practices of impoverished people who are
not productive enough to formalize their activities. Ulyssea (2018) concludes that the most common
cause of informality in Brazil is the parasite form, and for that reason, eradicating informality would
be beneficial for the economy. While I am not familiar with the situation in Brazil, I am deeply
concerned by contemporary approaches to informality that disregard the socio-cultural aspects of
economic life. It seems, moreover, that dualism remains influential in academia. According to the
ILO’s 2002 definition, the informal economy does not include the criminal economy. The informal
sector may not be legal but, unlike the criminal economy, it produces and distributes legal goods
and services. In addition, in the ILO’s scheme, unpaid reproductive labor and care were also left out
of informal income since they do not have profit making purposes. Yet it remains unclear whether
corruption is a formal or an informal practice, and whether it is criminal and is therefore excluded
from the ILO’s definition. If so, this constitutes a grave problem, since corruption in many instances
formalizes  and  renders  legal  people’s  illegal  actions,  thereby  producing  legal  outcomes.  For
instance, one can consider citizens who, in order to formalize their illegal constructions or building
additions, bribed state officials so that they erased fines or registered false data into the system. In
practice, corruption not only produces legal outcomes, it makes  illegal activities appear legal. 
Scheider &  Buehn (2012) have conducted statistical research into the informal economy in
advanced economies in 39 OECD countries. Between 1999 and 2010, indirect taxes (29%), self-
employment (22%) unemployment (16%), personal income taxes (13%) and tax morale (9%) were
the main factors that had a major impact on the rise of informal activities. In Greece, which has the
highest rate of self-employment in Europe (25 to 30 %), had the informal economy disappeared, the
formal sector would have collapsed. As I have shown in the first two chapters, the formal and
informal sectors were interwoven during the course of Greece’s modern development. Danopoulos
& Znidaric (2007) shows how informal economy, which is almost always linked with tax evasion
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and  tax  avoidance,  can  have  both  positive  and  negative  effects.  On  the  one  hand,  informality
undermines economic governance structures and tax evasion is linked with underdeveloped welfare
states, while on the other, it leaves money in the hands of businesses and consumers, thus boosting
investment. During numerous crises in modern Greek history, when formal structures could not
cover people’s needs, informality provided the only solution for struggling populations. Small scale
informal activities generate capital which is reinvested into the local economy and thus they aid the
ailing  formal  economic  sector  that  is  struggling  to  cope  with  austerity  shocks  and  neoliberal
restructuring. 
Informal economic structures are resilient and facilitate both intentional and non-intentional
grassroots resistance to the dominant structures of economic power. Scott (1990, 1985 ,1976) has
unraveled how practices of everyday resistance indicate that people do not consent to dominance.
One way for Greek people to effectively resist the ongoing neoliberalization of the economy is to
disobey formal  regulations  and procedures.  This  practice  has  proven to be more  effective than
protests and demonstrations, and many of the imposed policies have been canceled as a result of
grassroots disobedience. People act informally across diverse occasions and settings, both in formal
and informal venues, and their activities, in the midst of the crisis and harshly imposed austerity, are
endowed with notions of resistance to a “regime that wants to enslave and exterminate” them. Even
before  the  crisis,  both  the  extraction  of  taxes  from  business  activities  and  the  fees  to  social
insurance funds were understood as part of “having the state as a business partner” who demands
that its share be paid first. In popular consciousness, the state was crystalized as a rentier structure
that, through taxes and social contributions, dispossessed people of a significant portion of their
earned income. The increasing discontent with extractive taxation policies and towards the state in
general and its social services, led to an intensification of informality and a reconceptualization of it
as an act of subsistence, resistance and survival in the hostile economic environment that austerity
and neoliberal policies had created. 
 The health system became inaccessible, especially after 2012, when neoliberal restructuring
and cuts to the operational costs of public hospitals made them unable to serve the public’s general
needs (Cabot, 2016a). For instance, if a person wanted to have a regular checkup at one of Greece’s
public  hospitals,  they  had  to  wait  for  months  for  the  next  available  appointment.  Therefore,
examinations were outsourced to private health clinics for which people had to pay part of the cost.
In addition, the police, especially after the waves of repression, and several incidents of misconduct
during the protests in Athens (see Hertzfeld, 2011), were also unpopular, yet this was the only civil
service which was not openly accused of incompetence and corruption - despite the widespread
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allegations of corruption in the public sector. Corruption in the police force was overshadowed by
the  brutality  it  had  shown  towards  protesters  (students,  workers,  pensioners)  in  the  massive
demonstrations that took place all over Greece. Among the younger generations, especially people
of the generation of Alexandros Grigoropoulos,101 the idea circulated of the police as “dogs that
guard their bosses [capitalists, banks and the government].” In an informal talk, a car mechanic who
had been providing his services informally since 2011, told me that a large nation-wide firm that
sold used cars, every year donated a few cars to Chalkida’s police force, thus buying them out.
 Public education, although it had suffered greatly from the lack of funds it has not collapsed.
Children accessed school and universities operated even with limited funds.   There were many
instances in which my informants talked down about schoolteachers who worked very few hours
and enjoyed an extended period of vacations compared to other 9 to 5 jobs. Furthermore, Greeks
spend a large amount of money in the so called parapaideia102 (private education) sector in order for
the  children  to  have  higher  chances  of  accessing  public  higher  education.  The  system  of
parapaideia absorbed the surplus of university graduates who were not hired in the public education
system. Even in times of crisis,  Greeks sent  their  children to  private  schools in  order  to  learn
English, usually starting at the age of 6, and by the time they entered high school, adolescents spent
3 hours more of their time in private after schools (frontistiria) to prepare for the highly competitive
national examinations (panellinies) in order to access higher education. The parapaideia sector had
a high level of informality, and private tutors did not issue receipts. Furthermore, in times of crisis,
many adverts  circulated at  bus stops,  street  corners,  announcement boards and newspapers,   in
which university graduates offered low cost private lessons to school children. 
Greeks’ low tax morality and their discontent with the state were structured over the course
of the country’s modern history.  These attitudes were enhanced by foreign economic supervision
and imposed austerity, policies which were perceived on the ground as “deathpolitics” for the lower
middle working classes,  the  mikromesaioi,  which aimed to dispossess them of their  means and
transform them into neoliberal subjects.  For instance,  a special  property tax was the first  to be
introduced, since a large portion of the lower middle classes are homeowners. Property tax was
widely referenced to as haratsi, a special tax that Christians in the Ottoman era had to pay to the
Sultan in order to freely exercise their religion.  This grassroots identification of property tax that
correlated it  with the Ottoman occupation of Greece exposes how the general public perceived
101 He was shot dead by a police officer on December 6th, 2008 when he was 15 years old. His death sparked nation-
wide revolts and even in small cities, violent protests and great unrest followed. See: https://thepressproject.gr/the-
murder-of-alexandros-grigoropoulos/ (Last accessed 16/02/2020).
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austerity measures as a new form of occupation through economic tribute. Since 2010, mainstream
political parties have tried to exploit widespread indignation at the special property tax, promising
that they would cancel or reduce it to attract voters. Yet, even if they wanted to, they could not, as
through it, the state extracted significant amounts of money that were vital in the government’s
budget. In this context, grassroots economic practices that were not taxed by the extractive regime
of austerity and public administration were reconceptualized as intentional forms of resistance. 
When I asked my interlocutors to elaborate on their informal activities, all used roughly the
same arguments, although none of them used the mainstream term ‘informal’, but referred instead
to the black market or black or untaxed money, in some cases,  they also used the urban slang
expression  sti zoula which means to do something covertly. Resistance, subsistence and survival
were terms used across responses when I asked people to explain the reasons for which they acted
informally. Quite a few talked about the injustice of a system which punishes petty informality and
criminalizes tax evasion while high level corruption scandals go unpunished, as does larger scale
tax evasion by large companies. As a 45 year old tavern owner told me: “if you owe a thousand
euros to the taxation agency [eforia] you go to jail. If you owe a million, you go to Switzerland.”
the tax haven for the rich. In another case, a 54 year old formerly multi-employed man who, in
parallel with his formal job, maintained an informal construction business at the weekends, said: “I
am glad that I did not declare that income. I take pride in not having done so, especially nowadays
since all those thefts of public money have been revealed. You want a solution to the crisis? Bring
the stolen money back, but instead, they make us feel guilty on top all that, that we [Greeks who
evaded tax] are guilty for this crisis.” 
Informal economic activities which were exclusive to Chalkida included fishing. The locals
often owned boats and had amateur fishing licenses, and they had developed fishing as a hobby.
Informal  commercial  activity  by  amateur  fishermen  intensifies  in  times  of  crisis  because  fish
provide a substantial source of income. I encountered many people, from diverse socio-economic
backgrounds,  who sold their catch. These included: a 50 year-old laid off factory worker whose
only source of income, after he was fired, was his fishing and diving hobby; a 35 year-old insurance
broker; an unemployed 45 year-old man who had set up an informal business and hired, on a regular
basis, two other unemployed people and an employee at the municipality. For these and others,
informal fishing provided a significant source of income and in some cases, constituted their only
income resource.  Fishing could yield significant amounts of money as fresh fish is an expensive
product that is part of  the weekly culinary habits of many households.  At the same time, it offered
the best quality/price ratio available. 
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Petty  agricultural  production,  on  the  contrary,  could  not  provide  adequate  income  and
remained mostly a self-subsistence practice. Two dynamic products, olive oil and wine, however,
were potential sources of extra income. Olive oil is an essential element, in a Braudelian sense, of
every Greek and Mediterranean household. Many households owned small and medium-sized olive
groves which at the very least could meet a household’s subsistence needs, and which might also
extend  further  to  cover  the  kinship  network’s  needs.  Olive  oil  production  often  takes  place  in
inherited  olive  groves  that  are  usually  owned and managed by the  older  generation,  who then
distributes the family’s production amongst the households of younger kin.
Wine was also a dynamic product in high demand. Small scale wine producers channeled
most of their production, through their networks of friends and acquaintances, to local taverns. They
maintained a dual status in terms of their income. They formally sold some of their produce, doing
so in order to justify their economic status and appear financially coherent to the tax authorities. As
they elaborated, small scale olive oil and wine producers could not make a profit if they operated
solely in the formal sector. “The new taxation regime on agricultural firms favors only large-scale
production ... Small and medium-sized production units have been made unsustainable because of
overtaxation. If I declared everything [income], it would not be worth the effort for someone to do
what I am doing here.” So said Sotiris (49), a laid off factory worker who found an outlet through
the agricultural property he had inherited, on which he had created a small wine production unit. He
had broken down the numbers and explained that he had to prepay the following year’s income
taxes based on the income he had declared the previous year, along with an additional 20 percent of
his profit. “I give some of my wine to a big winery in the area that absorbs local production. In
order to survive you need to become big,  or to operate as I do,  tsoukou tsoukou (little by little)
through friends and acquaintances.”  
The neoliberal doctrine of maximization had been established in the agricultural sector and
large investments had started gradually to absorb smaller producers and retailers. Sotiris explained
that  the  recent  prohibition  of  home-made  raki and  tsipouro had  been  promoted  by  large
multinational firms who had entered the economic field of spirit production and had insisted on
banning home based distilleries and the non-standardized informal products that circulated both
within  and  outside  of  formal  markets.  The  government’s  discourse  centered  on  public  health
concerns,  as well  as on the loss of tax income from products which were widely consumed in
Greece without paying taxes. Along the same lines, olive oil could only be sold in a standardized
form, and since 2016, taverns were obliged to use only standardized oil for their customers. Taverns
are  the  main  recipients  of  informal  food  production  and  have  the  capacity  to  formalize  it.  In
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numerous instances, the tavern owner was also a producer or had kin who were producers. Through
taverns, homegrown food was processed. For instance, I found one supplier of lamb chops in a
small town near Chalkida called Gymno. It was a family owned butcher that produced meat too,
while next to it the family operated a small tavern. Gymno was one of the main food production
sites around Chalkida, and many of its citizens were multi-employed, thus engaged in a high degree
of  informality.  Restructurings  in  agricultural  taxation  produced  greater  confusion  among  petty
agricultural producers. Even tax consultants identified as complex the bureaucratization of olive oil
production and they pointed to the elevated direct and indirect taxation of the different stages of
production, from the field to the factory. Moreover, the increased taxation of agricultural income
prompted many small producers to declare that the total amount of their production was intended
for self-subsistence, thereby fueling the country’s informal olive oil market. 
Katerina (Household 3) informed me that local, bulk olive oil production was exported to
Italy where it was standardized and then sold on European markets as Italian. She further elaborated
on the restructuring of agricultural production that had started in the 1980s in order to meet EEC
standards, and talked of how national agriculture was being controlled through European funding.
Sotiris told me about the EU directives which prohibited new vineyard plantations and enforced the
uprooting of unlicensed vineyards. Since the 1980s, the ECC gave incentives to uproot existing
vineyards in Greece. According to Katerina, these directives consisted of an orchestrated attempt to
control people by dispossessing them of their means of producing food. A similar point that was
raised in a group interview at the occupied cement factory. Food production was a basic survival
skill which people from rural backgrounds possessed. It was the strong rural-urban relationships
that people in Chalkida had maintained and the knowledge for producing their own food which, she
argued, proved that the Greek agricultural sector, which was formed by many small producers who
were not necessarily registered as farmers, provided the means for people to subsist and resist the
crisis and neoliberal and austerity policies. Petty producers within the agricultural sector had always
been resilient to power and could effectively resist reforms in the sector.  
Small scale food production often supplies a small income to households. For instance, an
employee at Chalkida’s municipality who owned a few orange trees, managed to cover his annual
phone bills by selling the oranges. Many households with a surplus of olive oil, sold it informally,
either through their social networks or to formal oil refineries. Giorgos (25), unemployed, and his
uncle Nikos (50), an accountant, had set up an informal business and used their contacts in Athens
to sell their olive oil. As soon as their informal venture was established, they started buying and
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There is a correlation between informal economic activities and social solidarity. During the crisis,
ruptures  in  the  redistribution  model  and  in  institutionalized  forms  of  organic  solidarity  were
substituted by informal means and expressions of solidarity. The rolling back and rolling out of the
state  reconfigured  the  social  contact,  reframing  the  pre-crisis  terms  under  which  Greeks  had
consented to be dominated. The state’s inability to provide made people turn to their close kin in
order to cover their needs, and thus an emergent mechanicalization of solidarity occurred through
social and kinship networks, which circulated both formal and informal resources. 
As I showed in the first two chapters, capitalist development and the modernization of the
Greek economy occurred late. The transition to capitalism relied on informal, extralegal and often
illegal means and initiatives and the formalization of those developments occurred afterwards, as a
fait accompli. Historical evidence suggests that capitalism grows faster in unregulated environments
thereby contradicting traditional approaches to the informal economy that view it as an index of the
lack of capitalist progress. 
 It  was  not  only  big  capital  that  reshaped  the  country’s  landscape.  Small,  private
illegal/informal and semi-formal construction schemes that enabled people to access basic needs
such as housing, were also prevalent ways of making a living. Indeed, from the 1950s until the
outbreak of  the economic  crisis  in  2009,  the  housing construction  industry was the economy’s
driving force. Until this day, many illegally constructed buildings exist all over Greece, for which
reason entire neighborhoods and settlements lack basic infrastructure such as streets, pavements,
drainage and so on. At the same time, the state cannot intervene as these settlements do not appear
in official records and documents, hence officially, they do not exist.  This incoherent reality, in
terms of organization, makes it difficult for the state to reach into every area and as a result, self-
regulated cores arise. In these, people need to collaborate and negotiate in person without having
those  relationships  mediated  by  the  state  and  its  authorities.  These  informally  produced  urban
spaces reproduce the rural habitus of their residents, thus village communities are recreated in the
city. Uncontrolled social spaces where the state cannot reach favor the development of institutions
of mutual aid. These village communities were indeed recreated and transformed into neighborhood
communities in urban centers (Hirschon, 1979; Panourgia, 1995). 
227
Urban spaces were produced by private initiatives since the state was unable to implement a
housing policy to accommodate the radical increase in the population of cities such as Chalkida.
This situation became established as a norm and was intensified during the economic boom years as
peoples’ incomes increased (Allen et al, 2004).  The antiparochi phenomenon is a clear example of
both the state’s inability to fulfill people’s housing needs and of the exclusion of the lower working
classes  from credit. The unregulated and chaotic “antiparochization” of urban lands created spaces
in which the state had no presence at all, not even in terms of basic infrastructure to guarantee
minimum standards of urban life such as the neighborhood which I stayed during fieldwork.  People
therefore developed an economic habitus and learned to disregard formal regulations and structures.
This played a significant role in the formation of the social contract and the emergence of the Greek
middle classes (Mouzelis, 1978). Thus, both citizenship and socio-economic habitus were shaped
by widespread informal activity, and this occurred at all levels of analysis. 
Historically, informality has been deeply embedded in Greek society and in the way in which
people understand the economy of everyday life. As Foucault has argued, “people know what they
do, they know frequently why they do what they do; but what they do not know is what they do
does” (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983: 187). This holds true for many every day, habitual economic
practices that can be classified under the broad term of informality. In times of crisis, however,
informal economic practices and structures acquire new grassroots meanings and definitions, as the
social and economic reproduction of an increasing number of people relies on informal economic
arrangements. Very often, people conceptualize their informal economic arrangements as acts of
subsistence and resistance, with the very fact of surviving the crisis regarded as a form of resistance
(Scott, 1990, 1985, 1977). During the crisis, informality has become a primary income generating
activity for many, for others, it allows them to cover their basic needs and enables them to “survive”
and reproduce in the decaying formal economic environment.
Market structures are vital for any social organization and ruptures in economic organization
produce socio-cultural  shocks.  In the case of Chalkida,  the rural  habitus  of its  citizens and the
proximity  to  food  production  sites,  allowed  social  cohesion  to  be  sustained  through  people’s
informal arrangements. Furthermore, due to the lack of economic resources, many incidents occur
where formally employed actors at the public services, such as school teachers, municipal officers
and doctors act on their own good will and bypass formalities to make things happen so as children
can have toilet paper and drawing materials, patients can be able to receive proper treatment and
citizens can resolve their issues.  These aforementioned practices are often illegal, and these people
could  get  prosecuted  for  not  adhering  to  formal  protocols.   In  this  sense,  informality  was  a
228
countervailing force to the austerity which had taken over formal structures. Anti-austerity could
only be exercised through informal means which enabled people to keep enjoying life, to have fun
and socialize against the austerity regime that, as some of my interlocutors put it, “wants us to stay
inside”  or  “makes  us  depressed  and  isolated.”  Hence,  in  the  neoliberal  context,   grassroots
informality  can be a  force of  disalienation,  that   that  counterbalances  the  social  and economic
isolation that the austerity crisis has brought. Informal economic practices sustain the social life in
Chalkida  and  support  many  families  and  individuals  in  getting  access  to  various  resources
(occasional employment, food, access to health structures, extra income). Grassroots informality is
also regarded as a “survival tactic”. However, the way in which people used “survival” in their
discourses should not be confused with mere positivistic notions of covering one’s basic biological
needs. People used “survival” with social connotations in order to express various ideas: that they
were able  to  meet  with their  social  obligations,  to participate  in  social  life,  to  have social  and
economic relationships, to be   active members of society and to have the capacity to enjoy life.  
The Greek social contract is thus constituted by grassroots informality which enjoys nation-
wide tolerance and acceptance. In this sense, informality did not undermine the development of
organic  solidarity,  on the  contrary,  informal  economic  activities  were  embedded in the  organic
solidarity project of modernization and progress. Organic solidarity was formed by the common
struggles and mutual aspirations of the rising middle classes in Greece who made use of informal
means in their effort to improve their socio-economic status. Almost everyone could sympathize
with  petty  informal  activities  that  transgressed  the  formal  economic  framework  and  evaded
taxation, while the widespread corruption of the Greek public sector has had a formative role in
capitalist progress.  In the current moment, in which the economy’s formal sector has collapsed,
organic solidarity is practiced, imagined and materialized at the grassroots level through informal
means and ways. 
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Chapter 6
Everyday Life in Crisis – Grassroots
Experiences and Analyses of Crisis and
Austerity in Chalkida
Introduction
Since the beginning of the so-called financial crisis in 2008, mainstream economists, politicians,
journalists and other “experts” from across Europe have employed organic and corporatist images
of southern Europe in crisis. Three core ideas shape their discourse. First, the crisis is a (class-blind)
state of disruption that affects the entire social body. Second, national entities share responsibility
for producing the economic meltdown through their collective bad southern behavior (the product
of  corruption,  conspicuous  consumption  and  the  lack  of  an  ethos of  hard  work).  Finally,  the
discourse lauds austerity as the “cure” for crisis that will promote regeneration of the social body
(Hadjimichalis,  2017;  Mylonas,  2014;  Narotzky,  2012;  Raudon  and  Shore,  2018).  I  use  the
Gramscian concept  of “common sense” to understand differences and tensions within subaltern
models  of  crisis  as  part  of  a  fragmented  consciousness  that  both  reproduces  and  challenges
hegemonic models. On the one hand, this contradictory conception of the world reflects tensions
between material experience (practical activity) and hegemonic ideology (explicit language); on the
other,  it  reworks the cumulative sedimentation of past  tensions  and struggles  in  relation to  the
present conjuncture (Gramsci, 1977, 1997, 2010; Crehan, 2011; Hall and Massey, 2010; Narotzky
and Smith, 2010; Roseberry, 1989, 1994). Methodologically, this focus on common sense points
towards the shared everyday experiences and discourses of dispossessed women and men, despite
differences in their voting choices or formal political positionings. 
The financial crisis of global capital that begun in US, in 2007, produced one of capitalism’s
greatest structural shocks. The crisis scaled down and transformed as it gradually started to affect
nations and local spaces, and austerity diffused and produced multiple crises at the grassroots level
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of social  reproduction  and daily  life.  In  this  chapter  I  present  how crisis  unfolded in  people’s
everyday lives and I examine understandings and explanations of it. People’s narratives entangled
several scales of analysis. In this way, they bring to the fore the articulation of local practices with
national and international power structures and form an extended case method (Burawoy, 2000).
Firstly, I examine how people apprehended the crisis and realized that there was a crisis. Next, I
look at  how people use historical  evidence  to  construct  an explanation,  what  one  might  call  a
grassroots  analysis  of  what  crisis  is  and what  crisis  does.  In  addition,  I  assess  how the  recent
economic crisis has produced multiple social,  cultural and ideological crises in the social body.
There has been a scalar crisis of meaning between the institutional approach to the phenomenon and
the formulation of austerity policies, and grassroots judgments. I focus on the events before and
after the Greek referendum in 2015, and then I examine the grassroots interpretations of crisis and
austerity as neocolonialism. 
In my analysis, one of my points of departure are the various socio-economic indices that
prompted  people  to  identify  crisis  in  their  everyday  life.  These  included  concrete  economic
downturns and social observations and signs which people interpreted using sociological, political
and financial arguments. At times, their arguments tended to reproduce dominant discourses around
crisis  and  the  economy.  At  others,  they  reworked  those  discourses  and  challenged  dominant
approaches to the economy by using a language of contention (Roseberry, 1994) that brought to the
fore the fact that crisis has been favorable to foreign interests that came to control the country and
its wealth through neocolonial methods. I give theoretical value to grassroots analyses, explanations
and judgments regarding what crisis is and what it does. My aim is to grasp the structures of feeling
(Williams 1977) of the crisis experience and to explain how people reform their ideological stances,
political interests and economic practices. Koselleck’s (2006) analysis of the concept of crisis in the
modern world shows that crisis has been endemic to modern development, and that it was through
crisis  that  capitalism  prevailed  to  become  the  global  economic  paradigm  for  socio-economic
organization.
 In addition to its economic model of social organization, capitalism advances a set of moral
values.  Capitalist  production  is  not  oriented  towards  covering  human  needs,  but  rather  to  the
exploitation of those needs, which it strives to multiply in its endless pursuit of profit. As Marx and
Engels elaborate, writing on capitalist overproduction crises: “How does the bourgeoisie overcome
these crises? On the one hand, by enforced destruction of mass productive forces; on the other, by
the conquest of new markets and by a more thorough exploitation of old ones. But how then does it
do this? By paving the way for ever more extensive and devastating crises and by diminishing the
means whereby crises are prevented” (Marx & Engels, 1978: 478). In this chapter, I investigate the
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ambivalent meanings and explanations of crisis held by ordinary working, middle-class people. On
the one hand, I examine the uneasy fit between these and “expert” discourses, paying attention to
how they are grounded in gendered and generationally differentiated lived experiences. On the other
hand,  I  highlight  their  ties  to  particular  historical  topographies  (Katz,  2001)  and  memories  of
domination. 
I  provide an alternative grassroots approach to  current  analyses of crisis  which enriches
existing ethnographic knowledge of how people adapt, counteract, think of and understand crisis in
their real life, and how new metaphors are generated (Turner, 1967) under the condition of “being
in” and “living with” crisis. What becomes evident is that solutions to the crisis have been worse
than the problem itself. Austerity has created more crises through its implementation (Katz, 2001;
Peck & Tickel, 2002), since it violently and unilaterally reduced people’s income, which produced
several crises in social  reproduction.  Focusing on grassroots reasoning and analyses of crisis,  I
explore discourses of what went wrong, who and what were to blame, discourses that emerge  when
people speak about the economic crisis and the subsequent austerity. 
In people’s conceptualizations of the crisis, I observed an interesting reversal of dominant
discourses. In mainstream economic theory,  austerity comes after the crisis and is  considered a
treatment for it,  while in my interlocutors’ discourses, crisis is the outcome of austerity, not the
other way around. Moreover, the foreign supervision which was imposed on Greece in 2010 with
the first MoU between the Greek government and the country’s creditors, unmasked crypto-colonial
relationships. For many, the Greek debt crisis and imposed austerity were understood as a new form
of neocolonial  domination. After the events surrounding the Greek referendum in July 2015, in
which the anti-austerity government of Syriza and Anel was forced into continuing austerity, it was
obvious to people that Greece was a powerless debt colony, a protectorate of its creditors (see
Chapter 2). Thus the recent crisis appears to many as a continuation of foreign intervention and the
hegemonic domination of Greece.  In grassroots conceptualizations and theories about the crisis
phenomenon, people often, revisited history and traced the root causes of the present economic
crisis to the past, to specific moments in modern Greek history that led the country to its present
position.  Moreover,  the  economic  crisis  was  understood  as  a  national  catastrophe,  and  was
represented as a hardship that Greeks, who found themselves confronted with yet another crisis, had
to endure.  “Our parents and grandparents endured wars and famines,  and now it  is our turn to
suffer” said Giannis  (56)  who understood hardships  and sacrifice as something that  pertains  to
Greek history and culture.
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6.1 Grassroots Experiences and Understandings of Crisis in Chalkida
The first signs of crisis that people noticed were the gradual reduction of their incomes. Therefore,
most people started to grasp what crisis does through their income. At the grassroots level, crisis
was understood and materialized as a crisis in social reproduction. Until 2011, most people had
been able to get by. However, after 2012, the economic downturn escalated and the first evidence of
ruptures in social reproduction appeared. As Dina (57), a shop owner, explained, she had realized
that  there  was  a  crisis  as  soon  as  she  could  no  longer  meet  her  monthly  obligations  (social
insurance, rent, bills and payments), circa 2012. A civil servant, Vangelis (54), who was a civil
engineer, told me that for him, the crisis became an issue in 2011 when, after cuts to his salary, he
started to struggle with his mortgage payments. He explained that 2012 was one of the darkest years
of his life, filled with anxiety and impotence at the fact that there was nothing he could do to change
the difficult economic situation he had been put in, in which he risked getting his house foreclosed. 
Takis (Household 8), identified crisis by the multiple closures of factories. As he specified,
he realized the extent of the economic depression and that “the worst has yet to come” as soon as he
heard rumors about the imminent closure of the cement factory in 2011. Then he observed how
people did not have money to spend on a day-to-day basis and for that reason did their shopping in
small, neighborhood shops that accepted informal credit. These were the so called  tefteri, named
after the ledger in which the mpakalika (general stores) kept tally of their customers’ debts, a very
popular cultural  and economic practice of the past which had reemerged to balance the lack of
money flow and enable the market to function. Takis understood the depth of the crisis through his
social circle, when people close to him were challenged by the crisis and could not maintain their
livelihood arrangements, both in Chalkida and elsewhere in Greece. For example, this was the case
with his wife’s sister (kouniada) who had no money to send to her son who was studying in Athens. 
The factories around Chalkida, especially the cement factory which had been a landmark of
Chalkida’s  economy,  were  used  by  many  as  an  index  for  describing  the  extent  of  the  recent
economic crisis. The closure of the cement factory, as I showed in Chapter 1, signified both a major
crisis in Chalkida’s local economy and society, and a nationwide crisis in the construction sector.
Chalkidians were accustomed to small scale crises that industrial restructurings (Narotzky, 2016a)
had  caused  in  the  past,  and  they  quickly  interpreted  the  recent  crisis  as  an  escalation  of
deindustrialization. For those directly affected by factory closures, crisis meant a rupture in their
livelihood  arrangements.  At  the  larger  scale  it  was  not  a  rupture  but  a  continuation  of  de-
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industrialization,  a  process  that  had  begun  in  the  1980s.  The  factories  around  Chalkida  had a
symbolic meaning for the city’s residents as they materialized its history and character. Given that
local livelihoods and intergenerational projects depended on them, they were thus the emblem of its
economic  prosperity.  According  to  Dina  (Household  4),  the  factory  closures  created  a  deep
economic crisis in Chalkida and its market since money, in the form of industrial wages, stopped
flowing into the local economy. This had a dual nature, on the one hand, the decline in industrial
jobs which used to bring money into Chalkida’s economy, and on the other, the cuts in public
expenditure (civil servant’s wages, pensions, service provision) that obliged people to adopt a new
approach to their economies. The factory closures and the massive losses in industrial positions
quickly became a matter of concern for local society. The loss of industrial sector jobs and the surge
in unemployment were the first indicators of what was about to happen. Crisis and the austerity that
followed affected the finances of many working people and thereafter, their social reproduction
practices were affected. Once austerity measures took hold of people’s financial arrangements, the
economic crisis expanded in society and was thus culturally appropriated.  Economic as well as
social activities were affected as shrinking household incomes produced ripple effects in the local
economy. 
Many of the unemployed became socially isolated and depressed. Widespread anger, despair
and depression were other indicators with which people identified the profound effect that crisis has
had on the social body. Manolis (Household 6) explained that economic scarcity and the social
isolation  it  produces  had  been  counterbalanced  during  the  first  years  of  the  crisis  by  social
gatherings in homes. He said: “We held many dinners and were invited to other peoples’ houses
instead of going out. Nowadays [in 2016] all these dinners [trapezomata] have stopped, people
cannot afford it anymore.” Quite a few of my informants noted that they had seen taverns and cafes
that used to be full, empty even on Friday or Saturday nights. “People have no money to spend and
stay at home,” several tavern and cafe owners explained. There were ruptures in sociality among
friends, and those who could not afford to go out for dinner were ashamed of not having money and
stayed in. Dimitra (32) told me that she had lost several of her social contacts and that in her close
circle  of  friends,  they  pooled  their  resources  when  they  went  out  so  that  they  could  include
members who lacked the financial resources. The image of empty taverns was a strong indicator of
how crisis,  which affected income resources,  produces ruptures in the grassroots institutions  of
sociality such as the tavern. In another example, once austerity had set in, Katerina (Household 3)
and her cousin Panayiota (Household 2), who lived next to each other, stopped exchanging gifts at
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Christmas. Further, austerity also caused crisis in intimate social relationships and alienated people
further by enclosing solidarity within the nuclear family and first-degree relatives (Chapter 4).   
Broken  hopes,  dreams  and  expectations  (Narotzky  & Besnier,  2014)  quickly  become  a
shared reality among the dispossessed masses and framed crisis experiences as a collective form of
suffering. Seeing their incomes fall and being unable to meet their monthly obligations, not being
able to pay their bank loans, being laid off and being unable to find a job, feeling stagnant and
impotent, these were common experiences that a wide cross-section of people lived through at the
same time. All the above framed the structures of feeling (Williams, 1977) of a society that was
undergoing one of its biggest crises of the preceding 50 years. According to the Greek Statistics
Agency (Elstat)’s  annual  birth  and death  rate  figures,  the population  had shrunk by more than
180.000 people between 2010 and 2018.103 This was the first time that Greece has had a population
decrease  since  WWII.  Because  of  the  nature  of  his  business  and  the  drop  in  clients,  Manolis
(Household 6) was quick to realize that there was a decrease in marriages as well as the cultural
shifts that the crisis has created in the traditional celebration of it. He told me: “Before the crisis,
when people married, they celebrated it more. Nowadays, people are tight with what they will spend
for the wedding banquet and they seem to be more timid and restrained at the celebration. The way
people organize their weddings has changed, it is not like before, not even the celebration is the
same, it has lost something.”
 The recent iteration of crisis may not be as lethal and catastrophic as other episodes in
modern Greek history such as the Asia Minor catastrophe, or the great famine and the civil war, yet
it affected fundamental structures and challenged the past five decades’ socio-economic habitus of
prosperity and continual economic growth. The break in economic growth and the “austerization”
of life prompted an existential crisis that signaled a reversal of progress, a retrograde movement.
Greeks felt that they were going backwards in time instead of moving forward and several of my
interlocutors said that austerity had canceled the Metapolitefsi era’s social, political and economic
progress. “I learn about all those labor reforms, and people who speak openly about how well things
were during the Junta and I feel like we’ve gone back to the 1970s”104 said Sofia (59), a high school
teacher. 
103 https://www.statistics.gr/en/statistics/pop   check birth and death demographic indices  (Last accessed 12/02/2020). 
104 A grassroots discourse that praised Papadopoulos’ totalitarian regime was present even before the crisis. “We need a
junta to get it straight” was a common expression used by ordinary people expressing their discontent towards the 
state and its democratic structures, and it is a narrative whose use has been growing. Golden Dawn expressed the 
views of this part of the Greek population. The party took advantage of the political system’s crisis and grew to 
become the third largest party in the Greek parliament in the 2012 and 2015 elections. 
235
Crisis has altered perceptions of time at the personal level too. Aliki (49), who was forced to
move back to her father’s house when she lost her job at the cement factory, felt like she was being
taken back to where she had started. Similarly, people who lost their businesses and assets because
of the crisis faced a cold reboot of their livelihood arrangements as they were pushed back to where
they  began  as  they  started  losing  their  livelihood  achievements  and  investments  which  were
devalued.  For  instance,  houses  lost  nearly  half  of  their  pre-crisis  commercial  value.  Someone
buying a house in 2013 would have paid nearly one third of the 2008 price. This is a generational
viewpoint of crisis, as younger generations who had not yet established their livelihoods, did not
lose anything tangible with the present crisis. For younger people, the crisis was not existential but
rather the natural outcome of where things had been headed. Dimitris (27) refused to accept that
everyone experienced the crisis in the same way.  Surprisingly, he believed that this was not for
class reasons, but for cultural and ideological ones. According to him, those who were integrated
into the  socio-economic  system were the ones  who suffered,  those who “felt  that  they existed
because they consumed and filled their  hollow existence with things they bought to show off.”
Christos (31) who worked at his mother’s clothes alterations shop had seen their business grow
substantially during the crisis years. He recalled an incident in which a customer of his, a man in his
30s, came in and asked if Christos could switch the labels of his new inexpensive coat with the
high-end label of his old branded coat that was worn out. Furthermore, Christos felt the generational
injustice of crisis in terms of failed consumption and the inability to lead a prosperous life.   
Older generations envisioned a dark and uncertain future as the outcome of the current crisis.
This was unlike in the past when, despite people’s everyday struggles and resource unavailability,
there was hope. Today, hopes for a future that would be better than the present had disappeared. “I
realized the extent of the crisis when I understood that my children would live with less than my
generation did,” said Anastasia (49), an employee at the Central bank of Greece. Regardless of their
socio-economic background, people faced significant ruptures in their social reproduction patterns
and had to proceed with livelihood restructurings and to reform their plans for the future. It took
people quite a few years to adjust to austerity’s reality and to start thinking about the future. The
political change brought about in 2015 with Syriza’s win at the elections showed that people need
hope105 and  a  vision  for  the  future  (Narotzky  &  Besnier,  2014).  In  this  sense,  crisis  can  be
conceptualized as the moment when something breaks, as a rupture or a point of no return. Just as
an earthquake shakes the foundations of a building,  so the crisis has shaken the foundations of
Greek  society.  However,  in  this  case,  irreversibility  is  produced  afterwards,  when  people
105 Syriza’s main slogan was “Syriza - I elpida erhetai” (Syriza - Hope is on the way).
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acknowledge the damages and consider their options. During the first five years of the crisis, the
process of collapse unfurled as austerity induced greater shocks in the national economy. Welfare
and  provisioning  structures  collapsed,  incomes  shrank  and  society  fell  into  a  deep  depression
( Apostolidou, 2018; Simou & Koutsogeorgou, 2014). By 2014, the most radical restructurings had
taken effect and people had started to accept the reality of living with “crisis” and to expect the
worst. Stavros (55), a solar boiler shop owner, described how his stance towards the realities that
crisis brought had evolved: 
At first I was hoping that the crisis would not last for long, you know, in our sector
[self-employed  retail  business]  we  have  had  many  ups  and  downs,  we  are
accustomed to uncertainty. So I hoped it would pass, then I got indebted to my
social insurance fund, then to the taxation agency (eforia) and then I couldn’t pay
my suppliers and ended up in Teiresias106 (the credit score agency) after failing to
cover a bank check. I didn’t know, maybe I should have closed my shop, but what
to do afterwards? So I  kept going hoping that things would change soon. And
guess what... they didn’t. Many of my competitors closed their shops, there was no
construction. I could not imagine what else I could do if I closed my shop. I ended
up owing more than 12,000 euros to my insurance fund and nearly 8000 to the
taxation agency. So yes, in 2015 I realized that I should have closed my shop two
years back. 
It  took Stavros almost 5 years to realize that there was no turning back and to accept that the
venture that he had built and kept running for the past 30 years was broken beyond repair. 
The crisis had a different impact on the self-employed than on waged workers, and small
business owners adopted a stance of waiting for the storm to pass. There was nothing they could do
to change the situation and they chose an attitude of waiting for the storm to pass (Roitman, 2013).
Nikos (53), a small shop owner selling electric appliances, said: 
People stopped buying and the market has been totally stagnated.  I asked around
other shop owners and they told me the same. From February 2012 until the summer,
I did not sell anything. In 2013, I had managed to stay afloat and I was thinking that I
106 Teiresias is an interbank company that keeps a database on the credibility of traders and consumers. People and 
companies who have failed to repay a debt are added to its database.
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had eaten the whole donkey and now only the tail remained,107 that the worst was
over, so I kept hoping that people would soon have money to spend, but nowadays
most people search online for the cheapest price and order things from Athens. This
is what crisis does: small shops are swallowed up by large firms. Month after month,
four years have passed with me worrying about the day to day, waiting for a change,
and now I am indebted to my insurance fund.108 The only thing I can do right now is
to worry (laughs).  
Theofilos (62) of Household 2, who had had a taxi license,  elaborated that:  “I  started at  7 am
everyday and came back at 7 pm and nothing. I earned tiny sums. Well this is crisis. Work is not in
your hands anymore.” Unlike others, Theofilos was quick to understand how bad the situation was
and stopped his business’ activities before getting indebted to his social insurance fund. For him
crisis not only meant dispossession of his income, but also a realization that he could not reenter the
job market to earn an income and he thus chose to wait for his retirement (Giannitsis & Zografakis,
2015). 
Household 2 is a case that represents the structures of resilience and shows how austerity,
rather than crisis, is embodied in socio-economic life. Interestingly, the couple sacrificed a great
part of their savings and resources to provide for their children and help them as they started out in
life. “Parents provide, we give to our children whatever we can,” said Theofilos, who presented this
as an intergenerational moral obligation. “What I’ve achieved in my life I owe to my parents, the
elders were the ones who laid the country’s foundations” he said in order to stress his generation’s
failure in the face of the country’s devastation by the crisis. He had expected his son to stay in
Greece and work as a doctor in Chalkida, in order to contribute to the common good through his
107 This is a Greek idiom/proverb which is used to describe that one should not give up as the worst have already 
passed, yet there is a little more to be done. 
108 According to the state’s records, in 2009, small and medium-sized enterprises’ accumulated debt to social insurance
funds was 16 billion euros; in 2018, the amount rose to 35 billion euros (KEAO 2019). Moreover, in 2018, 
accumulated debt to the taxation agency reached 101 billion euros. 3.6 million Greeks owe 10,000 euros or less to 
the taxation agency (3.7 billion debt). 240,000 Greeks owe 10 to 100,000 euros (6.6 billion debt), and 41,000 
people owe more than 100.000 euros which totals 91 billion of debt (Source: 
https://www.kathimerini.gr/986502/article/oikonomia/ellhnikh-oikonomia/aade-36-ekat-ellhnes-xrwstoyn-sthn-
eforia-ews-10000-eyrw ). (Last accessed 14/01/2020). However, these figures are inflated because there are many 
problems in the system. An accountant explained to me that many businessmen who had stopped their activities 
could not formally un-register from the system since in order to do so they would have to pay VAT on their unsold 
merchandise which in many cases amounted to a very large sum of money. Moreover, outstanding social insurance 
and taxation debts are charged high interest rates.  
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profession, and yet the crisis drove his son abroad in ksenitia109 (foreign land). Economic emigration
was another powerful proof of the depth of the crisis, and of the fact that the country could no
longer accommodate younger generations who fled en masse. 
Brain drain became a major issue which intensified with the imposition of austerity, and
more than half a million people left Greece from 2010 to 2016 (Lazaretou, 2016). Greece had the
highest unemployment rate amongst OECD countries in 2010; young university graduates could not
find jobs and one out of five graduates aged between 25 and 29 were unemployed (Pellicia, 2013;
Lambrianidis, 2013; Livanos, 2010). One out of every two people below 29 were unemployed even
before the outbreak of the crisis and they came to realize the extent of the economic crisis through
their parents. Under current conditions, it is difficult for younger people to prosper and sustain a
household of their own, and this dependence has been enhanced by crisis. Unlike older generations
who were rooted and therefore immobile – this is especially true of homeowners and families -
younger  people  were  more  eager  to  migrate  and  to  try  to  build  a  livelihood  abroad.  “Our
grandfathers  [referring to  the generation]  migrated to  Germany to work in  the factories  and in
taverns as unskilled workers. Back in the 1960s, those with university degrees stayed here and the
unskilled laborers left. This time the opposite is happening, university graduates like me are leaving
the country, and I’m not sure if they will ever return,” said Michalis, a 36 year old archaeologist
who worked in a classics department at a German university. Younger people’s life trajectories had
always followed similar paths, even before the start of the economic crisis which had accelerated
ongoing processes and forced many more to migrate. 
Precarization and uncertainty were  other markers that many of my interlocutors said made
them realize that there was a crisis. “We don’t know what tomorrow will bring” said Stella (43), a
self-employed civil engineer who had stopped her professional activity. Anestis (79) expressed the
idea that the worst might be still to come and Manolis said that: “the way things are headed, it is
definitely going to get worse and worse.” Employed people, including civil servants, said that they
had started to fear losing their jobs. Older civil servants who were close to retirement were usually
those who had entered public service in the 1980s and 1990s, had fewer skills and qualifications
than their younger colleagues and were afraid of being made redundant by austerity. 110  Crisis was
109 A culturally and emotionally charged Greek word that cannot be translated, only described, in English. It is used for
instance when someone is forced to leave the country driven by difficulties and material constraints in Greece. The 
word often appears in many popular folk songs (see Kavouras, 1990). 
110 In 2013, more than 607,516 people were employed in the public sector. Nearly 40 percent did not have a university 
degree and nearly 60 percent of civil servants are computer illiterate. This study has fueled arguments against the 
public sector (see Chapter 5) during the restructuring of the state. Source: 
https://www.iefimerida.gr/news/126483/%CE%B1%CF%80%CF%8C%CF%86%CE%BF%CE%B9%CF%84%CE
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indeed a shared reality for everyone, yet it produced distinct realizations and challenges for different
age groups. 
Young people  framed their  understandings  of  crisis  in  relation  to  the  older  generation’s
standards. Many precariously employed people in their 20s and 30s realized that they would never
lead lives like those of their parents. They would not be financially independent and without fear of
unemployment,  the  two  conditions  which  enable  people  to  form  new  families.  Crisis  has
dispossessed younger generations of the means for integrating themselves into the adult society of
working people and for designing their own livelihoods. Sergios (27) said: “I realized recently that I
cannot start a family any time soon. I live with my girlfriend in a small flat and we barely make
ends meet.” Through our conversation, I learned that Sergios lived according to baby boomers’
traditional values and social standards and cultivated similar expectations about life. In cultural
terms, traditional patterns of livelihood made family formation the purpose life. The duty was thus
to continue the  geniá (generation) and the family name which was bound to patrilineality. Faced
with the impossibilities that the crisis presented him, Sergios understood the crisis-imposed limits to
social reproduction practices as signals of ruptures in the cultural system. 
Mariana (26) was semi-formally employed by an Athens based marketing firm, who hired
her on a needs basis. She was in a long-term relationship and was very anxious about the possibility
of becoming pregnant when I first met her. Indeed, an unexpected pregnancy can create a stressful
situation at the best of times; in the midst of the economic crisis, however, having a child was
nearly  out  of  the  question  for  young,  un(der)employed couples.  Unlike  earlier  generations,  for
whom pregnancy-related worries centered on the problem of pregnancy outside of marriage and the
social stigma it entailed in a deeply religious and conservative society, for the younger generation,
anxieties around pregnancy related mostly to financial and work issues. Georgia (36), an employee
at her father’s firm said: “I do not want to have a family right now, but I might want to sometime in
the future. Now I realize that the longer I postpone it, the harder it gets to do it. At my age, my
mother already had 3 children.” Georgia was not particularly hindered by the crisis as she got a
secure job in her family’s business when she finished university, as well as a house that her parents
had given her. She understood the crisis through others, through friends who had been unemployed






%CF%84%CE%B5-%CE%AD%CE%BD%CE%B1-email (Last accessed 15/01/2020).
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network who faced economic problems which permeated their personal and social lives. She said
that many of her friends who had been in long term relationships had broken up during the crisis,
and she correlated the wider social crisis with crises that people faced in their personal lives. She
had recently broken up too and said that the crisis had revealed the incompatibilities between her
and  her  ex’s  future  aspirations.  Her  ex-partner  had  become  depressed  and  obsessed,  Georgia
claimed, with money, or rather with the lack of a substantial and fulfilling labor income, and he
wanted to migrate in order to find a well-paid job, while she did not want to leave Chalkida. Tassos
(34), from Household 4, said that he realized that there was a crisis when he returned from London
in 2013 and found out that almost all of his friends were unemployed. “It was exactly the opposite
of London where everyone in my social  circle worked, here all my friends were unemployed.”
Dimitra  (32),  an  administrative  workfare  employee, elaborated  that  she  had  always  been  in  a
precarious position in terms of jobs and that she had always lived under these kinds of conditions.
The only difference was that she did not expect  things to  improve anymore.  “Haha [in irony],
crisis… I have always been in crisis, I am thirty two years old and I have never had a stable job.
And  it  seems  unlikely  that  I’ll  find  one  here  in  Greece.  I’ve  started  to  think  seriously  about
migrating to Germany where my brother lives. I don’t want to though, but what else can I do?” 
Austerity restructuring and neoliberal transformations of the economy targeted the market
bases of the economy which in turn affected its community base (Gudeman, 1990) and prompted
subtle shifts within the other spheres of social reproduction and stratification (Doob, 2012; Gowdy,
2006). The vast majority of the population is now very careful with its spending, counting every
single penny. People working at supermarkets and at local open-air markets identified the signs of
crisis in people’s consumption practices. In the open-air markets, street vendors noticed that people
bought less food than they used to while new customers came to the markets in search of cheaper
food.  I met a young couple, both of them supermarket employees, at the children’s playground
where I took my one-year old son to play and to also conduct participant observation. They had just
had a baby too and I approached them because seeing such young people with kids was a rare
occurrence. Maria (24) and Giorgos (26) had found jobs on the shop floor of a supermarket chain
that had opened branches in Chalkida in 2013. Since they were both employed and had a supportive
kinship network, their decision to have a child was made easily. Although both complained about
the low wages, Maria said that “at least we have a job” for which reason they should not complain.
Giorgos identified the crisis in the consumption practices of the people he observed every day. He
recalled an incident that had attracted his attention the day before, which for him captured the crisis
condition. He described a man in his 70s who had bought just a one onion and one carrot, “just to
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make food for the day.” From this he deduced that people had stopped thinking ahead about the
future and cared only about the present and how to cover the basics. A decline in consumption is a
decline in grassroots investments and, as Narotzky & Besnier (2014) show, the economy mediates
the way people think about time and envision and invest in their futures. In times of crisis, when
human economies (Hart, 2008; Hart, Laville & Cattani, 2010) are affected, people face not only
financial but also existential problems.  Economic life is inscribed within people’s social habitus,




6.2 Crisis, Critique and History
In this section I examine grassroots discourses around the causes for the unprecedented current
crisis  in Greece.  This ethnographic data provides valuable insights into how people relate with
power  and  how they  harness  grassroots  structures  of  resilience  and  resistance  to  it  -  such  as
informality  and social  solidarity.  In  order  to  make sense  of  the  present  crisis,  people  revisited
history, citing evidence that located crisis within a historical continuum of the Greek nation. History
is a good entry point (Knight, 2015) for assessing how crisis is experienced, and how collective
memories inform crisis’ structures of feeling. However, it is not only the memories of the great
famine or WWII, as Knight suggests, that shape the way people understand the resource scarcity
that austerity has imposed. My ethnographic data shows that people perceive a broader history of
hegemonic domination and foreign intervention in Greece’s domestic political and economic affairs.
My informants called up a range of recent historical processes and events in order to interpret the
current economic crisis. As I showed in Chapter 2, the German occupation of the country was a
node that produced meaning and critique, hence, following Koselleck’s (1988) understanding of
crisis. Several critical junctures in modern Greek history have been inscribed within the national
habitus and harnessed by nationalistic discourses. In popular history and in the history that children
learn at  school,  the national characteristics of the country’s historical crises are overstated.  The
recent iteration of crisis prompted people to revisit history and evaluate what had gone wrong. Once
again,  the  country’s  social  and economic  project  was  re-centered  and crisis  and  the  collective
suffering it caused were nationalized. For this reason, the history of the recent economic crisis will
serve as a point of reference for future generations.
For instance, in separate interviews, Katerina (65) from Household 3 and Maria (49) from
Household 6, referred to the hardships that past generations had endured and concluded that “we are
going  to  make  it  too.”  “We”  was  used  both  to  designate  the  personal  household  level  and  a
struggling society in general.  Maria said: “I  was thinking about what my parents went through
during their lifetimes. They fled their homes in Smyrna when they were kids, then WWII, and I
thought – we have endured worse than this crisis.” Among the older generation of pensioners, crisis
and austerity had brought back the ghosts of the past, of austerity and suffering. During their lives,
they had struggled to  overcome material  constraints  and improve both their  own and society’s
standard of living. Austerity resembled the old days of poverty which they had worked hard to put
behind  them.  Their  efforts  to  support  a  national  development  project  and  its  promised
improvements  in  livelihoods  had  been  defeated  with  the  imposition  of  austerity  and  foreign
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supervision which signaled a loss of sovereignty. They felt that their struggles had been in vain
given  that  the  country  was  falling  apart  and  the  crisis  had  spread  throughout  the  social  and
economic spheres of life. They said that the crisis had rendered useless the efforts and sacrifices
they had made in order to secure the social reproduction of future generations. Their sacrifices
“epesan sto keno” (fell into the vacuum/gap) that the crisis had created in terms of socio-economic
organization, and once again, young people were being forced to leave the country. 
  Vasilis (70) from Household 3 pointed to the increasing number of people who congregated
outside soup kitchens, and to the growing poverty and threat of hunger that people faced in Athens
where people scavenged through the garbage. As Knight (2015) notes, the Athens experience of
crisis has become the national experience even in places that were not overwhelmingly affected. To
a great  extent,  people  realized  that  there  was  a  crisis  and understood it  as  a  social,  collective
suffering. Through it, national solidarities emerged that recreated the idea of Greeks as belonging to
a  homogenous  social  body  with  national  characteristics,  whose  suffering  was  due  to  foreign
intervention (Hertzfeld, 2011). For older generations, austerity was a cultural category which had
shaped their lives and they identified it through the resource scarcity and the culture of austerity and
poverty that many had experienced in their childhoods (see Chapter 4, Households 1, 2, 3).
 People who already had had a personal experience of crisis used it as a point of comparison.
Many recalled their past experiences of poverty. “I have been through many hardships in my life,
and I have not told my children about them,” said Theofilos, who had migrated to Chalkida with his
underage cousin to work and study (see Chapter 4, Household 2). The generation that was born
before 1970 had embodied memories and experiences of austerity. Austerity was part of the cultural
practices of the past, when resources had been scarce and people had led much simpler lives than
today. Despite material poverty, many said that there had still been hope: “I had very little when I
was a kid, you probably can’t picture what I’m saying, for instance, we had no shoes to wear and
very little food to eat,” said Panayiotis (82) from Household 1. Theofilos, who had also grown up in
poverty explained that the difference between the present austerity crisis and past experiences of
austerity was hope. “In the past you knew that if you were willing to work hard you would find
something to do and you’d manage to achieve something.” This last aspect of the current economic
crisis generated existential angst for the older generation which found it hard to believe that such a
thing had happened to the country. Earlier generations’ cultural values and models, such as the idea
of the male bread winner or of a strong work ethic, were being reconfigured by austerity. According
to my older interlocutors (above 60), it was the strong work ethic and the life of thrift and caution
that had allowed households of the older generation to pursue their social and economic goals of
material  stability  and  an  intergenerational  project  of  social  mobility  through  their  children’s
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education. It is worth highlighting here that there is a difference between household projects that
based  their  future  wellbeing  on  austere  lifestyles  and  the  impact,  at  the  household  level,  of
externally enforced austerity policies, dictated by faceless institutions and invisible global economic
forces.
Many of my informants traced the roots of the current crisis back to the 1980s when Greece
became a full member of the EEC, and to the 2000s, when it joined the eurozone. The country’s
accession to the EEC was the first instance in which it officially handed part of its sovereign power
to  supranational  institutions.  Thereafter,  Greece’s  cryptocolonial  relationships  with  hegemonic
powers were revealed to the public. Because of this, I do not totally agree with Hertzfeld’s (2002)
analysis of cryptocolonialism, especially after Greece’s accession to the EEC,111 when grassroots
discourses about neo-colonialism and counter hegemonic narratives became popular.  The Greek
debt crisis and the way it was handled, revealed that the country’s “national sovereignty” was a
mirage, both in terms of its international relationships and in relation to domestic fiscal policies.
Chalkidans  experienced the rescaling of  industrial  and agricultural  production to  meet with the
Common Market standards  first hand. For that reason, local analyses of the recent crisis framed
politicians and authoritative institutions as having caused the economic crisis, while they traced
responsibility on the lower scale of analysis, to individualism and the illusions of capitalist growth
as well as socio-cultural practices and grassroots aspirations that legitimized corruption. After the
restructuring of the Greek industrial sector in the 1980s, the national economy became dependent
on imports, and economic growth was driven by consumption rather than production.  In the 2000s,
as Greece entered the eurozone, the influx of credit resulted in many households becoming indebted
as  people  in  their  20s,  30s  and  40s  got  access  to  credit  cards112 and  indulged  in  conspicuous
consumption. In my discussion, I highlight intergenerational differences in explanations of what
caused the economic crisis in the first place. Young people condemned the lifestyle and political
choices  of the baby boomer generation: it  was middle-aged people who bore responsibility  for
having  indebted  the  next  generation,  thereby  destroying  the  future  and  the  older  generations’
sacrifices.
The relationship of Greece and the EU was at the center of the grassroots critique. Katerina
(Household 3) referred to the agricultural restructurings that the Europeans had demanded and the
fact that they gave funding to farmers to uproot olive groves and vineyards. “Many farmers were
111 I have to remind the reader here that Pasok and Andreas Papandreou won the elections in 1981 with the slogan 
“EOK kai NATO to idio syndikato” (EEC and NATO the same syndicate) (see Chapter 2).
112 I remember in 2006, when I was 19 years old, studying sociology at the university of Crete, a bank representative 
called me to suggest I should apply for a credit card, even after I explained that I was a student and had no income. 
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tricked  here  in  Evia,  you  see  they  wanted  the  easy  money.  You  earned  more  money  through
epidotiseis (funds)  than from agriculture”.   Dina’s understanding of  EU funds goes  against  the
discourses of the pro-austerity Greek technocrats that Gkintidis  (2018) examines.   As Gkintidis
elaborates, they supported a view that Greece had benefited from European funds and developed
public infrastructure and social welfare structures thanks to the money that the EEC (and later the
EU) gave it (as well as  other countries) to catch up with Europe’s core countries. They represented
Greece as an undeveloped country and attributed Greece’s failure to benefit from these funds to “the
inherently problematic  nature of  Greek society … failed implementation of  European cohesion
policies  … was attributed  to  endemic  or  acquired  ‘laziness’,  ‘short-sightedness’,  ‘egoism’,  and
‘greediness’ or,  in  more  subtle  terms,  incompetence  and  corruption”  (Ibid:  39-40).    When  I
interviewed Dina, a days before the Greek referendum of July 2015, we argued about the EU’s role
and  whether  Greeks  benefited  from the  EU or  not.  She  challenged  the  popular  pro-European
discourses that posited the impossibility of Greece having a future outside of the European project
by asking me: “You tell me how o aplos kosmos (ordinary people) has benefited from the euro and
the  EU  in  general?”  I  replied  by  mentioning  the  funds  that  had  been  used,  for  example,  for
developing public infrastructure, and also referred to the freedom of movement with the EU. In this
way,  I  managed  to  elicit  her  views  on  these  two  most  prominent  arguments  in  pro-European
discourse.  She  then  explained  that  “European  funds  for  agricultural  restructuring  made  Greeks
unproductive, and that because of the euro, the factory owners moved their production to Bulgaria”
and  later  concluded,  “...and  who  got  all  the  European  money  for  public  infrastructure?  Greek
politicians, banks and business elites, certainly not ordinary people.” 
 “The euro has destroyed the Greeks,” said Aristidis (42) who operates a stall at Chalkida’s
open air market. “Greeks [still] do not know how to value the euro … For me, 50 cent, 1 and 2 euro
coins, should have been banknotes for Greeks,” he said as he placed a coin of each on his stall.
“When we entered the euro [he means the eurozone], all the prices went up. I remember oil prices in
2001 were around 50 to 60 drachmas. Do you know, my friend, how much 60 drachmas is in euros?
Less than this,” he said, showing me a 20-cent coin. “Products that used to cost 1000 drachmas…
when the euro arrived, they automatically started costing 5 euros ...” He took out a calculator and
made the calculation: “You see, 5 euros! That’s around 1700 drachmas! Water at kiosks, it  was
priced at 50 drachmas, now it costs 50 cents! That, my friend, is the euro bubble. The  hiliariko
[1000 drachma banknote]  became,  in  one  year,  5  euros!”  Aristidis’ understanding of  the  crisis
permits a broader perspective on the economic models that have dominated in Greece and explains
the Greek bubble and how the economy got inflated by the euro in layman’s terms. He argued that
because of the euro, goods and services became overpriced and, following his line of thought, that
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is what caused the current crisis. Not only did prices go up, he stated, Greeks also lost track of their
micro-economies and the way in which people valued money changed. His argument was that the
replacement of drachmas by euros had created a subterranean crisis in people’s financial judgment,
in the way they calculated, related with and bonded through money.  
 Echoing Aristidis’ view, Theofilos said that the crisis had started when the IMF and the ECB
had come to save Greece. “People were having a good time and did not care. We had our eyes
closed and then this had happened… In my view, this was where things were headed when we
entered the eurozone.” Theofilos identified the course that things were taking as inevitable and
stressed the widespread ignorance that had made it possible for the country to “be ruled by thieves
and criminals.”  In the same vein, Sofia (59), a head teacher in one of Chalkida’s high schools,
traced responsibility for the crisis back to people who were comfortable (volemenoi) in their own
lives and ignorant of their  rights.  Because of the individualistic interests  and aspirations of the
working middle classes, the public interest and class-based collective claims had been undermined
and left undefended. Ignorance, blind faith and the individualist pursuit of well-being and upwards
mobility had fueled the corrupt regime of public administration and redistribution. 
The  economic  crisis  in  Greece  fueled  a  critique  of  modernity  and  the  socio-economic
organization and model of development that Greece had been pursuing. People judged and reflected
upon the failures not only of the Greek but also the European projects. Such discourses implied that
corruption in Greece had been mediated through the administration of these funds. In this way, both
European officials, investment funds and corrupt Greek politicians were held equally responsible
for  having fostered  corruption  in  Greece.  It  was  indeed the  case  that  with  the  Troika  and EU
dictated austerity, those EU funds were certainly not being distributed for free (Gkintidis 2018). The
acceptance of European money entailed certain obligations for the country which had to rescale its
economy to meet common market standards, that is; to restructure its industrial and agricultural
production,  modernize  and  rationalize  the  public  sector,  regulate  inflation,  develop  a  modern
infrastructure to enable the intensification of capital accumulation processes in order to align with
the financialized principles of neoliberal economy . Thus economic development in Greece was
bound to observe certain directives, while a few privileged elites, both within and outside of the
country, benefited greatly. 
Several interlocutors blamed the policies of Andreas Papandreou and the socialist turn in the
1980s for having ruined the country by overstaffing the public sector and inflating the Greek bubble
making Greeks believe in prosperity with money that was not their own. The trade unions were also
deemed  responsible  both  by  left  and  right-wing  people.  Leftists  accused  trade  unions  of  not
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defending labor rights and serving the clientilistic state, while right wing people saw unionism as
the main cause of deindustrialization, which had coincided with Greece’s accession to the EEC and
the socialist labor policies of  Pasok that enhanced the negotiating power of trade unions. Both left
and right-wing people agreed that unions had been integrated into the clientelist system and that
they were corrupt. Papandreou was also accused of populism that cultivated unrealistic dreams and
expectations for the Greek working classes. 
I met small  shop owners who criticized the recent European Union’s funds for boosting
entrepreneurship, arguing that they were not a solution to the crisis. They said that the problem for
small  entrepreneurs  was  not  their  competitiveness  but  the  declining  purchasing  power  that  the
austerity regime had produced:  “If people have no money to buy anything with, what difference
does it make if I renovate my shop and upgrade my equipment?” a 49 year old general store owner
wondered. A highly skilled 36 year old, pointing out that the initiatives funded by the state and the
EU in the area around Chalkida consisted of traditional shops and taverns, asked rhetorically: “How
are you boosting the national economy’s productivity by funding someone to open a traditional
tavern?”   Mainstream solutions  to  the  persisting  crisis  were  not  only  criticized  as  unjust  and
inhumane but as irrational and sometimes naive or foolish. “Don’t they [the EU, Greek government]
see that austerity is not a solution, if people have no money, how are we supposed to overcome the
crisis?” asked Stavros, 55. In this sense austerity has had the adverse effect. Stavros explained in
layman’s terms the paradox of thrift and the widespread critique to austerity. As Harvey (1990)
shows, neoliberal solutions to  crisis  induce more crises  during their  implementation,  instead of
solving the problem that they were designed for. 
Many informants pointed to the fact that the “crisis has been caused by the banks,” and that
ordinary people had been asked to pay the cost of saving them. Austerity measures were designed to
secure the banking system at the expense of the wider social good, and even the IMF admitted that
it had made mistakes in the way it handled the Greek crisis and dictated austerity policies.113 Thus
Paolo Batista, one of the Executive Directors of the IMF admitted on Greek television that “They
gave money to save German and French banks, not Greece.”114 The banks, who were recapitalized
by the Greek state,  never had to face the consequences of their  deviant practices and mistakes
which, according to many of my informants  “were the primary cause of crisis.”
113 https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324299104578527202781667088   (Last accessed 12/01/2020)
114 https://www.globalresearch.ca/imf-director-admits-the-greek-bailout-was-to-save-german-and-french-banks/  
5434989 (Last accessed 12/01/2020)
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Further, given the fact that it was the banks that had caused the global financial meltdown in
2007, conspiracy theories abounded.  There were many amongst my interlocutors who believed that
the crisis was nothing but a failure of the banking sector, for which ordinary people had been called
to pay the bill. Echoing Batista’s claim, Dina elaborated on the structural crisis of the economic
system by saying:
You see there is a pyramid. Capital is on top, there are the owners of the factories
that used to operate here in Chalkida. Because of the factories, Chalkida used to be
a very rich city and everyone wanted access to the local markets [referring to her
suppliers]. That was because money circulated from the top to the bottom, to the
workers who would spend it at the local shops. Now, capital is accumulated at the
top, and stays there. That’s why we have a crisis, and that is why all the small shop
owners are suffering. It makes me furious when I hear that Greeks got loans, wasted
their money or lived above their means. So what? It’s their money and they can do
whatever they want with it. All those indebted people have lost their assets, their
houses which the banks demanded as a mortgage and then foreclosed. What about
the banks? Banks also went bankrupt, but they never paid anything, they never lost
anything, instead we paid for them. The state borrowed billions to save the banks,
money that we are going to pay back. 
Bankers were not only accused of having caused the crisis  in the first  place but also of
having benefited from it as they indulged in speculative games over the national debt. Thus human
needs and social wellbeing had been undermined to secure financial profits for capital investment
funds. Livelihoods had been ruined and national and international elites benefited from the crisis
while  ordinary  people  struggled  to  make a  living.  The economic  crisis  deepened injustice  and
established the hegemony of the neoliberal economic model over society.  Moreover, during the
crisis,  the  banks  gradually  acquired  a  more  central  role  in  the  organization  of  everyday  life,
especially after the events of the Greek referendum in July 2015. 
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6.3 The Events Before and After the Greek Referendum 
As soon as the Greek referendum was announced on June 28th, 2015, Greeks foresaw the possibility
of Greece abandoning the eurozone and of its impact in the banking sector. Instantly, they rushed to
withdraw as much money as they could from the banks and by the next morning, the ATMs had run
out of cash. The next day, on June 29th, 2015, banks had closed and  capital controls were imposed,
limiting the amount of money  that people could withdraw from their bank accounts to 60 euros per
day from each of their accounts. People lined up every day to withdraw their money from the banks.
Queues in front of the ATMs were transformed into a social space where people debated political
ideas around the imminent referendum.  Several arguments for and against the referendum were
widespread among people, and it was clear that Greeks after five years of harsh austerity, were, in
their majority, against its continuation. The question, however, that they were asked to respond was
rather vague115,  and it  did not entail  an alternative course of action.  The question of the Greek
referendum asked if people agreed with the terms that the Troika proposed to the newly elected
Greek government. First of all, Greek people were unaware of details that the creditors’ proposal
entailed. Secondly, and most importantly, had the Greeks decided to reject the bailout agreement,
the No vote could not be clearly interpreted as providing legitimacy to the Greek government to
leave the eurozone, declare a default and return to its national currency. The question about the
leaving the eurozone or not could not be assessed by the result of such a referendum. Among the No
supporters, there were many who believed that Greece should abandon the eurozone, while others
were reluctant about such a development and opted for a change at the European level.  
 The Greek society were once again in its history divided, and people have drawn several
historical  resemblances.  For  the  “No”   (Oxi )  supporters,  the  Greek  referendum  has  been  an
opportunity to put an end to austerity and resist the authoritative, at times totalitarian regime of
austerity that was understood as a new Junta of Troika. However, it was not only the leftists that
supported the No campaign.  Eurosceptics both from the left  and the right  lined up for  the No
campaign. In general terms the parties of Syriza, Anel and Golden Dawn officially supported the
“no” vote. On the antipode, the pro-austerity parties of ND, Potami and Pasok directed the “yes”
campaign,  while  KKE chose  to  abstain  from the  process  and  called  its  voters  to  boycott  the
referendum.  For the “Yes” (Nai) supporters, the referendum has been an opportunity to put an end
to the leftist rise to power. Interestingly both sides had tried to develop nationalistic discourses.  Oxi
supporters were the ones that proposed a historical duty that this generation of Greeks had both for
115 Se e: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-33311422 (Last accessed 20/02/2020).
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their ancestors who fought against the Axis powers and resisted the Nazi occupation of Greece, and
for that reason they had to say “no” to the Germans, to the architects of the EU austerity. On the
other  side,  Nai supporters put  forth the argument  of the civil  war,  and the dominant  discourse
against the left that has historically undermined the national project of Greece. In their discourse,
the Greek left threatened once again the foundation of the Greek nation and its European future, as
it did in the civil war that supported the USSR and the communist project instead of the liberal
West.  “Greece  belongs  to  Europe”  they  said  and  demonstrated  with  the  slogan  of  “Menoume
Europi” (we remain/stay in Europe), stressing the historical relationships and the national project of
Greece with the western culture.  Their  main arguments were that a possible win of  Oxi would
automatically mean a Grexit. Greeks would lose a great deal of their savings, chaos will prevail, and
shortages  in  basic  goods  such  as  in  medicines  and  fuel  would  occur.  Moreover,  the  national
territories  would  be  in  danger  from  a  possible  Turkish  invasion.  On  the  other  side,  the  Oxi
supporters put forth a nationalist discourse against the hegemonic role of the EU, and the outright
subordination of Greece to its creditors. As an informant of mine elaborated “When you are wet,
you are not afraid of the rain”, meaning that Greek people could only gain in the long run if they
left  the  eurozone  and thus  be  able  to  design  their  own financial  policies.  Crisis  has  not  only
produced ruptures in people’s income and social reproduction, it has deeply wounded the national
pride that has been systemically cultivated by popular discourses in Greece. Apart from the glorious
past of ancient Greece, Greeks took pride for the resistance to the Germans during WWII. The
Greek referendum provided an historical opportunity for Greeks to regain their national pride and
resist  once  again  to  the  German  austerity.  Resisting  to  German  directives  of  austerity  was
understood as a patriotic/nationalist duty. 
Interestingly, back in 1944, Theotokas (2005), a Greek novelist and a lawyer who openly
supported the Greek liberal party, wrote about two big demonstrations taking place in Athens in
October 1944, a few months before the outbreak of the Greek civil war. On the one hand, a big
demonstration that  occurred on the 13th and 14th of  October organized by EAM and the Greek
communist party. According to Theotokas, the crowds that flooded the main squares of Athens were
heterogeneous with men, women, children and even priests taking part. The crowd was waving red
flags, mixed with Greek and other flags of the Allies. It was the biggest demonstration that Greece
had known until  then, that showed the power of communism in Athens. In response, a counter
demonstration was organized by nationalist organizations and addressed to the right-wing Greek
bourgeoisie. Given the fact that only the citizens of the bourgeois neighborhoods of Athens took
part, the demonstration was smaller, yet it was equally imposing as the crowd was elegantly dressed
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and many women had taken part  in the counter demonstration against  communism. Those two
demonstrations  bear  a  striking  similarity  between  the  anti-austerity  Oxi  and  the  pro-austerity
“Menoume Europi” demonstrations that were organized in Greece a few days before the Greek
referendum. 
After the vote, and a big win of  Oxi, that reached 63%, the pressure was put on the anti-
austerity government of Greece. Instead of following the public’s decision, the Syriza government
finally signed a new MoU in August 2015 and declared national elections. Greek people who have
voted for Oxi were disappointed by the government’s stance, and the inconsistency of its actions.
People felt detachment and hopelessness and started to accept that Greece was bound to follow the
EU directives. It furthermore revealed the subordinate position of Greece that had no other viable
option but to continue austerity as dictated, and Oxi  supporters justified the austerity regime as a
coup  that  undermined  the  democratic  will  of  Greeks.  The  September’s  elections  recorded  the
highest  abstention  rate  ever  (more  than  42 percent),  however,  Syriza  won again  and formed a
coalition  government  with  the  anti-austerity  right  wing  party  of  Anel  and  continued  applying
austerity and neoliberal restructurings. 
 The leftist coalition party of Syriza was totally reformed after the referendum, and many
have abandoned the  party declaring  that  they were cheated.  Syriza has  taken advantage of  the
collapse of Pasok and transformed from a vernacular  party of the left,  to a mainstream social-
democrat party after the disappearance of Pasok. There were many who had discerned the striking
similarities of Syriza with Pasok, as well as of its leader, Alexis Tsipras with Andreas Papandreou.
Syriza  had  had  a  strong,  anti-austerity  and  anti-imperialist  discourse  against  NATO  and  the
neoliberal EU, however, when it rose to power, the party had to face the pragmatics of international
politics,  and  had  to  reconsider  its  stance  by  the  challenges  of  being  in  power  instead  of  the
opposition. Furthermore, many former members of Pasok had found a place in the post-referendum
Syriza party and occupied high positions in the Greek government. 
During the crisis, and especially after the declaration of the Greek referendum, the banks
acquired a more central role in the organization of everyday life. The Greek economy had a low
level of neoliberal bankarization compared to other countries in the EU and everyday economic
activities were mediated almost exclusively through cash. The crisis that capital controls created in
the way people accessed their money posed a great opportunity for the banks to promote e-banking
and  the  use  of  debit  cards  instead  of  cash,  even  for  petty  everyday  transactions.  As  a  result,
bankarization  levels  increased  and  banks  took  on  the  role  of  policing  and  surveilling  capital
movements  in  order  to  combat  tax  evasion.  At  the  same  time,  the  state  handed  constitutional
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privileges  and  power  over  to  the  bankers.  Increasing  numbers  of  economic  transactions  were
mediated  by  the  banks  which  created  a  new  field  of  economic  interaction  as  socio-economic
relationships  between  persons  became  relationships  between  bank  accounts.  Instead  of  being
punished,  in  the  new crisis  articulation  of  neoliberal  power,  the  banks,  which  were  popularly
identified  as  kleftes (robbers),  acquired  structural  power  over  people.  This  development  made
people suspicious about the banks’ upgraded role in the neoliberal system. The imposition of EU-
directed policies was not only a matter of finance but also acquired cultural characteristics. Greeks
felt obliged to resist the loss of national sovereign power and, as I showed in Chapter 5, in this
process informality and grassroots economic solidarity were endowed with notions of resistance
since they provided the means for non-compliance. 
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6.4 Crisis, Austerity and Neocolonialism
As  new  forms  of  economic  organization  were  implanted  in  Greece  (labor,  production,
provisioning),  the  majority  of  my  interlocutors,  who  were  from  diverse  socio-economic
backgrounds and statuses, saw the austerity crisis as a form of a neocolonial war, through which
hegemonic  powers  used  debt  to  promote  their  own geopolitical  and  economic  interests  in  the
Eastern Mediterranean. Neocolonialism includes not only powerful states, but also multinational
firms. The closure of Chalkida’s cement factory (see Chapter 1) provides an outstanding example of
these types of neocolonial domination practices. From 2007, Lafarge had been trying to limit the
factory union’s negotiating power and to cut wages, claiming that the Greek labor market should
align with global free-market standards. At the time, when Lafarge’s management threatened to
close the factory — a move characterized by the workers as “neocolonial”- the workers and the
union had declared a  strike.  But  high national  demand for  cement  at  the time -  driven by the
housing  bubble  led  to  a  compromise  between  the  union  and  management.  By 2013,  however,
national demand for cement had reached a historic low. On March 26 th, 2013, management seized
the opportunity to close the factory and fire the “troublesome Gauls.”116 They did so by making use
of the second memorandum’s legislation that allowed mass layoffs (Dedoussopoulos et al., 2013).
Ever since that date, the trade union had been struggling to reverse the lay-offs and reopen the
factory, and the struggle continued through the time of my fieldwork and continues to this day. On
several occasions (through personal and group interviews, press conferences, demonstrations), the
workers claimed that Lafarge had imposed its terms on the former prime minister, Antonis Samaras,
when in 2012 he had met with the heads of 13 multinational companies to discuss how to enhance
the country’s competitiveness.117 In a group interview at the occupied cement factory, a worker took
the initiative to speak: 
We [the Greek nation] used to produce cars and electric appliances. Greece had a growing industrial
sector which was dismantled to serve the demands of the Germans. They wanted to make us dependent
on imports and credit, and that is how they achieved control over us. They gave us funds to dismantle
both  our  industrial  and  agricultural  production  and  made  us  dependent  on  them,  and  many Greeks
believed this money was for free [see Gkintidis 2018]. Now with this crisis they are buying us cheap and
making the workers easy prey for the multinationals.
116 Factory workers often used this expression to describe themselves in order to identify with the popular resistance
figures in Asterix. 
117 https://primeminister.gr/2012/12/17/9904> (Last accessed 12/01/2020). 
254
These words obscured class differences and exalted Greek capitalism. As I showed in Chapter 2,
such discourses resonated with the idea of the national project of development which was part of the
mutual  agreement  between  workers  and  capitalists.  Moreover,  the  agricultural  and  industrial
restructuring  of  the  1980s  and  1990s  that  integration  within  the  European  project  entailed
(Narotzky, 2016) was the outcome of a social contract and the nation’s sacrifice for the European
project and the country’s modernization.  Subsequent reforms only accelerated the accumulation of
capital by transnational firms which, in times of crisis, often acquire structural power, that is to say,
the power to make structures act on their behalf (Wettstein, 2009; Bourdieu, 2005). Large firms
exploited  the  national  economic  crisis  to  accelerate  neoliberal  restructuring  and  labor  market
deregulation, thereby undercutting the hard-won rights of Greek working people. Brandishing the
dignity of Greek workers, the struggle was framed as one of national resistance to re-invasion by
foreign capital. In an interview in a mainstream newspaper,118 the CEO of Lafarge explained that the
factory in Chalkida had been closed as part of broader plans to restructure cement production in
Greece, a move that favored two of their other Greek factories. But the structural violence against
the laid-off workers’ livelihoods resonated nationally and fed into an image of Greek society under
attack by neoliberal austerity. At the same time, laid-off workers blamed Greek governments for
selling the nation to multinationals and for being unable to defend its citizens, who in the midst of
deep economic crisis struggled to defend the national interests of labor and dignity. 
Michael  Hertzfeld  (2002)  defines  modern  Greece’s  relationship  to  the  hegemonic  cultural  and
economic models of the West as one of “crypto-colonialism.” The outbreak of the crisis and the
subordination of Greek governments to foreign control, led working people to realize that Greece,
throughout its modern history, had not been an independent nation but a debt colony, a subordinate
nation  serving the  demands  of  the  world’s  superpowers.  “Greece  is  a  protectorate  state  of  the
Americans and the Europeans, and it has always been like that” said Agamemnonas (61) a recently
retired cement  factory worker  who took an active role in the workers’ struggle.  Agamemnonas
endorsed the views of the Greek Communist party along with nationalist and conservative ideology.
The neoliberal way of dealing with the crisis threatened the national ideals which were embedded in
the Greek political habitus. The condition of living under foreign supervision prompted people to
argue that their country had lost its sovereignty, and that the state’s structures, instead of serving
social wellbeing, were serving alien interests. Thus the state became disembedded from the nation,
118 http://www.kathimerini.gr/484488/article/oikonomia/epixeirhseis/giati-apofasisame-na-kleisoyme-to-ergostasio-ths-  
aget-xalkidas> (Last accessed 12/01/2020 2019) (cf. Mylonas 2014). 
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and in grassroots discourses about the crisis, people treated the “nation” and the “state” as different
entities.
 Dina believed that “we have a crisis because they say so, I don’t know who ‘they’ are. They call
them ‘the markets.’ I cannot understand how Greece, a small country, poses a threat to the world
economy and (yet) they are doing this to us, this is a new type of war.” In a similar vein, Katerina
(65) from Household 3, a hard-working housewife, said that “what the Germans did not manage to
get with weapons in World War II, they are getting it now with this crisis. Greece is the best piece of
land in Europe, we have the sea and the sun” suggesting that “the northerners envy us.” The harsh
austerity  measures,  which the German government insisted on,  were equivalent  to  the resource
scarcity and the plunder of Greece’s economic resources by the German occupation during WWII.
Furthermore, austerity was understood as a cultural project of the North “where the weather is bad,
and people do not enjoy life as people in the South do.” Counter stereotypes were produced against
the  German people  who appeared  in  grassroots  discourses  as  another  homogeneous  nation.  As
Kalantzis (2012, 2015) has shown about Crete, another stronghold of the Greek resistance again the
German occupation during WWII, the resistance the patriotic duty against the austerity regime was
the natural thing one should do119.  In a general sense, Greeks reproduced emic understandings of
the  nation.  Many  of  my informants  discerned  punitive,  even  sadist,  characteristics  in  austerity
policies directed at Greeks and the southerners “who misbehaved” and “lived above their means” or
“threaten global economic stability.”120 In 2012, anti-austerity leftists generated a grassroots counter
narrative of “who owes whom” which grew in popularity and provided the basis for a language of
contention to hegemonic discourses and stereotypes (Roseberry, 1994). In that discourse, Greek
debt could be counterbalanced with the unpaid war reparations that were estimated to amount to
300 billion euros. In 2016, the Greek parliament  formed a commission whose mandate was to
officially  demand unpaid  war reparations.  As  the prime minister,  Alexis  Tsipras  said about  the
initiative that was voted through with a wide parliamentary majority “the claim [of unpaid war
reparations] is our historic and moral duty.”121 
Many of my informants believed that the crisis had been imposed on Greece in order to
enforce  neoliberal  policies  such  as  an  extensive  project  of  privatization.  The  crisis  was  a
restructuring of power as the Greek nation-state outsourced its powers to foreign institutions and
private  firms.  Greek crisis  era  governments  were powerless  in  the face of hegemonic financial
119  In Chania, Crete, my hometown, the Oxi gained nearly 72 percent of the vote in the Greek referendum. 
120  See: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/14/greek-bailout-angela-merkel-blackmail-athens-opposition 
(Last accessed 15/02/2020). 
121 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-greece-germany-reparations/greek-parliament-calls-on-germany-to-pay-ww2-  
reparations-idUSKCN1RT1PL (Last accessed 15/02/2020).
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institutions and power structures such as the EU and the IMF many informants told me. Greek crisis
era governments were obliged to follow an extensive project of privatization. Public companies,
national ports and airports, energy, water, drilling and mining rights, numerous large state factories
were all up for sale to foreign investors, who sought to buy them at the cheapest possible price. The
crisis caused a surge in the economic depreciation of public assets. Major credit rating agencies
degraded  the  Greek  economy and  Greek  bonds,  and  public  assets  were  classified  as  financial
garbage. This further weakened Greek governments’ negotiating power and they were forced to sell
cheap.  Privatization  was  the  other  pillar  which  mainstream economic  models  presented  as  the
solution  to  Greece’s  public  deficit,  and  each  of  the  three  MoU agreements  included extensive
privatization prerequisites. The progress of privatizations was overseen in detail by the Troika and a
special fund to manage the assets that were to be privatized was formed in 2012. “We will have a
crisis until they get what they want. Until we sell everything” said Evridiki (52), an administrative
employee at the Greek taxation agency of Chalkida. The idea that the crisis was a neocolonial war
was grounded in the fact that the country’s mineral resources (Sutton, 2018) and the renewable
energy resources of the sun (Knight, 2013) and wind were being targeted by British, American,
French and German energy companies. One popular belief was that the “crisis” had been implanted
in Greece because of the country’s oil reserves in the Aegean, Ionian and Libyan seas. Thus the
crisis has been fabricated, it was a “big lie” designed to force the country to sell off its natural
resources at cut rate prices (see Engdahl, 2013; Sutton 2018). In Dina’s view, the crisis had been
fabricated to further dispossess Greece’s working middle classes, with the increased unemployment
created  by  austerity  policies  producing  a  docile  labor  force  amenable  to  exploitation  by  large
multinational  firms.  Dina  discerned  that  multinational  firms  accumulated  locally/nationally
produced wealth abroad, further dispossessing local/national society. Katerina (Household 3) said
that the EU “wants us to transform ourselves into a nation of underpaid waiters to serve tourists.”
Others correlated the refugee crisis with the ongoing global population rescaling. “They imposed
this crisis on us, and now they’re forcing us to keep all these migrants here” said Eftichis (46),
implying that European agreements on migratory flows from the war-zones in the Middle East were
related with Greece’s economic crisis. Crisis and austerity were perceived as threatening national
cohesion and xenophobic reactions to migrants were frequent. 
Greeks’ collective  suffering  as  they  witnessed  their  country  fall  into  decay  under  harsh
austerity triggered a sense of national solidarity, which often acquired exclusive characteristics. As
with the Asia Minor catastrophe, during which displaced  mikrasiates  faced racism by indigenous
Greeks (see Chapter 2) as the Greek nation-state confronted it first modern existential crisis, the
recent  crisis  produced  xenophobic  reactions  to  the  perceived,  poor  migrant  populations.  The
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example of the Greek Asia Minor refugees was used by online media (and went viral in social
media) in order to underscore the fact that Greeks had also been refugees in the past, hence they
ought to treat the refugees who were stuck in Greece with compassion and understanding for what
these people had gone through.  “Yes, we have been severely affected by the crisis, but I cannot
compare that with what all these people [the refugees] have undergone. We are in a much better
position  and  we  should  maintain  our anthropia (human  qualities),  that  is  the  crisis’ greatest
challenge,” said  Georgia (59), from Household 5. Georgia was adamant though, that the refugee
crisis was caused by hegemonic countries that wanted to promote their interests, namely to sell their




In terms of its social symbolism, austerity acquired the cultural characteristics of a totalitarian regime that
had invaded the country with the aim of acculturating the natives to the neoliberal world system. Austerity
and crisis became public symbols which dominated people’s public and private lives. This interpretative
approach  to  crisis  and  its  meaning  aligns  with  symbolic  anthropology’s  object  of  study.  Symbolic
anthropology (Geertz, 1972; Sahlins, 1974; Turner, 1988, 1967) has placed emphasis on the power which
symbols concentrate.  Cultural  values  and symbols were often present  in  people’s  analyses of crisis  and
counter-stereotypes were produced to respond to mainstream representations of Greeks as lazy and irrational
in managing their economies. Turner (1967) shows how in certain circumstances, new forms, metaphors and
paradigms are generated by people. Crisis is a symbolic category which is inevitably negotiated though the
social sphere. 
If  we  understand  crisis  as  a  metaphor,  then  people  certainly  incorporated  hegemonic
concepts within their understandings of it, reworking it and reforming “new” narratives around it.
Crisis and austerity symbolized an earlier condition of resource scarcity during which Greeks had
been  subordinate  to  hegemonic  powers,  had  very  few job  opportunities,  were  confronted  with
hunger  and  had  been  forced  to  migrate.  The  recent  crisis  and  the  austerity  that  followed
encapsulated past crises experiences of hegemonic interventions of foreign countries in Greece’s
domestic  affairs  (see  Chapter  2).  The  imposition  of  austerity  and  the  neoliberal  economic
determinism that it  entailed,  quickly became identified as a form of occupation of the state by
foreign powers and interests, which materialized in the Troika. The austerity policies that the Troika
imposed as part of Greece’s bailout did not have a merely financial character and were understood
as instruments of neocolonial  governance.  In addition,  crisis,  as a metaphor,  transfers meaning,
reason and agency back and forth in time (Geertz, 1972). The perception of time unfolds in multiple
scales and dimension. It occurs at the personal level (feeling like a child, depended),  feeling like
history repeats itself as a joke, feeling like the every new year that comes by is de-facto worse, all
of those structures of feelings (Williams, 1977) are triggered by the economic downturn people
have experienced due to the neoliberal crisis of capitalism that invades violently their lifeworlds and
enforces a cultural change through their dispossession of people’s means and the crisis of social
reproduction. 
In this chapter, I addressed multiple facets of crisis and austerity, and how these concepts are
reworked and transformed at the grassroots level of social life. We need to be careful to discern the
different and often contradictory meanings and definitions of crisis inherent in people’s discourses
and structures of feeling (Williams, 1977). Thus it can be understood both as a rupture, especially
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when we consider social reproduction and established patterns of making a livelihood, but also as a
historical  continuity  relating  to  modern  Greek  history.  Grassroots  analyses,  realizations  and
understandings of crisis  and the restructuring process are critical  for understanding the multiple
ways  that  economy is  intertwined with society.   Breaks  in  social  reproduction  practices  create
ruptures in social organization and oblige people to reformulate their social projects. In this sense,
crisis  acts  as  a  detour  which  forces  people  to  judge  and  evaluate  their  situations  and  to  seek
alternative paths through the creative process of getting by. Moreover, crisis can be understood as
revelatory, a force that reveals the true nature of things and brings to the surface the concealed and
hidden aspects of social organization, including its problematic foundations and its creative counter-
balances Chapter 5). In the aftermath of crisis, people judge and reevaluate what is necessary, trace
what went wrong, assign responsibilities and identify problematic structures and practices which
before the crisis went unnoticed. Moreover, the crisis makes apparent Greece’s subordinate relations
with hegemonic powers, thus establishing a historical continuity in the country’s status as indebted
protectorate subject to neocolonial control (see Chapter 2).  
Of particular interest is the fact that crisis experiences were once again nationalized, thereby
obscuring class-based claims in my interlocutors’ discourses. Greeks were homogenized and crisis
experiences formed a national language of suffering and contention (Roseberry, 1994). Ordinary
people have in different ways reproduced, resignified and contested hegemonic discourses, making
sense,  in  their  own words,  of  the  decade’s  long  crisis  of  livelihoods,  hopes  and  expectations.
Dispossessed people place the economic and social turmoil they experience on a continuum with
other recent episodes of social upheaval. These include those of the 1980s and 1990s when, driven
by  the  process  of  European  convergence,  industrial  and  agricultural  restructuring  led  to  a
recentering of the national capitalist project of development  Nevertheless, the extensiveness of the
latest iteration of crisis — including its cuts to public spending, overtaxation and sovereign debt —
topped memories  of  previous  restructurings  and reinforced doubts  about  whether  the  sacrifices
made for accessing full membership of the EU had been worthwhile (Narotzky 2016). However,
while at  the time the sacrifices people had made in order to  support the European project had
enjoyed general social consent, the present restructurings had been unilaterally imposed on crisis
afflicted countries  of the European periphery.  In Greece,  the unilateral  imposition of neoliberal
dogmas that appeared as a remedy for the ailing Greek economy, and that were justified through a
discourse of salvation, hold striking similarities with religion (Mirowski, 2013; Benjamin, 2002).
One can thus view neoliberalism as a New Age economic religion that makes use of concepts such
as “austerity” and “crisis”, whose origins can be traced back primarily to Christianity and its ascetic
ideals (Nietzsche, 1998). 
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Grassroots analyses of crisis and austerity enable us to assess the social impact of crisis and
austerity in everyday life, and to grasp the ideological and practical shifts in people’s reasoning,
together with the ways in which they seek to adapt to and make sense of change. The reflexive
experiences of “crisis” examined in this chapter also reworked specific histories and memories of
contention.122 Grassroots understandings of austerity as a neocolonial regime can be traced back to
the  formation  of  the  modern  Greek  nation-state  and  through  the  numerous  past  crises  that
generations have endured, as I showed in Chapter 2. Nationalist discourses remerge in every critical
moment as they have done in the recent iteration of crisis. The nation appears as a bed rock in
Greek social conscience, a domain which unites the common interests of Greeks. In this way, class
based  claims  are  downplayed  and  crisis  experiences  and  structures  of  feeling  are  once  again
nationalized. 
During the crisis, nationalist discourses have been used by both left and right-wing populism
in order to appeal to the struggling masses to describe the national interests which were threatened
by neoliberal doctrine. After Syriza’s election, leftists gained a chance to participate in nationalist
rhetoric.  Until  then,  they had been excluded from nationalism or  seen as  a  threat  to  it  and to
Greece’s  Western  orientation.  Austerity’s  neoliberal  attack  strengthened  solidarities  based  on
collective symbols and identifications, and it was conceived of as a new method of economic war,
waged through top-down policies. These further dispossessed people of the livelihood assets and
achievements they had made, both at the individual and collective levels of the nation, and they
were aimed at enslaving Greeks. Within grassroots perceptions of crisis, it was perceived to be a lie.
People noted the fact that during the crisis, numerous large firms and institutions had engaged in
and indeed enhanced their capital accumulation. There are therefore, as one can see, different scales
and  viewpoints  which  people  endorsed  in  their  analyses  of  crisis,  which  often  revealed
contradictory economic logics at multiple scales of analysis. Counter-narratives framed the crisis as
a breakdown of expectations of inter-generational social and material improvement, foreclosing the
future which could no longer be imagined - or was seen in the past - expressing a circular or reverse
temporality, a non-modern temporality of “a crisis without a future.” Although history, class and
scale informed these counter-narratives of crisis, what was absent was a sense of the possibility of
change towards a “better” future. With this view of their experiences, my interlocutors challenged
modern understandings of history as unfolding in a steady, linear fashion (Koselleck, 2001; Bodei,
1997). For my informants in Chalkida, the primary issue of concern was “where has our future
122 I use the term “memories of contention” to refer to historically embodied experiences of conflict and social struggle
which, in particular periods in the past, functioned as languages of contention (Roseberry, 1994) and which, in 
fragmentary ways, are part of contemporary common sense. 
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In this thesis I focused on the everyday struggles and life experiences of crisis in Chalkida, Greece,
a mid-sized city that has suffered greatly as a result of the recent Greek crisis. I did so by utilizing a
bottom up approach to crisis and austerity in order to highlight the substantive differences between
grassroots meanings and understandings versus mainstream explanations of the crisis and austerity.
I investigated the impact crisis has had on income and resource allocation at the household level,
the impact of crisis in construed labor identities and the experience of long term unemployment,
the various temporalities that unfolded in the context of crisis and austerity and how people cope
with the challenges in social reproduction. Despite its vulnerability to the global economic crises,
the city of Chalkida managed to sustain its social cohesion. Thanks to the multi-employment model,
homeownership, social and kinship networks of proximity and access to nature, Chalkidians coped
with crisis in a much more effective way than people in Athens. Chalkidian’s not only managed to
“survive” but also to maintain a certain level of satisfaction from life and reinvented grassroots
institutions of mutual aid.  Small cities are resilient to the neoliberal acculturation as they preserve
traditional values and maintain  structures of resilience and produce spaces of resistance either in
intentional way or not (Scott, 1990, 1985). Smaller cities are which were belatedly intergrated to the
capitalist model of development are indeed capable of opposing to the dominant neoliberal ideology
of the free-market since many economic relationships have been embedded and tightly knit into the
social web of the city and thus, managed to keep society together.  As a result, divisive tensions
were dampened, and people managed to find ways to support each other, unemployed people could
find an outlet to nature, not only to produce a money income, but to acquire satisfaction from life, to
produce goods that would provide an occasion for people to organize food gatherings and  feasts.
In their understandings, being able to enjoy life despite the imposed austerity which not only aimed
to dispossess  them from their  means to  socially  reproduce,  it  aimed to  dispossess  their  hopes,
dreams and the things that make live worth living.
Given the importance of modern Greek history, the first two chapters offer a compass and
point of reference that provide the reader with the necessary historical background and evidence. In
the Chapter 1, I formulated a bottom up historical account of Chalkida’s political economy and of
the numerous historical transformations that enabled specific livelihood projects and strategies to
evolve, such as urbanization and modern capitalist development’s industrialization. In my effort to
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explain the relationships between global transformations and local agency, I examined the global
history of cement production and its role in capitalist expansion in relation to the life history of
Chalkida’s cement factory, which was the symbol of its modern, industrial identity as a prosperous
city. The factory’s story itself narrates a history of both macro processes at the global scale and local
processes and grassroots  practices  and reveals  the logics of  capital  accumulation in  its  various
phases  of  development,  which  take  tangible  form in  the  everyday  realities  of  locals.  Lastly,  I
examined the struggle of the laid off cement factory workers that since 2013 were struggling against
Lafarge, current owner of the factory. 
 In Chapter 2, I examined Greece’s social, political and economic history and its modern,
capitalist development until May 2015 when my fieldwork begun. I did so by focusing on certain
critical  junctures  that  shaped  the  national  project  and produced  the  particular  model  of  Greek
capitalism  in  which  the  socio-economic  and  political  habitus  of  Greek  people  was  formed.  I
discussed numerous important historical events that had a decisive impact on the ways in which
Greek  people  relate  to  popular  interpretations  of  history,  understand  the  country’s  current
subordinate position in relation to international institutions, and produce emic understandings of the
Greek  nation  and  its  international  relationships.  I  highlight  several  continuities,  such  as
indebtedness and hegemonic (neo)colonial interventions, that affected past crises of the nation-state.
In this  sense,  Greece’s  current  subordinate  position  is  nothing more  than  a  reproduction  of  its
subordination to hegemonic powers. 
In Chapter 3, I assessed the impact of authoritarian policies on everyday life in Chalkida. In
my quest to unravel the inherent inequalities of capitalism and analyze the new labor regimes that
emerged in the context  of neoliberal austerity,  I  engaged in an ethnographic exploration of the
effects of crisis on labor income and distinct labor sectors. I demonstrated that specific types of
work manufacture identities based on gender, nationality and class (de Neve, 2001; Salzinger, 2003;
Cross, 2012) which factors I enriched by also considering generation. I therefore proposed a cultural
approach to the different labor sectors that I examined. I showed that industrial labor had shaped
masculine identities in Chalkida as it used to absorb the male labor force. Further, it was through the
prevalence of industrial labor that the male bread-winner model was structured and reproduced over
time. Crisis has led many factories to close and thus there has been a reversal of the male bread-
winner model. This has not necessarily meant a reconfiguration of the gendered division of labor,
since the burden of crisis - both in terms of income and reproductive labor - was born by working
class women, in a similar pattern that González de la Rocha (2001) unravels about the 1990s crisis
in Mexico. My research on households demonstrated that other factors apart from income, notably
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education  and  generational  characteristics,  are  critical  in  the  deconstruction  of  the  male  bread
winner model. I examined the livelihood arrangements of industrial workers who, parallel to their
industrial income, developed other income creating activities that were usually related with food
production and entrepreneurship. Numerous laid-off cement factory workers had used their wages
to fund their wives’ and children’s entrepreneurial activities and invested on assets such as private
property (homes or agricultural land) and thus were managing to endure the economic crisis through
their household’s resources.
  I  examined the  precarization  of  labor  in  the public  and private  sectors.  Precarity  was
common among the younger generations who did not have stable employment and who, in order to
get by, combined multiple sources of labor income such as seasonal employment, fixed term job
contracts and workfare projects. “We have always been in crisis” was a generational viewpoint and
understanding of crisis among the younger generations.  For them, crisis had not produced new
shocks in their livelihood arrangements but rather epitomized capitalism’s generational inequalities
and the impossibilities of making a living in a country which had driven many to migrate abroad. A
new feature was that people over 50 were introduced to precariousness. Thus they either lost their
jobs or feared losing them and therefore had to learn, as did their younger counterparts, to live with
uncertainty. Becoming unemployed at that age, the only options open to them in terms of formal
labor  income  were  the  various  workfare  programs  that  the  municipalities  offered  in  order  to
compensate for the understaffing of public services that restructuring had caused. 
Civil  servants  are  another  cultural  category  that  had  enjoyed  the  stability  and  security
afforded by their monthly salaries. People who had indefinite job contracts in the public sector saw
their income fall dramatically. As a consequence, they experienced a major shock in the ways they
had  to  manage  their  economics,  and  thus  had  to  restructure  their  consumption  practices  and
calculate their  spending carefully.  Moreover, as new austerity cuts and restructurings threatened
their jobs, they started to fear being made redundant; at the same time they were burdened with
additional tasks caused by austerity-induced understaffing.  They were also stigmatized as being
responsible for having contributed to the creation the public deficit,  and were accused of being
corrupt and incompetent. 
Lastly, I examined the capital accumulation patterns of the self-employed who approached
their economics very differently to waged employees. Furthermore, owners of small firms who,
despite being employed, saw their annual budgets shrink, identified their condition as worse than
being unemployed. This was because they barely managed to keep their ventures afloat, and they
did so by becoming indebted to their social security funds. As many self-employed elaborated,  the
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vast decrease on people’s disposable income, coupled with uncertainty and precariousness at all
levels of social life  prohibited social investment through consumption since people withheld their
money and their savings in fear of escalation of the crisis and imposition of new austerity measures.
Ruptures in the formal market,  probed alterations in the ways’ money circulates and maintains
businesses,  professions and households,  and connects local people at  the social  structure of the
market. Local shop-owners were against the planned Sunday opening of the markets and reasoned
that  this  would be the  tomb-stone of  the  small  family enterprises  in  Greece that  dominate  the
regional markets, while they accounted for the numerous austerity restructurings that favored large
firms and led many to close their ventures which has been a symbolic socio-economic death. 
 Further, I chose to include an additional category, that of pensioners, since their income
derived from established citizenship rights from their former jobs. Pensioners were in their majority
male beneficiaries as most of the women who had started to access the job market did so in the
1980s, and had therefore not reached retirement age. Pension income was critical for the social
reproduction of the younger unemployed masses. I suggested that pensioners were transformed into
modern kinsmen who redistributed money to their children and grandchildren whose livelihoods
were  threatened by unemployment  and  wage cuts.  In  times  of  crisis,  the  pension  income was
transferred  to  the  younger  generations  and  thus,  new  intergenerational  forms  of  economic
interdependence emerged.     
In  Chapter  4,  I  focused on social  reproduction  patterns  at  the  level  of  the  household.  I
carefully selected nine (9) households and examined the life and work histories of their members
vis-à-vis the ways people designed livelihood projects. I thoroughly investigated the ways people
accessed and managed their resources at the household level, and looked at the grassroots systems
of provisioning (Narotzky, 2005, 1997). I did so by focusing on gendered and generational aspects
of household structures and functions and on the domestic networks of proximity. I assessed the
historical  reconfiguration  of  the  extended family  by focusing  on Smith  & Wallerstein’s  (1992)
proposal  that  we theorize the  household as  a  resource  pooling unit.  In  the  process,  I  critiqued
mainstream statistical and positivist approaches which cannot account for the ethnographic realities
I encountered (Narotzky, 2007). Allen, Barlow, Leal, Maloutas, & Padovani (2004) explain that in
Southern  Europe,  underdeveloped  social  welfare  structures  were  compensated  for  by
homeownership. In the context of the Greek crisis, my ethnographic data demonstrate that home
ownership can be conceptualized in Marxist terms as owning the means of (re)production. In times
of crisis, private property was taxed horizontally without regard to income or other assets. Even so,
I  identified  that  through  homeownership  the  effects  of  crisis  were  dampened,  and  at  least
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homelessness was not prevalent in Chalkida. In Greece, homeownership was the primary livelihood
investment  which  opened  up  a  web  of  possibilities  both  in  the  present  and  also  for  future
generations.  Furthermore,  homeownership  has  strong  generational  repercussions  since  in  the
context of crisis, younger people are de facto unable to buy or build a house. This distinguishes
them from older generations who were able to do so either through the credit  that was widely
available to the working middle classes from the 2000s to 2008, or through the antiparochi that was
been prevalent from the 1950s to 2000s, when credit was not widely available. My data demonstrate
that  ruptures  in  organic  solidarity  were  counterbalanced  by  a  process  which  I  called
“mechanicalization”  of  solidarity  and a  reinvention  of  family  and kin-based grassroots  welfare
system. This  was confined  to intimate relationships among kinship networks that orbited around
the household and circulated and shared their resources, both in terms of reproductive labor and
care, and in terms of income, assets or food resources which in times of crisis become increasingly
important. 
In Chapter 5, I combined Durkheim’s sociological theory with the anthropological theory of
the gift economy (Komter, 2005). I proposed to theoretically reframe the gift economy by reversing
Mauss’ (1990) argument that gifts can be treated as a special type of money (Godelier, 1996). Given
the fact that crisis and austerity produced a lack of money, I theorized money as a special social
asset  that  is  at  the  center  of  complex social  organizations.  In  the  crisis  context,  where  money
resources were scarce, money took the form of a special gift, a social investment that sustained
cultural and social reproduction. In the crisis context, notions of economic and social solidarity
materialized through the circulation of money in both formal and informal economic practices. In
addition, I analyzed informal economic practices and networks which in the context of the austerity
crisis and the neoliberalization of the state apparatus aided social cohesion and sustained socio-
economic relationships. I proposed a bottom up approach to understanding what informality is and
what informality does. Doing so, one can unravel the multiple forms of embeddedness that were
inherent in practices that bypassed the formal economic structures which were unable to provide
enough in order to sustain social and cultural reproduction practices.  
In  Chapter  6,  I  focused  on  the  multiple  grassroots  meanings,  understandings  and
explanations of crisis and austerity, directly addressing the question of “what crisis is and what
crisis  does.”  I  gave  theoretical  value  to  people’s  understandings  of  the  concepts  that  were
introduced to Greece and assessed how ongoing austerity restructuring and neoliberal policies were
understood  as  a  reversed  temporality.  A variety  of  contradictions  were  apparent  in  people’s
discourses and understandings of crisis;  these were related with the theoretical viewpoints they
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assumed. For instance, by incorporating dominant concepts into their analyses, people referred to
the  crisis  as  a  structural  shock.  Yet  the  systemic  failure  of  the  banking system and the  Greek
sovereign  debt  crisis  were  severely  critiqued.  In  my  interlocutors’ understandings,  crisis  was
nothing but a new way of dispossessing people of their means and facilitating capital accumulation
processes. The public debt crisis provided the perfect excuse for foreign institutions and hegemonic
countries to promote their interests. Recurrent grassroots explanations of the systemic crisis were:
“they [referring at times to the EU or more often to Germany] want buy us out,” “they [referring to
popular  stereotypes  that  were  reproduced  by  the  media]  want  to  make  us  feel  unworthy  and
unproductive” or “to create a docile, underpaid labor force.” Some even argued that the crisis had
been fabricated because of the oil reserves that had been found in the country. Crisis was therefore
understood as a new type of economic war waged by hegemonic countries that wanted to promote
their  geopolitical  and economic interests  in  the condensed space of the Eastern Mediterranean.
Thereby, counter narratives to crisis and the language of contention acquired cultural characteristics
that were informed by national identities.    
 In such discourses, crisis appears as a fiction and austerity restructurings as having the aim
of enforcing privatization and enhancing the financialization of everyday life. However, when I
asked people to point to how crisis had unfolded in their social life, an interesting reversal appeared.
The scalar shift that I proposed prompted them to elaborate on the crisis of social reproduction and
the various impacts that austerity has had on the social body. Thus, crisis acquired a grassroots
definition: the socio-economic crisis that people situated in diverse positions experienced was the
outcome  of  austerity.  Ordinary  people  had  not  experienced  the  2008  large  scale  crisis  before
austerity measures were unilaterally implemented since 2010. Grassroots experiences of crisis and
austerity provided a grassroots critique that deconstructed and challenged mainstream economic
models in simple lay terms. In this sense, the crisis was not viewed as the sudden failure of a system
that had until then been working, but rather, as a continuation of where things had been headed. In
their analyses, people provided historical evidence and traced the root causes of the present crisis to
the past and especially in the ascension of Greece into EEC which most people had experienced it
(cf  Knight,  2015),  not  simply  shared  a  collective  national  memory,  naming  geometries  of
responsibility. There were two scalar viewpoints. One that scaled up and assigned responsibility to
dominant global structures and institutions (EU, IMF, banks) on the one hand, and on the other,
responsibilities scaled down to the self and the social body in relation to the generational factor.
Different generations had different responsibilities, or no responsibility at  all.  Older generations
(over 45) were mostly deemed responsible for a) allowing corrupt politicians to bring the country
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on the brink of destruction,  b) having harnessed individualistic aspirations that  undermined the
social good. Middle aged generations were responsible (40-60) for their over-consumption practices
through credit.  The  youth  as  well  as  the  future  generations  yet  unborn  whose future  has  been
foreclosed by the MoUs bore no responsibility at all. The grassroots definition of the crisis therefore
took the form of a moral judgment.    
The ethnographic data I systematically collected and analyzed in the thesis, reveal complex
structures of feeling of collective suffering produced by crisis and common struggles to make a
living which are correlated with the Greek social struggles of the past which especially before 1974
which  were  nationalized.  It  can  therefore  be  inferred  that  the  recent  economic  crisis  has,  like
previous ones, been nationalized, and that the nation serves as a rhetorical mask that obscures and
undermines class-based inequalities and claims within Greek society. A homogeneous narrative was
established by forceful references to the nationalist struggle in which Greeks were depicted as a
national  body  under  attack  that  had  to  overcome  inherent  inter  and  intra-class  differences.
Interestingly, nationalistic understanding of crisis tended to reproduce traditional forms of liberal
capitalism  that  ran  counter  to  neoliberal  methods  of  exploitation.  People  therefore  were  not
advocating for a radical change, but rather expressing a desire to return to pre-crisis standards or, as
many said, to get their jobs and lives back. Thus nostalgic structures of feeling (Williams, 1977)
towards  life  during  the  pre-crisis  era  were  created.  As  Weber  has  shown  (2003),  it  was  not
communism that was capitalism’s greatest enemy, but traditionalism. In the recent crisis context,
during  which  people  experienced  the  structural  violence  of  financialized  capitalism  and
accumulation  by  dispossession  in  the  flesh,  liberal  capitalism  was  romanticized  and  was  thus
reinvented  and  embedded  within  tradition.  Although  it  may  sound  odd,  one  can  say  that
neoliberalism’s biggest enemy can be understood as its younger self. 
My ethnographic research in Chalkida demonstrates how local people are interconnected
with  each other,  either  through local  relations  of  production  and market  structures,  or  through
kinship and social networks - or both. Therefore, multiple forms of embeddedness emerge through
my ethnographic description,  and these expose the various social  and political  projects  that  lie
behind  these  articulations  of  social  and  economic  proximity.  In  the  city,  social  cohesion  was
maintained through informal social and kinship networks that circulated resources which could be
attained outside the formal economic system which was in crisis. My research demonstrated that
economic  practices  that  are  embedded  in  social  relationships  tend  to  be  able  to  resist  the
financialization of everyday life and calculative reasoning, and therefore cope with crisis in a much
more  effective  way  than  is  possible  in  large  urban  centers.  Economic  relationships  were  re-
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evaluated on the basis of maintaining social cohesion and mutual support, and of reestablishing
organic solidarity through economic behavior. In numerous instances, this took the form of political
consumerism (Lekakis, 2015) which reworked notions of national organic solidarity that came to be
expressed through economic practices that demonstrated both formal and informal characteristics.
At the same time, I found that many people in Chalkida accessed the market through their social
and  kinship  networks.  Economic  practices  were  in  this  way  regulated  by  intimate  social
relationships.  Thus  many  economic  practices  maintained  their  embedded  nature  and  were  not
eroded by the financialized principles of the free-market economy. As a result, informal economic
practices bypassed the formal structures that mediated economic relations such as the state and the
banks, and formed their own regulatory framework based on reciprocity, trust and mutual support.
In  small  cities,  such  as  Chalkida,  the  social,  political  and  economic  life  is  governed  by  the
‘unwritten laws’ of reciprocity that opens the gate for social solidarity. Solidarity that is crystalized
through grassroots political and economic attitudes, stances and beliefs.  
 In the context of the Greek crisis and the escalating processes of rolling back and rolling out
the state (Peck & Tickell, 2002), grassroots informality aids social reproduction and sustains social
cohesion. Furthermore, grassroots welfare systems of provisioning and the institutions of mutual aid
that evade formal regulatory frameworks, enable us to theorize the concept of embeddedness as a
reversal which emerges in the form of human economy (Hart, 2017). This human economy counters
the  alienating,  disembedding  tensions  inherent  in  the  market’s  financialized  principles.  It  is
nonetheless the case that under the pressure of resource scarcity, calculative reasoning prevailed as
people sought  to maximize the use value of their  disposable income in order  to achieve social
reproduction. Further, economic relationships that did not have a solid social foundation were easily
broken by the financialized principles that were imposed through austerity and which scaled down
to affect everyday life. However, as I have shown in this thesis, people in Chalkida who accessed
the market through their social and kinship networks offered spaces of resistance and resilience to
the neoliberalization of the economy. Yet it is not clear how much longer these social networks will
be maintained in the face of the relentless and ongoing financialization of everyday life and the re-
establishment and stabilization of the neoliberalized structures and patterns of accessing resources
in the post-crisis period. “Crisis is over”, said prime minister Alexis Tsipras, who announced the
end of foreign supervision in August 2018.123 It remains, therefore, to be seen how the experiences
of the recent economic crisis are going to inform the new post-crisis social contract and how the
123 https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2018/08/21/is-the-greek-financial-crisis-over-at-last   (Last 
accessed 29/02/2020) 
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Greek society is going to find a new balance after the abrupt multi-scalar reforms of neoliberal
austerity. 
In this sense, this thesis opens up new research questions that demand further exploration in
regards to the ways people reconstruct their social identities and reform their livelihood projects and
aspirations after the storm has passed, and how the recent crisis experiences are going to guide their
livelihood dreams, hopes and aspirations, especially those of the youth who experienced crisis in
their adolescence and early adulthood. 
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